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The banking sector is central to the economy, but has recurrent dysfunctions.  Following 
the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2009, regulators have attempted to reform 
governance in banks.  However, previous empirical studies on the effects of governance 
structures have important gaps.  Using an econometric framework with novel 
simultaneous equations models and new dependent variables, I investigate whether 
corporate governance and ownership have significant effects on bank risk and 
performance.  I employ a novel data set combining financial data from the Bankscope 
database with governance and ownership data collected painstakingly by hand from 
annual reports and Basel Pillar 3 disclosures of UK banks over the period 2003-2012.  
My findings are supported by interpretation of relevant literature and are summarised as 
follows (stated along with policy implications in parentheses for which features of 
banking should be encouraged, based on normative assumptions stated in section 9.3).   
My work shows that the effects of a particular ownership or governance structure can be 
attributed to the ways in which categories of decision-maker within the bank are 
empowered by that structure, and that factors relating to information processing 
capability have important effects.  Mutual and foreign ownership each have negative 
effects on risk and return because of managerial incentives and information 
asymmetries, respectively, without either affecting provision of investment to the wider 
economy.  A foreign parent also increases the probability of bank failure (implying 
mutuality is socially beneficial while foreign ownership is not).  A higher NED ratio 
reduces the probability of bank failure, as does having a remuneration committee, 
because of greater accounting for risk in decisions (implying they are desirable).  The 
presence of an independent Chairman increases risk because it weakens CEO 
accountability and confuses decision-making (implying it is undesirable).  An 
independent CRO (as a full Board member) may have similar effects.  A higher 
proportion of Directors with no previous financial services experience increases both 
returns and the probability of failure because of weaker use of information (implying it is 
undesirable).  Permission to use IRB models lowers risk and return because it provides 
information to empower risk-averse agents, again without affecting credit provision to 
the wider economy (implying it is desirable).  I report other novel findings on effects of 





People and companies need the services of banks, but the banking sector has 
numerous problems.  In 2007-2009 many banks globally almost went bust (or did 
actually fail) and this had negative effects on everyone else because there was less 
lending.  The authorities have since tried to improve how banks are run.  However, we 
don’t know everything about how best to do this.  In my PhD, I use statistics to help us 
discover more.  For 115 banking firms (“banks”) in the UK, I obtained data on important 
outcomes like profits and bad loans over a ten year period.  I also gathered data on key 
features of these banks, like who owned them and what kinds of people and 
Committees were in power inside the bank.  For example, I noted whether or not each 
bank (in each year) had a Chairman who was a separate person from the Chief 
Executive, so that they could monitor him/her.  
I used patterns in my data to work out the effects of different ways of running banks.  For 
example, if I see that banks with an independent Chairman have more bad loans, then 
maybe the former caused the latter.  To be sure, I used a type of analysis where a 
computer program took background factors I wasn’t interested in, but which could still 
have an effect (like how much debt the bank had or what was happening in the rest of 
the economy) and used these factors to explain-away as much as possible of the ups 
and downs in the outcome (profit or bad loans).  I then analysed the variation in the 
outcome that was left over and determined if it was still linked to the factors I was 
interested in (like the presence of an independent Chairman).  This approach allowed 
me be sure effects I found are real.  To make the test really tough, I used lots of 
background factors and varied the set of these I used.  I’m also sure effects don’t go the 
other way (e.g. from bad loans to management structures) because management 
structures don’t change much from year to year.  
I found that banks which are owned by their customers (i.e. building societies) have 
lower profit and less bad loans than other banks but, for their size, give just as much 
investment into the economy.  Banks with lots of independent Directors (who are 
separate from day-to-day management) are less likely to go bust, and the same is true 
for banks that have a Committee which oversees pay.  Having an independent 
Chairman actually does the opposite of what people think – it causes more bad loans 
than in other banks, probably because the Chief Executive feels less accountability and 
decisions are confused.  Banks with lots of Directors who haven’t previously worked in 
banking (or other kinds of financial services) have higher profits but are more likely to 
eventually go bust.  Banks that have permission (from government authorities) to use 
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advanced methods to forecast risk have lower profit and less bad loans than other 
banks but give just as much investment into the economy.  My results give us more 
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2SLS Two-Stage Least Squares. 
FRC Financial Reporting Council.  A public body in the UK and Ireland 
that produces standards designed to ensure high-quality corporate 
governance and reporting. 
FS Financial Services. 
FSA Financial Services Authority.  The UK public body that was 
responsible for regulation and supervision of banks and other 
financial institutions in the time period considered in this thesis.  It 
was responsible for both financial stability (prudential regulation) 
and fair treatment of consumers and investors (conduct 
regulation).  These responsibilities were split between the 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and Prudential Regulation 
Authority (PRA) from April 2013, after the period considered in my 
analysis. 
FSCS Financial Services Compensation Scheme.  The UK scheme which 
provides deposit insurance and other forms of insurance designed 
to protect consumers of financial services. 
GMM Generalised Method of Moments. 
GOB    Government-Owned Bank. 
GTA Growth in Total Assets.  The year-on-year percentage growth rate 
of balance sheet assets. 
IRB Internal Ratings Based.  An approach to credit risk modelling that 
banks may use under Basel II and III regulation, subject to national 
regulators deeming that they have met certain standards. 
LI Loan Impairments.  The ratio of impairments on loans over total 
loan assets. 
LII Loan Interest Income.  The income earned on loan assets 
normalised to total loan assets. 
MOB Mutually Owned Bank.  Any bank that is owned by its depositors or 
employees, on a basis where owners are equal or near-equal with 
each other. 
NED Non-Executive Director.  A Board Director who does not have 
executive responsibilities.   
OLS Ordinary Least Squares. 
ROA Return on Assets.  The ratio of Net Income for a year over assets.  
It gives a measure of how efficient the asset base, which tends to 
be relatively stable, is in terms of generating profit.   
ROE Return on Equity.  The ratio of Net Income for a year over equity.  
It gives a measure of how efficient the equity base is in terms of 
generating profit.  
RRP Recovery and Resolution Plan.  A scheme organised by regulators 
for forestalling incipient bank failure and / or dismembering a failed 
bank in a manner whereby its remaining assets are used to 




RWA Risk-Weighted Assets.  A measure of the total riskiness of bank 
assets.  It is a financial quantity that is usually much smaller than 
total assets.  The proportion of the two is determined by the output 
of IRB models or other regulator-prescribed quantification 
methods. 
SOB    Shareholder-Owned Bank. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Summary 
1.1 Introduction 
Banking plays a central role in the global economic system that exists today 
(Mishkin, 2012).  Indeed, in all but the most rudimentary economies, a 
banking system of some kind is likely to be essential for economic function 
and growth.  But banking systems can take very different forms, involving 
different kinds of ownership, control, reserve requirements and regulation.  
The kinds of banking system that have been prevalent in practice have been 
subject to a number of problems that are particular to the sector, including 
difficulties in controlling risk-taking, systemic instability and financial crime.  
These problems have recurred over a period of centuries (Kindleberger and 
Aliber, 2011).   
Various means have been proposed to address these issues, and bank 
regulation has evolved in response to the experience of bank stress.  There 
were notable changes in regulation in the UK (which is the focus of my study) 
immediately after the crisis of 2007-2009 (see Section 2.3 for details).  The 
division of responsibilities amongst UK regulatory bodies has changed.  New 
standards for liquid asset resources have been introduced, designed to cover 
stressed outflow periods.  Methods for quantifying regulatory capital 
requirements have been made more stringent; minimum capital ratios have 
been increased sharply; a range of capital buffers that apply in certain 
circumstances have been introduced; standards for the quality of regulatory 
capital required have been improved; and maximum leverage limits have 
been imposed.  Regulators have gained authority to engage in “macro-
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prudential” supervision, by adjusting capital buffers and other tools in 
response to systemic conditions.  New rules have come into force for dealing 
with bank failure, including retail ring-fencing, Recovery and Resolution 
Plans (RRPs) and more extensive deposit insurance.  Finally, governance has 
been updated, including revised standards for the suitability of Directors, the 
operation of risk oversight structures and the management of remuneration. 
Better governance within banks is widely seen as a means of improving 
banking.  Amongst bank Directors and their regulators it appears to be 
assumed that corporate governance has substantial effects and, if designed 
appropriately, can ensure desirable functioning of the banking system.  For 
instance, the UK Corporate Governance Code – which represents the 
combined work of various government-appointed commissions and the 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC) and is used in regulation and stock-
market listing – states in its introduction that: 
“The purpose of corporate governance is to facilitate 
effective, entrepreneurial and prudent management that can 
deliver the long-term success of the company.”   
(UK Corporate Governance Code, 2014.) 
 
This statement entails a clear assumption that corporate governance can 
achieve the aims stated for it.  It also indicates an assumption that 
shareholder oversight and financial-market dynamics are insufficient to 




Given the reliance placed upon it, it is necessary to ask: does corporate 
governance actually achieve the objectives set for it?  Can it be relied upon to 
temper potential undesirable consequences of commercial incentives that are 
central to how banks operate in a market economy, such as those identified 
by Mittnik and Semmler (2013)?  Since governance itself is practiced by 
individuals with strong commercial incentives, we must question its 
effectiveness.  
In this thesis I take an empirical approach to answering such key questions, 
applying econometric models under conditions that allow me to make causal 
statements based on the results obtained.  Specifically, I identify governance 
variables that have the characteristics of exogenous variables determined 
outside the model and use a range of regression and simultaneous-equation 
models to determine if these have causal effects on financial performance, 
loss and bank stress.  This analysis used audited data published in financial 
databases and bank annual reports. 
I also consider the role of explanatory variables relating to ownership type 
and bank size, both because these have been the basis of various proposals for 
reforming the banking system and the economy more generally (such as 
increased worker ownership of firms – e.g. Gupta, 2014) and because they 
provide a comparator for the effects of governance variables.  Again, these 





This section provides a very concise statement of the aims of this thesis.  My 
primary objective in this study is to better understand the effects of different 
ownership and governance structures on bank risk and performance, and 
thus to evaluate proposals for bank reform that would consist of changing 
ownership and/or governance structures.  In my work, governance is defined 
as consisting of any internal structures for overseeing the firm, including 
structures for remuneration-setting and information-processing 
arrangements used for making decisions.  My secondary objective is to 
understand the effect of bank size on bank risk and performance, because this 
is another bank-level determinant that is discussed extensively in the 
literature and which may have significant implications for policy.  Pursing 
these objectives has entailed addressing gaps in the relevant empirical 
literature. 
 
1.3 Relevant Literature – A Summary 
The existing literature in this field suggests a number of conclusions relating 
to the effects of governance and ownership on bank risk and performance.  
This literature is summarised here, with all the specific papers upon which 
the summary is based being described in Chapter 2. 
The starting point for the relevant literature is agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976 and Schleifer and Vishny, 1997).  Agency theory is concerned 
with situations in which one economic actor, the agent, takes actions on 
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behalf of another, the principal, in the presence of incentives that may or may 
not tend to align the interests of the two. 
Agency theory suggests that bank shareholders have a higher risk appetite 
than depositors and other external stakeholders and potentially have a higher 
risk appetite than managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976 and Sullivan and 
Spong, 2007).  However, the latter may not be true if managers are 
incentivised on the basis of performance, are disciplined by equity markets or 
can transfer to other banks in the event of bank under-performance. 
The specific argument in Jensen and Meckling (1976) is that the separation of 
ownership and control inherent in typical corporate structures may result in 
managerial decisions that deviate from shareholder value maximisation.  
Meanwhile, Sullivan and Spong (2007) argue that shareholders who are 
diversified can be expected to have a higher risk appetite than managers who 
hold part of their wealth as firm-specific human capital.  Taken together, 
these papers yield an argument that managers will reduce the risk tolerance 
of the firm below that which would be preferred by owners, unless prevented 
by other incentive structures. 
Agency theory and supporting empirical work also suggest that government-
owned banks may have higher risk and lower return than shareholder-owned 
banks, while mutually-owned banks may have lower risk and return than 
shareholder-owned banks (Schleifer and Vishny, 1997 and Iannotta et al, 
2007).  This is because state-owned banks have social and / or political 
objectives alongside financial ones, while the managers of mutuals have 
limited incentive to take risk or pursue profit.   
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Agency theory further suggests that different agents within banks, such as 
senior executives, non-executive directors, traders, deal-makers, risk 
managers, compliance officers and internal auditors will behave differently 
because they have different incentives in respect of risk and return. 
A number of findings in the relevant empirical literature align with the 
predictions of agency theory.  The empirical literature tells us that state 
majority ownership increases risk and reduces return, while mutual 
ownership reduces risk and return (Iannotta et al, 2007).  Foreign ownership 
and managerial ownership each have effects that are very much context-
dependent.  Concentration of owners’ personal wealth in banks’ equity 
reduces risk (Sullivan and Spong, 2006) while the presence of shareholders 
that own large blocks of the bank increases risk (Auvray and Brossard, 2012).  
The presence of more independent directors and a larger Board both lead to 
less risk, as does the presence of a joint CEO-Chairman (Aebi et al, 2012 and 
Brandão-Marques et al 2014).  The latter can be explained on the basis of 
literature suggesting that having separate oversight by the Chairman weakens 
the personal accountability of the CEO to limit risk and confuses decision-
making (Yang and Zhao, 2014 and Rus et al, 2011).   
The presence of a CRO on the Board is found in a limited number of studies 
to cause reduced risk (Aebi et al, 2012 and Dong et al, 2014).  However, given 
that independent monitoring by a Chairman has the opposite effects reported 
in the literature from independent monitoring by the CRO, it is not clear that 
these results are reliable.  It may be more plausible that an independent 
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Chairman and an independent CRO each have adverse effects because they 
weaken the personal accountability for limiting risk perceived by the CEO. 
In conclusion, the literature provides a number of insights into how 
ownership and governance affect bank risk and performance, but it has a 
number of significant gaps, as discussed in the next section.  Please refer to 
Chapter 2 for more details of the literature mentioned here. 
 
1.4 Literature Gaps and Hypotheses 
My study is necessary because past empirical studies give an incomplete 
picture of how bank ownership and governance affect risk and return.  This is 
evident in a number of important issues that have not been evaluated in the 
pre-existing empirical literature.   
Firstly, it is important for studies in this field to include a range of dependent 
variables that reflect the outcomes of greatest interest to banks and policy-
makers, specifically returns, loan impairments, bank failure, loan interest 
income and asset growth.  Measures of returns (especially return on assets 
and return on equity) are important because they are direct indicators of how 
effectively the bank uses its financial resources in generating profit.  Loan 
interest income is important because interest earned on loans is the principal 
source of bank income.  Loan impairments are important because they are a 
measure of realised risk in banks’ main activity (credit intermediation).  Bank 
failure is important because it is the most socially-harmful risk event that 
occurs in the banking system (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2011).  Bank asset 
growth is important because including it allows a researcher to test whether 
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factors that affect bank performance also affect provision of investment to the 
wider economy.  However, existing empirical studies on ownership and 
governance omit dependent variables relating to loan interest income, bank 
failure, and bank asset growth.  This represents a significant gap in the 
literature.  I address the gap by including these outcomes as dependent 
variables in my models.  (Please refer to section 3.4 for details of variables 
used.) 
Secondly, it is important to account for simultaneity of risk and return.  This 
is important since finance theory treats these quantities as simultaneous 
(Jones, 2008) implying that omission of such simultaneity could cause 
results to be biased.  No empirical studies have assessed the effects of 
ownership and governance on bank risk and return using a framework in 
which bank risk and return are treated as simultaneous.  This is potentially a 
serious gap in the literature in that reported findings could be affected by bias 
in which correlation of a regressor with one outcome (risk or return) is 
mistaken for a causal effect on the other outcome.  I therefore seek to test the 
hypothesis that bank risk and bank return are simultaneous with one 
another.  When I confirm such simultaneity, I use it to create a modelling 
framework for testing other hypotheses.  (Please refer to section 4.3 for the 
specific hypothesis evaluated in respect of simultaneity.) 
Thirdly, it is important that models include as full as possible an accounting 
for effects of a) the incentives of different agents within banks and b) the 
information and capabilities of these agents.  This should include indicators 
of the presence or absence of different agents who have different levels of 
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incentive or ability to seek profit and tolerate risk.  It should also include 
indicators of how well-equipped bank leaders and bank systems are to 
process information relating to risk and performance.  Specific empirical 
studies have omitted certain important indicators of banks containing agents 
with different incentives, such as the presence or absence of a Chief Risk 
Officer and / or a Commercial Director as full Board members.  Empirical 
studies have also omitted indicators of information-processing capability, 
such as the experience of Directors and the presence or absence of 
permission from regulators to use Internal Ratings Based (IRB) models for 
credit risk.  No studies have been explicitly designed to ensure that a 
balanced range of such characteristics is used.  I therefore test the effects of 
the following explanatory variables: the proportion of Directors with previous 
financial services experience, permission from regulators to use IRB models 
for credit risk analysis, Board size, the ratio of Non-Executive Directors 
compared to executives, the presence of a Joint CEO-Chairman, the presence 
of a CRO who is a full Board member, the presence of a Commercial Director 
who is a full Board member and the proportion of the Board who are female.  
(Please refer to section 6.4 for the specific hypotheses evaluated.) 
Fourthly, it is important to assess the impacts of remuneration structures at 
all levels of seniority in a bank, including the effects of pay that is not clearly 
linked to systematic factors1.  Considering all levels is important since the 
aggregation of actions at all levels could be as important as decisions at the 
                                                          
1 In this context “systematic” means factors that are shown to be significant at the level of my 
sample of banks.  Components of pay not determined by such factors clearly must have 
determinants of some kind, but these determinants are not systematically important across banks. 
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most senior levels.  If pay is more generous throughout the organisation, 
compared to other banks, then staff may be subject to efficiency-wage effects 
(Akerlof and Yellen, 1987) that improve all outcomes for the bank.  Likewise, 
considering excess average pay (that component of average pay which is not 
explained by systematic factors) is important because it reveals the effects of 
unjustified pay that is indicative of unresolved agency problems (Carter, 
2016).  However, there are no studies in the literature which consider the 
effects of remuneration structures at all levels in a bank (as opposed to 
studies that focus on pay at the CEO- and executive- levels) such that the 
effects of pay-based incentives throughout banking organisations are not 
well-understood.  It is also important to understand the role of governance 
structures designed to control pay and, through pay, to affect incentives to 
take risk.  I therefore test the effects on bank risk and performance of having 
a remuneration committee (a structure that oversees pay at multiple levels), 
of disclosing executive pay (which is likely to affect remuneration-setting 
behaviour and which covers at least one level below the CEO), of average pay 
at all levels, and of excess average pay beyond that which can be explained by 
systematic factors.  (Please refer to section 7.3 for the specific hypotheses 
evaluated.) 
Fifth and finally, it is important to understand whether competitive 
advantages in the form of implied subsides arising from comparative 
systemic importance have distinct effects from competitive advantages in the 
form of economies of scale, arising from sheer size.  Both of these are 
important in economic theory, but the empirical literature on banking has 
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not clearly distinguished them.  In order to do so, I evaluate the effects of 
relative size compared to those of absolute size.  (Please refer to section 8.3 
for the specific hypotheses evaluated.) 
  
1.5 Methods and Data 
To test hypotheses on the effects of variables mentioned above, I use 
econometric models with measures of bank risk and performance as 
dependent variables and indicators of ownership, governance, information 
processing capacity, remuneration structure and relative and absolute size 
amongst the explanatory variables.  In order to cover all the relevant 
outcomes, measures of risk and return include the loan impairments ratio, 
bank failure events, return on assets, return on equity, loan interest income 
and growth in total assets.  To minimise bias, I employ models that take 
account of simultaneity (especially between certain measures of risk and 
return) and which include appropriate controls.  To verify the robustness of 
results, I vary model specifications and estimation procedures. 
To estimate models, I employ a novel data set created by combining financial 
data from the Bankscope database with governance and ownership data 
collected painstakingly by hand from the annual reports and Basel Pillar 3 
disclosures of UK banks over the period 2003-2012.  This yields unique data 
not available to other studies.   




1.6 Results and Contributions to the Literature 
My research yields a number of important results that constitute new 
contributions to the literature.  I summarise my findings here (along with 
policy implications in parentheses).  It is important to state policy 
implications because they are a fundamental motivation for any study of this 
kind.  I draw policy implications  by interpreting my results in the context of 
the relevant financial-policy literature and making assumptions a) that loan 
impairments and bank failure are clearly undesirable (with bank failure being 
worse because of the strong potential for systemic effects, e.g. Bernanke 
1983), b) that provision of investment to the economy is clearly desirable 
(Romer, 2006), and c) that the desirability of bank profit is ambiguous (a 
priori one does not know whether it is based on efficiency or rent-seeking, 
Stiglitz 2013).  Please refer to section 9.3 for further detail on policy 
implications. 
I find that simultaneity, with a negative sign, is present between risk and 
return, as represented by loan impairments and return on assets, 
respectively.  This occurs because of a direct accounting relationship between 
these quantities.  There is also a positive lagged relationship between these 
quantities, due to a classical risk-return correlation as predicted by finance 
theory (Jones, 2008).  This is the first time a simultaneous relationship of 
this kind has been identified and used in a study of bank ownership and 
governance.  Inclusion of the simultaneous effect in models is vital to prevent 
bias, which could emerge if correlation of a regressor with either risk or 
return is confounded with causal effects of risk and return on one another.   
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In respect of specific ownership and governance variables, my work shows 
that the effects of a particular ownership or governance structure can be 
attributed to the way in which specific types of individuals within banks are 
empowered by that structure.  Frequently, this means that banks have lower 
return and lower risk when there is either a) an ownership structure that 
entails less pressure on management to pursue profit and take risk, or b) 
governance structures that involve clear accountability for limiting risk and 
which generate information that empowers risk-averse decision makers.   
For instance, I find that mutual and foreign ownership each have negative 
effects on risk and return without affecting provision of investment to the 
wider economy, and that a foreign parent also increases the probability of 
bank failure.   These effects occur because mutual ownership does not entail 
strong incentives for managers to take risk and pursue profit, because mutual 
owners do not set such incentives, while foreign ownership entails an 
information asymmetry between management and owners, such that there is 
less incentive to pursue profit and a greater vulnerability to failure because 
the negative effect on profits is large.  The results for mutual ownership 
confirm theoretical predictions (Schleifer and Vishny, 1997) and earlier 
empirical work (Iannotta et al 2007), but this is the first time these effects of 
mutual ownership have been identified in a model with simultaneity, and the 
combination of results for foreign ownership is novel.  These results are of 
substantial interest in the context of ongoing debates on the merits of mutual 
and foreign ownership of banks (e.g. Gupta, 2014) and have implications for 
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policy (specifically they imply mutuality is socially beneficial but foreign 
ownership is not). 
I find that state majority ownership of banks lowers loan interest income, 
because it involves incentives to make soft loans for social and political 
reasons (implying that it is inefficient outside special cases).  This is in 
accordance with theoretical predictions (Schleifer and Vishny, 1997) and 
earlier empirical work (Iannotta et al, 2007) but it is the first time it has been 
verified in a simultaneous equations framework with this particular 
dependent variable – which is important given that soft lending has been 
central to arguments that state ownership of banks is inefficient (Gonzalez-
Garcia and Grigoli, 2013).  My finding therefore provides additional support 
for the conclusion that the state should only own banks in special 
circumstances. 
These findings on ownership are important because they confirm the effects 
of mutual ownership in a new framework against a background where only a 
few empirical papers have addressed the matter; they confirm the effects of 
state ownership with a new dependent variable that relates directly to soft 
lending; and they show for the first time that foreign ownership has a similar 
combination of effects to mutuality and increases the probability of bank 
failure.   
In respect of bank governance, I find that permission to use IRB models 
lowers risk and return because it provides information to empower risk-
averse decision-makers, again without affecting credit provision to the wider 
economy (implying that it is desirable).  This is the first time this result has 
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been obtained in any study and it is especially credible because it is found in a 
modelling framework that takes account of simultaneity (both between risk 
and return and of IRB permission with leverage).  This novel finding is of 
particular interest in the context of ongoing debates on the effectiveness of 
the IRB framework (Haldane, 2013 and Aikman, 2014).   
I obtain several other findings relating to effects of specific governance 
structures, remuneration and bank size that are novel and which have 
important policy implications.  A higher proportion of Directors with no 
previous financial services experience increases both returns and the 
probability of bank failure, because it entails pursuit of profit without 
understanding of risk (implying that it is undesirable).  Board size positively 
affects returns because it improves information processing (making larger 
Boards desirable).  A higher NED ratio reduces the probability of failure, as 
does a remuneration committee, because both empower individuals with 
incentives to minimise risk (implying that they are desirable).  Higher 
average pay leads to faster growth and lower risk, while higher excess pay, 
beyond that explained by systemic factors, leads to slower growth and higher 
risk, due to effects related to efficiency wages and agency theory respectively 
(implying that high average pay is desirable while excess pay is undesirable, 
leaving aside important macro-level income-distribution concerns).  Greater 
relative size boosts bank growth whereas absolute size does not, probably 
because greater systemic importance leads to a belief that the bank would be 
bailed out in a severe stress, leading in turn to lower funding costs and an 
inventive for growth-oriented strategies (suggesting that policymakers should 
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seek to mitigate moral hazard by counteracting the effects of implied 
subsidies).   
Consistent with the limited literature on the subject, I find that presence of a 
Joint CEO-Chairman is associated with lower loan impairments.  In 
agreement with this, but contrary to the specific literature on the role of the 
CRO, I find the presence of an independent Chair or CRO is associated with 
higher impairments.  Both results occur because the presence of other senior-
level monitors (a Chairman or CRO) dilutes the personal accountability of the 
CEO and confuses decision-making. 
Each of these results is novel, in that some of them have not been found 
before, while others confirm earlier results in a more robust framework.  My 
results provide guidance to regulators in terms of which features of 
governance have desirable effects and which do not. 
 
1.7 Outline of the Thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows.   
Chapter 2 provides a detailed review of the relevant literature.  Chapter 3 
provides a summary of my hypotheses and details of the econometric 
approach and data I have used.  In Chapter 4, I show that simultaneity is 
present between return on assets and loan impairments and use this to create 
a new framework for evaluating the effects of bank ownership and 
governance.   
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In Chapter 5, I utilise this simultaneous equations framework to show that 
mutual ownership and a foreign parent each have a negative effect on both 
risk and return.  This is the first time a multi-equation framework has been 
used in this way.  I corroborate these results by showing in single-equation 
models that mutual ownership and a foreign parent have negative effects on 
return on equity.  Another novel finding is that the presence of a foreign 
parent is associated with a greater likelihood of bank failure.   
A further novel finding in Chapter 5 is that state majority ownership has a 
negative effect on loan interest income (which was not previously used as a 
measure of performance in studies of this kind and is important given that 
critiques of state banks relate to soft lending).  I also find that state majority 
ownership increases the likelihood of failure events, probably because state 
ownership arises in this sample mainly due to stress and on-going stress 
raises the probability of further failure events, implying that the correlation is 
of limited interest.  More importantly, I find that state ownership, mutual 
ownership and a foreign parent have no effects on rates of growth in bank 
assets.  This suggests that, although these can lead to lower performance for 
banks, they do not affect the provision of credit and other forms of 
investment to the wider economy.   
In Chapter 6, I use another novel framework in which risk, return and 
leverage are endogenous to confirm that regulatory permission to use 
Internal Ratings Based (IRB) models leads to lower impairments and lower 
ROA.  This occurs because IRB models entail better detection of risk and thus 
empower risk-averse decision makers with information, leading to lower risk-
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taking and lower return.  In my analysis, IRB permission is allowed to affect 
the equity ratio because regulators may permit IRB banks to hold less equity 
capital. 
Using single-equation models, I obtain a further novel result in Chapter 6 
relating to information-processing capability: I find that the proportion of 
Directors without previous financial services experience positively affects 
ROE.  I also find that banks in which fewer of the Directors have previous 
financial services experience are more likely to fail.  These effects occur 
because of more aggressive pursuit of returns, without sufficient 
understanding of the eventual risk.  
Using the same novel multi-equation framework as for results on ownership, 
I find in Chapter 6 that Board Size positively affects returns, due to better 
information-processing compared to other banks.  Supporting work using a 
single-equation model with ROE as the dependent variable reaches the same 
conclusion.  An independent Chairman and an independent CRO are both 
found to increase risk, because they weaken the personal accountability for 
managing risk perceived by the CEO and confuse decision-making.  As a final 
novel result in Chapter 6, I find that a higher ratio of NEDs and the presence 
of a remuneration committee both lower the probability of bank failure – 
suggesting that these structures work as intended in respect of risk 
management: ensuring better oversight of risk-taking and remuneration that 
is better aligned with risk, respectively. 
In Chapter 7, I show that higher average pay at all levels in banks leads to 
faster growth and lower risk, because of efficiency-wage effects.  A measure of 
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excess pay (the component of average pay that is not determined by 
systematic factors) has the opposite effects, because it is indicative of 
unresolved agency problems (Carter, 2016). 
My analysis also shows that the presence of a remuneration committee leads 
to higher average pay, and that disclosure of executive remuneration leads to 
lower average pay.  These are again novel findings and they occur because a 
remuneration committee is used to justify higher pay, while the effect of pay 
disclosure is to discourage high pay, for reputational reasons. 
In Chapter 8, I show that bank relative size has a positive effect on the rate of 
growth in bank assets, while absolute size does not.  This is a novel result that 
occurs because larger banks can grow faster due to competitive advantages 
arising from implied subsidies, while economies of scale are not important in 
my sample.   
Chapter 9 summarises conclusions, discusses policy implications and 
considers future research.   
 
1.8 Conclusions 
This work is the first empirical study to a) evaluate the effects of bank 
ownership and governance in a framework where risk and return are 
simultaneous, b) include a full treatment of indicators of ownership and 
governance structures, c) examine the effects of structures designed to 
improve information processing in bank management, d) consider the effects 
of remuneration structures and pay at all levels in a bank and e) compare the 
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effects of absolute and relative bank size.  It therefore has important 
implications for banking policy.  Specifically, it suggests that certain features 
of banks are desirable or undesirable, given the normative assumptions 
stated in sections 1.6 and 9.3.  Specific desirable features include mutuality, 
IRB permission, a high NED ratio, a remuneration committee and high 
average pay at all levels.  Undesirable features include foreign ownership, an 
independent Chairman, an independent CRO, Directors with no prior FS 




Chapter 2: Literature and Literature Gaps 
2.1 Introduction 
The study of bank risk and performance, and of variables which affect these, 
such as ownership and governance, is motivated in part by the episodes of 
banking instability which have marked financial history.  It is desirable to 
understand which variables can be altered in ways that make the system less 
prone to crisis, and more efficient in non-crisis periods, so that we can make 
use of this knowledge in economic and financial policy. 
Bank failures and banking crises have been a recurring pattern in market 
economies throughout history (Gorton, 2012) and can intensify economic 
downturns (Bernanke, 1983 and Fernandez et al, 2013).  It is therefore 
important to understand their causes and seek means to reduce their 
frequency and impact.  Banking instability is driven by effects at the systemic 
level, including expectations, macroeconomic imbalances, exogenous shocks 
and contagion effects (Gorton, 2012).  Policy responses must be designed to 
take account of such factors.  However, the characteristics of individual banks 
are likely to affect the extent to which they are vulnerable to stress, and are 
more tractable to study and manage because they entail fewer confounding 
influences than macro-level aggregates.  
Different institutional arrangements in banks may affect the probability of 
bank failures, and ownership structures and governance are likely to be 
important in this regard.  The actions of banks, whether they lead to success 
or failure, are the result of decisions by individuals within banks, particularly 
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senior individuals.  Basic microeconomic theory tells us that individuals 
respond to incentives in the form of personal payoffs (Varian, 2009).  Bank 
ownership structures and governance determine the incentives of owners, 
Directors and managers and the possibilities they have for acting on these 
incentives.  So, if we wish to understand banking instability, it is necessary 
that we understand bank ownership structures and governance and their 
implications for risk and performance.  Any structures which affect outcomes 
for many individual banks will likely also affect outcomes for the system 
overall.  
In exploring the implications of ownership and governance structures, it is 
important that we consider both risk and performance.  Finance theory 
suggests that risk and performance are fundamentally linked, because 
providers of debt and equity investment seek greater return as compensation 
for greater risk (Jones, 2008).  By comparing the effects of explanatory 
variables on risk and return it may be possible to elucidate the mechanism by 
which each variable has its effects.  For instance, if a variable lowers risk 
without lowering returns it may be that it reflects a characteristic which 
entails a better ability to process information compared to other banks, such 
that the theoretically-predicted risk-return correlation is not apparent.   
I address in this Chapter the general body of literature relevant to my 
research.  This starts with critical evaluation of literature relating to which 
observational units should most appropriately be included in my study 
(section 2.2).  I then consider literature that addresses bank instability and 
places studies of bank governance in the context of a range of proposed 
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reforms intended to affect bank risk and performance and thus the stability of 
the wider banking system (section 2.3).  In the central part of the chapter, I 
move on to the implications for banks of agency theory, along with empirical 
literature which tests these implications (sections 2.4 to 2.6).  Towards the 
end of the Chapter, I consider other theories with implications for bank risk 
and return and their empirical confirmation (sections 2.7 and 2.8), before 
finishing with an assessment of gaps in the literature and consequent new 
directions for research (section 2.9), which I seek to address through the 
results I present in subsequent chapters. 
This is an extensive and complex set of literature.  Within it there are 
contradictory findings.  In order to provide an unbiased review, I discuss the 
details and limitations of papers that reach opposite conclusions.  However, 
in the interests of clarity, I end each section, and the Chapter overall, with a 
summary of what can be concluded from the various papers I have discussed. 
While this chapter provides an overall introduction to the literature and key 
questions that have yet to be conclusively answered, each of the empirical 
chapters in my work – Chapters 4 to 8 – picks up specific elements of this 
body of literature and discusses them in more detail in order to develop 
hypotheses that are then tested. 
 
2.2 The Nature of Banking 
Before considering literature on banks’ institutional structures and their 
effects, it is important to critically evaluate different definitions of the entities 
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referred to as “banks” since they are observational units to which my 
literature review and my empirical research relate.  This is of fundamental 
importance, and the definition to be used is not immediately obvious, for the 
reason that there are differing economic and legal definitions of what 
constitutes a bank, with the range of ownership and governance structures 
evident perhaps differing substantially depending on which definition is 
used.  The legal definition is effectively a sub-set of the economic definition, 
so it is necessary that I discuss here the literature on what kind of entities 
each of these sets contains, what sub-set my literature review and research 
should relate to, and why this is a useful definition in the context of key 
questions and previous research.  
In economic terms, the financial sector is fundamentally about contracts that 
facilitate the exchange of utility today for utility at some point in the future, 
in the face of risk and uncertainty (Jones, 2008 and Chisholm, 2009).  
Financial intermediaries are organisations that intermediate such 
relationships between different parties, for various economic purposes 
(Mishkin, 2012).   
Economically, banks are a particular form of financial intermediary that act 
to intermediate credit (Mishkin 2012).  Frexias and Rochet (2008) provide a 
thorough overview of the basic microeconomic theory of banking.  They note 
that banks link savers and borrowers by borrowing from the former (in the 
form of deposits or similar) and lending to the latter.  In so doing, they argue, 
banks provide economies of scale and scope in monitoring depositors and 
borrowers that would be unachievable for smaller agents who have not 
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specialised in this way.  The role of intermediating credit intrinsically 
involves a substantial degree of leverage, because it entails substantial debt 
financing. 
Banks borrow funds with one set of loan sizes and maturities and lend on 
different scales and maturities.  (Such as borrowing callable funds from small 
depositors and then lending with a maturity of several years to a small, 
medium or large enterprise).  Typically banks’ liabilities are much shorter 
maturity than their assets, and are frequently callable without notice (as is 
the case with retail deposits).  Banks operate in this way because agents who 
lend to banks, including depositors, demand assets they can treat as a store of 
cash (used as the basis of payment systems) while agents who borrow from 
banks seek larger, longer-maturity, more predictable commitments.  A 
relatively informal economic definition of banking has been suggested as 
“borrowing short and lending long” (Edwards and Mishkin, 1995). 
Allen and Gale (2007) present a model of the basic rationale for banking in 
which the presence of banks allows individual depositors, who may be subject 
to unforeseen private demands for liquidity, to gain some of the returns from 
long-maturity investments while holding short-maturity claims, even if they 
must exercise these claims early.  This is not possible in some other forms of 
financial intermediation where early liquidation of holdings entails forgoing 
returns.  So the economic definition of banking directly implies provision of a 
risk-management service.  
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Different types of banks conform to the definition that banking consists of 
“borrowing short and lending long”, but differ in other respects (Casu et al, 
2006).  Retail banks borrow deposits and lend residential mortgages and 
other retail loans.  Commercial banks borrow from retail and commercial 
depositors and lend to businesses.  Investment banks borrow in the short-
term money markets and use the funds to make large loans and to participate 
as principal, market-maker, agent or advisor in markets for new-issue or pre-
existing investments.  These categories often overlap and universal banks 
have extensive operations in all these areas.  
The legal/regulatory definition of a bank is narrower than the economic 
definition.  It consists of having regulatory permission to accept deposits (a 
legally-defined form of liability) from customers and being subject to specific 
rules, governance structures and regulatory supervision arrangements that 
come with this permission.  In the United Kingdom, the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) defines a bank as:  
“A firm with Part 4A permission which includes accepting 
deposits, and which is either a credit institution or whose Part 
4A permission includes a requirement that it comply with the 
rules in GENPRU and BIPRU relating to banks.”  
(FCA Glossary.)   
In this definition, the deposits accepted may be from individuals or 
businesses, the “Part 4A permission” simply refers to being authorised to 
undertake some regulated financial service under the UK Financial Services 
and Markets Act 2000, and GENPRU and BIPRU are specific rule-books 
employed by UK regulators.  In UK law, building societies are defined 
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separately from banks, but their definition also includes deposit-taking as a 
central element. 
The economic and regulatory definitions of banking are not equivalent in the 
sense that the borrowing entailed in “borrowing short” in the economic 
definition could take a form other than accepting deposits as they are legally 
defined.  The “shadow banking system” consists of increasingly-prevalent 
organisations that are economically banks, but not legally banks because they 
are not regulated as banks (Claessens et al 2012).  Shadow banks include 
investment banks that are financed through forms of short-term borrowing 
that are not legally deposits.  They also include Special Purpose Vehicles 
(SPVs) that issue Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) and use the 
proceeds to finance loans, along with various forms of investment funds that 
have a similar balance sheet structure to a regulated bank. 
The economic definition of banking is clearly more interesting than the legal 
one for the purposes of modelling bank risk and performance and 
considering their systemic implications.  This is because it would be arbitrary 
to exclude bank liabilities that are equivalent in economic effect to deposit 
financing but differ in legal details which mean they are not regulated as 
deposits.  Therefore I seek to stay as close as possible to the economic 
definition of a bank.  
However, a study of bank ownership and governance cannot encompass all 
kinds of entities which are economically banks.  This is because some of the 
kinds of entities included in the definition of shadow banks do not have well-
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elaborated governance structures or do not disclose key information.  Thus, 
the relevant population consists of those entities which are economically 
banks and have a clearly-defined governance structure that they disclose – 
specifically retail banks, private banks, commercial banks, building societies, 
investment banks and universal banks.  This is the population where it is 
possible to examine effects of governance (and ownership in the same model) 
on bank risk and performance.  Findings in the literature and my research 
cannot necessarily be extrapolated beyond this population. 
 
2.3 Bank Governance in the Context of Bank Reform 
The fundamental motivation for my study relates to the need to evaluate 
different proposed changes to banks that would supposedly improve 
outcomes at the bank level and thus make the banking system overall less 
crisis-prone, taking account of the fact that reforms to bank ownership and 
governance have been one such proposed change.  Thus I briefly summarise 
the literature relating to bank instability, proposed reforms and the place of 
ownership and governance amongst such reforms. 
Banking is nearly as old as civilisation itself and developed its modern 
structure from the late Middle-Ages onwards (Davies and Davies, 1996).  
However, since its historical origins, modern banking has suffered serious 
crises that have adversely affected the wider economy (Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2009).  In historically recent periods, banking crises of varying severity have 
affected the United States in 1907, the US and Central Europe in 1929-33, the 
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United Kingdom in 1973-1975, emerging markets and the US in 1982-1991, 
Japan and Scandinavia in 1990-1995, emerging markets in 1997-2002 and 
developed countries from 2007 (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2011).  Such crises 
can have very serious impacts: the worst banking crises and associated 
macroeconomic downturns have involved GDP contractions in the vicinity of 
30%, with attendant social and political dislocations.   
Bank stress is the subject of an extensive literature, demonstrating the 
importance and complexity of the problem.  It is important to summarise this 
literature and understand the nature of the issue if we are to discuss whether 
reforms to ownership and governance represent a plausible solution.  
Kindleberger and Aliber (2011) argue that bank stress occurs due to concerns 
over bank solvency, whether justified or not, and can rapidly increase in scale 
as some short-term creditors (such as depositors) observe others 
withdrawing and conclude that they too should withdraw, from the same 
banks or from other banks that may have correlated exposures.  Asset sales to 
meet withdrawals may affect valuations in a way that makes concerns over 
solvency self-fulfilling.  Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) build 
theoretical models in which the sole driver of bank runs is expectations about 
the behaviour of other depositors.  By contrast, Allen and Gale (1998) build a 
model in which real shocks to the value of bank assets are the sole driver. 
Other theoretical models add additional elements, and more realism, to these 
two basic approaches.  Kiss (2010) modifies the Diamond-Dybvig 
expectations-based approach by allowing investors to signal non-withdrawal 
and showing that, if this signal is of low-enough cost, it prevents runs.  
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Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) and Postlewaite and Vives (1987) both show 
that a combination of low returns on bank assets and high stochastic needs 
for liquidity at the level of individual depositors may trigger bank runs.  Chari 
and Jagannathan (1988) and Gu (2010) each develop models in which 
observation of aggregate withdrawal decisions or of the specific actions of 
other depositors, plus noisy private signals relating to the future performance 
of bank assets received by some or all depositors, drive withdrawal 
behaviour.   
Allen and Gale (2000 and 2004) develop models in which sale of assets by 
banks experiencing liquidity stress causes asset prices to fall and thus 
propagates and amplifies the crisis.  Rochet and Vives (2004) and Calvo 
(2009) consider, respectively, the potential for wholesale depositors to refuse 
liquidity to solvent banks because of uncertainty relating to their connections 
to other aspects of the system, and the potential for crises to emerge from 
collapsing acceptance as liquidity of instruments based on illiquid assets.  
Bank regulation seeks to address the issue of bank instability and other 
problems specific to the sector (Schooner and Tylor, 2009 and Financial 
Conduct Authority Handbook, Prudential Standards).  Regulation is divided 
into conduct regulation, which aims to prevent mistreatment of consumers 
and market abuse, and prudential regulation, which aims to ensure the 
stability of individual banks and the banking system overall.  It is prudential 
regulation which is relevant to this thesis.   
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Given the experience of the crisis years of 2007-2009, bank regulation in the 
UK (which is the focus of my study) underwent significant change in the 
years after 2008 (Prudential Regulation Authority Annual Report and 
Accounts, 2014).  The bodies which oversee regulation were reformed.  Prior 
to 2013, prudential and conduct regulation were overseen by the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) while the Bank of England undertook monetary 
policy.  Since 2013, prudential regulation of the largest financial services 
firms has been undertaken by the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) 
while prudential regulation of smaller financial services firms and conduct 
regulation of all firms in the sector has been undertaken by the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA).  However, this change at the top has been less 
significant than change in the content of regulation. 
One of the most basic ways in which banks may be regulated is through rules 
controlling the activities they may undertake and the interest rates they may 
pay or receive.  Such regulations existed from the 1940s up to the 1980s in 
the UK (and until the 1990s in the US).  They included rules that prohibited 
deposit-taking institutions from undertaking activities in market-making and 
corporate finance, and restrictions on cross-border capital flows, with the aim 
of preventing contagion of stress between different sub-sectors of financial 
services, while also preventing the financial sector from behaving in ways 
inconsistent with the goals of macro-economic policy.  However, these 
controls were removed as part of a broader ideological drive towards 
deregulation and free markets (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2011). 
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Other regulations involve standards for the levels of liquid asset reserves (on 
the asset side of the balance sheet) and regulatory capital (on the liability side 
of the balance sheet) that banks must hold.   
Minimum levels of liquid asset reserves are intended to reduce the likelihood 
of panic-induced bank runs and ensure smooth function of the payment 
system (Schooner and Tylor, 2009).  Various countries impose minimum 
levels of central bank reserves that banks must hold, with such minima being 
adjustable as a tool of monetary policy, but the UK has never set minimum 
reserve requirements.  Instead, banks have set voluntary levels of reserves, 
governed via interpersonal relationships with the Bank of England up until 
1981 and, from 1981 to 2009, via bilateral contracts with the Bank of 
England.  In 2009, the UK authorities introduced a requirement that banks 
conduct an Individual Liquidity Adequacy Assessment (ILAA) in which stress 
testing is employed to assess potential outflows over one- and three-month 
periods, with qualifying liquid assets to be held sufficient to cover these 
outflows (Financial Conduct Authority Sourcebook, Prudential Standards).  
On the international level, similar requirements were codified in the Basel III 
accord, somewhat later than they were introduced in the UK. 
As an additional means to prevent liquidity stress, the Bank of England and 
other central banks have long operated Lender of Last Resort (LLR) facilities.  
These involve lending at a penalty rate against qualifying collateral, with a 
“haircut” taken in the valuation of such collateral, and are intended to 
prevent concerns over liquidity becoming self-fulfilling in circumstances 
where bank assets are actually of good quality (Schooner and Tylor, 2009). 
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Bank regulatory capital requirements in the UK were governed by the Basel I 
international capital accord (as implemented in EU and UK regulation) prior 
to 2004, with capital requirements established via regulator-prescribed 
formulae (Bank for International Settlements, 1988).  Between 2004 and 
2007, this was progressively replaced by the Basel II standards (Bank for 
International Settlements, 2006).  Pillar 1 of Basel II involves either 
regulator-prescribed formulae or internal models (depending on the 
regulatory permissions of the bank) for determining capital required for 
credit, market and operational risk.  Pillar 2 involves a Supervisory Review 
and Evaluation Process (SREP) and an Internal Capital Adequacy 
Assessment Process (ICAAP) in which capital requirements are quantified via 
scenario analysis for risk types excluded from Pillar 1, and macroeconomic 
stress tests over future horizons of 3-5 years are used to adjust the 
assessment of capital requirements for all risk types under the assumption of 
severe but plausible economic scenarios.  Pillar 3 involves public disclosure of 
capital requirements and resources and of associated calculations, on the 
assumption that this aids financial-market efficiency and makes uninformed 
panic less likely. 
One feature of Basel II regulation was that it permitted very low levels of 
regulatory capital and very high leverage, supposedly justified by the belief 
that banks understood their own risks and had sufficient incentive to mitigate 
them.  Since 2009, under changes in UK regulation and the Basel III accord 
(Bank for International Settlements, 2009) regulatory capital standards have 
become much more stringent.  This has involved augmenting the Basel II 
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framework, rather than replacing it.  Stress testing assumptions have become 
more severe and there has been more stringent regulatory supervision of 
stress testing and models.  Minimum levels of Core Tier 1 (CT1) capital have 
been introduced, along with CT1 buffers for capital conservation, systemic 
importance and counter-cyclical adjustment, and maximum leverage ratios 
have been introduced to reduce the impact of banks manipulating internal 
calculations of regulatory capital requirements. 
Under Basel I and II, capital could be held as Tier 1 capital (common and 
preferred stock plus retained earnings), Tier 2 capital (revaluation reserves, 
hybrid debt-equity financing and subordinated debt) or, unusually, Tier 3 
capital (short-term subordinated debt), with minimum levels for Tier 1.  
However, the crisis revealed that only common equity as a ratio of total assets 
provided protection against solvency risk and negative perceptions: the 
market essentially discounted other forms and measures of capital.  In 
consequence, the standards of Basel III are defined almost entirely in terms 
of Core Tier 1 (CT1) capital (common equity).  In addition, Basel III allows for 
contingent-convertible capital: debt that converts to common equity when 
regulators deem that certain measures of stress have occurred at the level of 
an individual bank, with the aim being to protect solvency and bolster market 
discipline by imposing a cost on creditors. 
The PRA and similar regulators in other countries have the legal authority to 
pursue macro-prudential policy.  This involves adjusting regulatory capital, 
liquidity requirements and other tools in a counter-cyclical manner to 
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counteract speculative booms and stress periods.  The power to intervene in 
this way was granted to the PRA in 2013 but it has yet to be used extensively. 
Finally, since 2010, UK regulators have enhanced their tools for dealing with 
bank failure.  Retail banking operations are to be ring-fenced in separate legal 
groups with independent governance, and financial and operational 
resources sufficient to ensure they could survive separately from other 
divisions in a crisis.  Recovery and Resolution Plans (RRPs) have been 
introduced, including pre-prepared actions for ensuring the survival of banks 
under stress and, where survival is impossible, for winding-up banks in an 
orderly manner where remaining assets are used to service priority liabilities, 
such as retail deposits.  Deposit insurance has long existed in the UK to 
protect retail depositors, but the maximum amount covered by the Financial 
Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) was increased sharply in 2007 to 
mitigate the risk of depositor panic. 
Corporate governance in the UK has a distinct history from banking 
regulation.  In the late 1980s and early 1990s a series of corporate scandals 
involving accounting fraud and embezzlement led government-appointed 
commissions to recommend codified corporate governance.  In 1995, the 
recommendations of these commissions were amalgamated in the Combined 
Code, which was later re-named the Corporate Governance Code (UK 
Corporate Governance Code, 2014).   
Meeting the standards of the Code is a requirement for listed companies in 
the UK and is considered good practice for other corporate entities.  The 
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provisions of the code are not rigidly prescriptive, but rather are enforced by 
auditors on a “comply or explain basis”. 
The contents of the Code are driven by an assumption that preserving and 
increasing shareholder value is the objective of a company.  This is distinct 
from other countries such as Germany where governance is designed to 
safeguard the interests of a wider set of stakeholders, through such structures 
as worker representatives on Boards and cross-shareholdings between 
supply-chain counterparties.  It is also in contrast with the objectives of UK 
financial services regulation which, as I have discussed, is aimed at 
preventing mistreatment of consumers and detrimental effects on the 
stability of the financial system and economy. 
Specific requirements of the UK Corporate Governance Code include 
separating the roles of the CEO and Chairman, having a sufficient number of 
suitable Non-Executive Directors, and having Board-level Committees to 
oversee Audit and Remuneration.  The effectiveness of the Board and its 
Committees must be subject to internal evaluation.  The Board is also 
responsible for establishing clear individual accountabilities for managers, 
formal structures for monitoring risk, and structures to safeguard the 
independence of control functions within organisations. 
Following the banking crisis of 2007-2009, standards for bank Governance, 
and supervisory enforcement of such standards have been updated.  This has 
created additional requirements to be met within a wider context defined by 
the UK Corporate Governance Code.  The additional requirements applicable 
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to banks have been codified in the handbooks of the FSA, FCA and PRA 
(Financial Conduct Authority Handbook, Systems and Controls Sourcebook) 
moreso than the Corporate Governance Code itself.   
Specifically, there has been greater scrutiny on the selection and skills of 
Non-Executive Directors (NEDs) and a greater time commitment is expected 
from NEDs.  The powers of Risk Committees and Chief Risk Officers to block 
transactions have been enhanced, and there are requirements that the 
independence of such oversight functions is safeguarded.  There are more 
stringent standards for control over remuneration, linkage of remuneration 
to risk and disclosure of remuneration.  Finally, there is an expectation that 
governance structures, including role descriptions, be documented more 
clearly.  In the area of bank governance, there has been more change in the 
level of energy in regulatory supervision of standards than in the standards 
themselves. 
Because UK regulation and governance standards have changed over the 
period of my empirical study (2003-2012), with likely effects on bank 
behaviour, I include dummy variables to control for external conditions (see 
Section 3.4 for details). 
For the future, a range of proposals to reform banks and bank regulation have 
been advanced that would, it is claimed, reduce the propensity of banks and 
the banking system to undergo crisis.  It is important to understand the range 
of these proposals and the part of this range to which my research relates.  
Some proposals for reform would involve fundamentally changing the nature 
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of money and banking, such as by requiring retail banks to operate on a full-
reserve basis: holding all assets as cash, central bank reserve accounts or 
government bonds and offering deposit-taking and payment systems as their 
only services, while transformation of savings into investment was handled 
by separate asset management businesses (Kobayakawa and Nakamura, 
2000).  This reform would sharply reduce liquidity risk as fractional-reserve 
banking would no longer exist and would likewise reduce insolvency risk in 
the financial system as investment funds make no promise to remain above 
the originally invested value.  However, the transition to such a system would 
presumably be challenging. 
Other proposals would involve extensive reform of the current system while 
preserving the essential features of fractional reserve banking.  Such 
proposals include more widespread mutual ownership, changing structures 
for governance and incentive-setting, sharp reductions in leverage (on the 
basis that this reduces solvency risk while the costs of equity capital are 
lowered by falling risk), closer supervision by regulators, and arrangements 
to wind-up failing banks in an orderly fashion so that their remaining assets 
can provide uninterrupted support to high-priority liabilities, such as retail 
deposits.    
Some measures along these lines have been implemented since the global 
banking crisis of 2007-2009 (Schooner and Tylor, 2009).  Since 2010 the UK, 
for instance, has changed regulations relating to bank governance (and 
supervisory practices in enforcing these regulations) so that there are now 
more suitable Non-Executive Directors, greater individual accountability, 
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remuneration that is more closely linked to risk, and greater rigour in several 
areas of risk analysis. 
It is certainly plausible that reforms to governance could affect outcomes at 
the bank level and, consequently, affect systemic stability.  If the incentives of 
bank managers are changed so that they are less profit-seeking and less risk-
tolerant, then risk at the bank level will likely fall.  The propensity for 
systemic panics will also reduce if banks are less exposed to solvency shocks 
and depositors know this is the case. 
However, I argue that reforms to bank governance could fail to have the 
intended effects for a number of reasons.  In a complex and opaque system, 
bankers might find new means to pursue their own interests even under a 
reformed governance structure, outside the observation of regulators and 
with the consequence that bank-specific and systemic risk stayed the same.  
Or asset allocations that would change risk in the ways that managers with 
different incentives would intend might not be available.  Or depositors might 
not be aware-enough of changes to affect the propensity for bank runs to 
occur. 
The problem with many current proposals for reform is that they are based 
on theory or anecdotal experience, and there has generally not yet been 
sufficient empirical assessment of how they perform in practice.  Empirical 
research is clearly needed to assess the likely consequences of different 
options.  The research reported in this literature review and my research is 
relevant to options that would alter ownership and governance structures 
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whilst preserving the basic fractional reserve system.  Since this is the path 
reform efforts have taken to date after the global bank crisis of 2007-2009, it 
is vital to evaluate its effectiveness as soon as possible.  
 
2.4 Agency Theory and its Implications 
Arguments that different ownership and governance structures lead to 
different outcomes at the corporate level, and that changing such structures 
could reform banking so as to make it less crisis-prone, arise from agency 
theory.  It is therefore important that I evaluate the relevant parts of agency 
theory and assess the extent to which they generate relevant, testable 
hypotheses. 
As explained in Fama (1980), agency theory is concerned with situations in 
which one economic actor, the agent, takes actions on behalf of another, the 
principal, in the presence of incentives that may or may not be designed to 
align the interests of the two.  It involves models based on assumptions of 
individual self-interest, maximising behaviour and information constraints.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the separation of ownership and 
control inherent in typical corporate structures may result in managerial 
decisions that deviate from shareholder value maximisation.  This ‘agency 
cost’ may increase as the proportion of equity held by managers falls and as 
external ownership increases.   
How exactly might the interests of shareholders and managers differ?  
Sullivan and Spong (2007) hypothesise that shareholders who are diversified 
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and earn equity returns are expected to have a higher risk appetite and a 
stronger profit motive than managers who hold part of their wealth as firm-
specific human capital, unless managers have strongly performance-related 
pay.    
How might principal-agent conflicts be mitigated?  It is argued in Fama 
(1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983a) that performance-based wage-setting 
in markets for managerial labour and value signals generated as a result of 
trading of firms’ equity on public markets may substitute for managerial 
share ownership by disciplining managers to take actions aligned with 
shareholder interests.  In this setting, managers who do not please 
shareholders will either earn less or be replaced following a decline in the 
share price and acquisition by new shareholders. 
However, one can propose other hypotheses for manager behaviour, omitted 
in the relevant literature.  For instance, if we have a situation in which bank 
managers have human capital that is largely transferrable to other banks and 
there are liquid markets for managerial labour, then managers may have a 
risk tolerance comparable to that of shareholders.  This could occur if 
managing risk carries a personal or cognitive cost and managers expect they 
will have some control over the information available to a new employer, 
such that bad performance can be left behind.  This is particularly likely to 
influence behaviour if managers are incentivised on the basis of bank 
performance (especially short-term performance).  In some cases managers 
might even have a higher risk appetite than shareholders who intend to hold 
the bank’s equity long-term.  Such managers may make decisions almost 
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exclusively on the basis of maximising returns, in the expectation that they 
can change employer if serious risk materialises.   
The prospect of reputational damage, where managers are blamed for poor 
bank performance and consequently command a lower external wage, could 
impose discipline. But this effect may be weakened if individuals have 
influence over information available to new employers or accountability is 
dispersed amongst managers in a firm such that it is unclear who is 
responsible for losses.  The prospect of systemic stress occurring as a result of 
risk-taking by bank managers across the economy (likely causing personal 
loss for these managers) may not be effective either in disciplining managers, 
since they each have an incentive to defect from any consensus to be prudent.  
So, contrary to Sullivan and Spong (2007), I argue that it is not clear that 
bank managers will necessarily have a lower risk appetite than shareholders. 
What is clear is that bank shareholders have a higher risk appetite than 
depositors and other external agents with an interest in bank stability 
(including regulators).  Forrsbaeck (2011) argues that this is the case because 
shareholders have unlimited upside potential from good bank performance 
(combined with limited downside potential) while other agents have limited 
upside.  He also argues that depositors may not impose a risk premium on 
banks in the presence of deposit insurance, thus removing one risk-limiting 
mechanism, although this ‘moral hazard’ effect may be limited when bank 
franchise values are high (giving owners an incentive to preserve these 
values) or when prudential regulation is stringent.   
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The consequences of agency problems within individual banks may have 
direct implications at the systemic level.  Allen and Gale (1997) show how 
agency problems affecting bank managers and investors can cause credit-
driven asset-price bubbles that, when they burst and adversely affect asset 
prices, may trigger bank runs.  The agency problems in question involve bank 
managers financing speculative investment because they are incentivised 
only by short-run returns, not long-term loan performance.   
In conclusion, it is clear that this body of literature on agency theory 
generates relevant, testable hypotheses.  Different ownership and governance 
structures empower different individuals with different incentives within 
banks, and give them different information, or protect them from monitoring 
by others.  So it seems clear that different structures should affect decisions 
made and, ultimately, bank risk and performance. For instance, mutual 
ownership structures that do not entail counterbalances against the 
incentives of managers to preserve firm-specific human capital may lead to 
low risk and low performance.  Cross-border ownership may create 
monitoring difficulties that increase principal-agent conflicts.  Empowering 
of comparatively risk-averse agents such as Non-Executive Directors may 
lead to lower risk and lower performance, and so on. 
However, we must recognise that various frictions in real banks may interfere 
with the realisation of theoretically-predicted behaviours.  For instance 
constraints on the availability of, or information on, a range of different kinds 
of investable assets could narrow differences in risk-taking across different 
governance structures.  Or NEDs might not, in practice, have the power that 
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the banks’ annual reports say they do.  It is for such reasons that agency 
theory must be tested empirically. 
On a specific level, agency theory has been employed to consider the 
implications for risk and return of particular types of ownership and 
governance structures within banks.  I discuss these implications, alongside 
the relevant empirical literature, in sections 2.5 and 2.6 below.   
 
2.5 The Role of Ownership Types 
In assessing the literature on bank ownership I consider studies of ownership 
by other types of firms, private shareholders, governments and mutual 
owners who may be depositors or employees.  I also consider work on the role 
of managerial ownership or foreign ownership, in the latter case addressing 
the question of whether foreign ownership affects the risk-return trade-off 
due to international diversification or greater information asymmetries 
between owners and managers that are in different countries.  Ownership 
concentration is also discussed, considering such questions as whether the 
presence of owners that control large percentages of a bank’s equity facilitates 
monitoring and control by owners.   
Work by Schleifer and Vishny (1997) suggests that Shareholder-Owned Banks 
(SOBs), Mutually-Owned Banks (MOBs) and Government-Owned Banks 
(GOBs) may have different risk-return profiles.  They point out that 
government-owned entities are overseen by public officials who have 
concentrated control rights but no significant cash flow rights.  They are 
therefore not incentivised on the basis of financial returns and may instead, if 
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they are not motivated by social goals, be motivated by political goals, such as 
granting concessions to political supporters.  In mutuals, meanwhile, 
managers may have a very limited equity stake, ownership is not 
concentrated (potentially implying reduced monitoring by owners) and there 
is no equity market listing to discipline managers, so theory suggests that risk 
and return may be low.  Rasmussen (1988) argues that, if the depositors of 
MOBs are more risk-averse or less well-informed than those of other banks, 
or if depositors in general are badly informed, these entities may not be 
punished if their deposit services are more costly (but less risky) than 
competitors.  So GOBs may have higher risk and lower return than SOBs, 
while MOBs may have lower risk and return than SOBs. 
Empirical studies have sought to test such predictions by means of regression 
models with various metrics of performance and risk as dependent variables 
and indicators of ownership type and various controls as regressors.  In an 
extensive study of European banks, Amadou-Barry et al (2010) examine the 
hypothesis that different ownership structures imply different risk-return 
profiles.  They find a significant negative association of several indicators of 
risk with ownership by families/individuals and ownership by other banks.  
While the latter is difficult to interpret, the former is consistent with the 
hypothesis that concentrated owners who own a large block of the firm are 
more able to monitor managers and have a stronger incentive to limit risk 
when their personal wealth is concentrated in the firm.   
It could be argued that another interpretation of this result is simply that 
individual or family investors choose to invest in banks with different levels 
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of risk compared to institutional investors: the opposite direction of 
causation to that hypothesised.  However, since family ownership is likely to 
be long-standing and to have shaped the culture of a firm over several 
generations, this is not plausible. 
Marco and Fernandez (2007) employ panel methods to analyse the 
relationship between ownership structure and risk in the Spanish banking 
sector.  Following Merton (1977) they argue that deposit insurance has an 
option value to the owners of banks that increases with risk and that such 
insurance therefore induces risk-taking.  They propose that owner-manager 
agency conflict, in which managers are more risk averse, can counteract this 
incentive and that there will be differing levels of risk between institutions 
with differing degrees of owner control.  This conflict may be least effective as 
a risk mitigant in commercial banks where managers can have an equity 
stake, and more effective under mutual ownership where there are fewer 
incentive structures to increase the risk tolerance of managers. 
They consider a sample of 127 Spanish banks over the period 1993-2000 
using data from banking industry associations and regulators in Spain.  The 
sample included 50 non-commercial savings banks, which were owned by 
combinations of local governments, depositors and founding entities.  They 
find a significant negative association of savings bank status with risk-taking.  
However, this study does not reveal which aspects of savings bank status are 
important for risk aversion – is it the incentive arrangements of managers, 
depositor ownership or something else correlated with one of these?  Good 
use of control variables could differentiate these possibilities, but the range of 
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controls included is limited.  Specifically, changes in the governing body were 
the only governance variable included, and the study omitted each of foreign 
ownership, sophistication in risk management, liquidity and asset portfolio 
composition.  Nevertheless, the result is consistent with theory and other 
empirical studies, so it is convincing. 
Angkinand and Whilborg (2010) explicitly examine the interaction of 
ownership types and deposit insurance in determining risk.  They find 
evidence that government ownership of banks increases the risk-taking 
incentives associated with the option value embedded in deposit insurance.  
However, this study is not convincing as it relies on country-level data.  It is 
therefore vulnerable to omitted variables at the bank level and aggregation 
effects.  In any case, it is not clear that the option value of deposit insurance 
should affect the decisions of public sector managers (who have negligible 
cash flow rights) more than those of private owners. 
In an important study, Iannotta et al (2007) compare the performance and 
risk of SOBs, GOBs and MOBs in a sample of 181 large banks from 15 
European countries over the years 1999-2004.  They reveal that SOBs are 
more profitable than either GOBs or MOBs, which is as theory predicts.  They 
also show that GOBs have higher risk than SOBs, which in turn have higher 
risk than MOBs.  This is again as theory predicts.  The results are convincing 
because of their empirical rigour and alignment with theory.   
This study omitted controls for other ownership types, governance, 
sophistication in risk management, balance sheet composition and liquidity 
resources.  However, a large set of other controls was included and a panel 
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model specification was used so, while there are specific reasons to consider 
vulnerability to omitted variables bias, the extent of the problem is limited.  
For these reasons, and because of agreement with theory, the results are 
convincing.  It would also be interesting to confirm if the results obtained are 
applicable to smaller banks and other territories, such as the US or Asia, 
given that parameter values may not be the same in these settings. 
Overall, empirical studies of the roles of government and mutual ownership 
in banking show that government ownership increases risk and lowers 
return, while mutuality lowers risk and return.  The conclusions for mutual 
ownership are based on just two studies (Iannotta et al, 2007 and Marco and 
Fernandez, 2007) but these papers are each robust and their findings are 
consistent with theory, so the conclusion can be relied upon. 
 
2.5.1 Government Ownership 
As discussed above, GOBs may take more risk and have worse performance 
than SOBs because they are controlled by public officials who have no 
significant cash flow rights and instead use their control to pursue social or 
political aims.  The findings of Iannotta et al (2007) cited above lend strong 
support to this view.  Different business models may also explain differences 
in risk between public- and private-sector banks.  For instance, Pennathur et 
al (2012) find indications that public sector banks in India pursue less non-
interest income (such as from corporate finance and financial-markets 
trading) than other banks.  If government banks have a less-diversified 
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income base, and if diversification mitigates risk, then government banks will 
be riskier. 
Boubakri et al (2005) report that banks selected for privatisation in 22 
developing countries generally have worse performance and solvency and 
that their risk-return profile improves over time, which suggests that the 
transition to private ownership makes them do better.  However, this study 
does not account for the performance recovery that may happen anyway in 
underperforming banks without ownership change or privatisation, or the 
potential effects of any change in ownership (regardless of whether private or 
public ownership was the initial state).  It is simpler to study the effects of 
government versus non-government ownership as static states (albeit ones 
that prevail over time in the context of panel models) rather than relying on 
studies of privatisation. 
A number of empirical studies have focused explicitly on the implications of 
government ownership for bank risk and performance.  Interestingly, Karas 
et al (2010) employ an empirical method different from the usual approach of 
regression modelling and use Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to analyse 
factors linked to the efficiency of banks in Russia, with efficiency defined as 
the ratio of total costs to the value of capital employed by the bank.  DEA is 
an approach based on optimisation that estimates a production frontier of 
one or several outputs produced from a number of inputs.  Other studies of 
bank efficiency have used similar methods.  This study finds no difference in 
efficiency between government- and privately-owned banks.  However, it is 
possible that this result does not generalise well to other countries because of 
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the high levels of corruption in transition economies, and especially in post-
transition Russia, which may have the effect of making government and 
private banks equally inefficient. 
Examining the Asia-Pacific region, Hossain et al report results that are 
contrary to theory in that they find that, compared to private-sector banks, 
state ownership results in smaller losses during crisis periods without 
reducing returns during benign periods.  However, this study has a number 
of serious methodological flaws.  It uses stockmarket returns as a dependent 
variable and adjusts this only for world stock index returns, which means that 
investor expectations of government aid (which could be higher for state-
owned banks) and other market factors could affect the results as much as 
the fundamental value and risk of bank assets.  In addition, it relies on 
ownership data at the country level rather than the bank level.  Finally, the 
same instrumental variables are used for each of several variables on 
regulation that are included in the model (meaning that the model is under-
identified) and the instruments used (distance from the equator and religious 
composition – Catholic or Protestant) may be irrelevant as their causal effect 
on bank regulation is very doubtful.  
Cornett et al (2010) also consider the Asia-Pacific region.  They analyse 
annual financial data from Bankscope and other commercially-available 
sources for several hundred banks in 16 Asia-Pacific countries over the period 
1989-2004, a sample which is interesting because it includes the Southeast 
Asian financial crisis of 1997-2000.  This study reveals that, compared to 
private-sector banks, state-owned banks were less profitable and more risky 
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prior to 2001 and that they suffered more rapid deterioration during the 
crisis years of 1997-2000, but that the negative effects of state ownership 
diminished in the 2001-2004 period.  These findings are consistent with 
theoretical predictions in relation to state-owned banks made in Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997).  The changes in the 2001-2004 period are interesting and 
suggest that other characteristics (which are omitted in this study) can 
mitigate the adverse effects on risk and performance of government 
ownership.  The only control variables include were foreign ownership, bank 
size and year, making these results vulnerable to omitted variables bias.  But 
the results remain convincing because of agreement with other empirical 
studies and with theoretical predications. 
Al-Tamimi and Jellali (2013) examine the hypothesis that shareholder-owned 
banks are less risky that state-owned banks because they have incentives to 
preserve shareholder value while state-owned banks pursue political and 
social objectives.  However, they acknowledge that government protection 
could lower risk in state-owned banks.  They study a sample of 15 banks in 
the United Arab Emirates over the period 1998-2010.  The sample was 
selected to include all domestically-owned banks other than those which were 
new, or small with incomplete data.  Four of the banks included had an 
Islamic-finance business model, which prohibits interest and instead involves 
joint ventures and risk- and profit- sharing of various kinds.   
As dependent variable they use the ratio of Risk-Weighted Assets (RWA) over 
total assets as a proxy for risk-taking behaviour.  A problem with this 
approach is that RWA is not a consistent measure.  The meaning of a given 
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ratio of RWA over total assets has varied over time as the banking system has 
progressed through the Basel I to III international capital accords.  It is likely 
to have varied across countries as different national regulators have imposed 
their own standards for the advanced internal models for estimating capital 
requirements that are permitted under Basel II and III for banks with the 
necessary capabilities.  In addition, it is likely to have varied across banks as 
different banks have used either regulator-prescribed formulae or internal 
models for computing RWAs.  Other omitted variables are also likely to have 
affected the ratio of RWA over total assets, such as characteristics of the 
business strategy, governance structure and individual directors.  Such effects 
can be controlled by including dummy variables for period, bank and country 
(with the latter obviously not relevant for Al-Tamimi and Jellali), or by using 
panel data models at the bank level with dummies for year and country.  But, 
since Al-Tamimi and Jellali do not employ such methods, their results are not 
convincing. 
The most convincing results on the impact of government ownership are in a 
second study from Iannotta et al (2012).  Using data from Bankscope, the 
rating agencies Standard & Poor’s and Fitch and official sources, they apply 
the same sample selection criteria as in Iannotta et al (2007) and thus 
examine a sample of 210 banks from 16 European countries over the period 
2000-2009.  Dependent variables are based on rating agency grades, which 
they argue avoids the problems of endogeneity and inaccuracy inherent in 
using accounting-based measures of risk.  Since rating agency grades are 
based in part on accounting data, this rationale is debatable, but it is 
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nevertheless arguable that agency grades are a reasonable measure of default 
probability in the case of corporate entities.  This is supported by the back-
testing of their grades published by rating agencies (e.g. Standard and Poor’s, 
2012).  The authors enumerate agency grades to create a numerical scale and 
use both issuer grades (which are a measure of default risk) and individual 
grades (which remove the effect of implied government support).   
Using a panel model, they find that government ownership has a significant 
positive association with underlying risk (that is, risk after the effect of 
government support has been removed) and a significant negative 
association with default risk.  The former result is interpreted as meaning 
that government ownership leads to increased risk-taking in the way that 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) predict.   The latter result shows that there is 
greater government support for state-owned banks that enter distress, such 
that they exhibit a lesser default risk than private-sector banks.  Finally, both 
underlying risk and government protection increase in election years.  These 
results are as theory predicts and are supported by the earlier work of the 
same authors in Iannotta et al (2007), which reaches similar conclusions on 
the effects of government ownership using different dependent variables.   
The association of government ownership with issuer and individual ratings 
is found to be particularly strong for German banks.  When German banks 
are removed from the sample, the findings remain robust for individual 
ratings but cease to be significant for issuer ratings.  This implies that 
government-owned banks in all countries have greater underlying risk, but 
that the extent of implied government support varies.   
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Since the results employ rating agency grades as dependent variables they 
could simply reproduce biases inherent in such grades (such as a subjective 
belief that government-owned banks are riskier).  However, the controls that 
are present and the use of a panel model, together with the credibility given 
to agency corporate grades by published back-testing studies makes it likely 
that the results are reliable. 
Dong et al (2014) use a panel model to show that state-owned banks in China 
engage in greater risk-taking compared to other banks.  This lends further 
support to the view that state-owned banks are generally riskier. 
In conclusion, several empirical studies find that government ownership is 
associated with increased risk (Angkinand and Whilborg, 2010, Iannotta et al 
2012 and Dong et al 2014) while others find that it is associated with higher 
risk and lower return (Iannotta et al 2007 and Cornett et al 2010).  These 
results are clear and are consistent with the predictions of agency theory 
 
2.5.2 Managerial Ownership 
As discussed above, Sullivan and Spong (2007) argue that non-owner 
managers, unless they are subject to performance-related pay, have a lower 
risk appetite and weaker profit motive compared to shareholders.  This is 
because they seek to protect the value of firm-specific human capital.  In 
banks where managers do have a significant ownership stake (without 
managers having their personal wealth concentrated in the bank’s equity) we 
would therefore expect to see greater risk-taking than in banks where control 
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and ownership are separate.  However, as discussed earlier, one can also 
make an argument that in certain situations managers have a risk appetite 
similar to, or higher than, shareholders.  This, in turn, implies that 
substantive managerial shareholdings will not affect, or may even reduce, 
risk-taking.  Given these contradictory hypotheses, the impact of managerial 
shareholding on risk is a purely empirical question.  
Using data for South Korea, Lee (2008) reports a positive correlation of 
insider ownership with return on assets and a negative correlation of such 
ownership with the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans.  The latter 
result is contrary to theory.  However, since the only control included was for 
bank size, these results are not persuasive.  Using data for South Korea and 
Japan, Chun et al (2010) report that managerial ownership increases risk in 
Japanese banks but does not do so in Korean banks.  They find the increased 
risk of Japanese banks with higher managerial ownership is not compensated 
by increased profit.  However, for the positive associations reported, this 
study relied on stock market returns and the volatility of such returns as 
dependent variables and did not include any controls related to wider 
financial-market dynamics.  It is therefore likely to be severely biased by 
omitted variables that affect stock prices.  
Forssbaeck (2011) considers a sample of 331 banks in 47 countries over the 
period 1995-2005.  As dependent variables he uses the ratio of non-
performing loans to equity and the Z-score.  As regressors he uses the 
proportions of equity held by corporate insiders and institutional investors 
and dummy variables indicating that the largest shareholders are the 
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government or foreign.  Using panel models, he finds significant negative 
relationships between risk and both insider ownership and institutional 
ownership.  The former is inconsistent with the prediction that non-owner 
managers are risk averse as they seek to preserve firm-specific human capital 
and instead supports the view that non-owner managers can have a higher 
risk appetite than shareholders under some circumstances.  If we assume that 
institutional owners can exert more control than small individual owners, the 
latter result suggests that institutional investors are comparatively risk 
averse.  This study is methodologically robust and the results are therefore 
convincing.  
Anderson and Fraser (2000) consider a sample of 150 banks in the United 
States over the period 1987-1994 using data obtained from regulatory 
authorities, financial accounts and the Centre for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP).  As a dependent variable they use firm-specific risk (the volatility of 
the residuals left over when a systematic model is used to explain stock 
prices).  As a regressor they use the equity holdings of insiders.   
Using a panel model, they find a positive relationship between insider 
ownership and firm-specific risk.  This is more convincing than the results of 
Chun et al (who also used market-based measures of risk and return) since 
the use of firm-specific risk after systematic risks have been removed allows 
one to control for various factors that affect equity prices, while the use of a 
panel model controls for unobserved heterogeneity at the bank level.  
However, details of the systematic risk model used are not disclosed and it 
remains possible that not enough of the many factors potentially affecting 
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equity markets have been controlled for.  In addition, the result on the effect 
of insider ownership contradicts that of Forssbaeck (2011), which suggests 
that the risk appetite of managers is context-dependent. 
Laeven and Levine (2009) address the implications for risk and performance 
of shareholder control within banks.  Analysing the effects of control rights of 
shareholders addresses essentially the same question as considering the 
effects of shareholdings held by managers: does closer alignment of 
shareholding and control result in higher risk and performance?  The authors 
analyse data on 279 large banks across 48 countries for the period 1996-2001 
using data from Bankscope, other databases, annual reports and company 
websites.  As dependent variables they use the volatility of return on assets 
and the z-score.  As a regressor they use the cash flow rights of executive 
managers and directors.   
Using a pooled cross-sectional model, they find a positive association of 
managerial cash flow rights with bank risk.  The contrast of this finding with 
that of Forssbaeck (2011) suggests that contextual factors, such as the 
transferability of managerial labour to other banks, are important in 
determining the effect of managerial ownership on risk and return. 
The extent to which a bank is owned by its managers is not the only aspect of 
managerial ownership that can be expected to have an impact on risk-taking.  
While managers may have a substantial portion of their abstract wealth 
concentrated in the bank in the form of firm-specific human capital, 
manager-owners may or may not have their financial wealth concentrated in 
the equity of the bank.  If their financial wealth is concentrated in the bank, 
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their investment portfolio is not diversified and they are therefore likely to be 
more risk averse in their decisions. 
Sullivan and Spong (2006) was the first empirical study to evaluate this 
hypothesis.  Using data obtained from the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Commission (FDIC) they analyse a sample of 267 banks in seven US states in 
the years 1993 and 1994.  This included data on the ownership stakes of 
managers in banks and their net personal worth.  They demonstrate that 20 
banks which failed and were removed from the sample had similar 
descriptive statistics to the included banks, indicating that their removal does 
not cause selection bias. 
As a dependent variable they use the standard deviation of operating return 
on equity.  As regressors they use managers’ combined equity ownership over 
total personal worth of managers, monitors’ combined equity ownership over 
total personal worth of monitors (with ‘monitors’ defined as Non-Executive 
Directors), the proportion of equity owned by hired managers and their 
families and the proportion of equity owned by owner-managers and their 
families.   
Using a cross-section model, this study reveals a significant negative 
relationship between risk and the extent to which managers have their wealth 
concentrated in the bank.  It finds a similar relationship for ‘monitors’.  In 
this way, it is confirmed that concentration of managers’ wealth in a bank’s 
equity leads to less risk-taking. 
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In summary, the literature contains conflicting results for the effects of 
managerial ownership.  Forssbaeck (2011) finds a negative association of 
managerial ownership with risk while Anderson and Fraser (2000) and 
Laeven and Levine (2009) find a positive relationship.  Chun et al (2010) 
finds a positive association in one country but not in another.  This supports 
the hypothesis that non-owner managers (the counterfactual in these studies) 
may have a greater or lesser risk appetite compared to shareholders 
depending on such factors as remuneration structure and the ease with which 
they can move firm. 
Two studies in the literature show more clearly that, when owners have their 
personal wealth concentrated in the equity of a bank, those banks take less 
risk compared to other banks (Amadou-Barry et al, 2010 and Sullivan and 
Spong, 2006).  This is the expected behavioural response to a less-diversified 
portfolio: a lowering of risk appetite. 
 
2.5.3 Foreign Ownership 
There are clear reasons why foreign ownership of banks might be important 
for risk and performance.  Viewed on a consolidated basis, internationally 
diversified institutions might have higher risk and return compared to other 
banks.  They might, because of diversification, take more risk in each of their 
subsidiaries.  And their larger resources of capital, skills and infrastructure 
might enable them to achieve a better risk-return trade-off.  Alternatively, 
cross-border ownership might make monitoring and control more difficult, 
such that local management are able to follow their own risk appetite (which 
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might be higher or lower than that of foreign owners).  Because these effects 
could be contradictory, the role of foreign ownership in bank risk and 
performance is an empirical question. 
Bhaumik and Piesse (2007) construct a portfolio-choice model that can 
explain the asset allocations to government bonds and risky credits of 
domestic Indian banks over the years 1995-2004, but they find that it cannot 
explain the behaviour of foreign-owned banks.  This suggests that there may 
be a difference in behaviour between foreign-owned and domestic banks, 
although the model did not include controls for financial characteristics of 
banks and could thus be subject to omitted variables bias.  Using data for 
South Korea, Choi and Hasan (2005) report that the number of Board 
directors representing foreign owners has a positive association with 
performance and a negative association with risk.  This potentially reflects a 
better risk-return trade-off achievable as a result of foreign ownership.  
However, the study is not convincing as it only includes controls for bank size 
and deregulation.  
Angkinand and Whilborg (2010) report a positive effect of foreign ownership 
on bank risk, however this effect is present in a cross-section model only and 
disappears in a panel model, suggesting that it is due to omission of 
unobserved heterogeneity.  In any case, this study is not convincing as it 
relies on country-level data, creating vulnerability to omitted variables at the 
bank level and aggregation effects.  The study by Forssbaeck (2011) cited 
earlier, which was more robustly controlled, finds no impact of foreign 
ownership.   
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Havrylchyk and Jurzyk (2011) focus on banks in Central and Eastern Europe.  
They construct a logit model of the propensity to be acquired by a foreign 
owner and then match each bank that was so acquired to another, non-
acquired, bank with the closest propensity score at the time of acquisition.  
Using a differences-in-differences model, they show that acquired banks have 
significantly higher ROA one, three and five years after acquisition.  Variables 
used in the logit model include return on assets, capital adequacy, bank size, 
state ownership and macroeconomic factors.  These are unlikely to be the 
complete set of factors explaining the decision to acquire, and indeed the 
model only achieves a pseudo-R2 of 12%, so this analysis is not completely 
convincing.  In addition, it does not differentiate between the effect of 
takeover by foreign owners and takeover per se. 
Results from Chen and Liao (2011) suggest that the effects of foreign 
ownership may be context-dependent, which is as we would expect from the 
theoretical discussion at the start of this section.  Specifically, they find that 
foreign-owned banks are more profitable than domestically-owned banks 
when the parent bank is highly profitable and the host country features a 
banking sector with less competition.  
Overall, empirical results for the effects of foreign ownership are 
contradictory.  Angkinand and Whilborg (2010) report a positive effect of 
foreign ownership on bank risk, but Forssbaeck (2011) finds no effect and 
Results from Chen and Liao (2011) suggest the effects are context-dependent, 
being affected by profitability of the parent entity and levels of competition in 
the host market.  It may be that the effects of foreign ownership depend on 
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which of its corollaries (such as greater diversification or greater information 
asymmetry) are dominant. 
 
2.5.4 Ownership Concentration 
One theoretical perspective is that widely dispersed shareholder ownership of 
firms that are listed on the stock market generates equity price signals that 
provide an effective means of disciplining managers (Fama and Jensen, 
1983a).  An opposing perspective is that shareholder scale matters.  
Grossman and Hart (1980) show that dispersed shareholder control creates 
disincentives to expend resources on monitoring as other investors will 
benefit from this informational public good.  Shleifer and Vishny (1986), 
meanwhile, argue that large shareholders can overcome this difficulty 
because they internalise the benefits of monitoring and can monitor at lower 
cost, because of their greater stake and economies of scale.  So ownership 
concentration may increase shareholder control.  If shareholders have higher 
risk appetite than managers who do not own shares, then concentrated 
ownership should be positively associated with profits and risk. 
Using data for Japanese banks, Kim et al (2007) find evidence of a positive 
association between ownership concentrations and risk in the period 1986-
1988 (when they state regulation was relaxed) but not in the periods before 
and after (when regulation was more stringent).  This suggests that strong 
shareholder monitoring is present only when regulatory intervention does 
not suppress any instructions from shareholders to take more risk.  However, 
this study relies on a cross-section model and only includes controls for 
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Keeley’s Q (a measure of franchise value), membership of a Keiritsu (a cluster 
of coordinated Japanese firms with government guidance and centred on a 
bank) and loan write-offs.  It is therefore very vulnerable to omitted variables 
bias and unobserved heterogeneity at the bank level and is not convincing. 
Riewsathirathoran et al (2011) use data for 36 banks in 5 Asian countries over 
a five-year period and a measure of ownership concentration equal to the 
percentage of equity held by the top five shareholders.  In a cross-sectional 
model, they find that ownership concentration is associated with lower 
profits and lower risk.  These results, although published as a working paper 
and not peer-reviewed, are more convincing than Kim et al (2007) because a 
wider range of controls were included.   
Auvray and Brossard (2012) study quarterly data for a sample of 76 banks in 
18 European countries (11 of them euro-zone countries) over the period 1997-
2005.  They use data from the commercially available Bankscope and 
Datastream databases, the Thompson One Bank Ownership (TOBO) database 
and media sources.  As dependent variables they use modelled probabilities 
of bank credit rating upgrades or downgrades.  As regressors they use the 
percentages of equity held by certain numbers of the bank’s largest 
shareholders and dummy variables that take a value 1 if the largest 
shareholder has a stake exceeding certain thresholds.  They interact some of 
the regressors with the Merton-KMV Distance to Default (DD) indicator.  
This relies on equity prices, introducing the possibility of bias due to market 
factors unrelated to bank fundamentals, but it has been shown to be a 
significant predictor of default risk.   
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Using a lagged cross-section model, this study finds a positive association 
with risk for the dummy variable for the largest shareholder controlling more 
than 5% of equity.  This result exists independently of interaction of this 
dummy with DD.  The fact that these results contradict those of 
Riewsathirathoran et al provides a further indication that, as discussed in the 
preceding section, shareholders may have a higher risk appetite than 
managers in some settings and a lower one in others. 
An issue with all of these studies is that they omit the wealth concentration of 
large owners.  If these owners have their wealth concentrated in the bank and 
are thus not diversified, they will be more risk averse than otherwise.  In 
addition the authors do not control for the effects of managerial share 
ownership. 
Stable shareholding may have similar effects to concentrated shareholding, 
with long-termist shareholders having more incentive to monitor and control 
firms.  Using data for Japan, Konishi and Yasuda (2004) report a non-linear 
relationship of bank risk with the ownership stake of shareholders they define 
as stable.  They find that the level of risk decreases initially as the ownership 
stake increases, but subsequently increases again.  This suggests that low but 
positive levels of stable shareholding undermine the ability of market 
discipline to force managers to take more risk, but that increasing 
concentration of stable ownership eventually substitutes effective monitoring 
for market discipline. 
In conclusion, the presence of ownership concentrations in which large 
blocks of a bank’s equity are owned by one investor appears to have a positive 
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effect on bank risk.  Kim et al (2007) and Auvray and Brossard (2012) find 
evidence of a positive association between ownership concentrations and 
risk.  Riewsathirathoran et al (2011) find a negative association of ownership 
concentration with risk and performance, but this study is less-well-
controlled and can thus be discounted.  The conclusion that ownership 
concentrations are positively associated with bank risk is consistent with the 
hypothesis that ownership concentration is necessary for monitoring.  It 
seems that concentrated shareholders can force managers to take risk greater 
than their preference in a way that dispersed shareholders cannot. 
   
2.6 The Role of Governance Arrangements 
Analysis of bank corporate governance leads us to consider a different set of 
incentive conflicts from owner-manager conflicts.  Different managers and 
departments within banks may have different remuneration structures and 
therefore different incentives.  Senior executives, financial-market traders 
and deal-makers may receive a large proportion of their pay as performance-
related bonuses, including remuneration in shares, and therefore have 
incentives to take risk.  By contrast, Non-Executive Directors (NEDs), risk 
managers, compliance officers and internal auditors receive little or none of 
their pay in this form and thus have fewer incentives to take risk.  They may 
also have different professional cultures and be more likely to have incentives 
to preserve membership of professional bodies, such as law and accounting 
societies.  Governance structures which affect the comparative power of 
different groups within bank management may therefore be important in 
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determining bank risk and performance.  Mehran et al (2011) provide an 
informative survey of the literature on how bank governance affects risk and 
performance.  
Many empirical studies have sought to evaluate the predictions of agency 
theory in respect of the implications of bank governance.  I review this 
empirical literature in this section.  As in section 2.5, I give more attention 
than elsewhere in the literature review to the specifics of data sets and 
methodologies, in order to reflect the centrality of these papers to my 
research and to evaluate a number of conflicting results in the literature. 
A study by the World Bank (Anginer et al, 2014) reports that independence in 
the governance structure at Board level leads to increased bank risk-taking, 
which they interpret as being due to Boards representing the risk-tolerant 
preferences of diversified shareholders.  However, this study relies on 
composite measures of Board strength (which makes it more difficult to 
interpret causal mechanisms) and controls at the country level (which creates 
pronounced vulnerability to omitted variables bias at the bank level).  
Analysis from the International Monetary Fund (Brandão-Marques et al 
2014) summarises bank- and country-level studies examining the effects of 
bank governance on risk and performance.  They also report new results 
suggesting that greater independence amongst bank Board members leads to 
reduced risk.  However, although this study included bank fixed effects and 
country-level controls, bank-specific controls were limited to return on book 
assets, log book assets, the deposit-to-asset ratio, the Tier 1 capital ratio, and 
revenue growth.  There may therefore be omitted variables bias. 
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Aebi et al (2012) collect data from commercially-available databases, annual 
reports and regulators for 372 US banks over the period 2007-2008.  As 
dependent variables they use buy-and-hold returns and return on equity.  
They use a diverse and interesting range of regressors consisting of a dummy 
for the presence of Chief Risk Officer (CRO) at board level, a dummy for 
whether the CRO reports directly to the board (independently of the CEO), a 
dummy for the presence of a risk committee at board level, board size, the 
percentage of independent directors on the board, the meeting frequency of 
the risk committee, the number of directors in the risk committee, the 
percentage of directors in the risk committee who are independent, a dummy 
variable for the presence of a dual CEO-Chairman, the percentage of directors 
who joined the board before the CEO, the percentage of directors over the age 
of 72, the percentage director non-attendance at board meetings, the 
existence of a board nominations committee consisting only of independent 
directors and a general corporate governance index.   
Using a cross-sectional model, they find a significant positive impact on 
returns of the CRO reporting directly to the Board, a negative impact on 
returns of the CRO reporting only to the CEO and no impact for the presence 
of a CRO.  This suggests that CRO independence of the CEO is more 
important than his/her presence.  They also found a positive impact on 
returns of board size and the frequency of meeting of the risk committee, but 
a negative impact of the possession of a risk committee.  This suggests that 
the possession of an active risk committee is beneficial and that risky firms 
perhaps tend to maintain inactive risk committees.  Director non-attendance, 
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intuitively, is found to be harmful.  The proportion of directors who are 
independent has a negative impact.  This latter result could be explained if 
regulators have forced firms seen as risky to strengthen their boards but 
these firms remained risky.  Other governance features had no significant 
effects. 
These results are of interest because of the diverse range of governance 
indicators explored and results relating to the CRO and risk committee, 
which can be interpreted in accordance with agency theory.  However, this 
study was based on a brief, abnormal time period and omitted controls for 
ownership type, sophistication in risk management and liquidity resources.  
The results are therefore persuasive but remain open to challenge. 
Pathan (2009) analyses a sample of 212 large US Bank Holding Companies 
over the period 1997-2004 using data obtained from Bankscope, Datastream, 
regulators and annual reports.  As a dependent variable, he uses a measure of 
firm-specific risk similar to that cited in Anderson and Fraser (2000) cited 
above, together with the volatility of stock returns and the Z-score.  As 
regressors he uses board size, the percentage of directors who are 
independent, an index of shareholders’ rights, an index of Board 
entrenchment, and a dummy variable for the presence of a dual CEO-
Chairman.   
Using a panel data model, he finds that board size, director independence, 
shareholders’ rights and a dual CEO-Chairman all have a significant negative 
association with bank risk.  The result for independent directors is as 
expected from theory since these individuals do not receive remuneration 
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linked to bank performance.  The result for board size is as expected from 
theory if we assume that larger Boards are larger because they contain more 
independent directors or more aggregate experience.  The result for a dual 
CEO-Chairman is consistent with other studies by Yang and Zhao (2014) and 
Rus et al (2011) which suggest, respectively, that separating the roles of CEO 
and Chair confuses decision-making, while also weakening the personal 
accountability for risk perceived by the CEO.  Anginer et al (2016) report that 
a banks having joint CEO-Chairman leads to lower leverage ratios.  This 
finding is consistent with the results of Pathan et al (2009) in the sense that 
it implies lower risk. 
Dong et al (2014) use a panel model to show that banks in China with a CRO 
on the Board engage in less risk taking than other banks.  This study was 
well-controlled, although it included limited controls for external conditions 
or balance sheet composition, and it accords with Aebi et al (2012). 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from this body of literature.  The 
presence of independent directors on a bank’s Board leads to reduced risk 
and performance (Brandão-Marques et al 2014, Pathan 2009 and Aebi et al 
2012).  A dissenting result is Anginer et al, 2014 but this study had a number 
of serious empirical weaknesses, as noted above, and can thus be discounted. 
Two papers that examined the role of Board size (Pathan, 2009 and Aebi et 
al, 2012) both find that it has a negative impact on risk.  This suggests that 
the availability of a greater set of skills and experience at a senior level leads 




A single study (Pathan, 2009), examines the effects of combining the CEO 
and Chairman roles and shows that a dual CEO-Chairman has a negative 
association with bank risk.  This is not what we would expect if we believed, 
as regulators appear to, that separating these roles would yield more 
independent oversight and thus mitigate the high risk appetite of bonus-
remunerated CEOs.  Instead, it is consistent with other literature (Yang and 
Zhao, 2014 and Rus et al, 2011) indicating that separating the roles in this 
way leads to confused decision-making and less personal accountability on 
the CEO for managing risk. 
Results relating to the presence of a CRO as a full Board director appear 
clear-cut, but are based on very few papers and are questionable because they 
appear to contradict results for an independent Chairman.  Aebi et al (2012) 
show that a CRO on the Board has a positive impact on returns, while Dong 
et al (2014) show that it has a negative impact on risk.  Both of these studies 
must be treated with doubt because they relied on narrow research settings 
and it is questionable why independent monitoring by the Chairman would 
have such very different effects compared to independent monitoring by the 
CRO.   Instead, it is possible that both kinds of independent monitoring lead 
to higher risk or lower return. 
So, according to the empirical literature, independent directors lower risk 
and return, a larger Board lowers risk, and a Joint CEO-Chairman 
unexpectedly lowers risk.  The empirical literature also suggests that a CRO 
on the Board improves the risk-return trade-off, but this may not be true in 
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that we could expect this role to have similar adverse effects to an 
independent Chairman. 
 
2.7 The Role of Remuneration in Banks 
Remuneration is a topic of central interest in agency theory.  Given the 
proposition of classical microeconomics that individuals respond to 
incentives, it follows that linking remuneration to different outcomes will 
lead to different management behaviours and that these behaviours may or 
may not align with the interests of owners and other parties.  In addition, if 
the outcomes to which remuneration is linked are hard to measure, or if they 
are linked to other outcomes that are hard to measure, incentive structures 
may have consequences their designers view as undesirable (Brookfield and 
Ormrod, 2000).  For instance, if incentivised to maximise profit or market 
share, managers may do so by increasing risk and concealing that risk if it is 
difficult for shareholders to detect that they have done so. 
The majority of studies of remuneration in banks have focused on the 
incentives of the CEO, although a few have been broader.  The CEO has a 
uniquely powerful role in most firms.  Other than authorities reserved to the 
Board or Board sub-committees, and any reporting lines that are 
independent of the CEO (such as the CRO and head of internal audit may 
have), the CEO has wide-ranging powers over strategy and its execution.  The 
incentives of the CEO are therefore a crucial governance question, worthy of 
consideration apart from general governance issues.  They may also serve as a 
proxy for the effects of pay incentives on executive behaviour more generally. 
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Using data for US Bank Holding Companies, Acrey et al (2011) report an 
insignificant or negative association between bank risk indicators and 
compensation of the CEO in the form of performance-related bonuses or 
unvested options.  This is contrary to theory but the empirical study had no 
obvious defects and so is credible.  It may simply be that CEO performance 
bonuses do not encourage risk-taking in all circumstances. 
Bai and Elyasiani (2013) analyse a sample of 132 US Bank Holding 
Companies over the period 1992-2008 using data from Standard & Poor’s 
Execucomp database on executive remuneration, regulators and the CRSP.  
As a dependent variable they use the Z-score and the volatility of return on 
assets.  As regressors they use the percentage of CEO compensation in the 
compensation of the top five executives in the bank and ‘vega’, a modelled 
coefficient measuring the effect of a change in bank stock price on CEO 
wealth.   
Using a panel model, they find that vega has a significant positive association 
with bank risk while CEO pay share has a significant negative association 
with bank risk.  This is as theory predicts: CEOs are incentivised to take risk 
when their remuneration is linked to bank performance and are incentivised 
to be cautious when they have a high base salary.  Given that the results 
accord with theory and the range of controls involved, including use of a 
panel model to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the bank level, these 
findings are persuasive. The contradiction between these results and those of 
Acrey et al (2011), who also focused on US bank holding companies, suggests 
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that the Acrey et al results could be biased by unobserved heterogeneity 
because they did not also use a panel model approach. 
The corporate finance literature supports the hypothesis that CEO variable 
remuneration is positively related to risk-taking.  In a sample of acquiring US 
banks, Hagendorff and Vallascas (2011) show that CEOs with remuneration 
that is more sensitive to the bank’s share price are more likely to engage in 
risk-inducing mergers.   
As well as its level, the nature of performance-related remuneration may be 
important.  If CEOs receive such remuneration in cash rather than shares, 
their incentives are entirely short-term and they may be incentivised to take 
even higher risk than if remuneration is in shares.  Fahlenbrach and Stulz 
(2011) report no evidence that banks whose CEOs received a larger fraction of 
their remuneration in cash bonuses performed worse during the financial 
crisis of 2007-2009.  This result is contrary to theory, which predicts that 
higher variable remuneration leads to greater risk-taking and thus worse 
performance in a crisis.   
Beyond CEO remuneration, only two studies focus on the effects of 
remuneration at the bank executive level more generally.  The first such study 
is Uhde (2015), who examines 63 banks in 16 EU countries (generally the 
largest banks in each territory) over the period from 2000 to 2010 and 
concludes that excess variable remuneration, whether it takes the form of 
cash or shares, increases risk-taking.  Excess variable remuneration is 
defined as the residual of a regression of executive variable pay on bank size, 
country and time dummies.   
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The second such study is Efing et al (2015), who take a different approach 
and use payroll data for 67 EU banks to consider the effects of variable 
remuneration (defined as bonuses in this case) in the treasury and capital 
markets divisions, using variable remuneration in other divisions as an 
instrument to capture the effect of general remuneration policy, as opposed 
to division-specific policy.  They find a significant positive association of 
variable remuneration in the treasury and capital markets divisions with the 
level and volatility of earnings from these divisions, with the effect on 
volatility appearing to overwhelm the effect on level of earnings. 
In conclusion, empirical results relating to the role of remuneration appear 
consistent with theory.  Higher variable and performance-based 
remuneration is leads to increased risk-taking.  There are dissenting results 
(Acrey et al, 2011 and Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011), but Bai and Elyasiani 
(2013) and Hagendorff and Vallascas (2011) each show robustly that the 
performance-sensitivity of CEO pay has a positive effect on risk, while Uhde 
(2015) and Efing et al (2015) each show that excess variable pay of executives 
and traders leads to increased risk-taking. 
 
2.8 The Roles of Complexity, Diversification and Size 
Complexity, diversification and size are fundamental topics in industrial and 
financial economics and are likely to be important for risk and return in 
banks.  Complexity relates to diseconomies of scale.  In basic microeconomic 
theory (e.g. Varian, 2009), economies of scale arise as fixed overhead costs 
are spread over more units of production, leading to a lower unit cost.  
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However, at a certain scale and associated level of complexity, difficulties 
arise in coordinating different elements of the firm, such that more effort and 
money is spent on coordinating different teams within the organisation.  This 
means that unit costs (and other financial outcomes) begin to deteriorate as 
size moves beyond a certain level.  Competitive forces may then mean that 
firms in a sector tend to have sizes between the minimum and maximum 
efficient scale for that sector.   
In banking and finance, complexity may increase risk by making 
organisations more opaque or magnifying the number of channels through 
which contagion of systemic risk can occur.  For instance, Gai et al (2011) 
construct a theoretical network model of a banking system and use it to show 
how contagion of funding risk can propagate through this network.  They 
demonstrate that greater complexity and concentration can magnify the 
fragility of the network.  This supports the view that Systemically Important 
Financial Institutions (SIFIs) pose a threat to the stability of the financial 
system and economy and regulators have explicitly made complexity one of 
the criteria for identifying a SIFI (Bank for International Settlements, 2013). 
Meanwhile basic finance theory (e.g. Jones, 2008) suggests that 
diversification generally causes imperfectly correlated risks to offset one 
another, such that lower risk can be achieved at a given level of return.  This 
should be true of any investment portfolio, including the portfolios of assets 
held by banks.  This model relies on assumptions a) that sufficient 
information is available on risk and return for shareholders and managers to 
take steps to ensure that they are commensurate, and b) that correlations of 
92 
 
return with total risk are evident even when we recognise that total risk 
contains both idiosyncratic and systematic components. 
Firm size is also important in basic microeconomics, with larger firms more 
likely to achieve monopoly status or other forms of market power (such as the 
ability to dictate prices for asset classes in which they are a dominant trader).  
In the economics of banking (e.g. Mishkin, 2012) size is likely to be associated 
with greater systemic importance of a bank since it is more likely to be a key 
component of the national and global financial system.  This makes it more 
likely that larger banks will be bailed-out by governments in the event they 
experience distress.  They may therefore experience moral hazard effects 
(greater risk-taking because they expect to be protected from adverse 
consequences) and implied subsidies (cheaper financing costs because 
investors do not expect the bank to be allowed to fail).  One could also 
hypothesise that, because of these advantages, larger banks are able to attract 
more skilled and more ambitious staff, although there is no formal theory 
detailing this. 
No empirical studies have investigated the role of complexity in banking.  
Markman and Venzin (2014) compute an index of risk that combines 
financial performance and volatility and show that this correlates with 
indices of portfolio and product complexity.  However, this analysis relies 
exclusively on bivariate correlations (for the purpose of showing that their 
indicator correlates with other indicators of interest to risk managers) and 
thus cannot be said to support any causal hypothesis.  
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The empirical literature on bank diversification is richer, but contains some 
mutually contradictory results.  Wall (1987) using US data finds no evidence 
that the presence of a non-bank subsidiary has an effect on bank risk.  By 
contrast, Brewer (1989) also using US data reaches a contradictory 
conclusion – that the presence of non-bank subsidiaries reduces risk.  The 
principal difference between the studies is a different dependent variable – 
accounting volatility in the former and stock price volatility in the latter, 
indicating that diversification may impress investors but does not necessarily 
affect underlying performance.  In accordance with this view, Baele (2007) 
finds evidence that diversification of bank income streams leads to higher 
stock-market valuations and lower firm-specific volatility of the stock price. 
Shiers (2002) employs data on US banks with branches in different states of 
the USA, together with data on the differing economic characteristics of 
states, to show that geographical and sectoral diversification both mitigate 
risk.  Similarly, Using a Credit Value at Risk (C-VaR) model with simplifying 
assumptions for 49 of the largest banks globally over the period 1992-2009, 
Fang and van Lelyveld (2014) report that geographical diversification lowers 
credit risk.   
Mergaerts and Vennet (2016) use data on 550 EU banks to show that 
different business models (as identified by factor analysis) are associated 
with different risk and return profiles, revealing that business model 
diversification is associated with enhanced performance.  Meslier et al (2014) 
report a similar finding that diversification to include interest and non-
interest income increases bank performance in emerging markets.  By 
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contrast, Mercieca et al (2007) find no evidence that diversification of income 
streams in smaller European banks has an effect on performance.  
Inspired by debate over the “Too Big To Fail” (TBTF) status of the largest 
national and global banks and the experience of the Global Financial Crisis of 
2007-2009, a number of recent studies have focused on the effects of bank 
size.  Bhagat et al (2015) report a positive effect of bank size (total assets) on 
risk-taking.  Similarly, in a study at the country level, Laeven et al (2015) 
report a positive effect of bank size on systemic risk. 
Hughes and Mester (2013) attempt to isolate the effect of bank size on 
performance by estimating bank production functions.  They do so using a 
full accounting for the cost structure of banks and controlling for factors, 
such as funding costs, that could be subject to implied subsidy effects.  They 
report positive effects of scale on performance.  Beccalli et al (2015) use a 
similar approach for European banks and reach the same conclusion, with 
the extra finding that economies of scale are reduced for large banks in small 
economies, and can even become diseconomies at a certain point.  A third 
paper that uses a similar approach and again reaches the same conclusion 
that bank size positively affects performance, this time using US data, is 
Hughes et al (2001). 
In conclusion, there are no empirical results on the effects of bank 
complexity.  Empirical results relating to bank diversification are fairly clear-
cut and in line with theory: diversification lowers risk and increases return.  
The dissenting results are Wall (1987) and Mercieca et al (2007).  By 
contrast, Brewer (1989), Shiers (2002) and Fang and van Lelyveld (2014) all 
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show that bank diversification reduces risk.  Mergaerts and Vennet (2016) 
and Meslier et al (2014) show that diversification increases performance.  
Baele (2007) shows that diversification leads to higher performance and 
lower risk.  Results relating to bank size are even more clear-cut and are in 
accordance with theory: larger bank size leads to increased risk and increased 
performance.   
 
2.9 Gaps in the Literature 
Taking the existing empirical literature as a starting point, it becomes clear 
that several avenues for future research remain open in this field, and I 
address several of them in my research.  One of the more obvious deficiencies 
of the relevant literature is the fact that key results are dependent on a few 
papers and other results are plagued by contradictory findings.  For instance, 
our understanding of the effects of each of the following is either dependent 
on one or a few papers or is affected by the presence of a significant number 
of contradictory findings: mutual ownership, foreign ownership, managerial 
ownership, ownership concentrations, independent Directors, Board size, a 
CRO on the Board and a joint CEO-Chairman.  Only for state majority 
ownership, executive remuneration, diversification and size can I report a 
substantial body of essentially uncontested literature. 
A further issue is that, despite the range of theoretical and empirical 
literature that exists on the effects of bank ownership and governance, 
simultaneity between risk and return has not been taken into account in this 
field.  Basic finance theory (e.g. Jones 2008) treats risk and return as 
96 
 
simultaneous but empirical studies focused on bank ownership and 
governance have not included this.  This could prove important if omitting 
simultaneity leads to bias in estimating other effects. 
Another area that remains open for investigation is the role of information-
processing capability in banks.  Considerations relating to the completeness 
and accuracy of information, and its asymmetry between agents, are 
fundamental in economics (Bircher and Butler, 2007).  Bebczuk (2003) 
argues that limitations relating to information are important in finance.  This 
implies that imperfect or inaccurate information relating to risk and / or 
return may lead to mispricing of risk such that assets with the same level of 
risk have different returns. 
An important indicator in this regard is the presence of regulatory permission 
to use the Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach under Basel 2/3 regulation.  
The IRB approach involves estimating regulatory capital requirements using 
statistical models estimated on the bank’s own portfolio data to quantify 
credit risk.  In order to obtain permission from the national regulator to use 
IRB, stringent tests relating to information systems, modelling and 
governance must be met, making IRB a good proxy for information 
processing capability – provided that one controls for size, which tends to be 
correlated with IRB permission.  A second feasible indicator of information 
processing capability in banks is the previous financial services experience of 
Directors, which is likely to impact the quality of their decisions.  However, 
no empirical studies have sought to address the questions of whether having 
IRB permission or having more-experienced Directors, as indicators of 
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information processing capability, are associated with reduced risk or 
increased performance. 
Remuneration is a further area of banking where, although have been 
numerous studies, important questions remain unanswered.  The majority of 
studies on the effects of bank remuneration structures focus on the CEO 
level, and two others consider executive remuneration more generally and 
remuneration in the capital markets divisions of banks.  These are discussed 
in section 2.7.  However, there are no studies which consider the effects of 
remuneration structures at all levels in a bank.  This is an important omission 
since the aggregation of actions at all levels in a bank could be as important 
as decisions at the most senior levels.   
Bank complexity is important in the theoretical literature as a potential driver 
of diseconomies of scale and as a source of risk due to increased 
interconnection with other financial services firms.  However, no empirical 
studies have examined the role of complexity in banks in determining risk 
and return.   
Studies in the literature also have limitations in terms of the selection of 
variables employed in models.  Some studies include a very limited set of 
control variables, such that they are especially vulnerable to omitted variables 
bias.  The literature also omits dependent variables relating to outcomes of 
central interest when considering risk and return, such as bank failure, bank 
growth and loan interest income. 
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Finally, while studies have employed pooled data for many countries or have 
considered one specific country (such as the US, Germany, Japan or China), 
there are no studies examining the effects of ownership and governance on 
bank risk and return specifically in a UK context.  Given the significance of 
the UK as a banking centre, and the need for UK-based bank managers and 
regulators to understand the particularities of the UK system, this is a 
significant practical gap.  It also represents a missed opportunity to consider 
a setting in which mutual ownership corresponds to a single clear type of 
legal entity (the depositor-owned building society) that is similar to a bank in 
essentially all respects other than ownership, such that causal effects of 
ownership type can be clearly identified.  
Chapters where empirical results are presented (Chapters 4 to 8 below) 
explain the gaps in the literature more fully and use them to develop 
hypotheses to test, in an attempt to increase our understanding of how bank 
ownership and governance affect risk and return. 
 
2.10 Conclusions 
In summary, the empirical literature tells us that state majority ownership 
increases risk and return, while mutual ownership reduces risk and return.  
Foreign ownership and managerial ownership each have effects that are very 
much context-dependent.  Concentration of owners’ personal wealth in 
banks’ equity reduces risk, while the presence of shareholders that own large 
blocks of the bank increases risk. 
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The presence of more independent directors and a larger Board both lead to 
less risk, as does the presence of a joint CEO-Chairman.  The presence of a 
CRO on the Board appears in a limited number of empirical studies to cause 
increased performance and reduced risk, but this is doubtful because the 
relevant studies relied on narrow contexts and it is unclear why independent 
monitoring by a CRO would have entirely different effects from independent 
monitoring by the Chairman.   
Higher variable and performance-based pay at senior levels lead to higher 
risk. Finally, bank diversification increases returns and reduces risk, while 
bank size increases risk and returns. 
However, the literature contains significant gaps.  Many key findings are 
based on one or a few empirical papers, simultaneity between risk and return 
is not accounted for even though theory suggests it should be important and 
the effects of banks’ comparative ability to process information relating to 
risk and return has not been considered.  Similarly, studies relating to the 
causes and consequences of bank pay have not considered levels below senior 
executives, bank complexity has been overlooked, dependent variables of key 
interest to regulators and bank managers have been omitted and no studies 
have focused on a UK context. 
In my empirical Chapters (Chapters 4 to 8) I use the literature develop 
specific hypotheses and I test these using an econometric methodology 
(described in Chapter 3) that has a high degree of commonality across all 
empirical Chapters.   My research expands our understanding of the role of 
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bank ownership and governance beyond that which would be possible based 





Chapter 3: Methods and Data 
3.1 Introduction 
My research strategy in this thesis is to test hypotheses relating to the effects 
of bank ownership and governance on risk and performance by building and 
evaluating econometric models with measures of bank performance and risk 
as dependent variables and indicators of governance and ownership as 
explanatory variables.  In this Chapter I describe the models and data I use to 
test my hypotheses and the data processing I have carried out.  I also provide 
details of assumptions and conventions used in obtaining and processing 
data, and I include descriptive statistics to show that potential dependent and 
explanatory variables have appropriate characteristics for modelling. 
 
3.2 Summary of Hypotheses 
In each of my Chapters where empirical results are presented – Chapters 4 to 
8 – I develop specific hypotheses that are subsequently tested via an 
econometric methodology that has a high degree of commonality across all of 
these Chapters.  It is appropriate that hypotheses are developed in full in the 
empirical Chapters, in the context of relevant literature and leading directly 
to their testing, but it is nevertheless useful that I provide a summary here.  
In econometrics, hypotheses must be understood before models and data can 
be selected and explained.  
In Chapter 4, I start from the argument of general finance theory (e.g. Jones 
2008) that return is higher when risk is higher, because investors demand 
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sufficient return to compensate for risk.  I then develop, and subsequently 
test, the hypothesis that this correlation should hold for measures of risk and 
return derived from the profit and loss statements of banks, assuming that 
bank shareholders have sufficient information to demand that banks earn 
adequate return for the risk arising from investments made by the bank.    
In Chapter 5, I use earlier results in the literature such as Iannotta et al 
(2007) to develop hypotheses that state majority ownership and mutual 
ownership (meaning ownership by depositors in my sample) each have 
effects on indicators of risk and return – specifically that state ownership 
lowers return and increases risk while mutuality lowers them both.   I also 
take earlier empirical results such as Chen and Liao (2011) and theory 
relating to diversification (Markowitz, 1952) and information asymmetries 
(Bebczuk, 2003) to develop the hypothesis that a foreign parent has effects 
on risk and return, with the sign of these effects being a purely empirical 
matter, depending on whether diversification or information asymmetries are 
dominant.  I then test these hypotheses in a novel framework in which risk 
and return are simultaneous, and aim to resolve conflicts in the literature 
relating to the effects of a foreign parent. 
In Chapter 6, I start from the arguments of Bebczuk (2003) that information 
asymmetries are fundamental in finance, along with studies by Yang and 
Zhao (2014) and Rus et al (2011) which suggest that separating the roles of 
CEO and Chairman can be damaging, and studies such as Renneboog and 
Zhao (2011) which suggests that governance structures intended to control 
remuneration can be subverted to increase it.  I then develop (and 
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subsequently test) hypotheses that bank risk and return are affected by 
factors that entail different abilities to process information (such as the 
number of persons on the Board, previous financial services experience of 
Directors and permission to use certain kinds of credit modelling framework) 
and by other aspects of governance (including the proportion of non-
executives on the Board, the presence of a Joint CEO-Chairman, the presence 
of  a Chief Risk Officer on the Board and the presence of a Remuneration 
Committee). 
In Chapter 7 I develop and test hypotheses that average pay in banks is 
affected by banks’ returns, loan impairments, certain governance structures 
and whether the bank is a mutual or an investment bank.  This is based on 
theoretical and discursive papers in banking and other sectors identifying 
each of these as potentially important for pay (see section 7.2 for details).  
Later in Chapter 7, I use the theory of efficiency wages as described by 
Akerlof and Yellen (1987) and agency theory to develop hypotheses that bank 
pay measured in certain ways has effects on bank risk, return and growth, 
before testing these hypotheses empirically.  
Finally, in Chapter 8, I develop hypotheses that bank risk and return are 
affected by relative and absolute size of the bank, complexity and 
diversification.  This is done because these are important issues often 
discussed alongside questions of governance and ownership (as shown in the 
literature discussed in section 8.2) and because the relative importance of 




The remainder of Chapter 3 discusses the models and data to test these 
hypotheses. 
 
3.3 Approach to Hypothesis Testing 
The main purpose of Chapter 3 is to discuss models and data, all together in 
one place, to avoid repeating the same information many times in the 
empirical Chapters.  This need arises from several basic features of my 
research.  First, I am considering a limited set of dependent variables 
reflecting aspects of risk and return that are of interest to banks, their 
regulators and society.  Second, for each of my hypotheses I am generally 
interested in impacts on more than one of these dependent variables.  Third, 
since my hypotheses are stated as effects on risk and return (not on specific 
indicators) and since there is reason to believe that anything which affects 
risk also has an effect on return (see section 4.2 for discussion), then models 
for each dependent variable must contain broadly the same explanatory 
variables. 
This means that, for each of the six dependent variables I use, there is one 
basic model equation that contains a full set of explanatory variables relating 
to ownership and governance, plus a set of controls relating to balance-sheet 
characteristics and external conditions that could affect risk and return.  
Some of these equations are estimated simultaneously, whereas others are 
used as single-equation models.  Variation occurs in terms of adding 
regressors to test ancillary hypotheses, and testing robustness by dropping 
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sets of regressors or changing estimation procedure, but the basic approach 
remains the same. 
The result is that identical, or very similar, equations are used in different 
chapters.  The empirical Chapters differ from one another in that they each 
discuss an entirely different set of explanatory variables, including ownership 
(Chapter 5), governance and information-processing capability (Chapter 6), 
pay (Chapter 7) and size (Chapter 8).  So, even where the same equations (or 
very similar equations) are used in more than one Chapter, the analysis 
focuses on evaluating an entirely different set of right-hand-side variables in 
that equation. 
In my empirical Chapters, robustness testing is conducted by estimating 
models more than once (with some regressors dropped in some estimations) 
to ensure that results are not dependent on one model specification.  
Estimation procedures are also varied to ensure that results are not 
dependent on one estimator.  In addition, when a Chapter uses an equation 
that is a variation on an equation used in an earlier Chapter, I check that it 
re-produces the results reported in that earlier Chapter; this serves as an 
additional means of robustness testing and is thus better than always using 
the exact same model specification in every Chapter. 
In any case, to avoid extensive repetition of methodology across the empirical 





3.4 Dependent and Explanatory Variables 
As dependent variables to test the hypotheses summarised in section 3.2, I 
use realised measures of bank return and bank risk.  Realised measures are 
used (as opposed to any kind of expected measure, such as implied volatility) 
in order to ensure that my analysis focuses on relationships between 
objective, observable quantities. 
For returns, I use Return on Assets (ROA) because it is a measure of asset 
performance that is normalised to a stable measure of bank size, along with 
Return on Equity (ROE) because results for this outcome can be compared 
with those for ROA in informative ways, and loan interest income (as a ratio 
of gross loans) because interest earned on loans is a principal source of 
income for banks.  As measures of risk I use loan impairments (as a ratio of 
gross loans) because it is a pure measure of adverse asset outcomes and is 
again normalised to balance sheet size, and an indicator of bank failure 
because it represents the most adverse risk event that can occur in banking.  
Similar measures of risk and return are used in the literature, for instance 
Aebi et al (2012) uses return on equity while Forrsbaeck (2011) uses a 
measure of loan impairments normalised to an indicator of bank size. 
My choice of loan impairments as a dependent variable is driven by the fact 
that, as noted in Section 2.3, my study is motivated by the history of 
instability in the banking system.  To inform refinements to banking policy 
and regulation, I aim to understand factors which affect outcomes at the bank 
level, especially bank solvency.  That is, I am interested in the operations of 
banks and the accounting measures they report, especially the solvency 
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position of their accounts, and not in effects of bank risk on the wealth of 
shareholders or in any external, market-based measure of bank risk.  
This contrasts with other studies, which do use market-based measures of 
risk, such as measures derived from credit spreads or measures of firm-
specific risk that are obtained by removing systematic components from 
share price volatility (Jones, 2008).  Such market-based measures reflect the 
market’s combined view of bank risk, but are not directly part of outcomes 
which affect bank solvency and stability and are thus not the appropriate 
measures for my study.  They can also be distorted when issues other than 
bank-specific risk affect share price volatility, although multi-factor models 
that correct for such influences are used to address this issue. 
In addition, a major objective of my study is to include as many as possible of 
those entities which meet the economic definition of a bank (as per Section 
2.2) and to make comparisons between different types of such entities.  It 
would be impossible to include mutual banks (40% of my sample), or small 
unlisted banks, or to ascertain the effects of mutuality, if market-based 
measures of risk were used.  This is because these entities do not have listed 
equities and generally do not have debt instruments in issue from which 
credit spreads could be derived. 
For these reasons, it was necessary to use a measure of risk derived from 
financial accounts.  One possible option was the volatility of ROA or ROE.  
However, with annual-frequency panel data available over ten years and 
quarterly data having high missing-value rates, it would not have been 
feasible to derive a statistically-robust volatility measure in this way. 
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Loan impairments as a ratio of gross loans, however, represents a suitable 
measure.  It is directly part of the financial accounts of a bank, and directly 
affects the bank’s stability by eroding equity and thus solvency.  It is a clear 
adverse outcome, making it a good measure of realised risk.  It is normalised 
to gross loans, such that it is not distorted by differences in the size of banks 
or in the proportion of bank balance sheets made up by loans.  Finally, it is 
available and well-populated in my data. 
Measures of loan impairments and non-performing loan balances are used by 
regulators, academics and advisors to track levels of stress, at the national 
and bank-specific levels.  For instance, the International Monetary Fund 
reports this data and used it to track the status of the global banking system 
in the aftermath of the 2007-2009 banking crisis and the Eurozone debt 
crisis that began in 2009 (IMF Financial Stability Reports and associated 
data releases, April 2011, April 2013 and November 2016).   
It is notable that the IMF data has temporal and spatial patterns consistent 
with economic experience, indicating that it is a reliable measure of realised 
risk.  In the US and UK, for instance, impaired loans were low prior to 2007, 
rose sharply during the crisis years and declined again from 2010.  In Italy 
and Spain, by contrast, impaired loans continued to rise for several years 
after 2010.  Ghosh (2015) also demonstrates variation through time in non-
performing loans in the US that corresponds with economic experience.  
Similarly, private sector advisors report data from the ECB, EBA and bank 
accounting information showing a cross-country comparison in 2013 that is 
also in line with economic experience, with Greece, Ireland and Italy having 
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the highest rates of impaired loans and Sweden, Norway and Switzerland 
having the lowest (Oliver Wyman, 2014). 
It could be argued that loan impairments may be flawed as a measure of risk, 
such as if accounting and audit practice are so poor that impairments are not 
recognised at all.  However, it is not plausible that the measure could be 
flawed to this extent, and the temporal and spatial patterns found in the 
studies outlined above indicate that the loan impairments ratio functions well 
as an indicator of realised risk.  Because this indicator corresponds to 
economic experience at the macro-financial level, the bank-level data from 
which macro-financial aggregates are derived must also contain important 
information on risk.  For this reason, previous important studies comparing 
the risk levels of different banks have used loan impairments or loan losses as 
dependent variables (e.g. Iannotta et al, 2007 and Forrsbaeck, 2011).  It is 
possible that the full extent of loan impairments takes time to emerge, but 
this is addressed by the fact that my study employs lagged regressors. 
As noted, other measures of risk used in the finance literature consist of 
various forms of firm-specific risk.  For the reasons stated above, such 
measures are not suitable for achieving the objectives of the present study.  
However, there are empirical results indicating a positive correlation between 
banks’ non-performing loans and the volatility of their share price (e.g. Banca 
D’Italia Financial Stability Report No. 1, April 2016 and Oludare et al, 2015).  
This is consistent with the experience of the global financial crisis of 2007-
2009 in which concerns over the quality of bank mortgage loans (and related 
assets) and increasing loan impairments led to increases in market measures 
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of bank risk (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2011).  So, if it had been possible and 
appropriate to use market-based measures of risk in this study, one would 
not expect regression results to differ much from those I obtain. 
Of my dependent variables, ROA and loan impairments can be considered 
the main measures of risk and return.  This is because ROA is a pure measure 
of performance, normalised to bank size, while loan impairments is a pure 
measure of adverse asset outcomes, normalised to the total set of assets on 
which they can arise (loans).  I assume that ROE is the outcome of greatest 
interest to shareholders because it represents the efficiency of their equity 
stake in generating returns (Atrill and McLaney, 2006). 
My dependent variables are measures of realised, as opposed to expected, 
risk and return.  Because finance theory deals with expected risk and return, 
using my selected measures to test the specific hypotheses I have outlined 
entails assuming that ownership and governance structures have the same 
effects on realised risk and return as they do on expected risk and return.  
This is a reasonable assumption: there is no reason why explanatory variables 
that are predicted to increase expected returns would not, on average, have 
the same effect on realised returns.  Since realised returns are drawn from the 
distribution of potential returns, we will observe high returns more 
frequently in cases where expected returns are high.  The same argument 
applies to risk.  In any case, in empirical work, we must rely on quantification 
of realised outcomes, not unobservable potentials.  Precise definitions of the 
relevant dependent variables are provided in section 3.8.  
111 
 
Not all dependent variables are used for all hypotheses.  The default options 
are return on assets and loan impairments, because these are my principal 
measures of risk and return.  Combined failure is also used for all hypotheses 
relating to ownership and governance because it can be seen as a holistic 
consequence of other impacts on banks and because of the importance of 
bank failure in adversely impacting the economy and society (Bernanke, 
1983).   
Alongside measures of risk and performance, I also frequently make use of 
growth in total assets as a dependent variable to check if effects on banks’ risk 
and performance are accompanied by effects on their rate of provision of 
investment to the wider economy.  (The finding is usually that there are no 
such effects and the results are therefore often not shown due to space 
constraints, although they can be provided on request). 
Certain indicators of risk and return are important as dependent variables for 
certain hypotheses.  I use loan interest income in testing hypotheses relating 
to the effects of state majority ownership, because there is literature 
suggesting that state-owned banks grant soft loans (Gonzalez-Garcia and 
Grigoli, 2013).  Similarly, where hypotheses relate to the effects of proficiency 
in using information at Director level, I use return on equity as a dependent 
variable.  This is because, as argued above, it is the outcome of greatest 
interest to shareholders, and thus it is the outcome I assume Directors will try 
hardest to maximise when they have the ability to do so.  (Given that 
Directors are representatives of shareholders in large part).  
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The introductions of Chapters 4 to 8, and specific empirical sections within 
these Chapters, explain the dependent variables used, and the basis for the 
choice. 
Turning to the other side of the regression equations, to control for external 
conditions that vary over time but which are identical for all banks, such as 
macroeconomic and regulatory conditions, I use dummy variables 
representing each year from 2004 to 2012.  The year 2003 is taken as the 
base year.  Part of the rationale for this is that there is a business cycle that 
varies through time (Romer, 2006) and which can affect outcomes for banks 
(Allen and Gale, 1998).  The other part of the rationale is that regulatory 
conditions vary through time and this can also have impacts for banks (Noss 
and Toffano, 2016).  I also estimated models using a selection of 
macroeconomic variables in place of year dummies, but the results were not 
materially different from using year dummies, so this approach was not 
followed and the results are not reported. 
To control for characteristics of banks that vary between entities and 
potentially also through time, and which may affect outcomes of interest, I 
include a range of bank-specific controls encompassing business model, 
balance sheet structure and overall bank size.  The rationale for this is simply 
that risk and return can vary across business models (such as if different 
kinds of portfolios and services entail different risk and return).  Specifically I 
consider exposures of banks to one another on the basis that this can 
transmit risk (Tian et al, 2013), the extent of securities holdings as it has been 
argued that this may affect bank risk and return (Allen and Jagtiani, 2000), 
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the extent of fee-earning advisory activity as this can affect the risk-return 
trade-off through diversification effects (Pennathur et al, 2012), the extent to 
which deposits make up the liabilities of the bank as insufficient deposit 
financing can affect risk and return (King, 2013), the extent of equity 
financing as leverage is one of the most basic drivers of risk and return (Atrill 
and McLaney, 2006 and Valencia, 2014) and bank size as this has been 
identified as a driver of risk-taking behaviour (Bhagat et al, 2015).   
The choice of equity ratio (statistically equivalent to leverage ratio) as a 
control variable, rather than some ratio of regulatory capital (total regulatory 
capital, tier 1 capital or core tier 1 capital ratio) requires explanation.  The 
equity ratio is a well-defined concept, based on established accounting 
standards (Atrill and McLaney, 2006 and International Accounting 
Standards Board, 2015).  Regulatory capital ratios, by contrast, have a 
denominator (Risk-Weighted Assets, RWAs) that is quantified based on 
bank-internal models (Bank for International Settlements, 2006 and 2009).  
There is extensive evidence of inconsistency in the quantification of RWAs 
across banks, with the same assets attracting very different RWA treatments 
in different banks (e.g. Ferri and Pesic, 2016).  In addition, regulators report 
that simple leverage (equity ratio) is a better predictor of bank resilience than 
regulatory capital ratios (Haldane, 2013).  Therefore, equity ratio is preferred 
over leverage ratio because it has a more-consistent meaning across banks 




These considerations led me to include the following control variables (with 
definitions as in section 3.8): 
• Exposure to Banks; 
• Securities Holdings; 
• Advisory Activity; 
• Current Deposits Over Liabilities; 
• Equity Ratio; 
• Size over GDP. 
 
To control for effects that outcome variables may have on one another, I also 
include several of the continuous dependent variables I use (ROA, ROE, loan 
interest income and loan impairments ratio) as explanatory variables for one 
another.  Except where there is specific evidence of simultaneity, this is done 
at a lag, as for other regressors.  One rationale for including these as controls 
is that basic accounting (e.g. Atrill and McLaney, 2006) shows that one 
outcome may affect another, for instance if lower returns or higher 
impairments affect the occurrence of bank failure.  As another rationale, I 
argue the outcomes a bank has experienced in respect of one metric of 
interest may affect how it pursues other outcomes of interest in the 
succeeding periods.  For instance, if the loan book has experienced 
impairments, a bank may initiate other activities (such as cost cutting, 
redundancies or new business) designed to bolster ROE.  Responses designed 
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to cut costs by reducing headcount are common during crisis periods 
(Haltenhof, 2014). 
To test the hypotheses in Section 3.2, I use several kinds of explanatory 
variables: measures of ownership type, measures of governance structure, 
measures of information-processing ability and measures of remuneration.   
The measures of ownership type I use encompass the most basic 
characteristics of ownership, specifically whether it is by profit-seeking 
private shareholders, the state or a collective of ordinary individuals 
(depositors in this case) along with a distinction between domestic and 
foreign ownership.  The rationale for including these is to test the hypotheses 
summarised in section 3.2 (and developed in more detail in sections 5.2 to 
5.3).  Specific explanatory variables included are as follows (again with 
definitions as in section 3.8): 
• State Majority Ownership; 
• Mutual Ownership; 
• Foreign Parent. 
 
Measures of governance used include variables which provide an indication 
of the balance of power between agents with different incentives and different 
abilities to use information and coordinate with one another.  The rationale 
here is again to test hypotheses summarised in section 3.2 (and developed in 
more detail in sections 6.2 to 6.4).  Specific explanatory variables included 
are as follows (again with definitions as in section 3.8): 
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• Board Size; 
• Director Ratio; 
• Joint CEO-Chairman; 
• CRO Present on Board; 
• Commercial Director on Board. 
 
As an indicator of information-processing capacity I use the proportion of 
Directors with previous financial services experience, which may be related to 
the ability to process information relating to risk and return.  I also use the 
presence of permission from the national financial services regulator to use 
Internal Ratings Based (IRB) models for the quantification of credit risk, as 
defined in the 2004 Basel II international accord on bank capital adequacy.  
The regulator makes such permission contingent on meeting certain 
standards in respect of credit portfolio data, risk modelling and use of model 
outputs in credit decisions.  As such, it provides a proxy for sophistication in 
processing information.  Finally I include the proportion of Directors who are 
female, on the grounds that a low proportion of female Directors may reflect 
discrimination and unused skills and thus impaired information processing.  
Again, the rationale is to test the hypotheses stated in section 3.2 (and 
developed in more detail in sections 6.2 to 6.4).  Specific explanatory 
variables included are as follows (again with definitions as in section 3.8): 
• No-Experience Ratio of Board; 
• IRB Permission; 
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• Female Ratio of Board. 
 
To test hypotheses summarised in section 3.2 (and developed in more detail 
in sections 6.2 to 6.4) on the effects of governance structures intended to 
control remuneration I use indicators of the presence of a remuneration 
committee and of executive remuneration disclosures.  To test hypotheses 
summarised in section 3.2 (and developed in more detail in sections 7.2 to 
7.3) on the effects of remuneration I use a measure of average pay at all levels 
in the bank.  Specific explanatory variables included are as follows (again 
with definitions as in section 3.8): 
• Remuneration Committee Present; 
• Executive Remuneration Disclosed; 
• Average Pay. 
 
Taking the various sets of regressors listed in this section (bullet lists above) 
and combining them leads to a full set of regressors that is used as a basic 
model specification for all my dependent variables (ROA, ROE, loan interest 
income, loan impairments, growth in total assets and combined failure).  This 
is because, as explained in section 3.3, my key dependent variables are all 
indicators of risk and return.  I expect the same aspects of banks to affect 
different measures of return because these measures of return are all 
indicators of underlying profit appetite, and I expect the same aspects of 
banks that affect return to also affect risk, because risk and return are linked.  
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Thus, the baseline set of regressors for all dependent variables is as follows 
(Table 3.1).  Minor differences of model specifications from this baseline are 




Table 3.1 Basic set of regressors for modelling each of my dependent variables. 
• State Majority Ownership; 
• Mutual Ownership; 
• Foreign Parent; 
• Board Size 
• Director Ratio; 
• Joint CEO-Chairman; 
• CRO Present on Board; 
• Commercial Director on Board. 
• Cumulative Governance; 
• CRO or Chairman; 
• Low NED. 
• No-Experience Ratio of Board; 
• IRB Permission; 
• Female Ratio of Board. 
• Remuneration Committee Present; 
• Executive Remuneration Disclosed; 
• Average Pay; 
• Size Over GDP; 
• Exposure to Banks; 
• Securities Holdings; 
• Advisory Activity; 
• Current Deposits Over Liabilities; 
• Equity Ratio; 
• Year Dummies. 
Note: necessary variations to this set are explained in empirical sections of Chapters 4 to 8. 
The regressors stated are included in lagged form only to account for the fact 
that, because bank assets are long-lived, the financial consequences of 
commercial decisions made due to particular ownership and governance 
structures may take time to appear, but are unlikely to take more than one 
year to show an effect since the financial and operational management of 
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banks operates on a one-year cycle.  In addition, lagged explanatory variables 
are less likely to be subject to reverse or simultaneous causation. 
Although my models are linear-in-parameters, they accommodate non-
linearities such as interaction terms.  This is important to preserve realism.  I 
do not attempt to use a log-linear specification since, although this yields 
parameter estimates that are percentage elasticities, many of the explanatory 
variables of greatest interest are dummy variables that cannot be expressed 
as logs.  I do not express financial variables in real (inflation-adjusted) terms 
since they each consist of ratios of one financial quantity to another such 
quantity from the same period.  They thus take the same value regardless of 
whether the numerator and denominator have been inflation-adjusted or not. 
 
3.5 Econometric Approach 
In any natural or social science, relying on empirical findings entails 
assumptions that a) the system under investigation operates according to 
reasonably stable parameters that describe the effect of one variable on 
another and b) the relevant parameters can be estimated by observing the 
system.  In a general sense, these assumptions are validated by the 
regularities that are necessary and observed in natural and social systems 
(Gauch, 2012), thereby solving the problem of induction (Hume, 1748).  In 
any specific empirical setting, in order for econometric models to identify 
causal effects, explanatory variables must be determined outside the model 
(exogenous), models must contain enough controls to account for co-varying 
factors, sufficient variations of models must be shown to confirm that 
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associations are not specific to one approach, and there must be diagnostics 
to detect various biases that may arise (Greene, 2012). 
To test the hypotheses summarised in section 3.2, I use well-controlled 
econometric models meeting the above criteria.  The core of my research 
strategy is that these models have measures of risk and return as dependent 
variables and measures of governance, ownership and other factors of 
interest as explanatory variables, alongside a range of controls.  This 
approach makes it possible to determine if the relationships I hypothesise are 
present and statistically significant, or not. 
The generic situation I consider is where a range of explanatory variables 
separately affect a dependent variable, with no reason to believe the 
relationship is non-linear.  In this setting, a simple linear model is sufficient 
to estimate causal effects while controlling for co-variates.  Therefore, the 
most basic econometric models I employ are linear regressions estimated by 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).  These involve a dependent variable 𝒚𝒊𝒕 that is 
given by a random error term 𝜺𝒊𝒕 plus the products of a suitable range of 
explanatory variables 𝑿𝒊𝒕 with their associated parameters 𝜷 (with the matrix 
of explanatory variables including a vector of 1s to serve as an intercept 
term).  Banks are represented by subscript i and years by subscript t.  This 
gives equations of the form   




Whenever I use OLS I also, as a robustness test, use panel models with the 
same dependent and explanatory variables, estimated by means of the 
random effects estimator.  This is necessary to verify that results obtained by 
OLS are not simply the consequence of omitted heterogeneity across panel 
units, while also showing that results obtained by random effects are not the 
consequence of failure to meet a key moment condition (zero cross moment 
of regressors with the term for unobserved heterogeneity).  Ordinarily, one 
would verify the latter using the Hausman test, but this is not feasible in a 
setting where some regressors are dummy variables that do not change over 
time for certain banks, such that fixed effects models cannot be estimated to 
compare to random effects models via the Hausman test.  So instead I verify 
that the result is present in both OLS and random effects.  In my random 
effects models, observations are identified for bank i and time point t and 
contain two error terms: a term 𝒖𝒊 to encompass unobserved heterogeneity at 
the bank level and an idiosyncratic error term 𝜺𝒊𝒕.  This gives us equations of 
the form 
𝒚𝒊𝒕 = 𝑿𝒊𝒕𝜷+𝒖𝒊+𝜺𝒊𝒕          (3.2) 
 
Where two dependent variables are treated as simultaneous, it is necessary 
that I use multi-equation models with joint estimation (using two-stage least 
squares or the generalised method of moments) of equations of the following 
form.  These have 𝒛𝒊𝒕 representing a new dependent variable, 𝜶 and 𝜹 and 𝜽 
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representing new parameters to be estimated, and 𝒗𝒊𝒕  representing 
idiosyncratic error.  This gives us equations of the form 
𝒚𝒊𝒕 = 𝒛𝒊𝒕𝜶 + 𝑿𝒊𝒕𝜷+𝜺𝒊𝒕          (3.3) 
𝒛𝒊𝒕 = 𝒚𝒊𝒕𝜹 + 𝑿𝒊𝒕𝜽+𝒗𝒊𝒕          (3.4) 
 
Similarly, in cases where there are theoretical reasons to expect causal 
interactions amongst regressors, I use structural models of the following 
form (again estimated using two-stage least squares or the generalised 
method of moments).  These have 𝒙𝟏𝒊𝒕 representing an endogenous regressor 
that is a subset of 𝑿𝒊𝒕 and 𝑿𝟐 representing another sub-set of regressors that 
have causal effects on 𝒙𝟏𝒊𝒕.  This gives us equations of the form 
𝒚𝒊𝒕 = 𝑿𝒊𝒕𝜷+𝜺𝒊𝒕          (3.5) 
𝒙𝟏𝒊𝒕 = 𝑿𝟐𝒊𝒕𝜽+𝒗𝒊𝒕          (3.6) 
 
My multi-equation models are estimated using two approaches.  The first is a 
2-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) approach in which the first stage involves 
estimating the portions of the endogenous terms that are explained by all the 
exogenous terms, while the second stage uses these portions in estimating the 
model equations as stated (e.g. equations 3.3 and 3.4).  The second approach 
is the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM).  This involves taking a 
moment condition that is assumed as given (zero cross-moment of 
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instruments and residuals), substituting into this statement an expression for 
the residuals in terms of regressors and parameters, solving for parameters, 
and then inputting empirical values of explanatory and dependent variables.   
I only accept results from multi-equation models when they are significant in 
both two-stage least squares and GMM.  This is because each estimation 
method has different limitations.  2SLS is often subject to large standard 
errors in parameter estimates because estimated portions of endogenous 
regressors used in the second stage tend to be correlated with exogenous 
terms, while GMM can be biased or have size distortions in significance tests 
due to weak instruments.  Employing both is a prudent means of improving 
the robustness of results. 
Finally, in models where the dependent variable is binary, I use probit 
models, involving a cumulative normal transformation 𝝓  to a dependant 
variable bounded by 0 and 1, because this is necessary to express the form of 
the dependent variable.  Estimation is by numerical optimisation starting 
from a random seed.  Logit models were not used simply because the choice 
between logit and probit is considered arbitrary.  Tobit and truncated models 
were not used because there is no reason to suspect censoring or truncation 
in the data – financial variables are simply reported in banks’ financial 
accounts as they are while characteristics of governance and ownership are 
fully observable facts.  Linear probability models were rejected on the basis 
that they can predict probabilities greater than 1 or less than zero, which is 
clearly not meaningful.   
The approach chosen gives us equations of the form  
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𝒚𝒊𝒕 = 𝝓(𝑿𝒊𝒕𝜷)+𝜺𝒊𝒕          (3.7) 
 
In single-equation linear models estimated by OLS and random effects I use 
R-squared as the measure of fit.  R-squared is not used for multi-equation 
models since each equation can have a small R-squared (little more 
predictive power than a constant) even if the model overall has high power 
and contains highly significant parameter estimates.  For probit models, 
pseudo-R-squared is used, with this being based on the ratio of the model 
likelihood to the likelihood of a null model containing only an intercept. 
To measure the joint significance of all regressors I use the F statistic in 
single-equation models estimated by OLS and in multi-equation models 
estimated by 2SLS.  I use the Wald Chi-squared statistic in single-equation 
models estimated by random effects and in probit models.  For multi-
equation models estimated by GMM, I report the GMM criterion (cross-
moment of instruments and residuals) as of the final iteration of numerical 
estimation.  
Econometric studies must deal with a range of empirical issues that arise in 
models. Arguably, the most fundamental of these are parameter 
identification (meaning the set of explanatory variables and associated 
parameters to include) and parameter stability.  If we cannot identify a set of 
parameters that uniquely explain an observed data distribution, or if 
parameters are not reasonably stable over time, then causal inference is not 
possible.  In my work, identification of explanatory variables to include is 
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provided by earlier studies that identify features of governance and 
ownership which might affect risk and return.  Parameter stability can be 
assumed because the basic institutions and corporate law of the United 
Kingdom did not change appreciably over the period of my study. 
A further key consideration which any empirical study must address is 
ensuring that results are not affected by endogeneity.  We seek explanatory 
variables that are exogenous, that is with values determined outside the 
model, such that any correlations we detect in a controlled model can be 
interpreted as causal.  Endogeneity occurs when a regressor behaves as if it 
was determined within the model.  This may occur a) when there is reverse or 
simultaneous causality between this regressor and the dependent variable, or 
b) when there is an omitted variable that affects the dependent variable and 
which is correlated with the regressor of interest such that the parameter 
estimate measures the combined effect of two variables, or c) when a 
regressor is measured with error such that we cannot distinguish this error 
from the residual term, or d) when error terms are autocorrelated, such that 
higher or lower errors may occur in the same period as a regressor is high or 
low and may thus be estimated as part of the effect of that regressor.   
Each of these forms of endogeneity manifests as a correlation between the 
regressor affected and the residuals, reflecting the fact that something 
associated with that regressor has been left out of the model.  Endogeneity 
results in biased parameter estimates, such that we can confuse a significant 
with an insignificant parameter or even estimate the wrong sign for a 
parameter.  It must therefore be avoided. 
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My specification strategy is expected to be robust against endogeneity 
problems arising from reverse or simultaneous causation.  As noted in 
Section 3.10, explanatory variables relating to governance, ownership and 
business model are remarkably stable over time for individual banks.  This is 
because such features represent relatively fixed, constitutional choices made 
by banks, which do not generally change in response to variations in 
commercial outcomes, at least not over the time scales considered in this 
study.  These features can therefore be taken as variables that are given 
exogenously and not affected by the changing financial outcomes which I use 
as dependent variables.  We can thus assume (subject to empirical testing) 
that significant associations detected are causal in nature.  In addition, use of 
lagged regressors strengthens the argument that we have exogeneity since it 
makes it unlikely that we have reverse or simultaneous causality.   
Endogeneity due to error in the measurement of key regressors is very 
unlikely since explanatory variables relating to ownership and governance 
structures are precise categorical or count-variable terms that are measured 
with certainty.  Finally, endogeneity due to omitted variables is unlikely due 
to the systematic and comprehensive nature of my specification strategy, 
although it can never be ruled out entirely in a non-experimental study.  
All models were accompanied by diagnostic tests for violation of assumptions 
relating to the presence of independently identically distributed residuals, 
which must be satisfied in order to obtain unbiased, statistically significant 
parameter estimates.  Specifically, I test for endogeneity (using auxiliary 
regressions with residuals as dependent variable), heteroskedasticity (using 
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the Breusch-Pagan test or Hall-Pagan test), multicolinearity (using Variance 
Inflation Factors) and non-normality (using a Skewness-Kurtosis test).   
Tests reveal the presence of heteroskedasticity in all my models, significant at 
the 1% level.  The most important consequences of heteroskedasticity are to 
affect estimation of the standard errors of parameters around their central 
point estimates.  Standard errors are estimated separately from the model 
itself, using functions that involve the estimated variance of the residuals 
over the sum of squared deviations of regressors from their means – such 
that we estimate smaller standard errors when we have more variation in 
regressors (that is, more information).  They are used in hypothesis testing to 
estimate the probability that the parameter is significantly different from 
zero.   
Heteroskedasticity involves residual variance that is not constant over the 
range of values of explanatory variables and, if this is correlated with 
deviations of regressors from their means, we may not recognise that our 
biggest regressor deviations are correlated with the largest errors and we will 
thus over-estimate how much information we have.  This causes us to under-
estimate parameter standard errors, and potentially to over-estimate 
parameter significance.  Serial correlation causes a similar problem if it 
means that residuals are larger or smaller in periods where certain regressors 
tend to deviate above or below their mean. 
To address these issues, I use standard errors that are clustered at the bank 
level.  This involves computing sums through time for banks of residuals and 
of deviations of regressors from their mean (thereby obviating any effect of 
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serial correlation).  Residuals are then adjusted by the deviation of regressors 
from the mean for that observation (thereby obviating any effect of 
heteroskedasticity), residual variance is calculated, and standard errors are 
obtained as outlined above.  This procedure removes the effect of 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation on evaluation of parameter 
significance.  Where diagnostic statistics for heteroskedasticity are reported, 
they are reported for results prior to the introduction of clustered standard 
errors (otherwise the test would be unable to detect the problem). 
Skewness-Kurtosis tests reveal the presence of non-normality in the residuals 
of most models, significant on at least the 10% level and in most cases at the 
5% or 1% level.  However, since I have over 350 observations in each model – 
which is not approaching the asymptotic case but is much greater than the 
minimum number required to estimate standard errors – I conclude that any 
model parameters which are significant are likely to be reliable, especially if 
they are significant at the 5% or 1% level and are resilient in robustness 
testing. 
My models generally have VIFs of 1-8 for the regressors of interest.  This 
indicates that multicollinearity, which involves correlation of regressors with 
one another and therefore reduces the sharpness of the parameter estimates 
that can be obtained, has multiplied standard errors by factors of 1-2.8.  This 
makes it more challenging to obtain statistically significant results.  However, 
I do not remove regressors as the VIFs are not excessively high (they often 
exceed 100 for severe multicollinearity), there is no one obvious regressor to 
remove and I do not wish to unbalance my control strategy.  In any case, it 
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has clearly been possible to obtain significant results, despite the presence of 
multicollinearity, and I verify (using models with subsets of regressors) that 
multicollinearity does not cause sign reversal (as it sometimes can). 
A further potential problem is that results may somehow be specific to a 
single model specification.  This can occur if we omit a regressor that could 
also explain a result, or if we include a regressor that sharply changes the 
observation number, such that a significant result appears in a sub-sample. 
To address this danger, I carry out robustness testing by varying the set of 
regressors included and varying estimation techniques.  These techniques 
serve to show that results are not dependent on one specification or 
estimator.  Results are accepted only when they are found to be robust in 
such testing. 
A final statistical issue that must be considered is the potential for data 
mining bias.  Any study that examines dozens or hundreds of pair-wise 
correlations will always show a number of significant associations, just by 
chance, even if correlations are considered as part of multivariate models.  
For instance, if we examine 100 pair-wise associations then we would expect 
5 to appear significant at the 5% level, just by chance.  Focusing on these 5 
and accepting them as significant is an example of data mining bias. 
There are two reasons to believe that my work is robust against data mining 
bias.  First, I find many more significant associations than chance alone can 
explain. Across all models examined in my econometric strategy (including 
all model versions used in robustness testing and models not shown, but 
excluding year dummies), a total of 3174 pair-wise correlations were 
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examined.  By chance alone, we would expect 159 of these to appear 
significant at the 5% level and 32 to appear significant at the 1% level.  In 
reality, I found 958 associations that were significant at the 5% or 1% level – 
indicating that my model specification strategy has explanatory power far 
beyond what chance alone can explain.   
Second, I only deem causal effects to be robust where the parameter remains 
significant across variations of specification and estimator used in robustness 
testing.  Since one would expect such variation to quickly eliminate results 
that were due to chance alone, the possibility that my results are due to data 
mining bias can be excluded. 
All models were estimated and evaluated using the commercially-available 
statistical software STATA, versions 12 and 14.  STATA identifiers used in 
regression output are as defined in section 3.8. 
 
3.6 Data Sources and Processing 
Data was extracted from the commercially-available database Bankscope.  
This source contains data on several hundred financial variables, using a 
standardised format, for approximately 30,000 banks in all major world 
regions for all years since 1998 and encompasses both annual and quarterly 
data.   
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The data I extracted is at annual frequency2 for all years from 2003 to 2012 
for UK banks.  This covers a balanced selection of a benign economic period 
(2003-2007) and a stressed period (2007-2012), thereby ensuring that 
parameter estimates are not specific to the quality of economic conditions.  It 
excludes 2013 as this year contained only unaudited estimates at the time of 
data extraction and would change the clear balance of the sample between 
benign and stressed periods.  In terms of specific variables, I extracted those 
variables required to test my hypotheses, as per sections 3.4 and 3.8. 
Employing accounting data in an analysis of the economic and financial 
consequences of bank ownership and governance arrangements entails an 
assumption that accounting variables accurately reflect the economic reality 
they are intended to measure.  This is, of course, only imperfectly true.  
However, given the long-standing, robust framework for auditing of financial 
accounts in the UK, imperfections are likely to be limited in scope.  In 
addition, there is little reason to expect imperfections in the application of 
accounting standards to be systematically associated with any of the 
explanatory variables I analyse. 
Without filtration by business model (removing from the data set entities that 
are not true banks, such as investment managers and brokerages) or parent / 
subsidiary status, I obtain data on 711 legal entities for the United Kingdom.  
Filtration to remove entities that are not retail, private, commercial, 
corporate, investment or universal banks or building societies, and to ensure 
that only one entity per corporate group is present in the data reduces this to 
                                                          
2 I also extracted quarterly data, but did not progress with processing or using this data since it has 
many more missing values than the annual data.   
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115 banks.  In all but two cases, the one legal entity included per corporate 
group was the consolidated UK parent entity (i.e. the entity at the top of the 
corporate structure in the UK, even if there was an ultimate parent outside 
the UK).  In these two cases, there was a UK subsidiary in the data set with 
substantially greater total assets than the UK parent and this was thus 
included instead as it is clear that there was an issue with the consolidation.  
Total observations for these 115 banks over the 10-year period numbered 762.   
Where banks are established de novo and come into existence during a year, 
a record is included for them in my data for the year in which they come into 
existence.  Where banks cease to exist during a year due to failure, a record is 
also included for them for that year, but not for subsequent years.  Where 
banks cease to exist during a year due to merger or acquisition, no record is 
included for them for that year in order to avoid double-counting with the 
new group entity that is thereby created and which is also present in the data 
set3.  I also, for all banks present in my data set, painstakingly collected by 
hand data from annual reports and the Pillar 3 disclosures required under 
Basel banking rules.  The data collected in this way relate to all of the 
ownership and governance variables stated in sections 3.4 and 3.8.  Refer to 
section 3.8 below for further details of manually collected variables and other 
variables used in this study.  The use of manually-collected data gives my 
research unique information not used in other studies.   
                                                          
3 Note that the data contain records for an entity entitled ABN-AMRO (Guernsey) that continued to 
exist and be recorded in the database after the acquisition of ABN-AMRO operations and assets in 
the UK by the Royal Bank of Scotland Group in 2007.  This is because ABN-AMRO (Guernsey) is a 
residual component of the original parent entity that was not acquired by Royal Bank of Scotland, 
presumably because its parent wished to retain a private banking presence in the offshore banking 
market of the UK Channel Islands. 
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In addition to the Bankscope data and data manually collected on banks, I 
extracted from the World Bank database data on 13 macroeconomic variables 
for the UK for each of the relevant years and merged this into my dataset on 
the basis of year.  Ultimately, only GDP data was used in order to express 
bank size as total assets over GDP.  Other macroeconomic variables were not 
used as controls because I found that doing so yielded results no different 
from just using year dummies. 
 
3.7 Banks in the Data 
The following list (Table 3.2) summarises the 115 banking entities included in 
my data set, along with a description identifying each as either a retail bank, 
private bank, commercial / corporate bank, universal bank or building 
society.  For the purposes of my analysis, a bank is defined as any 
organisation in the data extract which borrows funds (from depositors or 
wholesale markets) and either invests these or uses them to support capital 
markets activities, such as market-making or proprietary trading in 
securities, currencies or commodities.  This is in line with the relevant 
definition of a bank for a study such as this, as discussed in section 2.2. 
A retail bank is defined as a bank which borrows from private individuals and 
lends to private individuals and small businesses.  A building society is a 
retail bank which is owned mutually by depositors.  A private bank is defined 
as a bank which borrows exclusively from comparatively wealthy individuals.  
A commercial or corporate bank is defined as a bank which is financed by 
borrowing from individuals and businesses and invests mainly in loans to 
135 
 
small, medium or large enterprises.  An investment bank is a bank which is 
financed by borrowing from wholesale markets and invests mainly in loans to 
large corporates or capital markets activities.  A universal bank is a bank 
which engages in most or all of the above activities and may also engage in 
other financial-services activities, such as insurance, brokerage or asset 
management.  These definitions do not have rigid boundaries between them, 
but this is not important here since they are only used to describe the entities 





Table 3.2 Banks included in the data set used in this thesis.   
 Entity Type of Bank  Accounting Year 
End (All at Month 
End) 
1 Abbey National Treasury Services Plc Corporate bank December 
2 ABN AMRO (Guernsey) Limited Private bank December 
3 Ahli United Bank (UK) Plc Universal bank December 
4 AIB Group (UK) plc Retail bank December 
5 Aldermore Bank Plc Retail bank December 
6 Alliance & Leicester Plc Retail bank December 
7 Anglo & Overseas Trust Plc Private bank ---- 
8 Ansbacher & Co Limited Private bank ---- 
9 Arbuthnot Banking Group Plc Private bank December 
10 Banc of America Securities Limited Investment bank December 
11 Bank Leumi (UK) Plc Universal bank June 
12 Bank of Ireland (I.O.M.) Limited Retail bank December 
13 
Bank of London and The Middle East 
Plc-BLME 
Corporate bank December 
14 
Bank of New York Mellon 
(International) Ltd (The) 
Investment bank December 
15 Barclays Plc Universal bank December 
16 Barnsley Building Society Building society December 
17 
Bath Investment & Building Society 
BIBS 
Building society December 




 Entity Type of Bank  Accounting Year 
End (All at Month 
End) 
19 Bradford & Bingley Plc Retail bank December 
20 Britannia Building Society Building society December 
21 British Arab Commercial Bank Plc Corporate bank December 
22 Brown, Shipley & Co Limited Private bank December 
23 Butterfield Bank (Guernsey) Limited Private bank December 
24 C. Hoare & Co Private bank March 
25 Cambridge Building Society Building society December 
26 Cattles Limited Retail bank December 
27 Celtic Bank Limited Retail bank ---- 
28 Chelsea Building Society (The) Building society December 
29 Cheshire Building Society Building society December 
30 Citibank International Plc Universal bank December 
31 Close Brothers Group Plc Corporate bank July 
32 Clydesdale Bank Plc Retail bank September 
33 Co-operative Bank Plc (The) Mutual bank December 
34 Coventry Building Society Building society December 
35 Credit Suisse International Universal bank December 
36 Cumberland Building Society Building society March 
37 Darlington Building Society Building society December 
38 Derbyshire Building Society Building society December 




 Entity Type of Bank  Accounting Year 
End (All at Month 
End) 
40 Dunfermline Building Society Building society December 
41 Europe Arab Bank Plc Corporate bank December 
42 
European Islamic Investment Bank 
Plc 
Investment bank December 
43 Fairbairn Private Bank Ltd Private bank December 
44 FBN Bank (UK) Limited Retail bank December  
45 FCE Bank Plc Commercial bank December 
46 Furness Building Society Building society December 
47 GMAC Commercial Finance Plc Commercial bank December 
48 Gulf International Bank (UK) Ltd Corporate bank December 
49 Habib Allied International Bank Plc Retail bank December 
50 
Hanley Economic Building Society 
(The) 
Building society August 
51 HBOS Plc Retail bank December  
52 Heritable Bank Plc Retail bank December 
53 Hitachi Capital (UK) Plc Commercial bank March 
54 HSBC Holdings Plc Universal bank December  
55 Investec Plc Corporate bank March 
56 Ipswich Building Society Building society November 
57 Itau BBA International Limited Corporate bank December 




 Entity Type of Bank  Accounting Year 
End (All at Month 
End) 
59 Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander Ltd Retail bank December 
60 Kent Reliance Building Society Building society December 
61 Lambeth Building Society Building society January 
62 Lazard & Co Holdings Limited Investment bank December 
63 Leeds Building Society Building society December 
64 Leek United Building Society Building society December 
65 Lloyds Banking Group Plc Retail bank December 
66 Lloyds TSB Bank Plc Retail bank December 
67 London Scottish Bank Plc Retail bank March 
68 Manchester Building Society Building society December 
69 Mansfield Building Society Building society December 
70 Market Harborough Building Society Building society December 
71 Melton Mowbray Building Society Building society December 
72 
Merrill Lynch International Bank 
Limited 
Investment bank December 
73 
Mitsubishi UFJ Securities 
International plc 
Investment bank March 
74 Monmouthshire Building Society Building society April 
75 
Morgan Stanley & Co. International 
Plc 




 Entity Type of Bank  Accounting Year 
End (All at Month 
End) 
76 N M Rothschild & Sons Limited Investment bank March 
77 National Counties Building Society Building society December 
78 Nationwide Building Society Building society April 
79 Nedbank Private Wealth Limited Private bank December 
80 Newbury Building Society Building society October 
81 Newcastle Building Society Building society December 
82 Nomura Bank International Plc Corporate bank March 
83 Northern Bank Limited Retail bank December 
84 
Northern Rock (Asset Management) 
Plc 
Retail bank March 
85 Northern Trust (Guernsey) Limited Investment bank December 
86 Nottingham Building Society Building society December 
87 Paragon Group of Companies Plc Retail bank September 
88 Portman Building Society Building society December 
89 Principality Building Society Building society December 
90 R Raphael & Sons Plc Private bank February 
91 Rathbone Brothers Plc Private bank December 
92 RBC Investor Services Limited Corporate bank October 
93 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc 
(The) 
Universal bank December 
94 Saffron Building Society Building society December 
95 Santander UK Plc Retail bank December 




 Entity Type of Bank  Accounting Year 
End (All at Month 
End) 
97 Scottish Building Society Building society January 
98 
SG Hambros Bank (Channel Islands) 
Limited 
Private bank December 
99 Skipton Building Society Building society December 
100 Southern Pacific Mortgage Limited Retail bank ---- 
101 Standard Bank Plc Universal bank December 
102 Standard Chartered Plc Universal bank December 
103 Stroud & Swindon Building Society Building society December 
104 Sumitomo Mitsui Bank Corp. Europe Corporate bank March 
105 Swansea Building Society Building society December 
106 
Tesco Personal Finance Group 
Limited 
Retail bank February 
107 Tipton & Coseley Building Society Building society December 
108 UFJ International Limited Corporate bank March 
109 Unity Trust Bank Plc Retail bank December 
110 Vernon Building Society Building society December 
111 Virgin Money Plc Retail bank December 
112 VTB Capital Plc Corporate bank December 
113 Weatherbys Bank Limited Private bank December 
114 West Bromwich Building Society Building society March 




3.8 Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
Variables used in this thesis are defined as in the table below (Table 3.3) 
where descriptive statistics are also shown.  Variables defined as ratios have 
been calculated from the various terms described in the definition of the 
variable, as provided in Bankscope or sources used in manual data collection.  
Some variables include multiplication by an arbitrary scalar (100 or 
1,000,000) in their definition.  This serves only to address the issue of 
inconveniently small regression parameters being estimated when these 
scalars are not included, or differences in units between the numerator and 
denominator of a ratio.  This does not affect evaluation of whether or not the 




Table 3.3 Variables used and descriptive statistics.   
Variable Definition Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 









return_on_assets Net income over 
total assets, all 
multiplied by 
100 
756 0.37 2.25 -33.48 23.93 -1.19 107.7 -13.29 23.26 N/A 
return_on_equity Net income over 
total equity, all 
multiplied by 
100 





gross loans, all 
multiplied by 
100 
560 6.65 13.58 0.00 258.49 14.2 237.7 2.7 10.4 N/A 
growth_total_ 
assets 
Total assets at 
the current year 
minus total 
assets at the 
preceding year, 
all over total 









Variable Definition Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 












gross loans, all 
multiplied by 
100 
645 0.63 1.90 -17.33 29.91 5.8 105.8 -0.1 2.9 N/A 
combined_failure Takes a value of 





bailout or stress 
acquisition, 
asset protection, 




760 0.07 0.26 0 1 N/A N/A N/A N/A 54 / 760 
state_majority_ 
owner 
Takes a value of 
1 if a national 
government 
owns more than 
50% of the 
shares, and 0 
otherwise 
 




Variable Definition Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 









mutual_ownership Takes a value of 
1 if the bank is 
owned by 
depositors and / 
or employees, 
and 0 otherwise 
760 0.40 0.49 0 1 N/A N/A N/A N/A 305 / 760 
foreign_parent Takes a value of 
1 if the bank is 
owned by a 
parent entity 
that is based 
outside the 
United Kingdom, 
and 0 otherwise 
760 0.29 0.45 0 1 N/A N/A N/A N/A 218 / 760 






529 11.53 3.73 0 31 1.2 5.4 7 18 N/A 
director_ratio Proportion of the 
Board who are 
Non-Executive 
Directors 
528 0.72 0.14 0.27 1 -0.4 3.0 0.45 0.93 N/A 
rem_co Takes value 1 if 
a Remuneration 
Committee is 
present, and 0 
otherwise 




Variable Definition Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 











Takes value 1 if 
executive 
remuneration is 
disclosed, and 0 
otherwise 
554 0.63 0.48 0 1 N/A N/A N/A N/A 349 / 554 
joint_ceo_ 
chairman 
Takes a value of 
1 if the Board 
Chairman and 
CEO of the bank 
are the same 
individual, and 0 
otherwise 
 
532 0.09 0.28 0 1 N/A N/A N/A N/A 43 / 532 
cro_present_on_ 
board 
Takes a value of 
1 if a Chief Risk 
Officer (CRO) is 
present as a full 
director on the 
Board of the 
bank, and 0 
otherwise 
 




Variable Definition Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 









comm_dir_board Takes a value of 
1 if a 
Commercial 
Director is 
present as a full 
director on the 
Board of the 
bank, and 0 
otherwise 
 
553 0.40 0.49 0 1 N/A N/A N/A N/A 216 / 553 
female_ratio The proportion 
of the Board 
who are female 
456 0.13 0.08 0 0.5 0.4 3.7 0 0.37 N/A 
no_exp_ratio The proportion 
of the Board 










Variable Definition Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 









cro_or_chair Takes a value of 
1 if either Chief 
Risk Officer 
(CRO) is 
present as a full 
director on the 
Board or there is 
a Chairman 
separate from 
the CEO, and 0 
otherwise 
760 0.74 0.44 0 1 N/A N/A N/A N/A 562 / 760 
cumul_gov Takes the value 
3 if a bank has 
all three of an 
independent 
Chairman, CRO 
on the Board 
and NEDs being 
over 50% of the 
Board.  Takes 
the value 2 if 
two of these are 
the case, and so 
on 
 




Variable Definition Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 









low_ned Takes a value 1 
if NEDs are less 
than half the 
Board, and 0 
otherwise 
 
760 0.07 0.25 0 1 N/A N/A N/A N/A 53 / 760 
irb_permission Takes a value of 






use the Internal 
Ratings Based 
(IRB) approach 




and 0 otherwise 




Variable Definition Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 









big_and_irb Takes a value of 
1 if 
irb_permission 
has value 1 and 
the bank has 
assets greater 
than 10% of 
GDP, and 0 
otherwise 





banks over total 
assets 






730 0.21 0.21 0 1.00 1.7 5.8 0.003 0.67 N/A 
advisory_activity Net fees and 
commissions 
over total assets 
701 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.39 6.7 68.7 0 0.06 N/A 
equity_ratio Equity over total 
assets 












Variable Definition Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 









size_over_gdp Total bank 
assets over 
GDP (with total 
bank assets first 
multiplied by 
1,000,000 to 
reflect the fact 
that it was in 
millions while 
GDP was in 
units) 













10.1 136.9 26 357 N/A 
excess_pay The portion of 
average_pay 
not explained by 
equation 7.3 (in 
GBP thousands) 






for the bank 




Variable Definition Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 











Rank by total 
assets, 
compared to all 
other banks in 
Bankscope in 
the same year 
520 3282 2463 18 10152 0.7 2.6 276 7667 N/A 
Year Dummies Year dummies 
that take the 
value of 1 for 
each particular 
year between 
2003 and 2012, 
and zero 
otherwise 
 - -  -  -  -  - - - - N/A 
Note: The mean, standard deviation and outliers for these variables all have economically reasonable values.  Outliers have been checked and relate to cases where 
the denominator and / or numerator changed sharply or the variable took an extreme value due to stress or other special conditions.  For instance, very low negative 
return on equity occurs when there are large losses and these have caused the equity (denominator in the ratio) to become very small.  As explained in section 3.13, 
a few extreme outliers are removed in regression analysis to avoid excessive impact on estimates, and influential observations analysis has been carried out to verify 




Specific outliers occurring in this data set were examined and confirmed to be 
reasonable.  For instance, large negative values of ROE occurred in years 
when banks made large losses and, because of these losses, the equity base 
(the denominator in the ratio) became small.  Large positive loan interest 
income occurred in cases where loan balances shrank markedly during the 
year (such that the denominator at year-end was small).  Negative loan 
impairments occurred in a few cases because of re-valuation of loan books.  
Advisory activity had a small negative value in a few cases where banks 
appear to have paid for such services.  The biggest banks had assets 
equivalent to just over twice UK GDP (with the largest being HSBC in 2012).  
Some investment banks with limited numbers of employees and high top 
salaries had average pay of up to just over £10m GBP (with the highest being 
Morgan Stanley International in 2006).  
For binary variables, the measure of distribution is simply the number of “1” 
values present, compared to the total number of observations.  Some 
variables are highly skewed, but I utilise only those where the number of 
minority cases exceeds 5% of the sample (≈37 observations).  This is enough 
to represent real variation, not the presence of a few idiosyncratic cases.  
Variables that were discarded because the number of minority cases was too 
low are discussed in Section 3.9 below.  In comparisons performed via 
regression models, effects of a limited number of minority cases can be 
detected if the scale of the effect is large enough to be statistically significant.  
Achieving significance is made easier by the efficiency of estimators, which is 
in turn assisted by my using an extensive set of controls for co-variates. 
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For continuous variables, the measures of distribution I use are skew, 
kurtosis, the 5th percentile and the 95th percentile.  These yield results 
consistent with the empirical distributions that are reported in Section 3.9.  
For instance, negative skew for ROA and ROE is observed due to cases where 
there was large negative performance due to stress (Section 3.13 describes 
how a few extreme outliers are excluded from analysis).  High kurtosis is 
evident in cases where there is a “typical” range of values in which many 
observations reside (e.g. ROA between -1% and +2%).  This is not 
problematic because neither the theory of OLS nor the theory of random 
effects nor that of multi-equation empirical modelling nor that of the probit 
model relies on any assumption relating to the distribution shape for 
dependent or explanatory variables.  We need only sufficient variation for 
modelling and Section 3.9 shows that this is present, including within the 
“typical” ranges.  The distribution shape for residuals does matter, but this 
ceases to be important as observation number approaches the asymptotic 
case (often several hundred).   Please refer to Section 3.9 for more complete 
information on variable distributions.  
The manually-collected variable IRB Permission takes a value of zero in all 
years prior to 2007, since this was the time at which the IRB regime took 
effect.  However, this is not problematic since what I am testing by including 
this variable is simply the consequences of banks having both a) permission 
to use internal models for calculating the regulatory capital required to 
address credit risk and b) an accompanying regulatory requirement that such 
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models be used for decision-making purposes, including decisions to grant or 
refuse credit. 
It is also important to understand associations of variables with one another.  
This has implications for occurrence of multicollinearity in models.  The 
assessment of correlations amongst regressors is best achieved using 
Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) because these are based on multivariate 
correlation.  I include VIFs with all models.  However, for completeness, 
bivariate correlations are shown here. 
Many measures of association exist (Siegel and Castellan, 1988).  For the case 
of one count or continuous variable versus another count or continuous 
variable, one may use Pearson correlation.  For a count or continuous 
variable versus a binary one, Pearson correlation is also acceptable.  It is 
based on correspondence of deviations from averages, so it works acceptably 
for binary versus continuous correlation. 
The binary versus binary situation requires more specialised measures, of 
which there are many choices.  Polychoric correlation infers associations 
between latent continuous variables that are assumed to determine observed 
binary states.  Measures based on the Chi-squared statistic compare the 
observed frequency of a pairing of states to the expected frequency under a 
null hypothesis of no association.  The Phi coefficient adjusts Chi-squared for 
sample size.  Cramer’s V adjusts Chi-squared for sample size and for low 
numbers of observations for either variable.  The Kappa coefficient is simpler 
and is based on numbers of concordant and discordant pairs.  The Lambda 
statistic treats one variable as dependent and the other as independent. 
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For my data, Cramer’s V is most suitable.  It has a robust theoretical basis 
using Chi-squared and the two adjustments it entails are both relevant.  
There is no reason to treat one variable as independent and the other as 
dependent since I am primarily assessing at correlations amongst regressors.  
I therefore show two correlation tables, containing Pearson correlation and 
Cramer’s V, respectively.  I include all variables in the former and only binary 
variables in the latter (Tables 3.4 and 3.5 below).  It is notable that 
correlations are generally low, with very few falling outside a range from -0.5 
to +0.5 (shown in amber).  More importantly, in Chapters 4 to 8, VIFs show 
that multivariate correlations of regressors are also limited.  
Interestingly, no existing bivariate association statistic fully captures the 
economics behind associations in my data.  For instance, state ownership and 
mutual ownership are mutually exclusive.  But they attract a Pearson 
correlation of only -0.23 and a Cramer’s V of only -0.18, rather than values 
closer to -1.0.  The reason is that there are many observations where neither 
state ownership nor mutual ownership exists so, computationally, the 
formula for Cramer’s V cannot identify that they are mutually exclusive.  
There could be scope for new operational research to develop a statistic that 
recognises when there are zero instances of a combination of states and 
boosts the positive or negative association accordingly.  For my current 
research, this is not an issue since the aim is only to understand the extent of 
multicollinearity, which is in any case better addressed through VIFs as 
reported in Chapters 4 to 8, rather than bivariate correlations. 
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3.9 Empirical Distributions 
In this section, I present sets of histograms (Fig. 3.1 and Fig. 3.2) showing 
empirical distributions for each of the variables considered in my analysis.  
Variables are as defined in Section 3.8.  This analysis confirms that the 
central tendencies and tail values present can be interpreted as economically 
reasonable.  It also shows that variables have sufficient variation for inclusion 
in regression models.  Binary variables are included in the same way as 
continuous and ordinal variables so as to show that there is sufficient 
representation of both states (0 and 1) for use in models. 
Figure 3.1 Empirical Distributions of Dependent Variables.  
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Figure 3.2 (contd.) Empirical Distributions of Explanatory and Control Variables.   
 
Note: variable abbreviations and definitions are as per section 3.8.  This includes various interaction 
terms created in Chapter 6 and the measure excess_pay created in Chapter 7. 
 
These descriptive plots demonstrate that the variables used are suitable for 
inclusion in regression models on the grounds that they have clear variation 
in their values and take on economically reasonable values.  In addition, 
descriptive statistics shown in section 3.8 show that they have low or very low 
missing-value rates.   
A small set of other variables (not shown) were considered as potentially 
useful indicators of risk but were excluded as unsuitable at this stage in the 
analysis.  A variable called other impairments (impairments on non-loan 
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762 potential observations and b) loan impairments (normalised to the size 
of the loan book on which such impairments can occur) can be used instead 
as a dependent variable that reflects realised risk.   A variable called total 
impairments was also excluded because it consists of the sum of loan 
impairments and other impairments and also had a serious missing-value 
problem. 
The variable Audit Committee / Board Risk Committee present was also of 
potential interest to determine if this structure mitigates risk in the way 
regulators expect, but was excluded as a potential explanatory variable on the 
basis that, out of 322 cases where this variable was populated, only 8 zero 
values were observed (2.5% of cases).  Internal Audit function present was of 
potential interest for similar reasons, but was likewise excluded on the basis 
that, out of 316 cases where this variable was populated, only 8 zero values 
were observed (2.5% of cases).  These patterns do not represent variation of a 
variable, but rather indicate the presence of idiosyncratic cases that differ 
from norms that are near-universal in the sample.  Indeed, given that 
regulation has long required UK banks to possess Board-level audit or risk 
committees and internal audit functions (UK Corporate Governance Code, 
1998), it is surprising that even this level of variation is present (although it 
may be explained by the ‘comply or explain’ principle embedded in the Code).   
Other variables with skewed distributions are retained, on the basis that 
there is still sufficient variation for modelling.  State majority owner takes a 
value of ‘1’ in 42 out of 756 populated cases (5.6% of cases).  However, this is 
a sufficient number of ‘1’ values to represent real variation in the population, 
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not just a few idiosyncratic cases.  Indeed, there are well-known cases of 
state-owned banks in the sample I used.  Bank size, as measured by total 
assets as a proportion of GDP, shows limited variation but it does have real 
variation, with many observations having values distributed between zero 
and 5%, plus a relatively even but very thin distribution over all values above 
that up to 205%.  This is sufficient variation to be of interest for modelling, 
especially since the extremes of the distribution represent radically different 
sizes of entity (small local banks compared to global banking groups). 
 
3.10 Stability of Explanatory Variables 
A crucial, and very useful, feature of this data set is that many of the 
explanatory variables of greatest interest, relating to ownership, governance 
and information processing capacity, are very stable over time.  The status of 
being state-owned, a mutual organisation or owned by a foreign parent tends 
not to change at all from one year to the next.  The composition of Boards 
tends to change little year on year.  Likewise, the practices of having the CEO 
and Chairman be separate individuals, or having a CRO on the Board, once 
adopted, tend not to be abandoned.  IRB permission, once obtained, is 
generally not lost or relinquished.   
This is important in that it gives reason to believe these variables are 
exogenous; they are given aspects of bank structure that may affect 
dependent variables of interest but which, because they do not change, do not 
appear to be susceptible to reverse or simultaneous causality, at least not over 
the time scales considered in this analysis.  Provided I control for covariates 
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that might be correlated with these explanatory variables, I should have 
exogeneity.  Thus, a severe problem that can affect regression modelling – 
endogeneity – is minimised.  To confirm this conclusion, models I run are 
accompanied by diagnostic tests for the presence of endogeneity. 
The following analysis (Table 3.6) shows autocorrelation coefficients at a lag 
of one year for explanatory variables used in hypothesis testing.  All have a 
value of 0.88 or greater and several approach perfect autocorrelation.  This 
supports the argument for exogeneity, as explained above, and potential 





Table 3.6 Autocorrelation coefficients over one year of regressors and control variables.   
Variable Autocorrelation Coefficient 
State Majority Owner 0.95 
Mutual Ownership 1.00 
Foreign Parent 1.00 
Board Size 0.91 
Director Ratio 0.93 
Remuneration Committee Present 0.91 
Executive Remuneration Disclosed 0.98 
Average Pay 0.98 
Joint CEO-Chairman 0.88 
CRO Present On Board 0.90 
Commercial Director Present On Board 0.92 
Female Ratio 0.86 
No Experience Ratio 0.92 
IRB Permission 0.87 
Exposure to Banks 0.91 
Securities Holdings 0.93 




Variable Autocorrelation Coefficient 
Equity Ratio 0.96 
Current Deposits Over Liabilities 0.96 
Size Over GDP 0.98 
 
 
3.11 Key Data Conventions 
A number of key conventions and definitions are important in understanding 
the data I extract and in ensuring it is used in an appropriate way to test 
hypotheses.  These are described in this section.  It is important to state these 
in order to show that my results are robust to definitional issues. 
The data I use from Bankscope are on an annual, calendar-year basis, with 
variables presented with universal definitions across banks, using the Fitch 
Universal Format.  Stock variables from the balance sheet are as of year-end.  
Flow variables from the profit and loss account or cash flow statement are for 
the course of twelve months from one year-end to the next. 
For banks that do not have a December year-end, Bankscope includes data 
for the bank accounting year-end nearest to a December year-end.  For my 
analysis, this variation in accounting year-ends is almost irrelevant as the 
great majority of the banks in my sample had a December year-end for 
financial reporting purposes.  Those that did not mostly had year-ends close 
to December.  Out of 111 entities for which I could obtain annual reports, 85 
(77%) had year-ends at the end of December and 106 (95%) had year-ends 
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between the end of September and the end of March.  In any case, since the 
external economic and regulatory conditions that are included in my models 
(captured through year dummies) tend to be stable from one quarter to the 
next and the fundamental ownership and governance characteristics of banks 
themselves do not change from quarter to quarter (as shown in section 3.10) 
a slight mismatch in the time points at which banks are compared should 
have only minimal effects on the analysis.  
I record governance data collected from annual reports and pillar III 
disclosures as the values that prevailed for most of the calendar year.  For 
instance, if a bank had 8 non-executive directors for most of the year but lost 
one of them three months before the calendar year-end, then I record the 
number of NEDs present for the year as 8.  This is possible because banks 
disclose arrival and departure dates for directors during the year.  In this 
way, performance and impairments accumulated over the year are compared 
with the governance structure that prevailed for most of the year.  This 
definitional point is very unlikely to be important for comparisons across 
banks since, as shown in Section 3.10, the explanatory variables I use are 
remarkably stable over time.   
All of the data included in my sample relate to UK entities.  In most cases, the 
entity is simply a bank with the ultimate parent entity based in the UK and all 
its operations in the UK.  In other cases, it is the UK subsidiary of a foreign 
bank, with only the balance sheet and income statement of the UK entity 
included in my data.  So, in all cases, I consider only the balance sheets and 
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income statements of UK businesses, with the assets, liabilities and income 
statements of non-UK operations excluded.   
In cases where a foreign parent had control over a UK branch or subsidiary, 
the composition of the foreign parent’s Board was generally used as the basis 
of the governance and ownership data I collected.  A separate UK Board was 
used only in a few cases where the annual report of the company stated 
explicitly that it had decision-making independence from the parent.  This 
convention provides further support for the argument, discussed in more 
detail in Section 3.10, that governance variables are exogenous: if a 
characteristic originates with an overseas parent entity, it is even less likely to 
be subject to reverse causality in which it is affected by financial 
characteristics of the branch or subsidiary. 
For a few continental European banks where there is both a supervisory 
Board and a managerial Board at parent level, I include only the supervisory 
Board in defining variables relating to Board composition.  This is because 
the supervisory Board has oversight over the managerial Board and can over-
rule its decisions, while the managerial Board is more similar to an Executive 
Committee (ExCo) in a UK or US corporate governance context.  This was 
relevant only for a few banks.  
Non-Executive Directors are defined in my data as Directors who do not have 
any executive responsibilities identified by the annual report.  In applying 
corporate governance codes and guidelines, banks may operate other 
definitions of non-executive status, such as having no executive 
responsibilities and having had no such responsibilities with the same or a 
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related organisation at any time in the past.  However, since banks may vary 
in their application of definitions established in governance codes – such as 
in what counts as a ‘related organisation’ – adopting their definitions could 
lead to inconsistency in my data.  I therefore adopt the simpler, more 
objective standard of simply counting NEDs as directors who do not have 
specifically-identified executive responsibilities. 
By this definition, Chairmen and Vice / Deputy Chairmen of banks are 
classified as non-executive since they do not have specific identified executive 
responsibilities and instead serve mainly to oversee the CEO and other 
executives. 
 
3.12 Data Processing Audit 
As discussed above, data processing in this thesis involved merging extracts 
of financial data from Bankscope with manually-collected data on ownership 
and governance, and with World Bank data for UK GDP, all using bank-year 
as a merge key.  Data collection and processing steps were carried out with a 
very high level of caution to avoid introducing error.  In order to provide 
further assurance that data collection and processing did not introduce error, 
I carried out a sample-based audit of the final processed data set.  This 




3.13 Imputation and Outliers 
Addressing the problem of missing values is an important issue in applied 
statistics and econometrics.  If more than a small proportion of values is 
missing for a given variable, imputation with replacement values is generally 
necessary.  This is because the alternative is to completely remove any data 
point containing a missing value for any variable, which would carry a greater 
cost in terms of estimator unbiasedness, consistency and efficiency.  If several 
variables have missing values, removing records when anything is missing 
can result in loss of most of the data set and, thus, an unrepresentative 
sample. 
I carried out imputation only after all of the descriptive analysis described in 
sections 3.8 to 3.10 above had been completed.  This was necessary for me to 
understand the data as it is, before making replacements to facilitate 
regression modelling.   
In conducting imputation, it was necessary to choose between two alternative 
approaches:   
1) Backward replacement in which a missing value is replaced with the 
value at the subsequent time point for the relevant variable and bank 
or, if this fails, replacement with the average value for the relevant 
variable for the bank; or 
2) Model-based imputation using the predicted values obtained from 
models with the variable with missing values as dependent variable, all 
other regressors as potential independent variables, and a machine 
learning algorithm to find the most predictive imputation model.  This 
172 
 
approach ultimately involves hypothesis testing using several replicate 
data sets with different estimates of missing values to estimate the 
final regression models, which has the effect of introducing an 
additional error component.  
Approach (1) has a strong empirical rationale in my data set in that the 
relevant characteristics of banks show a very high level of autocorrelation 
(see section 3.10), such that the best estimate for a missing variable is likely 
to be the value at the succeeding time point.  Compared to approach (2) it has 
the desirable characteristics that it is simpler, more easily understood and 
does not introduce additional variance through the variance inherent in using 
several replicate data sets.   
Approach (2) may be realistic in that different characteristics of banks are 
correlated and we can use this information to estimate what the missing 
values would have been.  However, the extent of the autocorrelations 
reported in section 3.10 suggests that approach (1) is likely to be as good a 
predictor of missing values as approach (2), without the additional 
complexity that approach (2) involves.  For these reasons, all of the research 
presented in this thesis has been carried out using approach (1) in missing 
value imputation.    
Missing-value replacement was carried out at the level of the actual derived 
variables used in regression (such as equity ratio) rather than the underlying 
variables used in deriving such ratios (such as equity capital and total assets).  
This is because financial ratios are more definitive of the nature of a bank 
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than absolute amounts and are therefore more likely to be stable over time as 
bank management pursue specific financial strategies. 
I do not carry out imputation for values of dependent variables that are 
missing because they are missing at very low rates, because dependent 
variables do not show the same degree of autocorrelation, and because their 
imputation would entail greater potential for affecting parameter estimates – 
especially for parts of the data where an imputed dependent variable was 
regressed on imputed regressors. 
After imputation, my panel of data remained mildly unbalanced (for instance 
due to certain banks coming into or out of existence during the period 
analysed).  However, this has no impact on the study because none of the 
estimators used requires a balanced panel. 
In my models, a small number of observations are removed due extreme 
outliers in the dependent variables that would have unduly affected 
parameter estimates.  This entailed removal of 6 bank-year data points, out of 
761 total observations.  The criteria for removing data points were as follows: 
• Removal of cases where loan impairments were more negative than -
10% of gross loans (because this removed one extreme outlier and it is 
abnormal to have large negative impairments); 
• Removal of cases where loan interest income exceeded 100% of gross 
loans (because this removed four extreme outliers and it is abnormal 
to have loan interest income exceeding gross loans); 
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• Removed cases where return on equity was more negative than -250% 
(because this removed one extreme outlier). 
 
Such removal was carried out only for extreme values of dependent variables, 
not for explanatory variables.  This was because the dependent variables had 
the clearest extreme outliers and are most likely to unduly affect many 
parameter estimates.  For explanatory variables, influential observations 
analysis confirmed that no single observation had a significant effect on 
parameter values. 
 
3.14 Observation Numbers in Models 
The number of observations in my models is typically less than the maximum 
in this data set (761) because the observation number for some dependent 
variables (which are not subject to missing-value replacement) can be as low 
as 560, because some explanatory variables after backward replacement can 
still have observation numbers as low as 616 (with missing cases not entirely 
matching the dependent variable) and because the operation of lagging 
sacrifices 115 observations.  Nevertheless, the approach to missing-value 
replacement employed is considered best to ensure results are not artefacts of 
replacement, while lagging is necessary to allow for delayed effects and to 





This Chapter describes the shared methodology that is used to test all of my 
hypotheses, in order to avoid reiterating it several times in empirical 
Chapters.  I describe models that contain all fundamental aspects of banks – 
ownership, governance, information processing capacity and financial state – 
as regressors, along with indicators of performance and risk as dependent 
variables.  Explanatory and control variables have been selected carefully to 
encompass a full range of attributes of banks.  Model parameters in 
subsequent Chapters are estimated by a range of approaches in order to show 
robustness to changes in estimation method, and robustness to variations in 
model specification is shown by estimating models that contain subsets or all 
of the full set of regressors.  This strategy makes it possible to answer my core 
research questions in a way that controls for co-varying factors and is robust 
to changes in model specification and estimation method.   
Data to estimate my models is obtained by combining financial data with 
institutional data collected by hand.  The data set achieves a balance of 
stressed and unstressed economic periods and has a sufficient observation 
number for analysis. 
Descriptive statistics show that all of the variables employed for modelling 
have sufficient variation and that their means and extreme values are 
economically plausible.   A data audit revealed no errors in data sourcing or 
processing and it was found that regressors are highly stable over time.  The 
latter means I have an a priori rationale for arguing that many of my 
regressors are exogenous (on the basis that they cannot have been subject to 
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reverse or simultaneous causality if they do not change), although I also test 
this argument empirically.  It also means that I can carry out missing value 
imputation by backward replacement with subsequent values for the same 
bank and variable, which is carried out for all regressors, but not dependent 
variables. 
In conditions where it is not possible to use real or quasi experiments, the 
type of approach presented here provides the strongest basis for empirically 
testing hypotheses of interest.  Results obtained are shown in each of 






Chapter 4: Simultaneity of Risk and Return 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I test the hypothesis that bank risk and return are 
simultaneous.  I use the methodological approach set out in the preceding 
Chapter, with equations used in a simultaneous estimation framework.  The 
dependent variables are ROA and loan impairments, because these are my 
most important measures of risk and return, and because simultaneity was 
not evident for other measures.  Robustness of simultaneity is tested by using 
many variants of the simultaneous model throughout this thesis. 
For the first time in the literature on banking, I show that simultaneity is 
present between ROA and loan impairments as realised measures of bank 
return and risk.  These variables are used in the empirical literature as 
measures of return and risk, but no studies in the literature on bank 
ownership and governance treat them as simultaneous.    
My demonstration of a simultaneous relationship is important for two 
reasons.  First, it shows that a basic tenet of finance theory – the simultaneity 
of risk and return – holds in this setting.  Second, it creates a framework in 
which to evaluate the effects of different aspects of governance and 
ownership, against a background where no studies in the literature on bank 
ownership and governance take account of such simultaneity between risk 




In the sections that follow, section 4.2 considers literature relating to the 
association of risk and return in finance, section 4.3 develops a specific 
hypothesis to test, sections 4.4 and 4.5 show that simultaneity is present and 
section 4.6 shows that bias in other estimates results if this simultaneity is 
ignored.  Section 4.7 synthesises results and explains how they provide a 
framework for Chapters 5 to 8. 
 
4.2 The Theory of Risk and Return 
Basic accounting (Atrill and McLaney, 2006) shows that loan impairments 
and return on assets may be related in that loan impairments enter the profit 
and loss account as a negative item.  Beyond this, finance theory suggests that 
risk and return are determined simultaneously (Jones, 2008 and Mishkin, 
2012).  If the return changes, it must be because of new activities in the 
underlying issuer of the security or speculative forces in financial markets, 
each of which entail risk.  Likewise, if the risk changes, then returns will 
generally adjust in response.   The latter occurs because investors demand a 
given return for a given risk.  If the return is too low, investors who hold the 
asset will seek to sell, prices will fall and returns will be driven up.  
Conversely, if the return is excessive, new investors will seek to buy the asset, 
prices will rise and returns will fall. 
This relationship holds for tradable assets such as shares.  However, I argue 
that it should also hold for measures of risk and return derived from the 
profit and loss statements of banks.  If bank shareholders see that banks have 
invested in assets which are riskier, and there is sufficient information for 
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them to know that this is so, they will demand that the bank seeks higher 
return on those assets because both the risk and the return ultimately flow 
back to them as owners. 
Key parts of finance theory are constructed on the foundation of a risk-return 
linkage.  In Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT), for instance, risk is treated as 
the standard deviation of expected return, such that the risk of different 
positions combines according to a quadratic function that takes account of 
their correlation (Markowitz, 1952).  The risk-return mix of different portfolio 
combinations of tradable assets thus plots as an efficient frontier, with 
combinations below the frontier being inefficient and combinations above it 
being achievable only through leverage.   
Investors have different degrees of risk aversion, reflected in the extent to 
which the price they will pay for a lottery deviates from the certainty 
equivalent obtained by probability-weighting the different outcomes.  In MPT 
they select a point on the efficient frontier based on where their set of parallel 
indifference curves, along which utility is constant, have the same slope as 
the frontier, such that utility is maximised subject to the frontier.  As 
discussed, bank shareholders may behave in an analogous manner by 
insisting that banks they control (or at least influence) ensure that 
investments made by the bank earn higher returns when those investments 
are riskier, compared to other available investments. 
However, the simultaneity between risk and return that is present in theory 
may be absent in certain applied situations.  Investors may lack adequate 
information about risk to price assets in a manner that brings about the 
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expected risk-return association.  Situations such as this where limitations 
relating to information prevent markets from adjusting in the manner 
expected are important in economics (Bircher and Butler 2007). 
More recent work in behavioural economics and neuro-economics provides 
further reasons why simultaneity of risk and return may not always be 
present  Wilkinson, 2008 and Glimcher and Fehr, 2013).  Even when 
information is available, individuals do not always respond to it in rational, 
consistent ways.  Several well-documented behavioural biases illustrate this.  
Trend following and herding involve relying on the assumptions of other 
investors rather than fundamental information.  Framing, narratives and 
mental accounting involve responding differently to the same information 
depending on how it is presented.  Anchoring and status quo bias occur when 
a single piece of information is relied upon because it was selected at some 
stage, or when there is an assumption the current situation will continue.  
Confirmation bias, overconfidence and self-attribution all involve responding 
only to information that reinforces prior beliefs and belief in self.  
Representativeness bias occurs when small samples of data are used for 
excessively general inferences.  Loss aversion entails avoiding actions that 
would mean recognising a loss, while money illusion and reference points 
involve responding inappropriately to nominal prices or arbitrary price 
thresholds.   
Not all of these behavioural biases are present in all situations.  But they stem 
from a common fundamental cause: human cognitive limitations, especially 
when faced with complexity or limited information.  This makes it necessary 
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to verify that the risk-return simultaneity assumed in theory for financial 
assets is present in practice for banks.  If it is present, it is then necessary to 
use multi-equation models that take account of this simultaneity in order to 
ensure that its omission does not lead to biased results. 
A small number of studies in the relevant literature on bank ownership and 
governance do use multi-equation models in a narrow way to test the 
robustness of results to an assumption that one particular explanatory 
variable is endogenous.  The study by Leven and Levine (2009) discussed in 
section 2.5.2, reporting that managerial ownership increases risk, confirmed 
its results using a simultaneous equations framework in which the regressor 
Tobin’s Q (a measure of franchise value) is made endogenous.  Likewise, the 
study by Pathan (2009), showing that the presence of more independent 
directors leads to lower risk, confirms its results using a simultaneous 
equations framework in which the proportion of independent directors is 
made endogenous.   
Other studies use multi-equation frameworks simply because an explanatory 
variable takes the form of a modelled parameter.  For instance, the study by 
Bai and Elyasiani (2012) discussed in section 2.5.2, showing that the 
sensitivity of bank CEO pay to stock price has a significant positive 
association with bank risk, intrinsically used a multi-equation framework. 
A few empirical studies more tangential to my core questions have used 
simultaneous equation models.  Cornett et al (2009) find that each of the 
following are endogenously determined: bank performance, the sensitivity of 
CEO pay to performance, an indicator of earnings management and the 
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proportion of the Board which is independent.  The consequence of board 
independence found in this study is a bidirectional positive relationship with 
the performance-sensitivity of CEO pay, but the effects of other ownership 
and governance structures are not considered and risk and return are not 
treated as simultaneous.   
Elyasiani and Jia (2008) employ an empirical framework in which bank 
performance and the stability of institutional ownership are simultaneous, 
revealing a positive effect of stable institutional ownership on performance.  
Elyasiani and Zhang (2015) use simultaneous equations to evaluate the 
effects of Director busy-ness (in the sense of multiple other directorships) on 
bank risk and performance, and find that busy-ness is associated with 
beneficial outcomes, but they do not consider effects of other ownership and 
governance structures.  Cooper (2009) uses a three-equation model of 
simultaneity between private-bank performance, the proportion of insiders 
on the Board and senior-level remuneration, revealing that insider 
representation leads to higher pay. 
All of these studies differ from my work in the framework used, the questions 
asked and the results obtained.  In summary, no empirical studies have 
assessed the effects of ownership and governance on bank risk and return 
using a framework in which bank risk and return are treated as simultaneous. 
 
4.3 Literature Gaps and Hypotheses 
As discussed in Section 2.9, no empirical studies have assessed the effects of 
ownership and governance on bank risk and return using a framework in 
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which bank risk and return are treated as simultaneous.  This is a gap in the 
literature that must be addressed. 
Therefore, in this Chapter I seek to test the following hypothesis: 
H4.1: Measures of bank risk and bank return 
are simultaneous with one another because of risk-
return simultaneity in the underlying assets in 
which banks invest and/or because of direct 
accounting effects linking measures of risk and 
return. 
 
It should be noted that, irrespective of the cause of simultaneity, when it is 
present it must be accounted for in models in order to avoid bias that could 
arise from confounding of a simultaneous effect with the effect of some other 
regressor. 
 
4.4 Simultaneity of Loan Impairments and ROA 
I tested for simultaneity of risk and return using two-equation models with 
measures of risk and return included both as dependent variables and as 
explanatory variables (lagged and unlagged) for one another.  Such models 
have not been reported previously in studies of bank ownership and 
governance.   
184 
 
Initially, I used this approach to test for simultaneity between loan interest 
income and loan impairments.  This revealed that there is no simultaneity 
between loan impairments and loan interest income and no significant 
association with a lag (results not shown for reasons of space but can be 
provided upon request).  This suggests that, at the portfolio level at least, loan 
interest income does not correlate with impairments in the manner that 
might be assumed based on finance theory.  This, in turn, suggests that the 
banks in my sample are unable to price loan portfolios with different degrees 
of risk so as to adequately reflect portfolio default rates.  This is very 
surprising given that there are many studies at the level of individual loan 
accounts showing robustly that banks engage in risk-based pricing (e.g. 
Magri and Pico, 2011).  This suggests some market friction affecting the 
banks I observe which prevents such risk-based pricing of interest rates from 
being evident at the loan-portfolio level.  Perhaps competition from a subset 
of lenders in the market which lack adequate information to price loans 
efficiently causes the expected correlation between loan interest and loan 
impairments to weaken at an aggregated level.   
In any case, there is robust simultaneity between loan impairments and ROA 
as measures of risk and return, respectively.  The simultaneous relationship 
shown in table 4.2 below is negative, likely because large impairments have a 
direct negative effect in accounting terms on ROA.  However, the expected 
positive risk-return association is present with a lag of one year.  The 
presence of this correlation in the absence of one between loan interest 
income and loan impairments suggests that banks are able to adjust their cost 
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and / or income profile overall so as to align return with risk in a way that 
meets the expectations of their shareholders, even if they cannot achieve such 
alignment at the level of loan portfolios. 
Models used to test hypotheses are estimated using the following equations 
(Table 4.1) with equation numbers used for cross-reference in regression 




Table 4.1 Dependent and explanatory variables in models for testing the hypothesis that 
risk and return are simultaneous. 
Dependent Variable: loan_impairments 































Table 4.1 (contd.) Dependent and explanatory variables in models for testing the 
hypothesis that risk and return are simultaneous. 
Dependent Variable: return_on_assets 


























Note: variable abbreviations and definitions as per section 3.8.  “L.” signifies a one-year lag. 
 
Loan impairments and ROA are used as dependent variables because they are 
the main measures of risk and return in my study.  In terms of explanatory 
variables, models differ from the baseline specification stated in Table 3.1 in 
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two respects.  Firstly, loan impairments or ROA are added as explanatory 
variables for one another because the purpose of these models is to test for 
simultaneity.  These are each included with and without a lag in order to test 
for simultaneous and delayed-simultaneous effects.  Secondly, additional 
explanatory variables (ones which cause a change in observation number) 
were added to equations 4.2 and 4.2 as a robustness test.  A further 
robustness test involving a complete change of estimation method is reported 
in section 4.5. 
Although this model aims to test simultaneity of risk and return, a full set of 
explanatory variables relating to ownership, governance and balance sheet 
characteristics is included, as per Table 3.1.  This is because (as hypothesised 
in sections 5.3 and 6.4) there are reasons to expect the specific ownership and 
governance variables included to affect risk and return.  In addition, it is 
reasonable to expect risk and return to vary with balance sheet characteristics 
since these characteristics reflect different business profiles, which will differ 
in financial outcomes, as explained in section 3.4.  Omission of these factors 
could bias estimates of the effects of risk and return on one another, so they 
are included. 
Results obtained using these equations are reported below (Tables 4.2 and 
4.3).  Models are estimated in linear form because a) there is no reason to 
expect specific nonlinear relationships to exist and b) this format is sufficient 
to estimate whether significant relationships exist while controlling for co-
variates.  Estimation is performed by 2SLS and (in the next section) GMM 
because these methods have different vulnerabilities to bias and using both 
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shows robustness to a change in estimation method.  Second-stage results 
from 2SLS are below and Appendix B shows first stage results for this and all 





Table 4.2 2SLS estimation results for models with simultaneity of risk and return.   
 Model 1 Model 2 









     
return_on_assets -5.056***  -4.846***  
 (1.102)  (1.564)  
L.return_on_assets 2.505***  2.469**  
 (0.804)  (1.104)  
loan_impairments  -1.998**  -1.754*** 
  (0.802)  (0.643) 
L.loan_impairments  1.357**  0.877* 
  (0.685)  (0.451) 
     
L.state_majority_owner 0.989 -1.022 0.167 -1.613* 
 (0.802) (0.796) (0.855) (0.828) 
L.mutual_ownership -2.425*** -0.682 -2.580*** -0.886* 
 (0.734) (0.515) (0.856) (0.470) 
L.foreign_parent -1.786** -0.659 -1.733** -1.120** 
 (0.714) (0.508) (0.714) (0.502) 
L.board_size 0.110* 0.0598 0.0697 0.102** 
 (0.0616) (0.0468) (0.0578) (0.0486) 
L.director_ratio -1.684 -0.140 -0.767 0.391 
 (1.600) (1.209) (1.509) (1.050) 
L.rem_co -0.0893 0.430 0.0644 0.857* 
 (0.612) (0.496) (0.617) (0.497) 
L.exec_rem_disclosed -0.0601 -0.000494 -0.494 -0.144 
 (0.441) (0.340) (0.412) (0.282) 
L.average_pay 5.741** -2.916 1.108 -2.031 
 (2.829) (2.455) (2.109) (1.710) 
L.joint_ceo_chairman -3.093*** -0.658 -3.685*** -0.485 
 (0.806) (0.511) (1.401) (0.617) 
L.cro_present_onboard -0.253 -0.149 -0.241 -0.364 
 (0.734) (0.565) (0.692) (0.494) 
L.comm_dir_board -0.176 -0.326 -0.448 0.107 
 (0.318) (0.270) (0.341) (0.221) 
L.female_ratio -0.953 0.243 -1.267 0.395 
 (1.971) (1.536) (1.860) (1.340) 
L.no_exp_ratio 0.890 0.617 0.461 0.921 
 (0.900) (0.694) (0.860) (0.653) 
L.irb_permission -1.069* -0.368 -1.808** -0.492 
 (0.632) (0.476) (0.755) (0.382) 
L.exposure_to_banks -1.912 2.042 -1.721 3.202* 
 (1.617) (1.623) (2.083) (1.817) 
L.securities_holdings -4.075** 2.016 -1.803 2.695 
 (1.885) (1.748) (1.888) (1.712) 
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L.advisory_activity 59.73*** 1.540 83.58** -23.97 
 (15.12) (11.40) (34.83) (24.74) 
L.equity_ratio -15.49** 17.91* -32.65 34.78* 
 (6.830) (9.929) (20.85) (18.03) 
L.curr_deposits_over_liabs 1.097 -0.594 1.687 -1.072 
 (0.699) (0.631) (1.064) (0.758) 
L.size_over_gdp 0.104 -0.212 0.687 -0.249 
 (0.718) (0.558) (0.726) (0.482) 
L.growth_total_assets   0.00305 0.000530 
   (0.00610) (0.00406) 
L.loan_interest_income   0.0232 -0.0216 
   (0.0213) (0.0133) 
Constant 3.959** -1.128 4.288 -2.789 
 (1.894) (1.571) (2.631) (1.971) 
     
Observations 393 393 297 297 
     
VIFs 1.30-6.44 1.27-6.51 1.28-7.23 1.28-7.35 
F statistic 5.58 2.18 8.52 3.96 
Pr > F <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Pr > F endo reg >0.999 >0.999 >0.999 >0.999 
Pr > Hall-Pagan <0.001 <0.001 0.0102 <0.001 
Pr > Breusch-Pagan <0.001 <0.001 
     
Year dummies included but not shown 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Equation numbers are as stated in Table 4.1.  Where two equations are estimated 
simultaneously they are shown under the heading of the same model.  Dependent variables are 
stated at the top of columns and explanatory variables in rows.  Equations are estimated using two-
stage least squares. Estimated parameter values are shown along with star symbols for statistical 
significance.  Classical standard errors are in parentheses.  Diagnostics using Hall-Pagan, Breusch-
Pagan and system tests reveals the presence of heteroskedasticity in each equation and the system 
overall, such that GMM with clustered standard errors is used in the next section to verify results.  
VIFs for this set of regressors vary from 1.27 to 7.35, but this has not prevented the detection of 
significant associations or caused sign reversal (shown by taking smaller sets of regressors).  Auxiliary 
regression using residuals as dependent variable shows no empirical evidence of endogeneity for any 
independent variable, as expected given the predetermined nature of these regressors.  Pr>F is the 
probability of obtaining an F at least as large as was obtained under the null hypothesis that the 
regression coefficients are all zero.  Pr>F endo reg is the probability of obtaining an F statistic at least 
as large as was obtained in an auxiliary regression of residuals on regressors (a test for endogeneity) 
under the null hypothesis that the auxiliary regression coefficients are all zero.  (Bivariate tests also 
confirmed absence of endogeneity; results not shown.)  Pr>Breusch-Pagan and Pr>Hall-Pagan are 
probabilities of obtaining test statistics at least as extreme as those obtained under the null 





This analysis (Table 4.2) shows as clearly as possible the presence of a 
simultaneous relationship.  This result is discussed in more detail after it is 
shown to be robust in the next section. 
 
4.5 Validation in a GMM Framework 
After estimation of the above models, diagnostics using Hall-Pagan, Breusch-
Pagan and system tests reveals the presence of heteroskedasticity in each 
equation and the system overall.  Since the 2SLS estimation employed does 
not support calculation of robust standard errors, a GMM estimator with 
standard errors clustered by bank was used as a complement.  Employing 
GMM also shows that the result is robust to a change of estimation method, 
which is important given that 2SLS and GMM have different vulnerabilities 
to bias and other empirical problems.  Results from GMM estimation reveal 
that the simultaneous relationship is robust.  Models are estimated using 
equations 4.3 and 4.4 above, albeit with a GMM estimator in place of 2SLS.  




Table 4.3 GMM estimation results for models with simultaneity of risk and return.   







   
return_on_assets -1.841***  
 (0.134)  
L.return_on_assets 0.322***  
 (0.0984)  
loan_impairments  -0.506*** 
  (0.0297) 
L.loan_impairments  0.0265 
  (0.0445) 
   
L.state_majority_owner -0.732 -0.334 
 (0.461) (0.246) 
L.mutual_ownership -1.471*** -0.849*** 
 (0.387) (0.218) 
L.foreign_parent -1.254*** -0.751*** 
 (0.477) (0.256) 
L.board_size 0.0773*** 0.0438** 
 (0.0270) (0.0178) 
L.director_ratio -0.213 -0.206 
 (0.643) (0.343) 
L.rem_co 0.609** 0.269** 
 (0.255) (0.126) 
L.exec_rem_disclosed -0.298 -0.169* 
 (0.188) (0.0993) 
L.average_pay -0.668 -0.135 
 (1.039) (0.575) 
L.joint_ceo_chairman -1.461** -0.909* 
 (0.660) (0.469) 
L.cro_present_onboard -0.387 -0.219 
 (0.252) (0.153) 
L.comm_dir_board -0.104 -0.0756 
 (0.0946) (0.0661) 
L.female_ratio -0.527 -0.567* 
 (0.492) (0.305) 
L.no_exp_ratio 0.847*** 0.485*** 
 (0.264) (0.165) 
L.irb_permission -0.696*** -0.437*** 
 (0.248) (0.149) 
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L.exposure_to_banks 1.344* 0.318 
 (0.802) (0.469) 
L.securities_holdings 0.629 0.170 
 (0.752) (0.381) 
L.advisory_activity 25.85*** 20.20*** 
 (6.744) (3.216) 
L.equity_ratio 6.402** 0.370 
 (2.577) (1.280) 
L.current_deposits_over_liabs -0.0952 0.152 
 (0.289) (0.177) 
L.size_over_gdp 0.0879 0.0251 
 (0.258) (0.143) 
L.growth_total_assets -0.00124 -8.08e-05 
 (0.00342) (0.00185) 
L.loan_interest_income -0.0118* -0.00188 
 (0.00625) (0.00291) 
Constant 0.322 0.439 
 (0.729) (0.402) 
   
Observations 299 299 
VIFs 1.31-7.23 1.28-7.35 
GMM criterion Q(b) 1.09 x e-17 2.11 x e-19 
Pr > F endo reg >0.999 >0.999 
   
Year dummies included but not shown 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Equation numbers are as stated in Table 4.1.  The two equations are estimated simultaneously 
and are shown under the heading of the same model.  Dependent variables are stated at the top of 
columns and explanatory variables in rows.  Equations are estimated using the generalised method 
of moments.  Estimated parameter values are shown along with star symbols for statistical 
significance.  Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.  Diagnostic testing for multicollinearity 
and non-spherical error variance was not possible for this estimator but can be assumed to be 
similar to results in Table 4.2.  VIFs for this set of regressors vary from 1.28 to 7.35, but this has not 
prevented the detection of significant associations or caused sign reversal (shown by taking smaller 
sets of regressors – results not shown).  Auxiliary regression using residuals as dependent variable 
shows no empirical evidence of endogeneity for any independent variable, which is as expected 
given the predetermined nature of these regressors.  Pr>F endo reg is the probability of obtaining an 
F statistic at least as large as was obtained in an auxiliary regression of residuals on regressors (a test 
for endogeneity) under the null hypothesis that the auxiliary regression coefficients are all zero.  






The clearest result in the above analysis (Table 4.3) and the preceding section 
is a simultaneous negative relationship between ROA and loan impairments.  
Taking the GMM estimates as definitive (because GMM is more efficient and 
less vulnerable to bias than 2SLS), and given how the units are defined, it 
appears that an increase in ROA of 1% (of total assets) is associated with a 
simultaneous change in loan impairments of -1.8% (of gross loans).  From the 
other equation in the model it appears that an increase in loan impairments 
of 2% (of gross loans) is associated with a simultaneous change in ROA of -
1.0%.  These effects are roughly consistent with one another.  
Given that the same-period simultaneous relationship is negative, as opposed 
to the positive risk-return correlation in finance theory, the most likely 
interpretation is that it is due to simple accounting effects.  Loan 
impairments constitute write-downs in the value of loan assets, and such 
write-downs enter the Profit and Loss (P&L) account as negative items (Atrill 
and McLaney 2006).  Thus, loan impairments lead directly to lower income 
and, since income is the numerator in the ROA ratio, to lower ROA. 
This interpretation is supported by the fact that movements in the loan 
impairments ratio of a given size correspond to movements in ROA of about 
half that size.  This is consistent if gross loans account for half of bank assets.  
Given that gross loans, on average, account for 58% of total bank assets in 
this data set, it does indeed appear that the simultaneous relationship is a 
result of accounting effects. 
Even though this is the case, it is nevertheless vital to take account of this 
simultaneity in models.  If we have cases where a given regressor affects ROA 
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and / or loan impairments and we estimate the effects of this regressor 
without allowing for effects of ROA and loan impairments on each other, we 
will have bias.  Thus, two-equation models are used throughout my work 
when loan impairments and ROA are the dependent variables.  Single-
equation models are used for other dependent variables. 
Alongside same-period simultaneity, there is also a lagged positive effect of 
ROA on loan impairments.  Again taking GMM estimates as definitive, this 
suggests that an increase in ROA of 1% (of total assets) leads to an increase in 
loan impairments of 0.3% (of gross loans) at a lag of one year.  There is also 
some evidence of a lagged positive effect of loan impairments on ROA, but 
this is not robust in GMM with clustering of standard errors.  This 
association is consistent with basic finance theory, as discussed in section 
4.2: anything which increases return is normally expected to increase risk 
and vice-versa. 
Not much can be concluded from the size of the parameter estimates for the 
lagged effects, because they differ so much in size between GMM and 2SLS.  
The 2SLS results suggest that a given increase in ROA leads to a much larger 
increase in loan impairments, suggesting that risk limitation should be the 
priority in banks’ decisions because pursuit of returns brings 
disproportionate risk.  The GMM results suggest that a given increase in ROA 
leads to a much smaller increase in loan impairments, suggesting that return 
can safely be pursued without too much concern for risk.   
Taking the balance of these lagged results from 2SLS and GMM, one is led to 
a conclusion that is consistent with basic finance theory: increasing return 
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generally leads to an increase in risk substantial enough to care about, and 
vice-versa.  Regulators must accept this trade-off in setting policy.  However, 
I generally find that variables which lead to lower profit have no measurable 
effect on provision of credit to the wider economy (as indicated by the 
dependent variable growth in total assets).  Since I assume that credit 
provision and avoidance of destabilising bank failures are of greater social 
importance than the private profits of banks (see section 9.3) this finding 
implies that regulators can reasonably have a bias towards limiting risk. 
This lagged positive association of risk and return that I detect exists because 
the returns and risk arising in a bank’s portfolio ultimately flow through to 
investors who own that bank, and investors will insist that banks act in a 
manner where higher return is earned to compensate for higher risk in 
investments made by the bank.  One would expect this association to be 
evident at every time lag, because bank assets are long-lived and some 
investments made by banks in the past that had higher returns will eventually 
bring higher impairments, because the higher return existed as compensation 
for higher risk.  The correlation is reversed in the current period due to 
simple accounting effects, as explained. 
In summary, hypothesis H4.1 is accepted: bank risk and return are indeed 





4.6 Comparison with Single-Equation Models 
A principal motivation of the multi-equation framework used in sections 4.4 
and 4.5 is to ensure that results are not biased by omitting simultaneity of 
risk and return.  This being so, it is important to show how parameter 
estimates differ when equations 4.3 and 4.4 above are re-estimated using 




Table 4.4 Estimation results for models of ROA and loan impairments using single-equation 
OLS. 
 (4.3) (4.4) 
VARIABLES loan_impairments return_on_assets 
   
return_on_assets -1.372***  
 (0.196)  
L.return_on_assets 0.0758  
 (0.159)  
loan_impairments  -0.397*** 
  (0.0526) 
L.loan_impairments  -0.0488 
  (0.0385) 
L.growth_total_assets -0.00236 -0.000503 
 (0.00393) (0.00171) 
L.loan_interest_income -0.0174** -0.000109 
 (0.00842) (0.00286) 
L.state_majority_owner -0.878* -0.228 
 (0.476) (0.293) 
L.mutual_ownership -1.387 -0.910 
 (1.342) (0.845) 
L.foreign_parent -1.246*** -0.765*** 
 (0.443) (0.280) 
L.board_size 0.0908*** 0.0443** 
 (0.0231) (0.0198) 
L.director_ratio 0.180 -0.138 
 (0.622) (0.405) 
L.rem_co 0.693** 0.218* 
 (0.269) (0.129) 
L.exec_rem_disclosed -0.279 -0.175 
 (0.188) (0.106) 
L.average_pay -0.730 0.137 
 (0.927) (0.647) 
L.joint_ceo_chairman -1.157*** -0.987* 
 (0.429) (0.502) 
L.cro_present_onboard -0.358 -0.181 
 (0.300) (0.161) 
L.comm_dir_board -0.0304 -0.0864 
 (0.0975) (0.0795) 
L.female_ratio -0.202 -0.636* 
 (0.563) (0.344) 
L.no_exp_ratio 0.683** 0.372* 
 (0.276) (0.193) 
L.irb_permission -0.638** -0.458*** 
 (0.281) (0.168) 
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L.exposure_to_banks 1.738** -0.0180 
 (0.774) (0.437) 
L.securities_holdings 0.793 -0.167 
 (0.777) (0.325) 
L.advisory_activity 14.22** 24.03*** 
 (5.665) (3.627) 
L.equity_ratio 12.74*** -2.722 
 (3.431) (2.231) 
L.current_deposits_over_liabs -0.325 0.291 
 (0.263) (0.191) 
L.size_over_gdp 0.00187 0.0375 
 (0.251) (0.154) 
Constant -0.482 0.685 
 (0.709) (0.480) 
   
Observations 303 297 
R-squared 0.884 0.852 
VIFs 1.24-7.67 1.29-7.48 
F statistic 795.4 40.0 
Pr > F <0.001 <0.001 
F (endo reg) 0.00 0.00 
Pr > F endo reg >0.999 >0.999 
Pr > Breusch-Pagan <0.001 <0.001 
   
Year dummies included but not shown 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Equation numbers are as stated in Table 4.1.  The two equations are estimated simultaneously 
and are shown under the heading of the same model.  Dependent variables are stated at the top of 
columns and explanatory variables in rows.  Equations are estimated using the generalised method 
of moments.  Estimated parameter values are shown along with star symbols for statistical 
significance.  Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.  Diagnostic testing using the Breusch-
Pagan test reveals the presence of heteroskedasticity, such that clustered standard errors are used.  
VIFs vary from 1.24 to 7.48, but this has not prevented the detection of significant associations or 
caused sign reversal (shown by taking smaller sets of regressors).  Pr>F is the probability of obtaining 
an F at least as large as was obtained under the null hypothesis that the regression coefficients are 
all zero.  Pr>F endo reg is the probability of obtaining an F statistic at least as large as was obtained in 
an auxiliary regression of residuals on regressors (a test for endogeneity) under the null hypothesis 
that the auxiliary regression coefficients are all zero.  (Bivariate tests also confirmed absence of 
endogeneity; results not shown.)  Pr>Breusch-Pagan is the probability of obtaining a test statistic at 






This analysis (Table 4.4) reveals that the lagged positive association of risk 
and return reported in sections 4.4 and 4.5 would be overlooked if single-
equation models were used.  A number of other important biases would also 
occur if I relied on single-equation models.  First, it would have appeared as if 
state majority ownership lowers loan impairments, the opposite of what the 
literature predicts.  Second, I would have concluded that mutual ownership 
has no interesting effects at all, entirely contrary to the literature.  Third, it 
would have appeared as if Board size positively affects both impairments and 
returns.  Fourth, it would have appeared that a Joint CEO-Chairman has a 
negative effect on both impairments and returns.  Fifth, and finally, it would 
appear as if the presence of a remuneration committee has a positive effect 
on both returns and impairments.  Each of these errors would have altered 
the interpretation of my results in important ways.  Specific problems that 
have been avoided by virtue of using multi-equation models are discussed in 
sections 5.4, 5.5 and 6.5. 
 
4.7 Conclusions 
The main conclusion of this chapter is that I accept hypothesis H4.1: there is 
indeed a robust simultaneous relationship between ROA and loan 
impairments.  The same-period relationship appears to be entirely due to 
accounting effects, but it is nevertheless vital to include it in models where 
the effects of ownership and governance on risk and return are assessed.  As 
demonstrated in section 4.6, failing to do so creates vulnerability to bias and 
raises the possibility that key results in the literature have been affected by 
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such bias.  One of the objectives of the next two Chapters is to determine if 
key results relating to the effects of ownership and governance hold when we 
allow for this simultaneity.  
Alongside the same-period simultaneous relationship, there is a positive 
lagged effect of ROA on loan impairments, and possibly vice-versa.  The 
lagged effect of ROA on loan impairments suggests that any factor which 
increases the return earned from bank assets tends to also increase risk.  This 
is consistent with basic finance theory (Jones, 2008): increased asset returns 
are demanded as compensation for taking more risk.  The converse 
relationship, if true, is also consistent with finance theory: increased risk will 
lead to increased return as the price of the relevant assets drops when it is 
sold by more risk-averse investors. 
This finding is important in a number of respects.  First, it shows the general 
applicability of basic finance theory as explained in Jones (2008).  There are 
many situations where the risk-return correlation predicted by basic finance 
theory breaks down, as discussed in Bebczuk (2003) and other works 
referenced in section 6.3.  However, if we can demonstrate that higher return 
is associated with higher risk within entities as complex as banks, then the 
basic hypothesis that risk and return are correlated has very general 
applicability. 
Second, showing same-period simultaneous and lagged-simultaneous 
relationships between bank risk and return it makes it essential that a 
simultaneous equations framework is used whenever return on assets and 
loan impairments are the dependent variables.  If it is not, then bias may well 
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be the consequence.  Section 4.6 demonstrates that very different parameter 
estimates can arise when simultaneity is omitted, which could lead to entirely 
different interpretations of results. 
Third, knowing that bank risk and return are correlated is important for 
interpreting results, even for dependent variables where a simultaneous 
equations framework is not needed.  When we know that, even in an 
environment as complex as a bank, the classical risk-return trade-off can 
arise, then any effect on risk should be interpreted in the context of possible 
effects on return, and vice-versa.  There may be situations where 
informational considerations cause this correlation to break down (as per 
Bebczuk, 2003) but, even here, we must discuss the correlation that could 






Chapter 5: The Role of Bank Ownership  
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I test hypotheses that different forms of bank ownership – by 
the state, depositors or a foreign parent – have effects on bank risk and 
return.  This uses the basic methodological approach described in Chapter 3 
and the simultaneous models developed in Chapter 4, with the main 
dependent variables being ROA, ROE, loan impairments and combined 
failure, as defined in section 3.8, because these are measures of risk and 
return.  Loan interest income is also used as a dependent variable for effects 
of state majority ownership, because the literature argues that state-owned 
banks give soft loans.  In addition, growth in total assets was also considered 
for all explanatory variables as a means to determine if effects on bank 
outcomes are accompanied by effects on investment in the wider economy.  
(The conclusion was that they are not, so these results are not shown, 
although they can be provided on request). 
Unlike any previous study, I use multi-equation models to avoid the bias that 
results if simultaneity between risk and return is omitted.  In this framework, 
I show that mutual ownership and a foreign parent each have a negative 
effect on both risk and return.  This is the first time a multi-equation 
framework has been used in this way to show that important results relating 
to bank ownership hold when allowing for simultaneity of risk and return.  
The results for mutual ownership confirm theoretical predictions (Schleifer 
and Vishny, 1997) and earlier empirical work (Iannotta et al, 2007) and those 
for a foreign parent add to knowledge in the sense that the combination of 
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effects I report has not been observed before.  The effects of foreign 
ownership on risk and return suggest that cross-border information 
asymmetries overcome the greater resources and diversification that come 
with cross-border operations in banking.   
The similarity of foreign-owned banks to mutual banks is contrary to the 
typical view of international banks as being efficient.  Specifically, it suggests 
that distance from the ultimate shareholders leads to reduced pressure on 
managers to take risk and pursue profit, which are generally taken to be the 
priorities of shareholders (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
I corroborate these results with findings from single-equation models 
showing that mutual ownership and a foreign parent have negative effects on 
return on equity, an indicator of return that was shown in the work reported 
in the preceding Chapter to not be simultaneous with risk.  Another novel 
finding I obtain is that the presence of a foreign parent is associated with a 
greater likelihood of bank failure.  This suggests that, in crisis periods, the 
adverse effects of foreign ownership on bank returns are more important 
than the beneficial effects on loan impairments (which may be the case 
because ROE has a direct impact on solvency and a foreign parent has a large 
impact on ROE).  The same does not occur for mutual banks because the 
effect of foreign ownership on returns is roughly twice as large as that of 
mutual ownership. 
Further novel findings are that state majority ownership has a negative effect 
on loan interest income (which was not previously used as a measure of 
performance in studies of this kind) and that state majority ownership 
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increases the likelihood of failure events.  The former is consistent with 
theoretical predictions (Schleifer and Vishny 1997) and earlier empirical work 
(Iannotta et al 2007) and suggests that state-owned banks obtain low 
earnings from loans because they have other priorities alongside financial 
ones.  It cannot be the case that state-owned banks in this sample simply 
owned loans in periods when loan returns were lower – this interpretation is 
precluded by the inclusion of year dummies in models. 
The effect of state majority ownership on bank failure probably occurs 
because state ownership arises in this sample mainly due to stress, and on-
going stress raises the probability of further failure events.  Control variables 
cannot be used to exclude this interpretation because the stress of 2007-2009 
took forms that are not easily modelled in a study of this kind, including 
short-term liquidity movements and sentiment effects.  
In addition, I find that state ownership, mutual ownership and a foreign 
parent have no effects on rates of growth in bank assets.  This suggests that, 
although these can lead to lower performance for banks, they do not affect 
the provision of credit and other forms of investment to the wider economy.  
This suggests that mutual ownership, in particular, is associated with lower 
risk, less profit taken from customers, fewer conflicts of interest with 
customers (Gupta, 2014) and no loss of investment for the wider economy. 
These findings are important because they confirm the effects of mutual 
ownership in a new framework against a background where only a few 
empirical papers have addressed the matter; they confirm the effects of state 
ownership with a new dependent variable that is indicative of granting soft 
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loans; and they show for the first time that foreign ownership is associated 
(in some applied settings at least) with lower returns, lower loan impairments 
and higher risk of bank failure, but no effect on credit provision to the wider 
economy.  These results naturally have policy implications, as discussed in 
section 5.7. 
In the remainder of this Chapter, sections 5.2 and 5.3 respectively consider 
previous literature and use it to develop the specific hypotheses that I test.  
Section 5.4 tests hypotheses relating to state majority ownership while 5.5 
deals with mutual and foreign ownership and 5.6 considers implications of all 
of these for bank failure.  Section 5.7 synthesises results and considers policy 
implications. 
 
5.2 Key Results in the Literature 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the relevant literature using agency theory 
suggests that the objectives of owners affect the behaviour of firms, including 
banks (Schleifer and Vishny, 1997).  State majority ownership is expected to 
lead to lower returns compared to shareholder-owned banks, at the same 
time as leading to higher risk.  Mutual ownership is expected to lead to lower 
returns compared to shareholder-owned banks, at the same time as leading 
to lower risk.  There is no clear prediction of the effect of foreign ownership: 
if information asymmetries and other effects of working across borders 
dominate then foreign ownership may have one set of effects, but if 
diversification and greater resources (of people, technology and financing) 
dominate then it may have different effects.  Several studies using empirical 
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data support the view that government ownership is associated with 
increased risk (Angkinand and Whilborg 2010, Iannotta et al 2012 and Dong 
et al 2014) and others find that it is associated with both higher risk and 
lower return (Iannotta et al 2007 and Cornett et al 2010). 
The results for mutual ownership appear equally clear-cut, and are again in 
accordance with agency theory, although they are based on a very limited 
number of studies.  Marco and Fernandez (2007) find that mutual ownership 
is associated with lower risk, while Iannotta et al (2007) find that it is 
associated with lower risk and lower return. 
Empirical results for foreign ownership are contradictory.  Angkinand and 
Whilborg (2010) report a positive effect of foreign ownership on bank risk, 
but Forssbaeck (2011) finds no effect and results from Chen and Liao (2011) 
suggest the effects are highly context-dependent, being affected by 
profitability of the parent entity and levels of competition in the host market.  
This suggests that foreign ownership is not a fundamental characteristic of a 
bank and that its effects depend on which of its corollaries (such as greater 
diversification or greater information asymmetry) are dominant in a 
particular applied setting. 
In summary, the relevant empirical literature tells us that state majority 
ownership increases risk and return, while mutual ownership reduces risk 
and return.  Foreign ownership and managerial ownership each have effects 
that are very much context-dependent.  Concentration of owners’ personal 
wealth in banks’ equity reduces risk, while the presence of shareholders that 




5.3 Literature Gaps and Hypotheses 
As discussed in section 4.2, finance theory treats risk and return as 
simultaneous.  My results in Chapter 4 confirm the hypothesis that they are 
simultaneous in the case of banks and I show that omitting this simultaneity 
can seriously bias estimates of other parameters.  However, as discussed in 
section 2.9, no empirical studies have assessed the effects of ownership and 
governance on bank risk and return using a framework in which risk and 
return are treated as simultaneous.  It is therefore necessary to re-test the 
effects of state, mutual and foreign ownership reported in the literature in a 




Therefore, in this Chapter I seek to test the following hypotheses: 
H5.1: State majority ownership has a positive 
effect on risk and/or a negative effect on return, for 
the reasons stated in the literature (see section 
2.5). 
H5.2: Mutual ownership has a negative effect 
on risk and/or a negative effect on return, for the 
reasons stated in the literature (see section 2.5). 
H5.3: A foreign parent entity has effects on risk 
and return, but the sign of these effects can only be 
determined empirically as it depends on which of 
the following are dominant: cross-border 
information asymmetries or the effects of greater 
diversification and resources. 
 
Hypothesis H5.3 is obviously less precisely-specified than the other two, but 
this is inevitable given that the signs of the relationships involved are 
considered purely empirical matters. 
To correct for possible bias in results arising from omission of simultaneity, 
the above hypotheses are tested in a simultaneous equations framework in 
which risk and return are allowed to affect each other simultaneously and 




5.4 State Ownership and Loan Interest Income 
The empirical analysis below shows that state majority ownership has a 
negative effect on loan interest income in single-equation models.  This is 
robust and consistent with the literature on agency theory.  There have been 
no studies that have used loan interest income in this way, which is important 
because loan interest income is a measure of the extent to which income is 
prioritised and earned (in this case on loans) that is relatively homogenous 
across banks and thus comparable between state-owned banks and other 
banks.  In addition, the omission of loan interest income as a dependent 
variable meant that the argument that state-owned banks grant soft loans 
(Gonzalez-Garcia and Grigoli, 2013) has not been tested as well as it could be, 
until now. 
Models used to test hypotheses are estimated using the following equations 
(Table 5.1) with equation numbers used for cross-reference in regression 






Table 5.1 Dependent and explanatory variables in models for testing hypotheses that 
ownership types affect loan interest income. 
Dependent Variable: loan_interest_income 
All Equations  




















































Note: variable abbreviations and definitions as per section 3.8.  “L.” signifies a one-year lag. 
 
Loan interest income is used as a dependent variable in these equations 
because it is argued in the literature that state banks give soft loans and thus 
earn less on their loans (Gonzalez-Garcia and Grigoli, 2013).  In terms of 
dependent variables, my model specification differs from the baseline 
specification stated in Table 3.1 in that variables that are used elsewhere in 
my empirical work as dependent variables (growth in total assets, loan 
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impairments, ROA and ROE) are added here as lagged explanatory variables 
(not simultaneous terms).  This is because outcomes in these other key 
measures of performance could, in principle, affect decisions in respect of 
loan interest income, or reflect general risk appetite and strategic priorities, 
with implications for loan interest income.  In the absence of simultaneity 
between loan interest income and any other financial outcome, these 
variables serve to control for the possibility that outcome variables in my 
study affect one another.  This is especially important in the case of loan 
interest income as a dependent variable in light of literature (Tokle et al, 2015 
and Trinugroho et al, 2014) showing that the general financial performance 
and status of banks can determine the loan interest rates they charge. 
Although the specific objective of this analysis is to test hypotheses relating to 
the effects of ownership, it is necessary to include aspects of governance that 
I argue also have an effect (as per section 6.4) below.  It is also necessary to 
include controls for balance sheet characteristics since these represent 
different business models that could entail different levels of loan interest 
income, as discussed in section 3.4.  Thus, to have a properly-specified model 
that is not vulnerable to bias in estimating the effects of ownership 
characteristics, I include each of these categories of regressor in the model.  
Model specification is varied across equations to show robustness. 
Models are estimated in linear form since there is no reason to expect specific 
nonlinear forms and a linear format is sufficient to test the effect of 
hypotheses whilst controlling for covariates.  I use a mixture of estimation 
methods: OLS for equations 5.1 to 5.3 and random effects for 5.4.  This is to 
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ensure that results are not biased by unobserved heterogeneity (a 
vulnerability of OLS) or by correlation of panel-unit-specific intercepts with 
regressors (a vulnerability of random effects).  If results are not specific to a 




Table 5.2 Estimation results for effects of state ownership on loan interest income.   
 OLS OLS OLS Random 
Effects 













     
L.state_majority_ 
owner 
-5.172** -3.413** -3.515** -3.308* 
 (2.560) (1.559) (1.756) (1.755) 
     
L.mutual_ownership 0.940 0.805 0.334 0.220 
 (1.060) (1.192) (1.053) (1.083) 
L.foreign_parent -0.991 0.244 -0.218 -0.296 
 (1.505) (1.251) (1.079) (1.109) 
L.growth_total_assets -0.00783 0.00254 0.00113 0.00101 
 (0.0133) (0.00864) (0.00708) (0.00707) 
L.loan_impairments -0.126 0.283 0.241 0.215 
 (0.346) (0.235) (0.276) (0.257) 
L.return_on_assets 0.513 1.245** 1.184* 1.081* 
 (0.462) (0.547) (0.641) (0.607) 
L.return_on_equity -0.0125*** -0.0163*** -0.0179*** -0.0179*** 
 (0.00403) (0.00335) (0.00256) (0.00218) 
L.board_size   0.0956 0.113 
   (0.121) (0.131) 
L.director_ratio   2.994 2.729 
   (2.394) (2.434) 
L.rem_co   -0.612 -0.735 
   (0.790) (0.849) 
L.exec_rem_disclosed   0.887* 0.924* 
   (0.521) (0.525) 
L.average_pay   5.885 6.706* 
   (3.772) (4.044) 
L.joint_ceo_chairman  -0.737 -1.544 -1.573 
  (1.624) (2.004) (2.037) 
L.cro_present_onboard  -0.244 0.609 0.487 
  (0.353) (0.531) (0.516) 
L.comm_dir_board  0.269 0.255 0.160 
  (0.266) (0.336) (0.345) 
L.female_ratio  1.645 1.776 2.166 
  (2.268) (2.760) (2.933) 
L.no_exp_ratio  -0.0332 -1.129 -1.166 
  (1.532) (1.403) (1.442) 
L.irb_permission  -0.944 -1.309 -1.680 
  (1.405) (1.590) (1.873) 
217 
 
L.exposure_to_banks 15.85** 9.077* 8.303* 8.114 
 (7.473) (5.253) (4.943) (5.043) 
L.securities_holdings 7.069 2.878 -0.803 -1.558 
 (4.464) (1.938) (3.421) (3.789) 
L.advisory_activity 59.81 21.29 26.26 24.83 
 (39.14) (45.42) (46.88) (46.66) 
L.equity_ratio -4.873 1.833 2.136 1.425 
 (6.887) (5.460) (6.330) (6.597) 
L.curr_dep_over_liabs -2.434** -1.696** -0.859 -0.809 
 (1.158) (0.749) (0.693) (0.709) 
L.size_over_gdp -0.409 0.523 0.694 0.932 
 (1.067) (1.767) (1.769) (1.990) 
Constant 5.582*** 3.859* 1.307 1.730 
 (1.613) (1.943) (2.805) (2.849) 
     
Observations 357 310 308 308 
R-squared 0.276 0.269 0.291 0.289 
VIFs 1.21-4.52 1.11-7.73 1.35-8.19 1.35-8.19 
F statistic 9.5 110.8 105.0  
Pr > F <0.001 <0.001 <0.001  
Wald Chi2    2538.6 
Pr > Chi2    <0.001 
F (endo reg) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pr > F endo reg >0.999 >0.999 >0.999 >0.999 
Pr > Breusch-Pagan <0.001 <0.001 <0.001  
     
Year dummies included but not shown 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note Equation numbers are as stated in Table 5.1.  Dependent variables are stated at the 
top of columns and explanatory variables in rows.  Equations 4.1 to 4.3 are estimated using 
OLS, while 4.4 is estimated using a panel model with random effects, for comparison 
purposes.  Estimated parameter values are shown along with star symbols for statistical 
significance.  Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.  Diagnostic testing for 
heteroskedasticity using the Breusch-Pagan test shows it to be present, such that clustered 
standard errors are used.  VIFs for this set of regressors vary from 1.21 to 8.19, but this has 
not prevented the detection of significant associations or caused sign reversals (as shown 
using subsets of regressors).  Auxiliary regression using residuals as dependent variable 
shows no empirical evidence of endogeneity for any independent variable.  Pr>Chi2 is the 
probability of obtaining a Chi2 at least as large as was obtained under the null hypothesis 
that the regression coefficients are all zero.  Pr>F is the probability of obtaining an F at least 
as large as was obtained under the null hypothesis that the regression coefficients are all 
zero.  Pr>F endo reg is the probability of obtaining an F statistic at least as large as was 
obtained in an auxiliary regression of residuals on regressors (a test for endogeneity) under 
the null hypothesis that the auxiliary regression coefficients are all zero.  (Bivariate tests 
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also confirmed absence of endogeneity; results not shown.)  Pr>Breusch-Pagan is the 
probability of obtaining a test statistic at least as extreme as that obtained under the null 
hypothesis of spherical error variance.     
 
The above results (Table 5.2) show a negative effect of state majority 
ownership on loan interest income that is robust across variations in 
specification and estimation method.  Given the units employed, they suggest 
that loan interest income is 3.3% to 5.2% lower (as a percentage of gross 
loans) in state-owned banks compared to other banks.  Against a mean value 
of loan interest income in this data set of 6.6%, these are large effects. 
These results are consistent with agency theory and earlier empirical work, 
both of which suggest that state-owned banks have lower performance than 
other banks because they pursue other objectives, social or political in nature.  
In certain times and places, ‘soft loans’ have been used to boost the economy, 
the public sector, other target sectors or segments of the population from 
which the incumbent government seeks political support (e.g. Gonzalez-
Garcia and Grigoli, 2013).  Some of these goals may be considered more 
laudable than others, but they all have financial implications for banks. 
Lending standards, in particular, can easily be adjusted for the sake of social 
and political objectives.  Assuming demand for credit is present and financing 
is available to the bank, a state-owned bank need only reduce its credit score 
cut-offs for lending or adjust the interest rates payable on loans, selectively or 
in general, in order to expand the flow of credit.  Thus, the presence of lower 
loan interest income for state-owned banks lends particular support to the 
hypothesis that such banks have other goals alongside financial ones. 
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This is plausible even in the UK, which is considered to have comparatively 
high standards in terms of avoiding public corruption and corporate 
governance.  As explained by Churm et al (2012), in the aftermath of the 
global financial crisis and subsequent economic crisis in the years 2007-2012, 
the UK authorities introduced a policy known as the Funding for Lending 
Scheme (FLS) in which banks were granted concessionary Bank of England 
financing conditional on expanding lending to small and medium enterprises.  
This was accompanied by media pressure on banks in general and political 
pressure on state-owned banks in particular to actually lend, given the state 
of the economy. 
Iannotta et al (2007) report that government ownership in European banks 
lowers operating income by 0.2% (of total assets) and lowers operating profit 
by 0.5% (of total assets).  Average values of these dependent variables were 
low in their sample, at less than 1.3% and 3.3% respectively.  Nevertheless, 
the comparative magnitude of effect I discover for loan interest income in my 
sample is at least three times as large, relative to the average value of the 
dependent variable. 
This suggests that, in my sample, loan interest income is a variable which is 
particularly susceptible to the effects of state ownership.  This cannot be 
because of the particular subset of state-owned banks included because these 
differ by country of origin and when they entered state ownership.  Instead, it 
must be that state ownership generally has large effects on lending behaviour. 
It could be argued that state-owned banks need to offer higher interest rates 
on deposits in order to attract such funding if they came into state ownership 
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as a result of stress.  If they do not, depositors might go elsewhere.  State 
banks might then need to charge higher interest on loans in order to afford 
higher deposit interest rates.  However, this is the opposite of what I observe 
and so can be ruled out. 
Another alternative argument is simply that the state-owned banks in the 
sample were present in time periods where returns on loans were lower.  
However, this interpretation is excluded by the use of year dummies as 
controls for general macroeconomic, macro-financial and regulatory 
conditions. 
It is crucial to note that, if a multi-equation framework had not been used 
and tested in sections 4.4 to 4.6, I would have reached the erroneous 
conclusion that state majority ownership also has a negative effect on loan 
impairments.  Faced with the combination of this erroneous result and the 
reliable results of section 5.4, I would have concluded that state ownership 
leads to less-risky lending and, in the classical risk-return trade-off, lower 
returns from lending.  The distinction between my actual conclusions and 
this potential error is crucial in that it shows that empirical work must, if it is 
to consistently confirm the hypothesis that state ownership makes banks less 
financially efficient, take account of simultaneity between risk and return.  
It is also interesting to note that, for most of the indicators of risk and return 
I consider, state majority ownership has no robust effect.  Earlier studies 
report positive effects on risk and negative effects on return using such 
dependent variables as profitability, stock returns, solvency and agency 
ratings.  For indicators similar to these, I do not find such effects. 
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Why might this difference exist?  It cannot be that state-owned banks in the 
UK do not offer any soft loans; this is contradicted by the effect I find on loan 
interest income.  Likewise, it cannot be that the UK government is better at 
running banks than other sovereigns; this is excluded by the fact that the 
state-owned banks in my sample were owned by a range of governments (UK, 
European and Middle Eastern).  The remaining interpretation is that the 
operating context in the UK is somehow different, such that granting of soft 
loans does not lead to adverse effects on ROA, ROE or loan impairments.  It 
may be that the institutional framework in the UK is such that soft loans do 
not necessarily lead to higher credit losses, perhaps because of better 
governance, while lost interest income can be offset in some way.  Some 
support for this conclusion is provided by Lensink et al (2008) who argue 
that differences in national institutions can modulate the effects of ownership 
type. 
My finding that state ownership is not inefficient on every measure contrasts 
with wider literature which suggests that government involvement in 
business is universally inefficient.  For instance Pack and Saggi (2006) 
suggest that industrial policy4 is always considered to be inefficient on the 
grounds that governments lack the right information or incentives to do it 
well, while Gonzales-Garcia and Grigoli (2013) suggest that this financial 
inefficiency includes banks, because of the granting of soft loans to political 
supporters of the incumbent government. 
                                                          
4 The term is used in this context to mean any state involvement in business, including ownership of 
companies or other policies targeted at specific sectors and firms. This often includes banks, with the 
goal being to direct credit to favoured sectors of the economy. 
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My findings suggest a more nuanced conclusion: that state ownership of 
banks is financially inefficient on some measures but not others.  This is 
consistent with arguments that industrial policy can be effective (Esteban et 
al, 2013) and that it works well when there are effective information flows 
between the state and firms (Rodrik, 2007). 
In conclusion, I accept hypothesis H5.1: there is indeed robust evidence of a 
negative effect of state majority ownership on bank returns (and, in section 
5.6 I also find the predicted effect on risk).  However, it should be noted that I 
find an impact only on certain measures of returns and no adverse effect on 
impairments.  Implications of these finding for economic policy are discussed 
in section 5.7. 
 
5.5 Mutual and Foreign Ownership – Similarity in Effects 
My analysis below shows that mutual ownership and a foreign parent have a 
negative effect on ROE in single-equation models.  These effects are robust to 
variations in model specification.  The effect of mutual ownership is 
consistent with predictions of agency theory reported in the literature, while 
that of a foreign parent suggests that information asymmetries dominate over 
the effects of diversification in this setting.  This is the first time the effects of 
foreign ownership have been found to mirror those of mutuality in this way.   
Models used to test hypotheses are estimated using the following equations 
(Table 5.3) with equation numbers used for cross-reference in regression 
tables.   
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Table 5.3 Dependent and explanatory variables in models for testing hypotheses that 
ownership types affect ROE. 
Dependent Variable: return_on_equity 
All equations 



















































Note: variable abbreviations and definitions as per section 3.8.  “L.” signifies a one-year lag. 
 
Return on equity is used as a dependent variable because it is an important 
measure of bank performance that one would expect to be affected by 
characteristics which affect the appetite for profit or the ability to achieve it 
(given that it is likely to be the principal objective of shareholders as argued 
in section 3.4) and results are complemented by consistent results for ROA 
and loan impairments later in this section. 
Amongst the explanatory variables, the only difference between these 
equations and the basic model specification stated in Table 3.1 is that 
224 
 
variables that are used elsewhere in this study as dependent variables are 
included here as lagged explanatory variables (not simultaneous terms) for 
the same reasons as stated at the outset of section 5.4 and in section 3.4.   
Although my objective here is to test hypotheses relating to the effects of 
ownership, I include governance variables and balance sheet characteristics 
also.  This is because, as explained in section 6.4, there are reasons to believe 
that these governance characteristics affect bank risk and return, while it is 
likely that difference balance sheet compositions reflect different business 
models with different levels of risk and return, as discussed in section 3.4.  
Thus, omission of either of these sets of characteristics could lead to mis-
specification and bias, so they are retained in the model.  Model 
specifications are varied across the four equations in order to conduct 
robustness testing. 
Models are estimated in linear form because there is no reason to believe in 
any particular nonlinear relationship and because this format is sufficient to 
test the significance of one relationship while treating covariates as held 
constant.  Equations 5.5 to 5.7 are estimated by OLS while 5.8 is estimated by 
random effects.  This is to show that my results are not specific to any one 
estimation method and not biased by the particular vulnerabilities of each 





Table 5.4 Single-equation estimation results for effects of mutuality and a foreign parent on 
return on equity.   
 OLS OLS OLS Random 
Effects 









     
L.state_majority_owner -3.895 -7.947* -6.429 -5.361 
 (5.005) (4.614) (4.235) (4.402) 
     
L.mutual_ownership -1.212 -7.458** -7.303* -7.352* 
 (4.039) (3.658) (3.721) (3.932) 
L.foreign_parent -6.410* -9.124** -13.44*** -12.66*** 
 (3.711) (3.617) (4.160) (4.430) 
     
L.growth_total_assets 0.0445* 0.0179 0.00540 0.0182 
 (0.0244) (0.0229) (0.0255) (0.0225) 
L.loan_impairments -0.711 -1.333* -1.450 -1.029 
 (0.863) (0.798) (0.873) (0.855) 
L.loan_interest_income -0.0567 -0.0906* -0.105** -0.0832* 
 (0.0543) (0.0455) (0.0481) (0.0505) 
L.board_size   0.681* 0.784* 
   (0.402) (0.418) 
L.director_ratio   -4.398 -2.809 
   (8.042) (8.428) 
L.rem_co   1.247 0.472 
   (3.016) (3.586) 
L.exec_rem_disclosed   -2.969 -2.348 
   (1.939) (2.078) 
L.average_pay   20.54 24.91* 
   (13.34) (14.63) 
L.joint_ceo_chairman  -20.55 -21.22 -22.63 
  (15.39) (14.79) (15.91) 
L.cro_present_onboard  0.230 -1.678 -1.582 
  (2.120) (2.472) (2.379) 
L.comm_dir_board  0.825 0.0887 0.444 
  (1.561) (1.551) (1.595) 
L.female_ratio  -19.54*** -14.45** -7.806 
  (6.705) (5.677) (6.240) 
L.no_exp_ratio  10.44** 7.301* 7.047* 
  (4.292) (3.953) (4.238) 
L.irb_permission  -3.338 -4.623 -5.223 
  (3.096) (3.494) (3.489) 
L.exposure_to_banks 2.131 -3.703 -2.960 -5.737 
 (7.790) (9.205) (10.13) (11.62) 
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L.securities_holdings 6.577 3.860 -6.680 -10.51 
 (6.178) (5.052) (9.217) (10.33) 
L.advisory_activity 132.7*** 118.7* 104.2 95.10 
 (41.58) (60.41) (69.01) (69.87) 
L.equity_ratio 10.05 23.17 20.25 14.67 
 (31.81) (24.78) (24.46) (24.83) 
L.curr_dep_over_liabs 4.477 4.125 4.392 5.988 
 (2.919) (3.434) (3.789) (4.059) 
L.size_over_gdp 2.822 4.365 4.157 4.130 
 (2.649) (3.427) (3.638) (3.564) 
Constant 3.598 7.811 4.872 1.986 
 (5.948) (4.888) (8.436) (8.610) 
     
Observations 349 305 304 304 
R-squared 0.180 0.339 0.373 0.366 
VIFs 1.13-4.45 1.12-6.69 1.29-7.08 1.29-7.08 
F statistic 11.6 16.5 12.3  
Pr > F <0.001 <0.001 <0.001  
Wald Chi2    382.6 
Pr > Chi2    <0.001 
F (endo reg) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pr > F endo reg >0.999 >0.999 >0.999 >0.999 
Pr > Breusch-Pagan <0.001 <0.001 <0.001  
     
Year dummies included but not shown 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Equation numbers are as stated in Table 5.3.  Dependent variables are stated at the top of 
columns and explanatory variables in rows.  Equations 4.5 to 4.7 are estimated using OLS, while 4.8 is 
estimated as a panel model with random effects, for comparison purposes.  Estimated parameter 
values are shown along with star symbols for statistical significance.  Clustered standard errors are in 
parentheses.  Diagnostic testing for heteroskedasticity using the Breusch-Pagan test shows it to be 
present, such that clustered standard errors are used.  VIFs for this set of regressors vary from 1.13 
to 7.08, but this has not prevented the detection of significant associations or caused sign reversals 
(shown using smaller sets of regressors).  Auxiliary regression using residuals as dependent variable 
shows no empirical evidence of endogeneity for any independent variable, as was expected for this 
set of regressors.  Pr>Chi2 is the probability of obtaining a Chi2 at least as large as was obtained 
under the null hypothesis that the regression coefficients are all zero.  Pr>F is the probability of 
obtaining an F at least as large as was obtained under the null hypothesis that the regression 
coefficients are all zero.  Pr>F endo reg is the probability of obtaining an F statistic at least as large as 
was obtained in an auxiliary regression of residuals on regressors (a test for endogeneity) under the 
null hypothesis that the auxiliary regression coefficients are all zero.  (Bivariate tests also confirmed 
absence of endogeneity; results not shown.)  Pr>Breusch-Pagan is the probability of obtaining a test 





These results (Table 5.4) show clear negative effects of mutual ownership and 
a foreign parent on return on equity.  In mutual banks, ROE is 7.3% to 7.5% 
(of total equity) lower compared to non-mutuals ceteris paribus.  In banks 
with a foreign parent, ROE is 6.4% to 13.4% lower compared to other banks 
ceteris paribus.  Given that the average value of ROE in the sample is 4.4%, 
these are very large effects.  However, it is important to note that the full 
scale of an effect such as this measured using a regression will never be 
evident in practice; this is because it will obviously be offset by the other 
causal effects such that smaller variation in the outcome variable is observed. 
The effects of mutual ownership are as predicted by theory and shown in 
earlier empirical studies (e.g. Iannotta et al 2007).  Those for a foreign parent 
also add to knowledge.  In particular, it has not been previously shown that a 
foreign parent has the combination of effects I report in this Chapter, or that 
it has effects mirroring those of mutuality.  The significance of these findings 
is discussed in more detail at the end of the section. 
In order to validate this result I show that it holds in a framework where risk 
and return are treated as simultaneous.  This analysis using simultaneous 
equation models shows that mutual ownership has negative effects on loan 
impairments and ROA.  A foreign parent also has negative effects on loan 
impairments and ROA.  This is the first time that such effects have been 
demonstrated using a simultaneous equation model.  The effects are robust, 
including to switching estimation method and adjustment for non-spherical 
error variance in the second table below. 
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Models used to test hypotheses in a simultaneous equations framework are 
estimated using the following equations (Table 5.5) with equation numbers 




Table 5.5 Dependent and explanatory variables in models for testing hypotheses that 
ownership types affect ROA and loan impairments. 
Dependent variable: loan_impairments 
All equations  

































Table 5.5 (contd.) Dependent and explanatory variables in models for testing hypotheses 
that ownership types affect ROA and loan impairments 
Dependent variable: return_on_assets 
All equations  





























Note: variable abbreviations and definitions as per section 3.8.  “L.” signifies a one-year lag. 
These models use the same basic specification as Table 3.1, with the only 
exception being that simultaneous effects between loan impairments and 
return on assets (and also lagged effects of these variables on one another) 
are introduced.  This is done because Chapter 4 confirmed that these 
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variables have simultaneous and lagged effects on one another and showed 
that omission of such effects can cause bias.  Robustness testing is conducted 
by varying the specification across models to show that results are not 
dependent on one specification.  Additional robustness testing is carried out 
in section 5.6 below, this time by changing estimation method entirely to 
show that results are not dependent on one estimation method. 
Although the objective is to test hypotheses relevant to the effects of 
ownership types on risk and return, and to estimate the parameters necessary 
to do so, characteristics relating to governance and balance sheet structure 
are retained in the model.  This is because, as explained in section 6.4, there 
are reasons to expect governance structures to have effects, while it is also 
plausible that risk and return vary with business model, which is reflected in 
balance sheet structure (as per discussion in section 3.4).  Omission of either 
set of variables could cause mis-specification and bias, so they are retained. 
Models are estimated in linear form because there is no theory which 
suggests any particular nonlinear form which should be used.  In addition, a 
linear form is sufficient to determine if hypothesised relationships are 
significant while treating co-variates as if they were held constant.  These 
models are estimated by 2SLS because this is a method of estimating multi-
equation systems that is unbiased and consistent under reasonable 
assumptions.  The effects of switching to GMM as an estimation method are 




Table 5.6 Multi-equation 2SLS estimation results for effects of bank ownership in models 
with simultaneity of risk and return.   
 Model 1 Model 2 









     
L.state_majority_owner 0.173 -2.418* 0.167 -1.613* 
 (0.891) (1.320) (0.855) (0.828) 
L.mutual_ownership -2.805*** -0.778 -2.580*** -0.886* 
 (0.932) (0.605) (0.856) (0.470) 
L.foreign_parent -1.324** -1.189* -1.733** -1.120** 
 (0.653) (0.626) (0.714) (0.502) 
     
return_on_assets -5.301***  -4.846***  
 (1.592)  (1.564)  
L.return_on_assets 2.849**  2.469**  
 (1.145)  (1.104)  
loan_impairments  -2.210**  -1.754*** 
  (1.020)  (0.643) 
L.loan_impairments  1.289*  0.877* 
  (0.751)  (0.451) 
L.growth_total_assets 0.00526 0.00258 0.00305 0.000530 
 (0.00668) (0.00539) (0.00610) (0.00406) 
L.loan_interest_income 0.0277 -0.0244 0.0232 -0.0216 
 (0.0218) (0.0181) (0.0213) (0.0133) 
L.board_size   0.0697 0.102** 
   (0.0578) (0.0486) 
L.director_ratio   -0.767 0.391 
   (1.509) (1.050) 
L.rem_co   0.0644 0.857* 
   (0.617) (0.497) 
L.exec_rem_disclosed   -0.494 -0.144 
   (0.412) (0.282) 
L.average_pay   1.108 -2.031 
   (2.109) (1.710) 
L.joint_ceo_chairman -4.003*** -0.405 -3.685*** -0.485 
 (1.449) (0.806) (1.401) (0.617) 
L.cro_present_onboard 0.226 -0.734 -0.241 -0.364 
 (0.715) (0.665) (0.692) (0.494) 
L.comm_dir_board -0.421 0.258 -0.448 0.107 
 (0.354) (0.304) (0.341) (0.221) 
L.female_ratio -1.964 1.469 -1.267 0.395 
 (2.108) (2.026) (1.860) (1.340) 
L.no_exp_ratio 0.662 1.364 0.461 0.921 
 (0.862) (0.858) (0.860) (0.653) 
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L.irb_permission -1.844** -0.416 -1.808** -0.492 
 (0.790) (0.497) (0.755) (0.382) 
L.exposure_to_banks -2.058 3.731 -1.721 3.202* 
 (2.058) (2.503) (2.083) (1.817) 
L.securities_holdings -1.414 2.568 -1.803 2.695 
 (1.466) (1.774) (1.888) (1.712) 
L.advisory_activity 92.32*** -32.00 83.58** -23.97 
 (34.32) (34.81) (34.83) (24.74) 
L.equity_ratio -37.22* 46.22* -32.65 34.78* 
 (21.06) (27.79) (20.85) (18.03) 
L.curr_dep_over_liabs 2.000* -1.725 1.687 -1.072 
 (1.157) (1.227) (1.064) (0.758) 
L.size_over_gdp 0.807 0.396 0.687 -0.249 
 (0.690) (0.584) (0.726) (0.482) 
Constant 4.274** -1.662 4.288 -2.789 
 (1.851) (1.789) (2.631) (1.971) 
     
Observations 298 298 297 297 
VIFs 1.12-6.77 1.12-6.91 1.28-7.23 1.28-7.35 
F statistic 8.20 2.68 9.55 3.96 
Pr > F <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Pr > F endo reg >0.999 >0.999 >0.999 >0.999 
Pr > Hall-Pagan <0.001 <0.001 0.007 <0.001 
Pr > Breusch-Pagan <0.001 <0.001 
     
Year dummies included but not shown 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Equation numbers are as stated in Table 5.5.  Where two equations are estimated 
simultaneously they are shown under the heading of the same model.  Dependent variables are 
stated at the top of columns and explanatory variables in rows.  Equations are estimated using two-
stage least squares.  Estimated parameter values are shown along with star symbols for statistical 
significance.  Classical standard errors are in parentheses.  Diagnostic testing using using Hall-Pagan, 
Breusch-Pagan and system tests shows the presence of non-spherical error variance in each 
equation and the system overall, such that this analysis is followed up with GMM estimation using 
clustered standard errors.  VIFs for this set of regressors vary from 1.12 to 7.35, but this has not 
prevented the detection of significant associations or caused sign reversal (as shown with smaller 
sets of regressors).  Auxiliary regression using residuals as dependent variable shows no empirical 
evidence of endogeneity for any independent variable.  Pr>F is the probability of obtaining an F at 
least as large as was obtained under the null hypothesis that the regression coefficients are all zero.  
Pr>F endo reg is the probability of obtaining an F statistic at least as large as was obtained in an 
auxiliary regression of residuals on regressors (a test for endogeneity) under the null hypothesis that 
the auxiliary regression coefficients are all zero.  (Bivariate tests also confirmed absence of 
endogeneity; results not shown.)  Pr>Breusch-Pagan is the probability of obtaining a test statistic at 




This analysis (Table 5.6) appears to show negative effects of mutual 
ownership and a foreign parent on loan impairments and ROA.  However, 
since the 2SLS estimation employed does not support calculation of robust 
standard errors, and since it is necessary to show robustness to a change in 
estimation method, a GMM estimator with clustered standard errors was 
used as a complement.  Models are estimated using equations 4.11 and 4.12 





Table 5.7 Multi-equation GMM estimation results for effects of ownership in models with 
simultaneity of risk and return.   







   
   
L.state_majority_owner -0.732 -0.334 
 (0.461) (0.246) 
   
L.mutual_ownership -1.471*** -0.849*** 
 (0.387) (0.218) 
L.foreign_parent -1.254*** -0.751*** 
 (0.477) (0.256) 
   
return_on_assets -1.841***  
 (0.134)  
L.return_on_assets 0.322***  
 (0.0984)  
loan_impairments  -0.506*** 
  (0.0297) 
L.loan_impairments  0.0265 
  (0.0445) 
L.growth_total_assets -0.00124 -8.08e-05 
 (0.00342) (0.00185) 
L.loan_interest_income -0.0118* -0.00188 
 (0.00625) (0.00291) 
L.board_size 0.0773*** 0.0438** 
 (0.0270) (0.0178) 
L.director_ratio -0.213 -0.206 
 (0.643) (0.343) 
L.rem_co 0.609** 0.269** 
 (0.255) (0.126) 
L.exec_rem_disclosed -0.298 -0.169* 
 (0.188) (0.0993) 
L.average_pay -0.668 -0.135 
 (1.039) (0.575) 
L.joint_ceo_chairman -1.461** -0.909* 
 (0.660) (0.469) 
L.cro_present_onboard -0.387 -0.219 
 (0.252) (0.153) 
L.comm_dir_board -0.104 -0.0756 
 (0.0946) (0.0661) 
L.female_ratio -0.527 -0.567* 
 (0.492) (0.305) 
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L.no_exp_ratio 0.847*** 0.485*** 
 (0.264) (0.165) 
L.irb_permission -0.696*** -0.437*** 
 (0.248) (0.149) 
L.exposure_to_banks 1.344* 0.318 
 (0.802) (0.469) 
L.securities_holdings 0.629 0.170 
 (0.752) (0.381) 
L.advisory_activity 25.85*** 20.20*** 
 (6.744) (3.216) 
L.equity_ratio 6.402** 0.370 
 (2.577) (1.280) 
L.current_deposits_over_liabs -0.0952 0.152 
 (0.289) (0.177) 
L.size_over_gdp 0.0879 0.0251 
 (0.258) (0.143) 
Constant 0.322 0.439 
 (0.729) (0.402) 
   
Observations 299 299 
VIFs 1.28-7.23 1.28-7.35 
GMM criterion Q(b) 1.01 x e-17 1.94 x e-19 
Pr > F endo reg >0.999 >0.999 
   
Year dummies included but not shown 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Equation numbers are as stated in Table 5.5.  The two equations are estimated simultaneously 
and are shown under the heading of the same model.  Dependent variables are stated at the top of 
columns and explanatory variables in rows.  Equations are estimated using the generalised method 
of moments.  Estimated parameter values are shown along with star symbols for statistical 
significance.  Clustered standard errors are in parentheses because non-spherical error variance is 
assumed.  VIFs for this set of regressors vary from 1.28 to 7.35, but this has not prevented the 
detection of significant associations, or caused sign reversals.  Auxiliary regression using residuals as 
dependent variable shows no empirical evidence of endogeneity for any independent variable.  Pr>F 
endo reg is the probability of obtaining an F statistic at least as large as was obtained in an auxiliary 
regression of residuals on regressors (a test for endogeneity) under the null hypothesis that the 
auxiliary regression coefficients are all zero.  (Bivariate tests also confirmed absence of endogeneity; 






These results (Table 5.7) show clear negative effects of mutual ownership and 
a foreign parent on loan impairments and ROA.  Importantly, the use of both 
2SLS and GMM estimation reveals that the effects reported are robust to a 
change of estimation framework and the use of clustered standard errors.  It 
also allows assessment of whether the estimated magnitude of effects varies 
with estimation framework. 
Taking GMM estimates as definitive because of greater efficiency and less 
vulnerability to bias, mutual ownership lowers loan impairments by 1.5% (of 
gross loans) and ROA by 0.8% (of total assets) ceteris paribus.  A foreign 
parent lowers loan impairments by 1.2% and ROA by 0.8% ceteris paribus.  
Given that the average in the sample of the loan impairments ratio is 0.3% 
and that of ROA is 0.4%, these are large effects (although they will be offset in 
practice by variation in other causal variables).  For mutual ownership, the 
results are as predicted by theoretical studies in the literature and earlier 
empirical studies.  However, my results lend essential support to pre-existing 
studies in a number of ways.  Firstly, they lend support to a literature that 
relied on relatively few papers, with the main results being in Iannotta et al 
(2007) and Marco and Fernandez (2007). 
Secondly, they show that mutual ownership has a negative effect on risk and 
return in an institutional setting where this was not established before: a data 
set where the great majority of mutuals are UK building societies.  This is 
important because, although UK building societies are owned by depositors 
and are thus mutual organisations in the standard international sense of the 
word, they differ from mutual banks overseas in terms of the range of 
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activities in which they are permitted to undertake.  The UK Building 
Societies Act, 1986 (legislation.gov.uk) was, as part of wider financial 
deregulation, designed specifically to widen the range of services building 
societies could offer and thereby intensify the competition between them and 
shareholder-owned banks.  After the Act was passed, building societies were 
allowed to offer unsecured loans and cheque accounts, and even to engage in 
foreign exchange activities, provide stock-broking services, manage retail 
investment funds and arrange and advise in respect of insurance.   
The key point is that, while mutual banks overseas are heterogeneous in 
nature, UK legislation makes building societies more homogenous as a group 
and more similar to banks in their commercial activities.  Thus, they offer an 
opportunity to test, a very pure way that is not confounded by correlation of 
mutuality with restrictions on business model, the effects of mutual 
ownership.  The fact that I find results for building societies in the UK 
consistent with theoretical predictions represents a more robust confirmation 
than any earlier study that the effects detected are due to mutual status and 
not any restrictions on business model that are correlated with mutuality. 
Thirdly, it is clear from the results of section 4.6 that, if I had not used a 
simultaneous equations model allowing for effects of risk and return on one 
another, the fact that UK building societies provide a very robust 
confirmation of the effects of mutuality would have been entirely overlooked.  
Omitting simultaneity would create the erroneous impression that mutuality 
has no effects on risk or return. 
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The results for a foreign parent must be understood in the context of the 
contradictory literature on this subject.  Choi and Hasan (2005) report a 
negative effect of foreign ownership on bank risk, Angkinand and Whilborg 
(2010) report the exact opposite, and Forssbaeck (2011) finds no impact.  
Havrylchyk and Jurzyk (2011) suggest that bank privatisation improves 
performance while Chen and Liao (2011) suggest that the implications of 
having a foreign parent entity may be largely context-specific. 
My findings support the side of the debate that suggests a negative impact on 
risk and are contrary to earlier studies that suggest a positive impact on 
performance.  Indeed, my result runs contrary to a general literature on 
economic globalisation that suggests cross-border ownership and other 
international linkages are always performance-boosting because they arose to 
exploit opportunities to increase efficiency by expanding overseas.  For 
instance, Hanousek et al (2012) argue that the relevant literature almost 
universally argues that foreign ownership increases efficiency compared to 
domestic ownership, and they find further evidence to support this in data for 
central Europe. 
My result for a foreign parent is credible, and likely more credible than 
earlier empirical studies, because it is consistent with two bodies of 
theoretical literature.  One is the literature summarised in section 4.2 which 
suggests that risk and return are correlated.  The second is the literature on 
information asymmetries.  For instance, Bebczuk (2003) argues that firm 
insiders have an informational advantage over outsiders (including investors) 
and that this manifests in various ways, including principal-agent conflict 
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and difficulty raising equity finance.  It is reasonable to assume that this 
information asymmetry is intensified if the owners are in a different country, 
with fewer personal interactions and differences in personal networks and 
culture.  It is informative here that my findings for foreign ownership are 
similar to those for mutuality, given that the theoretical literature (for 
instance Schliefer and Vishny, 1997) suggests the effects of mutuality are due 
to managers being able to pursue their own interests – which is arguably 
equivalent to how managers can behave when owners are based overseas.  
This is the first time the effects of foreign ownership have been found to 
mirror those of mutuality in this way.   
A few other studies support the view that foreign ownership is not always 
performance-boosting.  For instance, in stochastic frontier analysis of 
European corporations, Hanousek et al (2015) show that foreign majority 
owners detract from profitability.  
The literature relating to ownership concentrations surveyed in section 2.5.4 
is also relevant here.  The findings of Kim et al (2007) and Auvray and 
Brossard (2012) suggest that owners who control large blocks are better able 
to monitor banks and, assuming they are diversified with other holdings, will 
force more aggressive pursuit of profit and greater risk-taking.  Since 
mutuality implies the absence of any block holdings, and since foreign 
ownership entails the absence of any block holders geographically nearby, my 
findings are consistent with the view that mutuality and foreign ownership 




Overall, it seems that the effects I observe for foreign ownership of banks 
arise from cross-border information asymmetries and that these predominate 
over diversification and any other effects of foreign ownership.  The 
conclusion that the effects of a foreign parent are due to information 
asymmetries, while cross-border diversification is not important, is 
supported by my finding in Chapter 8 that diversification effects are not 
important at all in my sample. 
Importantly, neither mutual ownership nor a foreign parent has any 
measurable effect on the growth rate of total assets (results not shown but 
can be provided upon request), suggesting that, while they adversely affect 
bank performance in the sense of profitability, they do not affect the 
provision of finance to the wider economy. 
I find in section 5.6 that a foreign parent entity increases the probability of 
bank failure.  As well as being a novel finding, this difference from mutual 
ownership likely arises because foreign ownership has a larger negative effect 
on ROE (which is important for solvency) than mutual ownership.  It also 
supports the conclusion that foreign ownership acts primarily through cross-
border information asymmetries and suggests that the financial inefficiencies 
associated with foreign ownership can have seriously adverse social 
consequences. 
State majority ownership appears to have robust effects on ROA and loan 
impairments in initial analysis, but these disappear when I adjust for non-
spherical error variance and so should be disregarded. 
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In summary, mutual ownership has negative effects on bank risk and return I 
therefore accept hypothesis H5.2.  I also accept hypothesis H5.3: foreign 
ownership does indeed have effects on bank risk and return, and these effects 
are negative in both cases. 
 
5.6 Ownership and Bank Failure 
Logically, one would expect the effects of ownership and governance on bank 
risk and performance to exist alongside effects of the same regressors on 
bank failure.  There are likely to be direct and indirect effects involved here.  
In terms of indirect effects, ceteris paribus we would expect any 
characteristic which increases performance to reduce the probability of 
failure, and any characteristic which increases asset risk to increase the 
probability of failure.  If something reduces both performance and risk, then 
it would be expected that the larger of these two effects would be dominant in 
terms of effects on the probability of failure 
Ownership and governance are likely to affect many aspects of banks beyond 
those measured here, possibly including effects that have not been, or cannot 
easily be, measured effectively.  Success or failure is the result of a 
combination of all of these effects.  As a consequence, it is simpler from a 
modelling perspective if I test hypotheses relating to effects on bank failure 
using reduced-form models in which effects are treated as direct even if they 
include a complex and hard-to-specify mix of direct and indirect components. 
To determine if ownership and governance have effects on bank failure, I take 
the same regressors as used in sections 5.4 and 5.5 and use them in probit 
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models with the dependent variable being a combined indicator of failure 
(combined_failure) that takes the value 1 if the bank fails (in the sense of 
becoming insolvent, bankrupt or a defaulter) or receives government 
assistance (such as a capital injection or asset guarantee) designed to prevent 
failure.  Defining the dependent variable in this way ensures that I capture 
cases in which the business model of the bank has, in effect, failed, but an 
actual insolvency has not occured purely because of government intervention. 
Models used to test hypotheses are estimated using the following equations 
(Table 5.8) with equation numbers used for cross-reference in regression 




Table 5.8 Dependent and explanatory variables included in models for testing hypotheses 
that ownership types affect bank failure. 
Dependent Variable: combined_failure 
All equations 







































Note: variable abbreviations and definitions as per section 3.8.  “L.” signifies a one-year lag. 
Characteristics relating to ownership are retained in these models because 
the aim is to test, using an indicator of bank failure as a measure of risk, the 
hypotheses stated in section 5.3.  Characteristics relating to governance are 
retained as controls because, for the reasons stated in section 6.4, there is 
reason to expect these to affect bank risk.  (The converse logic applies when 
equations 5.13 to 5.15 are re-used in section 6.11: there I am testing 
hypotheses relating to governance variables and retaining ownership 
variables as controls in order to avoid mis-specification.) 
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The only difference in the set of explanatory variables compared to the 
baseline model specification stated in Table 3.1 is the inclusion as regressors 
of variables included elsewhere in my study as outcome variables.  The 
rationale for this is simple: financial outcomes have direct impacts on bank 
failure (e.g. low ROE directly erodes solvency and increases the chances of 
failure) and may be influenced by unknown factors not included in these 
models.  The only way to control for these potentially omitted influences is to 
include the relevant outcome variables as regressors.  In particular, various 
studies in the literature identify periods of rapid growth or speculative 
behaviour in banking as causes or predictors of subsequent bank distress (e.g. 
Gorton, 2012 and Allen and Gale, 1997). 
Balance sheet characteristics are included as controls because these are 
reflective of business model and it is plausible that bank risk could vary 
depending on the risk level of different business models, as explained in 
section 3.4. 
Probit models are used because they are suitable for testing significance with 
co-variates treated as held constant in settings with binary dependent 
variables, and the choice between logit and probit is arbitrary.  Linear 
probability models are not used because they can predict meaningless 





Table 5.9 Probit estimation results for ownership as a determinant of bank failure.   







    
L.growth_gross_loans   0.00714 
   (0.00550) 
L.growth_total_assets   0.0233*** 
   (0.00853) 
L.loan_impairments   -0.111 
   (0.435) 
L.return_on_assets   0.0560 
   (0.303) 
L.return_on_equity   -0.0221*** 
   (0.00610) 
    
L.state_majority_owner 1.172*** 2.061*** 8.760*** 
 (0.407) (0.694) (1.827) 
L.mutual_ownership 0.192 -0.736 0.998 
 (0.478) (0.639) (1.349) 
L.foreign_parent 0.913** 1.176** 5.887*** 
 (0.425) (0.592) (1.579) 
    
L.board_size 0.0178 0.0422 0.0832 
 (0.0498) (0.0694) (0.103) 
L.director_ratio -1.118 -3.317 -9.247*** 
 (1.280) (2.136) (3.522) 
L.rem_co -0.737** -0.985** -2.808*** 
 (0.329) (0.497) (0.743) 
L.exec_rem_disclosed 0.577 0.808 3.731*** 
 (0.397) (0.559) (0.910) 
L.average_pay 0.0313 -3.572 -5.424 
 (0.0694) (2.739) (4.198) 
L.joint_ceo_chairman -0.0881 0.889 0.398 
 (0.417) (0.547) (0.828) 
L.cro_present_onboard 0.460 -0.284 -0.349 
 (0.593) (0.565) (0.874) 
L.comm_dir_board -0.109 -0.505* -0.842** 
 (0.272) (0.300) (0.360) 
L.female_ratio -0.822 -1.148 2.664 
 (1.914) (2.394) (3.035) 
L.no_exp_ratio 0.478 2.211** 5.794*** 
 (0.709) (0.985) (1.609) 
L.irb_permission 0.0678 0.268 -5.956*** 
 (0.425) (0.492) (1.602) 
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L.exposure_to_banks  -2.188* -5.784*** 
  (1.217) (1.436) 
L.securities_holdings  -4.444** -7.575*** 
  (1.982) (2.462) 
L.advisory_activity  -83.80** -73.17 
  (34.92) (52.53) 
L.equity_ratio  2.362 5.221 
  (1.710) (10.08) 
L.current_deposits_over_liabs  -0.818 0.138 
  (0.553) (0.851) 
L.size_over_gdp  0.0362 1.718* 
  (0.683) (0.894) 
Constant -1.063 2.264 0.941 
 (0.803) (1.428) (2.042) 
    
Observations 406 384 294 
Pseudo-R-squared 0.235 0.376 0.591 
VIFs (these regressors) 1.18 – 3.15 1.27 – 6.23 1.28 – 7.3 
Wald Chi2 422.0 463.7 2225.7 
Pr > Chi2 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Pr < Smith-Blundell <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
    
Year dummies included but not shown 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Equation numbers are as stated in Table 5.8.  Dependent variables are stated at the top of 
columns and explanatory variables in rows.  Equations are estimated using maximum likelihood with 
numerical optimisation.  Estimated parameter values are shown along with star symbols for 
statistical significance.  The presence of non-spherical error variance is assumed, such that clustered 
standard errors are used (shown in parentheses).  Pr>Chi2 is the probability of obtaining a Chi2 at 
least as large as was obtained under the null hypothesis that the regression coefficients are all zero.  
Pr<Smith-Blundell is the probability of obtaining a Smith-Blundell statistic at least as small as was 
obtained under the null that regressors are endogenous. 
 
 
This analysis (Table 5.9) reveals that state majority ownership is associated 
with an increased likelihood of failure.  However, this is not as causally 
interesting as might first appear.  It is present probably because state 
ownership arises in this sample often due to government takeover following 
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severe distress.  Such stress does not stop immediately at the point of 
government takeover, and on-going stress raises the probability of further 
failure events for the kind I define above. 
More interestingly, the presence of a foreign parent raises the probability of 
bank failure.  This is consistent with the earlier finding that a foreign parent 
has large negative effects on ROE, which is directly important for bank 
solvency (a negative ROE entails erosion of equity capital and thus movement 
towards insolvency).  It is also consistent with the fact that a foreign parent 
lowers loan impairments by 1.2% of gross loans (0.7% of gross loans) but 
nevertheless lowers overall ROA by 0.8% of total assets – indicating that its 
other effects on performance overwhelm the beneficial effect on performance 
that occurs indirectly through lower impairments. 
Since the effects of a foreign parent on bank risk and return can be attributed 
to cross-border information asymmetries dominating over diversification 
effects and greater resources, the knock-on effects for bank failure can also be 
attributed to information asymmetries.  In essence foreign-owned banks are 
more likely to fail because their foreign shareholders face greater difficulty in 
monitoring and controlling local management. 
The parameter values estimated cannot be directly interpreted as partial 
effects because they relate to a model that involves a nonlinear 
transformation.  It can be observed that they vary substantially in magnitude 
across different specifications included for reasons of robustness testing.  
However, the values are significant in all cases and are larger in those models 
where more controls are added. 
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In conclusion, the results shown here lend support to hypotheses H5.1 and 
H5.3, which were already accepted on other grounds in sections 5.5 and 5.5. 
Please note that the effects detected above for governance variables are not 
discussed because they are dealt with in the penultimate section of Chapter 6. 
 
5.7 Conclusions 
The main conclusions of Chapter 5 are that hypotheses H5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 are 
all accepted.  There is robust evidence that state ownership reduces 
performance (albeit not on all measures) and perhaps increases risk, that 
mutuality lowers risk and performance, and that a foreign parent reduces 
performance and financial risk, while increasing the probability of failure. 
My work demonstrates that, when a framework is used in which bank risk 
and return are treated as simultaneous (the first time this has been done in 
the literature on bank ownership and governance), interesting effects of 
ownership types are evident.  Mutual ownership and the presence of a foreign 
parent have very similar effects to one another: they each lower bank risk and 
bank performance.  
The effects of mutuality are in accordance with theory (Schleifer and Vishny, 
1997) and earlier empirical work (Iannotta et al, 2007).  They are present 
because the managers of mutuals ceteris paribus have weaker incentives to 
pursue profits and take risk compared to the managers of other banks.  
Although they have been seen before, these results are nevertheless 
interesting.  They show that the findings remain robust in a framework where 
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risk and return are treated as simultaneous – a relationship that is important 
in theory and which I show is present in this empirical setting.  They also 
extend and support the relatively limited number of empirical papers 
showing the effects of mutual ownership of banks. 
The effects of a foreign parent are something that can only be understood 
empirically.  In theory, cross-border banks are subject to greater information 
asymmetries between owners and managers, but also benefit from greater 
diversification and resources.  Which of these is dominant in any given 
setting is a matter that can only be settled empirically. 
My results show that, in this data set, the effects of information asymmetry 
must be dominant over the other potential effects of a foreign parent that I 
considered.  Managers of banks with a foreign parent are not motivated as 
strongly as in other banks to pursue the objectives of shareholders – who are 
generally assumed to be more profit-seeking and more risk-tolerant than 
managers, all else being equal (e.g. Sullivan and Spong, 2007). 
The effects of a foreign parent on bank performance have a knock-on effect: 
they make banks more susceptible to failure.  This effect is not evident for 
mutual banks, most likely because the effects of mutuality on ROE (which is 
of vital importance for solvency) are half the size of the effects of a foreign 
parent. 
It is also important to note that neither mutual ownership nor the presence of 
a foreign parent has any detectable effect on growth in bank assets or growth 
in gross loans.  This suggests that, although effects on bank performance may 
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be present, there is no sign of an effect on provision of credit or other forms 
of investment to the wider economy. 
State majority ownership is found to lead to lower loan interest income.  This 
is a novel result and is likely due to the propensity of state-owned banks to 
pursue other objectives alongside financial objectives, and thus to do less-
well financially (Gonzales-Garcia and Grigoli, 2013 and Schleifer and Vishny, 
1997).  State-owned banks are also more likely to fail than other banks, but 
this is likely because many banks in this sample became state-owned as a 
result of on-going stress, which makes failure events more likely. 
In policy terms, all these results have interesting implications (drawn using 
normative assumptions stated in section 9.3).  The possible benefits of 
mutual ownership have been discussed by a number of authors (e.g. 
Guadano, 2009).  If mutual ownership lowers bank risk, has no effect on 
provision of investment to the economy and has its only adverse effects on 
private profits (which could be the result of efficiency or rent-seeking, albeit 
earned for small depositor-owners) then it appears, on balance, beneficial.  
This is especially so when we consider that the incentives which make the 
managers of such banks less profit-seeking and less risk-tolerant may also 
make them less likely to mistreat customers. 
This suggests that mutual ownership of banks should be widespread and that 
incentives to encourage it should be created, perhaps through the corporate 
tax system or by helping the creation of new mutuals.  We cannot argue on 
the basis of the results shown here that mutuality in bank ownership should 
be universal because going this far could have adverse general equilibrium 
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effects that cannot be foreseen using my data.  However, it is clear that 
increasing the prevalence of mutuals from its current level would be 
beneficial. 
The policy recommendation for a foreign parent is different.  If it increases 
the probability of bank failure, with all the systemic disruption this can entail, 
it cannot be seen as beneficial.  Although current international agreements on 
bank regulation and treaties designed to prevent trade barriers would 
preclude it, there is an argument for imposing higher regulatory capital 
requirements on foreign-owned banks as a means to protect their solvency 
and the stability of the system.   
The finding that state ownership of banks has adverse effects on performance 
suggests inefficiency due to granting soft loans and indicates, in the absence 
of any other measurable effects, that it would be undesirable to have an 
economy with many state-owned banks.  However, a limited number of state-
owned banks in an economy could be beneficial as a means to mobilise 
capital into innovative sectors that have been subject to market failures 
affecting investment levels5 (e.g. Lin et al 2015).  Bank nationalisation may 
also be necessary in cases where banks are failing and there are no credible 
systems of bank resolution to ensure orderly liquidation. 
In conclusion, the data suggest that mutual ownership of banks should be 
encouraged, though not necessarily to the exclusion of other ownership types, 
                                                          
5 In making this observation I should note, to avoid any appearance of a conflict of interest, that I 
currently work for a state-owned bank, the UK Green Investment Bank plc, that was created to 
address a market failure in provision of investment to renewable energy projects. 
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while foreign ownership should be limited and state majority ownership 






Chapter 6: Roles of Governance and Information Processing  
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I test hypotheses that aspects of bank governance affect risk 
and return.  The aspects of bank governance in question include features 
which relate to the ability of banks to make use of information on risk and 
return.  I make use of the approach set out in Chapter 3 and the models with 
simultaneity developed in Chapter 4.  The main dependent variables are 
ROE, ROA, loan impairments and combined failure, because these are 
indicators of risk and return.  Growth in total assets was also used as a 
dependent variable, to determine if effects on banks are accompanied by 
effects on credit provision to the economy (the conclusion was that they are 
not, so these results are not shown, although they can be provided on 
request).  
One key hypothesis I confirm is that IRB, because it entails better detection 
of risk and therefore empowers risk-averse agents within banks, leads to 
lower risk-taking and lower return.  This is tested using another novel 
framework in which risk, return and leverage are endogenous, with IRB 
permission allowed to affect the equity ratio because regulators may permit 
IRB banks to hold less equity capital.  Using this framework, I accept the 
hypothesis that IRB lowers risk and performance, which is a novel result not 
previously reported in the literature.  Specifically, I find that regulatory 
permission to use Internal Ratings Based (IRB) models leads to lower 
impairments and lower ROA.  This is an important finding in that it 
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contradicts recent studies such as Aikman et al (2014) and Haldane (2013) 
which have questioned the ability of IRB to affect risk-taking. 
I also confirm another novel hypothesis relating to information-processing 
capability: that a higher proportion of Directors without financial services 
experience positively affects return but also leads to higher risk (in the form 
of a higher rate of bank failure) because the consequences of pursuing returns 
are not fully understood by Directors in this setting.   
Using the same novel multi-equation framework as Chapters 4 and 5, I 
confirm the related hypothesis that Board Size positively affects return on 
assets due to having access to a wider set of skills and experience and thus 
better processing of information relating to risk and return.  Supporting work 
using a single-equation model with ROE as the dependent variable also 
confirms the hypothesis. 
Surprisingly, I find that the proportion of NEDs on the Board has no 
measurable effect on financial outcomes, even though having a sufficient 
number of NEDs on the Board is considered a core element of good corporate 
governance (UK Corporate Governance Code 2014). However, I do confirm 
the hypothesis that NEDs reduce bank risk in that I show a higher proportion 
of NEDs leading to a lower rate of bank failure.  Likewise, I confirm the 
hypothesis that strong governance of remuneration leads to lower bank risk 
by showing the presence of a remuneration committee leading to a lower rate 
of bank failure.  Taken together, these findings have the practical importance 
of showing that banks should have large Boards with many NEDs with 
experience in financial services and a remuneration committee. 
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I also confirm the novel hypothesis that an independent Chairman and an 
independent CRO each lead to higher risk because they dilute the personal 
accountability of the CEO and confuse decision making at the most senior 
levels.  This is of great practical importance because it runs contrary to the 
guidance in the UK Corporate Governance Code (2014) and Financial 
Conduct Authority Handbook that firms should have an independent 
Chairman and independent CRO for reasons of risk mitigation.  More 
surprisingly, I find that the presence of a Commercial Director as a full Board 
member has no robust effects.   
Subsequent sections of this chapter deal with relevant literature and 
development of hypotheses from this literature (sections 6.2 to 6.4), 
empirical results relating to how specific aspects of governance and 
information processing ability affect risk and return (sections 6.5 to 6.11) and 
overall synthesis of results and policy implications (section 6.12). 
 
6.2 Key Results in the Literature 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the literature on agency theory suggests outcomes 
across firms are affected by variations in levels of control by individuals with 
different incentives.  This applies to banks as much as other firms. 
The incentives of, and levels of control held by individuals are, in turn, 
determined by corporate governance arrangements.  The literature defines 
corporate governance as structures for overseeing a firm, often designed to 
manage agency conflicts.  This again applies to banks as much as other firms.  
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Corporate governance differs across banks.  Therefore agency theory predicts 
different outcomes at the bank level. 
The empirical literature validates this prediction.  It shows that the presence 
of more independent directors and a larger Board both lead to less risk, as 
does (more surprisingly) the presence of a joint CEO-Chairman.  The 
presence of a CRO on the Board is reported to lead to increased performance 
and reduced risk.   
The presence of independent directors on a bank’s Board appears to lead to 
reduced risk and performance.  Analysis from the International Monetary 
Fund (Brandão-Marques et al 2014) finds that independence at Board level 
leads to reduced risk, a result that is also found by Pathan (2009).  Aebi et al 
(2012) finds that director independence leads to reduced profitability in a 
crisis period.  A dissenting result is found in a study by the World Bank 
(Anginer et al, 2014), which reports that independence in the governance 
structure at Board level leads to increased bank risk-taking, but I dismiss this 
on the basis that it is contrary to theory and the rest of the empirical 
literature. 
Results for board size are clearer, but are based on few papers.  Pathan 
(2009) and Aebi et al (2012) both find that Board size has a negative impact 
on risk.  This suggests that the availability of a greater set of skills and 
experience at a senior level leads to better decision-making and lower risk.  In 
the case of non-financial firms Huang and Wang (2015) also report that 
larger Boards are associated with reduced risk.  Meanwhile, results in Liang 
et al (2013) indicate that larger Board size in banks has a negative impact on 
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financial performance.  This is consistent with a situation in which larger 
Boards lead to a lower risk appetite at the firm level and the classical risk-
return correlation discussed in section 4.2 is present.  A single study, Pathan 
(2009), examines the effects of combining the CEO and Chairman roles and 
finds that a dual CEO-Chairman has a negative effect on bank risk.  This is 
can be understood in light of a study by Yang and Zhao (2014) suggesting 
that separation of these roles confuses decision-making and a study from Rus 
et al (2011) suggesting that anything which weakens the personal 
accountability of a CEO increases risk. 
Results in the literature relating to the presence of a CRO as a full Board 
Director appear clear-cut.  Aebi et al (2012) find that a CRO on the Board has 
a positive impact on returns, while Dong et al (2014) find that it has a 
negative impact on risk.  However, these are based on narrow research 
contexts (a crisis period for the former and Chinese banks for the latter) and 
represent the opposite effect of senior-level monitoring from that reported 
for the Chairman.  So, on balance, it is more likely that an independent 
Chairman or an independent CRO each increase risk because the division of 
responsibilities involved confuses decision-making and weakens the personal 
accountability (for risk management) of the CEO. 
The literature attempts to understand how the personal-level incentives of 
individuals within banks differ, potentially providing a behavioural micro-
foundation for work that considers the effects of empowering different 
agents.  Šilingienė et al (2015) summarise the relevant literature and report 
that firm performance is a major factor in determining CEO remuneration.  
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By contrast, Goh and Gupta (2015) report that firm performance is not a 
determinant of NED or Chairman Remuneration in the UK.  Mallin et al 
(2015) report the same for firms in the UK and Italy.  This is consistent with 
the UK Corporate Governance Code 2014, which states that NED’s pay 
should not involve share options or other performance-related elements.  
There are no similar studies for the CRO, but regulation in the UK requires 
that remuneration of control functions is appropriately aligned to risk-taking 
incentives and that control functions are not subject to remuneration-based 
incentives that could undermine their motivation to limit risk (Financial 
Conduct Authority Handbook, Systems and Controls Sourcebook, Chapter 
19).   
On the basis of these sources, it appears that the CEO has strong incentives to 
seek profit and tolerate risk, while the Chairman, NEDs and CRO have 
incentives to minimise risk.  However, these personal incentives are not likely 
to be what determines the effects of an independent Chairman or CRO.  The 
CEO is the most powerful role in a bank, being responsible for its overall 
executive direction so, since the presence an independent CRO or Chairman 
makes it harder for the CEO to execute decisions immediately and limits the 
personal accountability for risk he or she perceives (Yang and Zhao, 2014 and 
Rus et al, 2011) then we can expect an independent CRO or Chairman to 
cause increased risk.  This is clearly contrary to what regulators assume, but 
it is a more plausible synthesis of the various studies on the roles of the 




In the case of Non-Executive Directors, these individuals form a more diffuse 
group with no clear personal roles, so they are less likely to confuse the CEO’s 
decisions or dilute his or her personal accountability.  Therefore, more NEDs 
can be expected to cause less risk and less return, in the way their personal 
incentives would suggest. 
In summary, based on the literature one would expect a larger Board to entail 
better use of information and thus better outcomes in terms of risk and / or 
return.  One would expect the effects of having an independent Chairman or 
independent CRO to be determined by dilution of CEO accountability and 
confusion of decisions while, by contrast, we would expect the effects of 
having more NEDs on the Board to be determined by the risk-averse 
preferences of NEDs. 
 
6.3 The Economics of Information 
Shannon (1948) shows that information is a fundamental physical quantity 
that can be quantified and modelled.  The quantity of information present, 
the quantity that can be present, and processes through which more 
information is generated has implications for system stability, pattern 
formation, evolution and economic growth. 
Theoretical work since the 1970s has recognised the importance of 
information asymmetries in a range of economic settings.  Such asymmetries 
can, for instance, cause a form of market failure in which trading volume 




More recent studies have applied the theory of information assymetries in a 
range of settings (Bircher and Butler, 2007) including financial services 
(Bebczuk, 2003).  For instance, because investors are aware that share 
issuers have an informational advantage, capital-raising through equity 
markets is lower than it would otherwise be if this asymmetry of information 
did not exist.  Similarly, because of limited information, banks may charge 
borrowers with different characteristics the same interest rate, with the 
results that a) credit is rationed and b) strong, honest borrowers subsidise 
less desirable borrowers. 
This body of theory implies that anything which affects the ability of banks to 
process information will have important effects on risk and return.  
Specifically, if some banks have better information-processing capabilities 
than others, and the other banks are unable to perfectly mimic their 
decisions, then they may be able to achieve lower risk at the same level or 
return (or greater return at the same level of risk).  This could perhaps be the 
case if banks have more experienced Directors or if they use the Internal 
Ratings Based (IRB) approach to credit risk analysis permitted under Basel 
regulation, which is a direct indicator of the ability to process information on 
the credit quality of borrowers. 
Hakenes and Schnabel (2011) have explored the effects of IRB in a theoretical 
model.  They argued that IRB improves capital adequacy (relative to risk) at 
IRB banks, but that banks’ right to choose between IRB and simpler 
regulator-prescribed formulae for determining capital requirements may put 
smaller, non-IRB banks at a competitive disadvantage, leading them to take 
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greater risk and magnifying aggregate risk.  These conclusions have not been 
tested empirically.   
While some studies show that IRB is considered relation to loan pricing (e.g. 
Ruthenberg and Landskroner, 2008) none show that banks seek to use it to 
identify attractive risk-return pairings.  Rather than leading to a better risk-
return trade-off, it may therefore be more likely that IRB permission simply 
leads to lower risk and return because it empowers risk-averse decision-
makers, reflecting the manner in which different kinds of agents can be 
empowered by information (Ashraf, 2008).  
In the case of Board size, one can construct an argument in which greater 
Board size entails a greater set of skills and experience to draw upon, leading 
to greater information-processing power and a better risk-return trade-off.  
This is contrary to the empirical studies summarised in section 6.2, which 
suggest that larger Boards have negative effects on both risk and 
performance.  However, evidence of a negative effect on performance is based 
on one study (Liang et al, 2013) from a particular setting (China) and it is 
more plausible that larger Boards benefit either risk or performance – 
because they entail greater experience, they do not affect risk aversion, and it 
should not be hard to coordinate a Board of less than 30 people when firms 
routinely coordinate thousands of staff.  My results (see section 6.5) are 
consistent with the hypothesis that larger Board size does improve the risk-
return trade-off. 
In conclusion, there is a strong basis for expecting that information-
processing capabilities should affect bank risk and return.  However, there 
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have been no empirical studies to validate this.  I address this gap in this 
Chapter. 
 
6.4 Literature Gaps and Hypotheses 
The empirical literature has not sought to determine if the predicted effects of 
governance variables hold true in a setting where risk and return are treated 
as simultaneous.  This is an important omission because I have shown in 
Chapter 4 that risk and return are, in practice, simultaneous and that 
overlooking this can lead to bias in model estimates.  Empirical studies have 
also omitted certain important indicators of the balance of power within 
firms, such as the presence of commercial directors who are likely to have 
strong risk-taking incentives.  Other omitted variables relate to features 
which affect the information-processing capacities of banks, including the 
presence or not of permission from regulators to use IRB models to analyse 
credit risk. 
Therefore, in this Chapter I seek to test the following hypotheses: 
H6.1: Board size is associated with higher 
return or lower risk, because it entails a greater set 
of skills and experience on which to draw, hence a 
greater ability to process information, and hence 
lower risk at the same return (compared to other 
banks) or greater return at the same risk. 
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H6.2: The presence of a Joint CEO-Chairman 
leads to lower risk and/or higher return because it 
increases the personal accountability of the CEO 
and permits clearer decision-making. 
H6.3: The presence of a CRO who is a full 
Board member entails higher risk and/or lower 
performance because it lowers the personal 
accountability of the CEO and confuses decision-
making. 
H6.4: The presence of a Commercial Director 
who is a full Board member entails higher risk and 
higher return because it empowers an individual 
(the Commercial Director) with strong incentives 
to pursue profit and take risk. 
H6.5: A higher ratio of Non-Executive 
Directors compared to executives entails lower risk 
and lower returns because it empowers individuals 
(NEDs) with weak incentives to pursue profit and 
take risk. 
H6.6: A higher proportion of directors with no 
previous financial services experience is associated 
with higher return and higher risk because it leads 
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to simple pursuit of profit without understanding 
risk. 
H6.7: Permission from regulators to use IRB 
models for credit risk analysis is associated with 
lower return and/or lower risk, because it 
empowers individuals with risk-averse preferences 
within banks. 
H6.8: The presence of more female Directors 
leads to higher return or lower risk, because it 
reflects a situation in which banks have not 
overlooked skills through irrational gender 
discrimination, meaning that they can use 
information better. 
H6.9: The presence of a Remuneration 
Committee leads to lower risk and lower return 
because it ensures that outcomes related to risk are 
taken into account in setting pay, whereas pay 
would otherwise tend to be based only on 
profitability. 
H6.10: The presence of Executive Remuneration 
Disclosures leads to lower risk and lower return 
because it discourages the setting of pay that 
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incentivises high levels of profit-seeking and high 
risk tolerance. 
 
Note that, in the case of hypothesis H6.4, I am not assuming that the presence 
of a Commercial Director weakens the incentives of the CEO to control risk 
(this is clearly not the case) or that it leads to confused decision-making 
(because, under Corporate Governance Codes, a Commercial Director does 
not have the same rights to monitor the CEO as the Chairman or CRO).  
Therefore I am assuming that, because Commercial Directors have profit-
oriented incentives, their presence on the Board leads to higher risk and 
higher return. 
In hypothesis H6.7, I am assuming that IRB permission empowers risk-
averse decision makers within banks, rather than improving the risk-return 
trade-off.  This is for the reasons discussed in section 6.3. 
In hypothesis H6.8, one could make reference to biological and sociological 
factors which have been reported to cause risk preferences to differ between 
genders (Sapienza et al, 2008).  These are not my starting point, because the 
literature in this respect is more uncertain than the simple, practical 
considerations that inform H6.8.  However, such factors are considered in 





6.5 Effects of Board Size and a Joint CEO-Chairman 
My analysis below shows that Board Size positively affects ROA, which is 
likely due to having a greater set of skills and experience on which to draw.  It 
also shows that the presence of a joint CEO-Chairman reduces impairments, 
which is consistent with the hypothesis that splitting the roles of CEO and 
Chairman leads to dilution of the personal accountability of the CEO and 
confused decision-making.  This is the first time a simultaneous equations 
model has been used in this way to analyse the effects of bank governance, 
making the results more credible than earlier findings in the literature in that 
they are robust to simultaneity between risk and return.   
Models used to test hypotheses are estimated using the following equations 
(Table 6.1) with equation numbers used for cross-reference in regression 




Table 6.1 Dependent and explanatory variables in models for testing hypotheses that 
governance variables affect loan impairments and ROA. 
Dependent Variable: loan_impairments 
All equations  
































Note: variable abbreviations and definitions as per section 3.8.  “L.” signifies a one-year lag. 
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Table 6.1 (contd.) Dependent and explanatory variables in models for testing hypotheses 
that governance variables affect loan impairments and ROA. 
Dependent Variable: return_on_assets 
All equations  




































Loan impairments and ROA are used as dependent variables because they are 
the principal measures of risk and return in my study and one would expect 
them to be affected by any attributes which affect appetite for profit and 
ability to achieve it, or tolerance for risk and ability to minimise it. 
Compared to Table 3.1, these model specifications introduce two important 
changes.  First, terms for the square and cube of the variable director ratio 
are introduced.  This is to test the possibility that this variable has nonlinear 
effects and that omission of these nonlinear effects could bias estimates for 
other effects of governance variables.  Initially, as the number of NEDs 
increases from zero it may have increasing effects on governance as the size 
of voting block they can create increases.  However, as the number becomes 
large, effects may diminish again as NEDs each assume that other NEDs will 
exercise oversight and that credit and blame will be diluted.  So the square 
and cube of the variable director ratio are included as a robustness test to 
allow for the possibility of this kind of nonlinearity, being additional in 
equations 6.2 and 6.4 to the shorter specifications in 6.1 and 6.2.  
Second, the dummy variable Low NED is included.  This takes a value of 1 if 
NEDs are less than half of the Board, meaning that they can be out-voted by 
executives who may have different incentives in respect of risk and profit.  
This is included because it is a natural complement to regressors involving 
powers of the director ratio. 
The model specifications here are slightly different from those used in section 
5.5, in that metrics of financial performance used as dependent variables 
elsewhere in my study were included as explanatory variables in section 5.5 
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but are not included here.  The reason for the difference is that it serves as a 
form of robustness testing.  I see that, despite slight differences in 
specification, a) all of the results reported in section 5.5 (negative effects of 
mutuality and a foreign parent on ROA and loan impairments) are evident in 
section 6.5 and b) all of the results reported in section 6.5 (positive effect of 
Board size on ROA and negative effect of Joint CEO-Chairman on 
impairments) are evident in section 5.5.  In all cases, this includes results 
being evident in both 2SLS and GMM specifications, showing that a complete 
change of estimation method does not undermine the results.  This is one 
example of how different sections of my thesis act as robustness tests for one 
another. 
Models are estimated in linear form because there is no basis for suspecting 
any specific nonlinearities and a linear form is sufficient to test significance 




Table 6.2 2SLS estimation results for effects of governance in models with simultaneity of 
risk and return.   
 Model 1 Model 2 









     
return_on_assets -5.443**  -4.568***  
 (2.315)  (1.499)  
L.return_on_assets 2.864*  2.164**  
 (1.604)  (1.005)  
loan_impairments  -1.605***  -1.721*** 
  (0.514)  (0.664) 
L.loan_impairments  0.724**  0.796* 
  (0.345)  (0.442) 
L.board_size 0.0591 0.105** 0.0330 0.115** 
 (0.0688) (0.0443) (0.0590) (0.0565) 
L.director_ratio 0.470 -0.995 141.4 -107.8 
 (2.107) (1.128) (113.1) (87.87) 
L.director_ratio_sq   -231.2 155.5 
   (166.7) (127.9) 
L.director_ratio_cu   121.5 -74.00 
   (80.95) (61.29) 
L.joint_ceo_chairman -4.200** -0.474 -3.992*** -0.341 
 (1.997) (0.553) (1.518) (0.669) 
L.cro_present_onboard -0.271 -0.310 -0.574 -0.276 
 (0.793) (0.438) (0.641) (0.475) 
L.comm_dir_board -0.378 -0.0480 -0.512 0.0524 
 (0.371) (0.190) (0.333) (0.230) 
L.female_ratio -1.121 -0.0116 -1.543 0.0207 
 (2.113) (1.157) (1.721) (1.293) 
L.no_exp_ratio 0.779 0.525 0.812 0.556 
 (1.035) (0.561) (0.823) (0.610) 
L.low_ned 1.485 -1.439* 1.202 -2.433* 
 (1.841) (0.842) (1.819) (1.460) 
L.growth_total_assets 0.00197 0.00196 0.000432 0.00256 
 (0.00680) (0.00380) (0.00529) (0.00427) 
L.loan_interest_income 0.0321 -0.0228* 0.0256 -0.0265* 
 (0.0315) (0.0123) (0.0230) (0.0157) 
L.state_majority_owner 0.260 -1.396** -1.077 -1.227* 
 (1.024) (0.674) (0.715) (0.654) 
L.mutual_ownership -2.816** -0.904** -2.700*** -0.806* 
 (1.125) (0.420) (0.880) (0.462) 
L.foreign_parent -2.087** -0.852* -2.001** -0.845* 
 (0.998) (0.437) (0.774) (0.473) 
L.rem_co 0.0102 0.771* -0.114 0.889* 
 (0.729) (0.424) (0.609) (0.531) 
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L.exec_rem_disclosed -0.536 -0.156 -0.290 -0.204 
 (0.483) (0.252) (0.368) (0.278) 
L.average_pay 1.384 -1.774 -1.321 -1.293 
 (2.521) (1.467) (1.871) (1.468) 
L.irb_permission -2.019** -0.482 -1.692** -0.491 
 (1.004) (0.342) (0.703) (0.370) 
L.exposure_to_banks -2.625 3.254** -2.585 3.758* 
 (3.062) (1.642) (2.431) (2.197) 
L.securities_holdings -2.390 2.516* -1.565 2.677 
 (2.528) (1.471) (1.773) (1.732) 
L.advisory_activity 92.68** -15.65 73.11** -17.53 
 (47.01) (19.17) (30.33) (22.52) 
L.equity_ratio -40.97 31.72** -30.40 35.28* 
 (31.12) (14.87) (20.73) (19.21) 
L.curr_dep_over_liabs 1.916 -0.846 1.649 -1.058 
 (1.387) (0.603) (1.033) (0.791) 
L.size_over_gdp 0.794 -0.202 0.898 -0.271 
 (0.876) (0.426) (0.717) (0.492) 
Constant 4.152 -1.507 -23.31 22.01 
 (2.939) (1.425) (23.97) (18.75) 
     
Observations 297 297 297 297 
VIFs 1.30-7.23 1.30-7.35 1.32-7.36 1.32-7.47 
F statistic 7.07 4.83 9.49 3.94 
Pr > F <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Pr > F endo reg >0.999 >0.999 >0.999 >0.999 
Pr > Hall-Pagan <0.001 <0.001 0.011 <0.001 
Pr > Breusch-Pagan <0.001 <0.001 
     
Year dummies included but not shown 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Equation numbers are as stated in Table 6.1.  Where two equations are estimated 
simultaneously they are shown under the heading of the same model.  Dependent variables are 
stated at the top of columns and explanatory variables in rows.  Equations are estimated using two-
stage least squares.  Estimated parameter values are shown along with star symbols for statistical 
significance.  Classical standard errors are in parentheses.  Diagnostic testing using Hall-Pagan, 
Breusch-Pagan and system tests shows the presence of non-spherical error variance, such that this 
work is complemented by GMM estimation with clustered standard errors (next results table).  VIFs 
vary from 1.30 to 7.47 but this has not prevented detection of significant relationships or caused sign 
reversal (shown using smaller sets of regressors).  VIF estimates exclude powers of the director ratio.  
Auxiliary regression using residuals as dependent variable shows no empirical evidence of 
endogeneity for any dependent variable.  Pr>F is the probability of obtaining an F at least as large as 
was obtained under the null hypothesis that the regression coefficients are all zero.  Pr>F endo reg is 
the probability of obtaining an F statistic at least as large as was obtained in an auxiliary regression of 
residuals on regressors (a test for endogeneity) under the null hypothesis that the auxiliary 
regression coefficients are all zero.  (Bivariate tests also confirmed absence of endogeneity; results 
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not shown.)  Pr> Breusch-Pagan and Pr>Hall-Pagan are probabilities of obtaining test statistics at 
least as extreme as those obtained under the null hypothesis of spherical error variance.     
 
 
This analysis (Table 6.2) suggests that Board Size positively affects returns 
and that the presence of a Joint CEO-Chairman negatively affects 
impairments.  However, since the 2SLS estimation employed does not 
support calculation of clustered standard errors, and because it was necessary 
to show robustness to a change in estimation method, a GMM estimator with 
standard errors clustered by bank was used as a complement.  Results are as 





Table 6.3 GMM estimation results for effects of governance in models with simultaneity of 
risk and return.   







   
   
return_on_assets -1.838***  
 (0.132)  
L.return_on_assets 0.300***  
 (0.0841)  
loan_impairments  -0.512*** 
  (0.0274) 
L.loan_impairments  0.0162 
  (0.0417) 
L.board_size 0.0692*** 0.0385*** 
 (0.0239) (0.0147) 
L.director_ratio 1.844 8.455 
 (43.05) (23.71) 
L.director_ratio_sq -15.71 -19.75 
 (63.18) (34.56) 
L.director_ratio_cu 12.68 12.41 
 (30.75) (16.71) 
L.joint_ceo_chairman -1.569** -0.976** 
 (0.719) (0.482) 
L.cro_present_onboard -0.451* -0.266* 
 (0.232) (0.145) 
L.comm_dir_board -0.215* -0.129* 
 (0.114) (0.0740) 
L.female_ratio -0.968** -0.758** 
 (0.491) (0.306) 
L.no_exp_ratio 0.669** 0.422** 
 (0.272) (0.175) 
L.low_ned -1.253** -0.509 
 (0.595) (0.360) 
L.growth_total_assets -0.000273 0.000116 
 (0.00256) (0.00142) 
L.loan_interest_income -0.0118* -0.00235 
 (0.00652) (0.00308) 
L.state_majority_owner -1.019* -0.541* 
 (0.585) (0.293) 
L.mutual_ownership -1.485*** -0.869*** 
 (0.384) (0.209) 
L.foreign_parent -1.142** -0.715*** 
 (0.494) (0.257) 
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L.rem_co 0.499** 0.219* 
 (0.240) (0.129) 
L.exec_rem_disclosed -0.240 -0.133 
 (0.165) (0.0879) 
L.average_pay -1.302 -0.578 
 (0.953) (0.488) 
L.irb_permission -0.687*** -0.428*** 
 (0.242) (0.145) 
L.exposure_to_banks 1.203 0.259 
 (0.907) (0.537) 
L.securities_holdings 0.714 0.232 
 (0.747) (0.400) 
L.advisory_activity 26.70*** 19.71*** 
 (5.738) (2.617) 
L.equity_ratio 6.473** 0.775 
 (2.784) (1.230) 
L.current_deposits_over_liabs 0.00385 0.176 
 (0.307) (0.178) 
L.size_over_gdp 0.192 0.0907 
 (0.265) (0.145) 
Constant 2.423 -0.106 
 (9.474) (5.260) 
   
Observations 299 299 
VIFs 1.29-7.36 1.32-7.47 
GMM criterion Q(b) 1.02 x e-17 1.97 x e-19 
Pr > F endo reg >0.999 >0.999 
   
Year dummies included but not shown 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Equation numbers are as stated in Table 6.1.  The two equations are estimated simultaneously 
and so are shown under the heading of the same model.  Dependent variables are stated at the top 
of columns and explanatory variables in rows.  Equations are estimated using the generalised 
method of moments.  Estimated parameter values are shown along with star symbols for statistical 
significance.  Clustered standard errors are in parentheses, as a means to address the assumed 
presence of non-spherical error variance.  VIFs for this set of regressors vary from 1.29 to 7.47, but 
this has not prevented the detection of significant associations or caused sign reversals (shown using 
shorter equations).  Auxiliary regression using residuals as dependent variable shows no empirical 
evidence of endogeneity for any dependent variable.  Pr>F endo reg is the probability of obtaining an 
F statistic at least as large as was obtained in an auxiliary regression of residuals on regressors (a test 
for endogeneity) under the null hypothesis that the auxiliary regression coefficients are all zero.  





Looking across all of the above results (Tables 6.2 and 6.3) it is clear that 
Board Size positively affects returns.  This conclusion is bolstered by the 
finding, shown in section 6.7, that a larger Board also boosts ROE.  It is 
consistent with the hypothesis (H6.1) that a larger Board entails greater 
expertise on which to draw and thus better use of information in respect of 
risk and return. 
The magnitude of the effect I find is material.  Adding one extra Board 
member increases ROA by an amount equal to between 0.04% and 0.12% of 
total assets, compared to an average bank ROA in the sample of 0.4% of total 
assets.  The lower end of this range is more credible because it is derived from 
more-robust GMM estimation, but it nevertheless seems that adding five 
extra Board members could increase ROA by at least half of its baseline value 
(making an assumption that they are of comparable ability to those members 
already present).  Results for ROE in section 6.7 similarly suggest that adding 
one extra Board member increases ROE by an amount equal to 0.7% to 0.8% 
of total equity, compared to an average of 4.4%. 
In some estimations, I also find a positive effect on risk arising from a larger 
Board size, but this is not consistently-significant and so must be discounted.   
Similarly, if I had omitted risk-return simultaneity in the manner of section 
4.6, I would then find that a larger Board size appeared to lead to greater risk 
and greater return.  This would have forced me to conclude that larger Boards 
encourage greater profit-seeking and greater risk-tolerance, possibly because 
of stronger shareholder representation.  This erroneous conclusion would be 
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very different from the one I eventually reached and shows the importance of 
accommodating simultaneity in my models. 
A potential objection to my conclusions is that Boards could become less 
effective as they get bigger, for various reasons.  Directors might assume that 
oversight responsibilities are being exercised by other Directors, or 
communication amongst Directors might become more difficult.  However, 
this is refuted in my data by the empirical finding that larger Boards boost 
profitability.   In addition, when I add powers of the Board size variable to my 
models, to allow for possible nonlinear effects (such as reversal of effect at 
very large values of the regressor) no additional significant relationships are 
found. 
These results are very interesting in the context of the relevant theoretical 
and empirical literature.  Empirical studies summarised in section 6.2 
(Pathan 2009, Aebi et al 2013 and Liang et al 2013) suggest that larger 
Boards lower risk and return.  However, the only consistently-significant 
effect I find is a positive effect on bank returns.   
I am therefore led to a very different conclusion from the pre-existing 
empirical literature.  The empirical literature appears to suggest that larger 
Boards entail lower risk appetite (presumably because there are more NEDs 
– a variable which I test separately) and a classical risk-return correlation.  
My results suggest instead a picture in which larger Boards entail greater 
skills and experience, hence greater information-processing capabilities, 
hence a better risk-return trade-off.  It is clear that the greater ability to use 
information that arises overwhelms any effects of disagreement within a 
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larger group or delays in making decisions.  In any case, it is not clear that a 
Board group of less than 30 individuals would experience significant 
coordination problems when firms can coordinate many thousands of staff. 
Why exactly do my results differ from earlier empirical studies?  The negative 
effect on performance reported by Liang et al, 2013 came from a study that 
did not have any obvious empirical deficiencies, but it was derived from a 
single setting (China) that is institutionally different from other economies in 
which bank risk and return have been analysed.  My results may be more 
indicative of what occurs in a Western-style economy. 
The negative effects of Board size on bank risk reported by Pathan (2009) 
and Aebi et al (2013) came from an economy (the US) where there is no 
obvious reason to expect Director incentives to be fundamentally different 
from my sample (the UK).  However, these studies did select different 
measures of risk from my work, including financial losses during a crisis 
period, the Altman Z-score and measures related to stock price volatility, and 
they are anyway not as contradictory with my results as those of Liang et al 
(2013). 
In any case, taking my results together with those in the literature, I conclude 
that larger Board size does indeed improve the risk-return trade-off (by 
lowering risk and increasing performance) because it improves information-
processing capability.   
In addition to the result for Board size, I also find in Tables 6.2 and 6.3 above 
that the presence of a Joint CEO-Chairman negatively affects loan 
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impairments.  This result would be surprising if we based our thinking 
entirely on personal incentives and believed, as regulators appear to, that 
independent Chairmen have weaker profit-seeking and risk-taking incentives 
than CEOs, such that they cause lower risk.   
This result is not specific to my data – the same finding is reported by Pathan 
(2009) using data for the US.  Pathan employed an extensive multi-year data 
set and a well-controlled panel model specification, so the result is reliable.  
The dependent variables used were entirely different from mine, but were 
still meaningful indicators of risk.  Taking these results together with my 
own, it seems that having the same person hold the CEO and Chairman roles 
does indeed lead to lower bank risk. 
One way to dismiss my result would be to argue that that independent 
Chairmen force better recognition of impairments, whereas unhindered 
CEOs are able to conceal them.  This would create the appearance that a Joint 
CEO-Chairman lowers risk.  However, it could equally be argued that a 
higher ratio of NEDs on the Board would lead to better recognition of 
impairments since ensuring ‘true and fair’ public accounting is a major 
function of Boards (UK Financial Reporting Council, 2014), and that this 
could create the appearance of an effect on risk contrary to theoretical 
expectations.  But this effect is not evident, so the ‘impairments recognition’ 
argument is not plausible. 
Another interpretation that could be advanced is that Joint CEO-Chairmen 
are remunerated differently from CEOs who are not also Chairmen.  
Shareholders and Boards might give the former less profit-seeking, risk-
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tolerant incentives.  However, Dey et al (2011) report the opposite: that CEO 
remuneration has a higher profit-linked component when the role is 
combined with that of Chairman.  This study used data for US corporates in 
general (not just banks) but it nevertheless suggests that pay does not explain 
my result. 
A more useful guide is provided by Yang and Zhao (2014).  They report that 
separating the roles of CEO and Chairman leads to lower bank performance.  
They also report that this negative effect is greater in firms with greater 
complexity and higher information costs (as indicated by expenditures on 
marketing and R&D, the level of intangible assets and investment analysts’ 
forecasting errors).  They suggest that this means that separation of the roles 
of CEO and Chairman has negative effects because of slower and more 
difficult decision-making. 
Another useful study is Rus et al (2011).  They find that the self-serving 
behaviour of leaders is moderated by individual accountability.  It is possible 
that, when the roles of CEO and Chairman are combined, there is no-one else 
the CEO can assume is exercising oversight, and no-one else they can blame 
in the event of adverse outcomes, so they are more motivated to be prudent.  
This effect can exist alongside that identified by Yang and Zhao (2014) and, 
indeed, is complementary to it.  So I can conclude that having a Joint CEO-
Chairman leads to lower risk because it permits clearer decision-making and 
places greater accountability for risk management on the CEO. 
It is important to note at this point that, had I omitted risk-return 
simultaneity in the manner of section 4.6, I would have mistakenly concluded 
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that a Joint CEO-Chairman leads to lower risk and lower return.  This would 
have been contrary to hypothesis H6.2.  It would have suggested an 
interpretation of lower risk tolerance, rather than the beneficial effects for the 
bank in terms of risk and/or return envisaged in hypothesis H6.2. 
My results suggest a number of other findings, but these are not robust and 
so are not relied upon.  A low NED ratio (NEDs being less than 50% of the 
Board) may lead to lower returns and / or lower impairments.  However, this 
is not consistent across the two estimation approaches (2SLS and GMM) and 
it is the opposite of what would be expected: that NEDs lacking power would 
allow executives to pursue returns more aggressively and take more risk.  So 
it is not relied upon.  
There is also unreliable evidence that the presence of a Chief Risk Officer as a 
full Board Director leads to lower risk and lower return, and that the presence 
of a Commercial Director as a full Board member has the same effect.  
However, these results are not consistent across the two estimation 
approaches and it is very surprising that the presence of Directors on the 
Board who would be expected to have opposing incentives (one to lower risk 
and one to pursue returns) appear to have the same effects.  So these results 
are again not relied upon – although more interesting conclusions relating to 
the CRO role are reached when its interactions are considered, in the next 
section. 
In conclusion, I accept hypothesis H6.1 and H6.2 based on the evidence of 




6.6 The Interactions of the Chairman and CRO 
A surprising feature of the above results is that governance variables do not 
have as many effects on bank risk and return as expected.  The Director Ratio 
appears to have no effects at all, even though having a sufficient number of 
NEDs on the Board is considered a core principle of good corporate 
governance (UK Corporate Governance Code 2014).  Meanwhile, estimates of 
the effects of a low NED ratio (NEDs being less than half of the Board) are 
inconsistent and unreliable.   There is credible evidence in section 6.11 that a 
higher Director Ratio leads to a lower probability of bank failure, but even 
here the robustness of the result is not fully complete. 
Having a CRO as a full Board member likewise does not appear to have any 
robustly-detectable effects.  This is again surprising as I expected that an 
independent CRO would have the same effects on risk and/or return as an 
independent Chairman. 
One possible technical interpretation is that these explanatory variables are 
affected by multicollinearity that prevents the detection of significant results.  
Variance Inflation Factors for the regressors in question are: Low NED: 4.07, 
CRO Present on Board: 3.41, Director Ratio: 2.95, Commercial Director 
Present on Board: 1.52.  These values are not extreme, and are no larger than 
for other regressors where I detect significant effects, so it is not likely that 
they caused an otherwise highly-significant result to become insignificant.  
To further test the possibility that significant associations are overlooked 
because of multicollinearity, the four regressors mentioned above were used 
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in models with no other regressors, other than year dummies as controls.  
These models used loan impairments, ROA, ROE, loan interest income and 
growth in total assets as dependent variables.  The first two dependent 
variables above were treated as simultaneous, as per the relationship 
uncovered in Chapter 4, while the others were analysed using single-equation 
models.  In this setting VIFs for the regressors were: Director Ratio: 1.92, 
Low NED: 1.60, Commercial Director on Board: 1.26 and CRO Present on 
Board: 1.02.  However, once again, no significant relationship of these 
regressors with any dependent variable was found (results not shown but 
available upon request).  Thus, because of the stripped-down models used, it 
is unlikely that multicollinearity is the reason no significant relationships are 
detected. 
Another possible reason that, in section 6.5, I do not find some of the effects 
expected relates to a further gap in the relevant empirical literature.  The 
empirical literature ignores the possibility that internal agents with similar 
incentives to one another (such as the Chairman, NEDs and the CRO) may 
act as complements or substitutes for one another.  For instance, an 
independent Chairman may be more effective in a setting where there are a 
large number of NEDs on the Board to support his or her decisions.  
Alternatively, an independent Chairman and a CRO may each have such 
powers to influence decisions that they are redundant, with the presence of 
either having the same effect as the presence of both. 
I address this possibility by using interaction terms.  Specifically I use the 
term cumulative governance (cumul_gov) which takes the value 3 if a bank 
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has all three of an independent Chairman, CRO on the Board and NEDs 
being over 50% of the Board.  It takes the value 2 if two of these are the case, 
1 if only one of them is true and zero if none of them are true.  I also use the 
term CRO or Chair (cro_or_chair), which takes the value 1 if either an 
independent Chairman or CRO (or both) is present.  Taken together, these 
test the possibilities that features of corporate governance which empower 
agents with similar preferences and effects are either substitutes or 
complements for one another.  Interaction terms are computed after missing-
value replacement so that the interaction values are consistent with the post-
replacement values of the underlying terms. 
Furthermore, it is possible that effects of the Director Ratio are not detected 
because important nonlinearities are omitted.  It is conceivable that, as the 
numbers of NEDs increase from very low levels, to average levels, to very 
high levels, their authorities and incentives change in nonlinear ways.  At 
very low numbers of NEDs relative to executives, they may lack the collective 
power to do anything.  At average numbers they may have the power and 
incentive to act.  At very high numbers, they may each assume that some 
other NEDs are exercising oversight, or that blame may be diluted in the 
event of failure, such that they each have limited incentive to intervene.  I test 
these possibilities by adding squares and cubes of the director ratio to models 
as a means to allow for nonlinearity. 
Models used to test hypotheses are estimated using the following equations 
(Table 6.4) with equation numbers used for cross-reference in regression 




Table 6.4 Dependent and explanatory variables in models for testing hypotheses that 
interactions between governance structures affect loan impairments and ROA. 
Dependent Variable: loan_impairments 
All equations  































Note: variable abbreviations and definitions as per section 3.8.  “L.” signifies a one-year lag. 
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Table 6.4 (contd.) Dependent and explanatory variables in models for testing hypotheses 
that interactions between governance structures affect loan impairments and ROA. 
Dependent Variable: return_on_assets 
All equations  



































These equations differ from the baseline model specification in section 3.1 in 
three respects.  First, the interaction terms discussed above the table are 
introduced, for the reasons explained.  Second, governance terms without 
interactions (specifically Joint CEO-Chairman and CRO Present on Board) 
are dropped to avoid multicollinearity with the interaction terms.  Third, 
powers of the Director Ratio are included as a form of robustness testing for 
the same reasons as in section 6.5.   
Please note that the changes in specification introduced here do not imply 
that models in earlier sections were mis-specified.  As I do throughout this 
thesis, I am simply introducing small variations to the baseline model 
specification stated in Table 3.1 because this is an effective means of testing 
many hypotheses.  It is also an effective means of showing that results are 
robust across many variations of model specification (for instance, the results 
reported in earlier sections for mutuality, a foreign parent and Board size still 





Table 6.5 2SLS estimation results for interactions amongst governance terms in models 
with simultaneity of risk and return.   
 Model 1 Model 2 









     
return_on_assets -4.828***  -5.662**  
 (1.711)  (2.519)  
L.return_on_assets 2.359**  3.026*  
 (1.153)  (1.748)  
loan_impairments  -1.706***  -1.615*** 
  (0.631)  (0.514) 
L.loan_impairments  0.785*  0.732** 
  (0.419)  (0.345) 
L.board_size 0.0113 0.116** 0.0435 0.104** 
 (0.0664) (0.0564) (0.0730) (0.0444) 
L.director_ratio 121.0 -103.2 1.366 -0.900 
 (114.7) (80.34) (2.224) (1.074) 
L.director_ratio_sq -201.7 148.6   
 (168.9) (116.4)   
L.director_ratio_cu 108.3 -70.74   
 (82.25) (55.68)   
L.low_ned 1.239 -2.722* 1.886 -1.694* 
 (2.154) (1.544) (2.249) (0.958) 
L.cumul_gov -0.410 -0.292 -0.140 -0.295 
 (0.674) (0.466) (0.826) (0.437) 
L.cro_or_chair 4.594** 0.644 4.499** 0.764 
 (1.864) (0.792) (2.244) (0.692) 
L.female_ratio -1.804 0.0317 -1.291 -0.0247 
 (1.870) (1.281) (2.224) (1.163) 
L.no_exp_ratio 1.112 0.527 1.002 0.552 
 (0.898) (0.587) (1.087) (0.553) 
L.growth_total_assets -0.000214 0.00259 0.00145 0.00190 
 (0.00563) (0.00423) (0.00706) (0.00381) 
L.loan_interest_income 0.0281 -0.0261* 0.0343 -0.0230* 
 (0.0255) (0.0151) (0.0339) (0.0123) 
L.state_majority_owner -1.225 -1.205* 0.151 -1.426** 
 (0.767) (0.623) (1.039) (0.664) 
L.mutual_ownership -2.681*** -0.819* -2.824** -0.895** 
 (0.938) (0.452) (1.182) (0.421) 
L.foreign_parent -2.093** -0.841* -2.163** -0.856* 
 (0.851) (0.467) (1.064) (0.440) 
L.rem_co -0.126 0.877* -0.000684 0.778* 
 (0.655) (0.511) (0.767) (0.425) 
L.exec_rem_disclosed -0.356 -0.198 -0.587 -0.160 
 (0.396) (0.272) (0.512) (0.253) 
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L.average_pay -1.404 -1.279 1.315 -1.810 
 (2.008) (1.443) (2.627) (1.465) 
L.irb_permission -1.779** -0.491 -2.093* -0.482 
 (0.779) (0.366) (1.077) (0.343) 
L.exposure_to_banks -2.666 3.692* -2.705 3.297** 
 (2.635) (2.072) (3.241) (1.637) 
L.securities_holdings -1.403 2.612 -2.270 2.574* 
 (1.855) (1.618) (2.606) (1.454) 
L.advisory_activity 74.35** -16.80 93.93* -16.30 
 (32.98) (21.12) (49.79) (19.01) 
L.equity_ratio -33.22 34.79* -43.43 32.04** 
 (23.35) (18.22) (33.67) (14.85) 
L.curr_dep_over_liab 1.789 -1.043 2.049 -0.852 
 (1.157) (0.760) (1.503) (0.606) 
L.size_over_gdp 1.056 -0.274 0.911 -0.196 
 (0.802) (0.488) (0.940) (0.428) 
Constant -22.71 21.05 -0.656 -1.798 
 (25.40) (17.65) (2.420) (1.435) 
     
Observations 297 297 297 297 
VIFs 1.33-7.30 1.32-7.51 1.33-7.18 1.32-7.29 
F statistic 8.44 4.08 6.59 4.83 
Pr > F <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Pr > F endo reg >0.999 >0.999 >0.999 >0.999 
Pr > Hall-Pagan <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Pr > Breusch-Pagan <0.001 <0.001 
     
Year dummies included but not shown 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Equation numbers are as stated in Table 6.4.  Where two equations are estimated 
simultaneously they are shown under the heading of the same model.  Dependent variables are 
stated at the top of columns and explanatory variables in rows.  Equations are estimated using two-
stage least squares.  Estimated parameter values are shown along with star symbols for statistical 
significance.  Classical standard errors are in parentheses.  Diagnostic testing using Hall-Pagan, 
Breusch-Pagan and system tests shows the presence of non-spherical error variance, such that the 
next results table uses GMM with clustered standard errors as a complement.  VIFs for this set of 
regressors vary from 1.32 to 7.51, but this has not prevented the detection of significant associations 
or caused any reversals of sign (shown using shorter equations).  VIFs for powers of the director ratio 
were excluded.  Auxiliary regression using residuals as dependent variable shows no empirical 
evidence of endogeneity for any dependent variable.  Pr>F is the probability of obtaining an F at least 
as large as was obtained under the null hypothesis that the regression coefficients are all zero.  Pr>F 
endo reg is the probability of obtaining an F statistic at least as large as was obtained in an auxiliary 
regression of residuals on regressors (a test for endogeneity) under the null hypothesis that the 
auxiliary regression coefficients are all zero.  (Bivariate tests also confirmed absence of endogeneity; 
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results not shown.)  Pr>Breusch-Pagan and Pr>Hall-Pagan are probabilities of obtaining test statistics 
at least as extreme as those obtained under the null hypothesis of spherical error variance.     
 
 
As in previous sections, because the specific 2SLS estimation command 
employed does not support calculation of clustered standard errors, and 
because it is necessary to show robustness to a change in estimation 
procedure, a GMM estimator with clustered standard errors was used as a 
complement.  Results are as follows.  Models are estimated using the same 




Table 6.6 GMM estimation results for effects of governance interactions in models with 
simultaneity of risk and return.   
 Model 2 





   
return_on_assets -1.832***  
 (0.133)  
L.return_on_assets 0.307***  
 (0.0867)  
loan_impairments  -0.512*** 
  (0.0274) 
L.loan_impairments  0.0185 
  (0.0421) 
L.board_size 0.0620*** 0.0342** 
 (0.0234) (0.0140) 
L.director_ratio -11.82 0.565 
 (40.37) (21.93) 
L.director_ratio_sq 4.610 -8.020 
 (59.23) (31.88) 
L.director_ratio_cu 3.086 6.888 
 (28.94) (15.46) 
L.low_ned -1.550** -0.674 
 (0.727) (0.455) 
L.cumul_gov -0.376* -0.222 
 (0.215) (0.135) 
L.cro_or_chair 1.920** 1.189** 
 (0.790) (0.533) 
L.female_ratio -1.034** -0.807** 
 (0.500) (0.322) 
L.no_exp_ratio 0.775*** 0.489*** 
 (0.273) (0.186) 
L.growth_total_assets -0.000555 -3.30e-05 
 (0.00250) (0.00139) 
L.loan_interest_income -0.0123* -0.00245 
 (0.00633) (0.00297) 
L.state_majority_owner -1.070* -0.572* 
 (0.608) (0.305) 
L.mutual_ownership -1.423*** -0.835*** 
 (0.385) (0.208) 
L.foreign_parent -1.137** -0.717*** 
 (0.504) (0.264) 
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L.rem_co 0.515** 0.226* 
 (0.229) (0.125) 
L.exec_rem_disclosed -0.262 -0.146 
 (0.171) (0.0943) 
L.average_pay -1.320 -0.585 
 (0.985) (0.504) 
L.irb_permission -0.680*** -0.427*** 
 (0.245) (0.148) 
L.exposure_to_banks 1.327 0.315 
 (0.886) (0.524) 
L.securities_holdings 0.864 0.316 
 (0.760) (0.403) 
L.advisory_activity 25.33*** 19.10*** 
 (5.698) (2.735) 
L.equity_ratio 6.863** 0.884 
 (2.753) (1.210) 
L.current_deposits_over_liabs -0.00952 0.176 
 (0.307) (0.181) 
L.size_over_gdp 0.228 0.112 
 (0.276) (0.154) 
Constant 4.006 0.740 
 (9.294) (5.139) 
   
Observations 299 299 
VIFs 1.33-7.18 1.32-7.29 
GMM criterion Q(b) 2.00 x e-17 3.24 x e-19 
Pr > F endo reg >0.999 >0.999 
   
Year dummies included but not shown 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Equation numbers are as stated in Table 6.4.  The two equations are estimated simultaneously 
and are shown under the heading of the same model.  Dependent variables are stated at the top of 
columns and explanatory variables in rows.  Equations are estimated using the generalised method 
of moments.  Estimated parameter values are shown along with star symbols for statistical 
significance.  Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.  The presence of non-sphericity is 
assumed, such that clustered standard errors are used.  VIFs for this set of regressors vary from 1.33 
to 7.29, but this has not prevented the detection of significant associations or caused sign reversals 
(shown using shorter equations with less multicollinearity).  VIFs for powers of the director ratio are 
excluded.  Auxiliary regression using residuals as dependent variable shows no empirical evidence of 
endogeneity for any dependent variable.  Pr>F endo reg is the probability of obtaining an F statistic 
at least as large as was obtained in an auxiliary regression of residuals on regressors (a test for 
endogeneity) under the null hypothesis that the auxiliary regression coefficients are all zero.  




These results (Tables 6.5 and 6.6) point to one new finding.  There is 
evidence that the variable CRO or Chair has a positive effect on loan 
impairments.  This is not what we would expect if, contrary to hypothesis 
H6.3, we believed that only personal incentives matter in determining the 
effects of a given role, such that empowering risk-averse agents would lead to 
lower impairments.  For anyone who does hold this view (as regulators 
appear to) my result cannot be dismissed as sign reversal due to 
multicollinearity with the other indicators of governance interactions, 
because I investigated this possibility using shorter equations and excluded 
any material impact of multicollinearity.  
Crucially, the effect reported here is not simply the same effect as that 
detected for the variable Joint CEO-Chairman in section 6.5 (given that 
having an independent Chairman is simply the negation of having a Joint 
CEO-Chairman).  If the effect of having an independent Chairman were the 
only one present, diluting this variable with a supposedly irrelevant term (the 
presence of an independent CRO) in the interaction variable CRO or Chair 
would substantially reduce the absolute value of parameter magnitudes 
compared to section 6.5.  Instead, in section 6.6 I find magnitudes of 1.9, 4.5 
and 4.6 (compared to 1.5, 2.9 and 4.2 in section 6.5).  The parameter values 
actually increase – indicating that the presence of a CRO on the Board has a 
similar effect to an independent Chairman, although the interaction term is 
required for the effect to be detectable due to substitution effects. 
In section 6.5 I concluded that CEOs behave in a more risk-averse manner 
when they also hold the role of Chairman, because of greater personal 
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accountability and clearer decision-making.  Here I conclude that two senior-
level agents that are both monitors of the CEO (the Chairman and an 
independent CRO) act as substitutes for one another and do so in ways that 
lead to increased risk. 
This should not be over-interpreted as meaning that all risk governance 
structures are without value.   First, the result relates only to an independent 
CRO who is a full Board member.  Nearly all of the banks in my sample had a 
CRO, but in most cases they were not a full Board member and reported to 
the CEO instead.  Because this is the counterfactual to having a CRO on the 
Board, it is clear that it cannot have the same adverse effects as having a CRO 
on the Board.  In short, it is better for the CRO to report to the CEO than to 
be an independent Board member. 
Second, other independent risk structures clearly do have value: I find in 
section 6.9 that IRB framework lowers risk and in section 6.11 that NEDs 
lower the probability of bank failure.  Third, it is likely that a CRO is helpful 
in running an IRB framework, whether or not they are a Board member.  So 
we can conclude that an independent Chairman and an independent CRO do 
not have the beneficial effects assumed by regulators, and indeed are 
counter-productive, but not that the principle of oversight of risk 
management is misguided. 
There is also some evidence that the variable Cumulative Governance leads to 
reduced impairments.  However, this is not robust across estimation methods 
(2SLS and GMM) and therefore cannot be relied upon. 
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Overall, the parts of my models on governance produce fewer significant 
parameter estimates than those on ownership.  It seems that governance, 
while it does have important effects, does not matter as much as ownership in 
determining financial outcomes for banks.  It may be that the governance 
structures are not always strong in practice, whereas ownership is a hard fact 
that can never be ignored by agents within banks.   
In addition, there is evidence that structures which are considered to 
represent good corporate governance (a high number of NEDs, an 
independent Chairman and a CRO as a full Board member) do not have the 
effects on financial outcomes that regulators rely on in guidance such as the 
UK Corporate Governance Code (2014).  A higher director ratio has no 
apparent financial effects, although it does have the very important effect of 
reducing the probability of bank failure (see section 6.11).   An independent 
Chairman and an independent CRO, by contrast, appear to have the opposite 
effects from those intended: increasing risk because they weaken the 
accountability of the CEO and complicate decision-making. 
The fact that the variable CRO or Chair yields significant results, while 
Cumulative Governance does not, suggests that a CRO and Chairman can act 
as substitutes for one another but that there is no sense in which those 
structures that are considered good governance (independent Chairman, 
independent CRO and many NEDs) are complements of one another.   The 
latter is consistent with the finding that CRO and Chairman are substitutes 
(rather than complements) and the finding that NEDs have different effects 
from either of these. 
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In conclusion, I accept hypothesis H6.3 based on the evidence shown in this 
section.  Given that hypothesis H6.2 was also accepted, this implies a need for 
substantial revision to Corporate Governance Codes.  The implications are 
discussed more in section 6.12. 
 
6.7 Limited Effects of Non-Executive Directors 
No significant effects for the Director Ratio were detected in the previous 
sections.  It appears that the proportion of NEDs on the Board has no effect 
on banks’ financial outcomes.  Can this be true when my results are 
considered in the context of the wider literature?  If it is true, what does that 
imply for regulators and policymakers? 
The lack of any financial effect of the Director Ratio must be understood in 
the context of a literature where there is a consensus on the role of Directors 
who are independent from management, but at least one major study that 
dissents from the consensus.  Analysis from the International Monetary Fund 
(Brandão-Marques et al, 2014) finds that independence at Board level leads 
to reduced risk.  Likewise, Pathan (2009) reports that director independence 
has a negative impact on bank risk.  By contrast, a study by the World Bank 
(Anginer et al, 2014) reports that independence in the governance structure 
at Board level leads to increased bank risk-taking 
These studies have important weaknesses.  The World Bank study relied on 
composite measures of independence at the Board level and is thus hard to 
interpret in terms of the effects of any one, clearly-defined governance 
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structure.  Meanwhile, the IMF study relied on controls at the country level in 
a way that leaves it particularly vulnerable to bias at the level of bank 
observational units.   
The study by Pathan (2009) used a different setting from me (the United 
States) and dependent variables relating to stock prices and composite 
measures of bank risk.  However, Pathan’s work was most similar to my own 
in terms of methodology.  It used panel models with clearly-defined variables 
and sufficient controls.  So it is the most reliable comparator. 
Comparing my results to those of Pathan (2009) forces me to the conclusion 
that the effects of having more NEDs on the Board are context-specific.  The 
effects are evident for certain indicators and settings but not evident for 
others.  Crucially, one of the ways in which an effect is evident is a higher rate 
of bank failure when NEDs are fewer in number, as reported in section 6.11 
below.  So NEDs are effective, just not as effective as the literature and 
corporate governance guidelines would suggest. 
In conclusion, hypothesis H6.5 is accepted based on the evidence of section 
6.11 which considers bank failure as a dependent variable, but the evidence 
suggests that effects on financial outcomes only occur in certain contexts.   
 
6.8 Director Experience and Bank Performance 
Information asymmetries and the implications of limited and imperfect 
information may be more important in banks than in other firms.  This is 
because banking is especially complex and opaque (Boot, 2011) with the 
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intangible nature of certain key issues likely increasing opacity because they 
make understanding more difficult.  In this setting, if some banks can use 
information better than their competitors, they may be able to find lower-risk 
assets without returns being priced-away. 
The empirical literature has not addressed this hypothesis.  I can test it using 
IRB permission and the number of Directors with previous financial services 
experience as regressors.  IRB is a regulatory framework designed explicitly 
to improve information processing in respect of risk, while financial services 
experience is likely to affect the ability of Directors to identify and assess risk.   
My analysis below shows that the proportion of Directors with no financial 
services experience has a positive effect on ROE.  This is consistent with the 
hypothesis (H6.6) that Directors lacking FS experience may pursue returns 
more aggressively because they do not understand the eventual consequences 
in terms of risk as fully as directors who do have FS experience.  In manually 
collecting governance data, I noted that many directors without FS 
experience came from the retail sector (which is focused on sales) so it is 
possible that they brought sales-oriented habits with them to the banking 
sector. 
Models used to test hypotheses are estimated using the following equations 
(Table 6.7) with equation numbers used for cross-reference in regression 




Table 6.7 Dependent and explanatory variables in models for testing the hypothesis that 
director experience affects returns. 
Dependent Variable: return_on_equity 
All equations 


















































Note: variable abbreviations and definitions as per section 3.8.  “L.” signifies a one-year lag. 
 
Return on equity is used as a dependent variable because this is assumed to 
be the outcome of greatest interest to shareholders (see section 3.4 for 
discussion) and, in an environment where Directors (who are in large part 
representative of shareholders) have better or worse ability to use 
information, this is the outcome one would most expect to be affected. 
These models use the baseline specification as shown in Table 3.1.  Unlike 
models for ROE reported in section 5.5, I do not introduce as extra controls 
financial outcomes used as dependent variables elsewhere in the thesis.  This 
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difference is introduced because it allows the two sections to act as 
robustness tests for one another and I can confirm that the same key results 
are evident in each (negative effect of mutual and foreign ownership on ROE 
and positive effect of Board size and no experience ratio on ROE).  Across 
equations 6.9 to 6.12 above further robustness testing is carried out by 
varying specification (using a different pattern of regressor-dropping from 
section 5.5) and by using OLS to estimate 6.9 to 6.11 and random effects to 
estimate 6.12.   
As noted previously, even though I am testing effects of governance, 
ownership and balance sheet characteristics are retained in the model.  This 
is because there are reasons to believe that governance characteristics have 
effects on risk and performance (see Chapter 5) and reason to believe that 
different business models (as reflected by different balance sheet structures) 
also have such effects (discussed in section 3.4).  Omitting either could lead 
to bias due to mis-specification.  Models are estimated in linear form because 
there is no literature which points to any specific non-linear relationship that 
should be used and linear models are sufficient to test the hypothesis of a 
significant relationship under the ceteris paribus condition that other 





Table 6.8 Estimation results for effects of director experience.   
 OLS OLS OLS Random 
Effects 









     
L.no_exp_ratio 3.617 10.41** 7.301* 7.047* 
 (3.554) (4.386) (3.953) (4.238) 
L.growth_total_assets 0.0507** 0.0421* 0.00540 0.0182 
 (0.0234) (0.0234) (0.0255) (0.0225) 
L.loan_impairments -1.011 -1.367 -1.450 -1.029 
 (0.961) (0.824) (0.873) (0.855) 
L.loan_interest_income -0.0616 -0.0839 -0.105** -0.0832* 
 (0.0603) (0.0533) (0.0481) (0.0505) 
L.state_majority_owner   -6.429 -5.361 
   (4.235) (4.402) 
L.mutual_ownership   -7.303* -7.352* 
   (3.721) (3.932) 
L.foreign_parent   -13.44*** -12.66*** 
   (4.160) (4.430) 
L.board_size   0.681* 0.784* 
   (0.402) (0.418) 
L.director_ratio   -4.398 -2.809 
   (8.042) (8.428) 
L.rem_co   1.247 0.472 
   (3.016) (3.586) 
L.exec_rem_disclosed   -2.969 -2.348 
   (1.939) (2.078) 
L.average_pay   20.54 24.91* 
   (13.34) (14.63) 
L.joint_ceo_chairman  -22.05 -21.22 -22.63 
  (14.97) (14.79) (15.91) 
L.cro_present_onboard  -0.0796 -1.678 -1.582 
  (1.620) (2.472) (2.379) 
L.comm_dir_board  1.322 0.0887 0.444 
  (1.567) (1.551) (1.595) 
L.female_ratio  -12.48 -14.45** -7.806 
  (7.518) (5.677) (6.240) 
L.irb_permission 0.474 -3.304 -4.623 -5.223 
 (2.875) (3.051) (3.494) (3.489) 
L.exposure_to_banks -3.306 -6.213 -2.960 -5.737 
 (7.160) (8.446) (10.13) (11.62) 
L.securities_holdings 2.712 -0.466 -6.680 -10.51 
 (5.494) (4.289) (9.217) (10.33) 
L.advisory_activity 157.4*** 198.5*** 104.2 95.10 
 (26.42) (52.47) (69.01) (69.87) 
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L.equity_ratio 26.64 38.58 20.25 14.67 
 (34.31) (23.92) (24.46) (24.83) 
L.curr_dep_over_liab 5.716** 3.696 4.392 5.988 
 (2.829) (2.699) (3.789) (4.059) 
L.size_over_gdp 4.547** 9.614*** 4.157 4.130 
 (2.232) (3.301) (3.638) (3.564) 
Constant -3.528 -3.269 4.872 1.986 
 (4.508) (3.303) (8.436) (8.610) 
     
Observations 354 310 304 304 
R-squared 0.149 0.294 0.373 0.366 
VIFs 1.13-3.92 1.10-4.70 1.29-7.08 1.29-7.08 
F statistic 11.0 12.1 12.3  
Pr > F <0.001 <0.001 <0.001  
Wald Chi2    382.6 
Pr > Chi2    <0.001 
F (endo reg) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pr > F endo reg >0.999 >0.999 >0.999 >0.999 
Pr > Breusch-Pagan <0.001 <0.001 <0.001  
     
Year dummies included but not shown 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Equation numbers are as stated in Table 6.7.  Dependent variables are stated at the top of 
columns and explanatory variables in rows.  Equations 6.9 to 6.11 are estimated using OLS, while 
6.12 is estimated as a panel model with random effects.  Estimated parameter values are shown 
along with star symbols for statistical significance.  Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.  
Diagnostic testing for heteroskedasticity using the Breusch-Pagan test shows it to be present, such 
that clustered standard errors are used.  VIFs for this set of regressors vary from 1.13 to 7.08, but 
this has not prevented the detection of significant associations or caused sign reversals (shown using 
smaller sets of regressors).  Auxiliary regression using residuals as dependent variable shows no 
empirical evidence of endogeneity for any independent variable, as was expected for this set of 
regressors.  Pr>Chi2 is the probability of obtaining a Chi2 at least as large as was obtained under the 
null hypothesis that the regression coefficients are all zero.  Pr>F is the probability of obtaining an F 
at least as large as was obtained under the null hypothesis that the regression coefficients are all 
zero.  Pr>F endo reg is the probability of obtaining an F statistic at least as large as was obtained in 
an auxiliary regression of residuals on regressors (a test for endogeneity) under the null hypothesis 
that the auxiliary regression coefficients are all zero.  (Bivariate tests also confirmed absence of 
endogeneity; results not shown.)  Pr>Breusch-Pagan is the probability at least as extreme as that 





These results (Table 6.8) indicate that the proportion of directors with no 
previous financial services experience has a positive effect on bank 
performance.  This suggests either that diversity of experience leads to better 
outcome because it makes it possible to draw on insights from a greater range 
of previous situations, or that Directors from non-financial-services 
backgrounds engage in more aggressive marketing because they do not 
understand the risk this may eventually bring.  In section 6.11 I find evidence 
that the proportion of directors with no previous financial services experience 
has a positive association with the probability of bank failure.  This makes it 
very unlikely that the ‘diversity of experience’ interpretation above is correct, 
and instead supports the argument that lack of previous financial services 
experience on the Board leads to more aggressive pursuit of profit, with 
positive implications for returns but also a heightened risk of bank failure. 
There are no other studies which specifically consider the role of Director 
experience in determining bank outcomes in this way.  However, it is clear 
that regulators, from their experience, note the importance of Director 
suitability.  The UK regulator operates an ‘approved persons’ regime for 
financial services, designed to ensure that senior individuals are ‘fit and 
proper’ (Financial Conduct Authority Handbook, Approved Persons 
Sourcebook) and the UK Corporate Governance Code (2014) likewise 
requires that Boards should include a suitable range of skills, knowledge and 
experience.  The investigation by the UK authorities into the failure of Royal 
Bank of Scotland in 2008 (Financial Services Authority, 2011) similarly 
points out that, while the Board of RBS met formal corporate governance 
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standards, it may not have included a sufficient level of experience in banking 
and investment.  These publications support the view that previous Director 
experience in relevant sectors is important. 
My results above also show a positive effect of Board Size on ROE.  This 
supports the conclusions of section 6.5 in that it suggests a wider set if skills 
leads to better use of information and stronger performance (see section 6.5 
for further discussion). 
In conclusion, hypothesis H6.6 is accepted.  Having a higher proportion of 
directors with no previous experience in financial services leads to increased 
profit, and a higher probability of bank failure.  This underlines the need to 
ensure that the right individuals are selected as bank Directors.  Policy 
implications are discussed further in section 6.12. 
 
6.9 IRB Permission: Effects on Risk and Return 
In this section, I use a novel simultaneous equations framework to show a 
clear negative effect of IRB permission on loan impairments and ROA.  The 
Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach to credit risk measurement in banks, 
as created in the 2004 Basel II international capital accord (Bank for 
International Settlements, 2006) and continued under the 2009 Basel III 
accord (Bank for International Settlements, 2009), permits banks to employ 
statistical models developed internally within the bank to quantify credit risk 
and the amount of regulatory capital required to mitigate this risk.   
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Banks must obtain regulatory permission to adopt the IRB approach, after 
regulators apply stringent scrutiny to their governance, risk management, 
data management and modelling capabilities in order to decide if such 
permission should be granted.  Banks which to not meet the required 
standard must instead adopt the Standardised approach to credit risk 
measurement, in which regulatory capital requirements are quantified using 
relatively simple formulae prescribed by the regulator (and are typically 
higher than under IRB).  In addition, on a model-by-model basis, regulators 
must be satisfied that the internal governance and analytical processes 
employed in developing, validating and approving a particular credit risk 
model are adequate before it may be used. 
IRB permission, because it reflects a generally superior framework for 
measuring and managing credit risk, and because it entails the presence of 
robust statistical models for quantifying such risk, is expected to enable 
banks to make better credit decisions than banks lacking such permission.   
Taking this as the starting point, one could argue that IRB banks achieve 
higher return at the same level of risk, or lower risk at the same level of 
return, because they can discriminate attractive risk-return pairings in 
individual loans better than other banks.  However, while some studies show 
that IRB is considered in relation to loan pricing (Ruthenberg and 
Landskroner, 2008) none show that banks seek to use it to identify attractive 
risk-return pairings.  Therefore, I hypothesise that IRB leads to lower risk 
and lower return simply because it provides information to risk-averse agents 
within banks and information can be empowering (Ashraf, 2008).   
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I use a three-equation model below to show that IRB permission lowers both 
loan impairments and ROA.  This finding is consistent with the hypothesis 
that IRB permission permits better detection of risk, empowers risk averse 
agents by providing them with information and thus leads to less risk-taking 
and lower returns.  However it should be noted that there is no effect of IRB 
on growth in total assets (results not shown), suggesting that there is no 
effect on investment provided to the wider economy, which is more 
important in a social sense than the profits of individual banks.   
Interestingly, I also find some evidence that IRB permission leads to lower 
equity ratios (higher leverage), which is consistent with the view that 
regulators permitted IRB banks in my sample to be more leveraged.  Since 
higher leverage normally leads to higher ROE, this finding vindicates the 
decision to control for effects of IRB on leverage when examining the effects 
of IRB on returns. 
Models used to test hypotheses are estimated using the following equations 
(Table 6.9) with equation numbers used for cross-reference in regression 




Table 6.9 Dependent and explanatory variables included in models for testing the 
hypothesis that IRB permission affects loan impairments and ROA. 
































Table 6.9 (contd.) Dependent and explanatory variables included in models for testing the 
hypothesis that IRB permission affects loan impairments and ROA. 
































Table 6.9 (contd.) Dependent and explanatory variables included in models for testing the 
hypothesis that IRB permission affects loan impairments and ROA. 





Note: variable abbreviations and definitions as per section 3.8.  “L.” signifies a one-year lag. 
 
Loan impairments and ROA are used as dependent variables, because these 
are my principal measures of risk and return, and because using ROE could 
lead to confounding as IRB may directly affect the equity ratio.  Effects of IRB 
on leverage are controlled for, but it is still prudent not to rely on a dependent 
variable that contains equity in its definition when IRB permission may 
directly affect the equity ratio. 
In terms of explanatory framework, the three-equation formulation shown 
above in Table 6.9 is necessary because it is suggested in the literature 
(Cathcart et al, 2015) that UK regulators have allowed IRB banks to hold less 
capital than other banks, such that they had lower equity ratios (higher 
leverage ratios).  By allowing IRB permission to affect equity ratio in my 
models, and equity ratio to then affect the outcomes of interest, I capture this 
effect.   
In terms of regressors contained in equations 6.13 and 6.14, the only 
significant departure from the baseline model specification stated in Table 3.1 
is that I test the interaction of IRB permission with an indicator variable for 
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large size (which takes a value of 1 if total assets are greater than 10% of 
GDP).  This is intended to control for the fact that IRB imposes significant 
burdens in terms of organisational structures (Chorafas, 2004) and it seems 
clear that these burdens involve thresholds that are more easily met by large 
banks.  Thus, there could be confounding between IRB and size that should 
be controlled for.  The threshold of 10% of GDP was chosen because the 
empirical distribution of the variable size over GDP is dense below this level 
and long and sparse above it.  Interaction terms were computed after 
missing-value replacement so that the interaction values are consistent with 
the post-replacement values of the underlying terms (although this is of 
limited relevance in this case as the relevant missing-rates are very low). 
The variable securities holdings is used as a regressor in equation 6.15, but 
not 6.13 or 6.14.  This is intended to reflect the tendency of investment bank 
status (as indicated by securities holdings) to lead to higher leverage (Ozcan 
et al 2012).  It also serves to ensure that the system of equations is identified 
by placing a regressor (securities holdings) in the equation for equity ratio 
that is not present in any other equation.  Such identification is necessary in 
order for any estimator to yield a unique set of parameter estimates for a 
given model specification and data set. 
Robustness testing involving holding out of subsets of regressors was carried 
out and showed the results to be robust.  This is not shown for reasons of 
space but can be shared upon request. 
Models are estimated in linear form because there is no reason to believe in 
any specific form of nonlinearity and because this format is sufficient to test 
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hypotheses while controlling for covariates.  Estimation is by both 2SLS and 





Table 6.10 2SLS estimation results for effects of IRB permission in models with simultaneity 
of risk and return.   
 Model 1 







    
L.irb_permission -2.013* -0.833** -0.0216** 
 (1.192) (0.415) (0.00973) 
L.big_and_irb 0.749 0.0707  
 (0.998) (0.513)  
L.securities_holdings   -0.00967 
   (0.0183) 
return_on_assets -4.342**   
 (1.683)   
L.return_on_assets 2.244**   
 (0.976)   
loan_impairments  -0.744***  
  (0.265)  
L.loan_impairments  0.637***  
  (0.236)  
L.growth_total_assets 0.00344 0.00100  
 (0.00550) (0.00275)  
L.loan_interest_income 0.0105 0.0422**  
 (0.0396) (0.0201)  
L.state_majority_owner 0.0512 -0.763*  
 (0.713) (0.410)  
L.mutual_ownership -1.999 -1.537***  
 (1.267) (0.390)  
L.foreign_parent -1.255 -1.803***  
 (1.176) (0.473)  
L.board_size 0.0728 0.0407  
 (0.0523) (0.0321)  
L.director_ratio -0.904 0.771  
 (1.348) (0.734)  
L.rem_co 0.102 0.612**  
 (0.548) (0.289)  
L.exec_rem_disclosed -0.402 -0.644**  
 (0.619) (0.268)  
L.average_pay -0.488 -0.418  
 (1.406) (0.713)  
L.joint_ceo_chairman -2.998** -0.924**  
 (1.377) (0.369)  
L.cro_present_onboard -0.237 -0.152  
 (0.613) (0.329)  
L.comm_dir_board -0.356 -0.235  
 (0.365) (0.151)  
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L.female_ratio -0.895 -1.261  
 (2.064) (0.951)  
L.no_exp_ratio 0.753 -0.363  
 (0.813) (0.513)  
L.exposure_to_banks -0.855 0.359  
 (1.772) (0.838)  
L.advisory_activity 67.41 25.03**  
 (46.98) (12.03)  
L.equity_ratio -21.18 -19.20  
 (33.78) (13.38)  
L.current_deposits_over_liabs 1.366 0.430  
 (1.310) (0.447)  
L.size_over_gdp 0.380 -0.691*  
 (0.721) (0.409)  
Constant 2.803 1.805 0.0682*** 
 (3.352) (1.254) (0.00435) 
    
Observations 295 295 295 
VIFs 1.29-7.26 1.30-7.42 1.05 
F statistic 9.29 7.73 3.77 
Pr > F <0.001 <0.001 0.023 
Pr > F endo reg >0.999 0.999 0.985 
Pr > Hall-Pagan <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Pr > Breusch-Pagan <0.001 
    
Year dummies included but not shown 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Equation numbers are as stated in Table 6.9.  The three equations are estimated 
simultaneously and are shown under the heading of the same model.  Dependent variables are 
stated at the top of columns and explanatory variables in rows.  Equations are estimated using two-
stage least squares.  Estimated parameter values are shown along with star symbols for statistical 
significance.  Classical standard errors are in parentheses.  Diagnostic testing using Hall-Pagan, 
Breusch-Pagan and system tests shows the presence of non-spherical error variance, such that the 
next results table uses generalised method of moments with clustered standard errors, as a 
comparator.  VIFs for this set of regressors vary from 1.05 to 7.42, but this has not prevented the 
detection of significant associations or caused sign reversals (shown using smaller equations).  
Auxiliary regression using residuals as dependent variable shows no empirical evidence of 
endogeneity, other than possibly in equation 6.15, which is present for control purposes only, not 
empirical testing.  Pr>F is the probability of obtaining an F at least as large as was obtained under the 
null hypothesis that the regression coefficients are all zero.  Pr>F endo reg is the probability of 
obtaining an F statistic at least as large as was obtained in an auxiliary regression of residuals on 
regressors (a test for endogeneity) under the null hypothesis that the auxiliary regression 
coefficients are all zero.  (Bivariate tests also confirmed absence of endogeneity; results not shown.)  
Pr>Breusch-Pagan and Pr>Hall-Pagan are probabilities of obtaining test statistics at least as extreme 




These results (Table 6.10) suggest very clearly that IRB permission leads to 
lower loan impairments and lower ROA.  However, since the specific 2SLS 
estimation employed does not support calculation of robust standard errors, 
and to test for robustness to a change in estimator, a GMM estimator with 
clustered standard errors was used as a complement.  Results are as follows. 
Models are estimated using the same equations 6.13 to 6.15 as above, albeit 




Table 6.11 GMM estimation results for effects of IRB permission in models with 
simultaneity of risk and return.   
 Model 1 









    
L.irb_permission -0.872** -0.561*** -0.0214*** 
 (0.370) (0.207) (0.00825) 
L.big_and_irb 0.259 0.200  
 (0.544) (0.309)  
securities_holdings   -0.00957 
   (0.0248) 
return_on_assets -1.880***   
 (0.123)   
L.return_on_assets 0.332***   
 (0.0960)   
loan_impairments  -0.502***  
  (0.0273)  
L.loan_impairments  0.0251  
  (0.0414)  
L.growth_total_assets -0.000896 0.000128  
 (0.00370) (0.00195)  
L.loan_interest_income -0.0111* -0.00170  
 (0.00616) (0.00292)  
L.state_majority_owner -0.677 -0.314  
 (0.471) (0.252)  
L.mutual_ownership -1.505*** -0.839***  
 (0.412) (0.236)  
L.foreign_parent -1.276*** -0.742***  
 (0.483) (0.263)  
L.board_size 0.0825*** 0.0465**  
 (0.0302) (0.0186)  
L.director_ratio -0.171 -0.189  
 (0.648) (0.334)  
L.rem_co 0.570** 0.256**  
 (0.250) (0.126)  
L.exec_rem_disclosed -0.285 -0.166  
 (0.191) (0.103)  
L.average_pay -0.180 -0.0327  
 (0.661) (0.382)  
L.joint_ceo_chairman -1.559** -0.917**  
 (0.652) (0.450)  
L.cro_present_onboard -0.417 -0.231  
 (0.263) (0.156)  
L.comm_dir_board -0.144 -0.0929  
 (0.0984) (0.0664)  
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L.female_ratio -0.501 -0.550*  
 (0.488) (0.302)  
L.no_exp_ratio 0.814*** 0.480***  
 (0.273) (0.172)  
L.exposure_to_banks 1.190 0.295  
 (0.842) (0.472)  
L.advisory_activity 28.68*** 21.05***  
 (6.788) (3.284)  
L.equity_ratio 5.680** 0.216  
 (2.320) (1.236)  
L.current_deposits_over_liabs -0.0605 0.165  
 (0.294) (0.174)  
L.size_over_gdp 0.120 0.00536  
 (0.271) (0.145)  
Constant 0.416 0.423 0.0680*** 
 (0.786) (0.445) (0.00556) 
    
Observations 297 297 297 
VIFs 1.29-7.26 1.30-7.42 1.05 
GMM criterion Q(b) 2.58 x e-17 4.05 x e-19 2.22 x e-12 
Pr > F endo reg >0.999 >0.999 0.940 
    
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Equation numbers are as stated in Table 6.9.  The three equations are estimated 
simultaneously and are shown under the heading of the same model.  Dependent variables are 
stated at the top of columns and explanatory variables in rows.  Equations are estimated using the 
generalised method of moments.  Estimated parameter values are shown along with star symbols for 
statistical significance.  Clustered standard errors are in parentheses and are used to address the 
assumed presence of non-spherical error variance.  VIFs for this set of regressors vary from 1.05 to 
7.42, but this has not prevented the detection of significant associations or caused sign reversals 
(shown using shorter equations).  Auxiliary regression using residuals as dependent variable shows 
no empirical evidence of endogeneity for any dependent variable.  Pr>F endo reg is the probability of 
obtaining an F statistic at least as large as was obtained in an auxiliary regression of residuals on 
regressors (a test for endogeneity) under the null hypothesis that the auxiliary regression 







These results (Tables 6.10 and 6.11) allow us to conclude that the effects of 
IRB are robust.  IRB permission leads to lower loan impairments and also 
lower ROA.  Taking the GMM estimates as definitive, on the basis that they 
are expected to be more efficient and less vulnerable to bias, suggests that 
IRB permission lowers loan impairments by 0.9% (of gross loans) and lowers 
ROA by 0.6% (of total assets).  Given that the average values in the sample of 
these dependent variables are 0.3% and 0.4% respectively, these are 
substantial effects (although they will obviously be offset in practice by 
variation in the other explanatory variables). 
The only consistent interpretation of these results is that IRB permission is 
reflective of greater competence in risk analysis and management, which lead 
to better detection of risk, which in turn empowers agents who are risk averse 
and leads to less risk-taking, which leads to lower returns.  The other 
possiblities outlined at the start of this section are not tenable; in particular, 
because IRB permission lowers both risk and return it cannot be argued that 
it improves the risk-return trade-off.   
It is important to interpret this finding in the context of literature which has 
questioned the value of the IRB framework.  The major critique of the IRB 
framework is found in Aikman et al (2014) and Haldane (2013) and other 
papers and comments by the same authors, who are senior regulators at the 
Bank of England.  Their fundamental argument is that back-testing shows 
that simple heuristics out-perform IRB as a predictor of bank risk, in part 
because of the difficulties inherent in predictive modelling, and in part 
because bankers have an incentive to deliberately mis-estimate IRB models, 
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which they can do in an environment of complexity and opacity.  When 
model builders in the risk management function are not sufficiently 
independent from the front-line business, bankers may be able to distort 
models to obtain lower estimates of risk so that they can do more deals and 
earn more bonus, irrespective of the eventual consequences for the bank as a 
whole. 
The arguments in Aikman et al (2014) and Haldane (2013) confuse and 
confound governance problems with analytical problems.  Even if models 
governance within banks is frequently weak, it does not imply that predictive 
analytics per se are not effective.  However, if the issues these authors 
describe are severe for every bank that has IRB permission (and they do point 
to clear evidence that they arise within banks) then the usefulness of IRB may 
be undermined. 
My results show that problems with IRB are not this severe.  I find clear, 
robust evidence that the IRB framework lowers bank risk and, as implied by 
the classical risk-return trade-off in finance theory, also lowers return.  So, 
while the operation of IRB frameworks may be subject to governance 
problems, it is very clear that these problems have not entirely undermined 
the effectiveness of the system. 
Why does the IRB framework lower both risk and return?  If it improves the 
availability of information, by converting raw data into a format usable for 
decisions in a way that other banks cannot match, then should we not expect 
it to have a beneficial effect on one of risk or return, without affecting the 
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other?  Why does it not lead to this kind of improvement in the risk-return 
trade-off?   
It cannot be because other banks can mimic the decisions of IRB banks so 
that benefits are priced-away; this would simply cause all significant effects of 
IRB to disappear because it would make outcomes the same across all banks 
irrespective of IRB status.  Likewise, it cannot be because other banks have 
non-IRB risk-scoring systems that are equally effective; this would again 
cause all significant effects of IRB to disappear.  What we are left with is the 
argument that the information generated by IRB may be used in a debate 
between agents who care chiefly about return (bankers) or risk (risk 
managers) and is not used to identify cases where return is anomalously high 
given the level of risk.  As noted already, there is no robust evidence that IRB 
is used by banks to identify loans where the risk-return trade-off is 
anomalously good, even though it would be in their interest to do so. 
However, there is evidence that information empowers agents in settings 
where they are in debate with other agents who have differing incentives.  
This has been found, for instance, in the case of providing information to 
poor citizens who must negotiate with potentially-corrupt bureaucracies in 
low-income countries (Ashraf, 2008).  Within banks, it is likely that risk 
officers can better curtail excessive risk-taking by profit-incentivised bankers 
when that can point to specific quantification of the risk involved.  So IRB 
likely empowers risk-averse agents. 
This suggests that IRB is a useful tool for achieving the policy goal of lowering 
risk in the banking system.  It also suggests that there is an unexploited 
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opportunity for banks and their regulators to improve the risk-return trade-
off in the banking system by using IRB to identify loans where the risk-return 
mix is anomalously good. 
I therefore accept hypothesis H6.7 on the basis that IRB is found to lower 
both risk and return.  The policy implications of this are discussed in section 
6.12. 
 
6.10 No Effects of Gender Imbalance 
Like IRB permission and the proportion of Directors with previous financial 
services experience, the gender balance on a bank’s Board may also impact its 
information-processing capability and the decisions made.  If the reason for 
gender imbalance is discrimination, then the bank has ignored suitable 
candidates for Board membership and has likely lowered its ability to process 
information effectively.  This hypothesis has not previously been tested in the 
literature on bank governance.  
As shown in section 3.8, the average bank in my sample has a Board which is 
13% female.  The literature on gender imbalance on Boards is divided over 
the cause of this.  In a discussion of the literature, Mishra and Jhunjhunwala 
(2013) identify causes on the demand side (subtle discrimination from men 
that tends to keep women out of the most senior roles) and the supply side 
(insufficient numbers of female candidates reaching senior levels because of 
such structural factors as unbalanced childcare responsibilities between men 
and women coupled with working environments not accommodative of 
childcare).   
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So, while it cannot necessarily be said that the gender imbalance of Boards is 
purely due to irrational discrimination, it appears clear that it may be at least 
part of the cause.  In addition, given that all banks face the same structural 
conditions in the economy that may cause some women to drop back earlier 
in their careers and not reach Board level as a result, any differential between 
banks in terms of gender imbalance on the Board must represent differing 
levels of discrimination.  Therefore, the proportion of the Board which is 
female represents a good indicator of comparative levels of discrimination.  
This could conceivably be positive discrimination (banks putting more 
women on their Boards in order to appear socially conscious) but, given the 
literature, negative discrimination appears more likely. 
My analysis below initially suggests that a higher proportion of female 
directors is associated with lower ROE.  However, this result disappears when 
we take account of structurally lower performance in certain banks.    We can 
therefore conclude that gender imbalance, although undesirable on other 
grounds, has no measureable adverse effects on bank financial outcomes in 
this sample. 
Models used to test hypotheses are estimated using the following equations 
(Table 6.12) with equation numbers used for cross-reference in regression 




Table 6.12 Dependent and explanatory variables in models for testing the hypothesis that 
the proportion of female directors affects returns. 
Dependent Variable: return_on_equity 
All equations 
















































Note: variable abbreviations and definitions as per section 3.8.  “L.” signifies a one-year lag. 
 
Return on equity is used as dependent variable because this is most 
appropriate in a setting where one is considering an attribute of a bank that 
may entail different abilities to use information at the Director level.  This is 
because, as argued in section 3.4, shareholders care primarily about ROE as 
an outcome because it represents the efficiency of their equity stake in 
generating returns, and Directors are in large part representatives of 
shareholders in a UK corporate governance context. 
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On the other sides of the equations, models use the baseline specification 
shown in Section 3.1, with specification varied across the four equations for 
reasons of robustness testing.  Ownership, other governance and balance 
sheet characteristics are retained and linear functional forms are used, for the 
same reasons in earlier sections of this Chapter.    Estimation is by OLS 
(equations 6.16 to 6.18) and random effects (equation 6.19) in order to avoid 
dependence of results on one estimation method.  This turns out to be 
important in that the presence of a significant association in OLS, with the 
opposite sign expected, can be explained via the absence of such an 




Table 6.13 Estimation results for effects of the proportion of female directors.   
 OLS OLS OLS Random 
Effects 









     
L.female_ratio -8.688 -20.99** -14.45** -7.806 
 (9.222) (9.404) (5.677) (6.240) 
L.growth_total_assets 0.0527** 0.0370 0.00540 0.0182 
 (0.0256) (0.0222) (0.0255) (0.0225) 
L.loan_impairments -0.959 -0.635 -1.450 -1.029 
 (0.952) (0.841) (0.873) (0.855) 
L.loan_interest_income -0.0591 -0.0543 -0.105** -0.0832* 
 (0.0585) (0.0539) (0.0481) (0.0505) 
L.state_majority_owner  -5.192 -6.429 -5.361 
  (4.724) (4.235) (4.402) 
L.mutual_ownership  -1.223 -7.303* -7.352* 
  (4.066) (3.721) (3.932) 
L.foreign_parent  -6.676* -13.44*** -12.66*** 
  (3.660) (4.160) (4.430) 
L.board_size   0.681* 0.784* 
   (0.402) (0.418) 
L.director_ratio   -4.398 -2.809 
   (8.042) (8.428) 
L.rem_co   1.247 0.472 
   (3.016) (3.586) 
L.exec_rem_disclosed   -2.969 -2.348 
   (1.939) (2.078) 
L.average_pay   20.54 24.91* 
   (13.34) (14.63) 
L.joint_ceo_chairman   -21.22 -22.63 
   (14.79) (15.91) 
L.cro_present_onboard   -1.678 -1.582 
   (2.472) (2.379) 
L.comm_dir_board   0.0887 0.444 
   (1.551) (1.595) 
L.no_exp_ratio   7.301* 7.047* 
   (3.953) (4.238) 
L.irb_permission  1.735 -4.623 -5.223 
  (3.045) (3.494) (3.489) 
L.exposure_to_banks -2.811 0.404 -2.960 -5.737 
 (7.302) (7.916) (10.13) (11.62) 
L.securities_holdings 1.920 5.417 -6.680 -10.51 
 (5.335) (5.687) (9.217) (10.33) 
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L.advisory_activity 165.8*** 139.8*** 104.2 95.10 
 (25.21) (41.53) (69.01) (69.87) 
L.equity_ratio 20.93 5.441 20.25 14.67 
 (31.84) (30.89) (24.46) (24.83) 
L.curr_dep_over_liab 6.042** 4.765* 4.392 5.988 
 (2.922) (2.833) (3.789) (4.059) 
L.size_over_gdp 4.940** 2.153 4.157 4.130 
 (1.981) (2.893) (3.638) (3.564) 
Constant -0.851 6.784 4.872 1.986 
 (3.868) (5.682) (8.436) (8.610) 
     
Observations 354 349 304 304 
R-squared 0.150 0.195 0.373 0.369 
VIFs 1.08-3.77 1.17-4.47 1.29-7.08 1.29-7.08 
F statistic 12.5 11.5 12.3  
Pr > F <0.001 <0.001 <0.001  
Wald Chi2    382.7 
Pr > Chi2    <0.001 
F stat endo reg 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pr > F endo reg >0.999 >0.999 >0.999 >0.999 
Pr > Breusch-Pagan <0.001 <0.001 <0.001  
     
Year dummies included but not shown 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Equation numbers are as stated in Table 6.12.  Dependent variables are stated at the top of 
columns and explanatory variables in rows.  Equations 6.16 to 6.18 are estimated using OLS, while 
6.19 is estimated as a panel model with random effects.  Estimated parameter values are shown 
along with star symbols for statistical significance.  Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.  
Diagnostic testing for heteroskedasticity using the Breusch-Pagan test shows it to be present, such 
that clustered standard errors are used.  VIFs for this set of regressors vary from 1.08 to 7.08, but 
this has not prevented the detection of significant associations or caused sign reversals (shown using 
shorter equations).  Auxiliary regression using residuals as dependent variable shows no empirical 
evidence of endogeneity for any dependent variable.  Pr>Chi2 is the probability of obtaining a Chi2 at 
least as large as was obtained under the null hypothesis that the regression coefficients are all zero.  
Pr>F is the probability of obtaining an F at least as large as was obtained under the null hypothesis 
that the regression coefficients are all zero.  Pr>F endo reg is the probability of obtaining an F 
statistic at least as large as was obtained in an auxiliary regression of residuals on regressors (a test 
for endogeneity) under the null hypothesis that the auxiliary regression coefficients are all zero.  
(Bivariate tests also confirmed absence of endogeneity; results not shown.)  Pr>Breusch-Pagan is the 
probability of obtaining a test statistic at least as extreme as that obtained under the null hypothesis 





These results (Table 6.13) initially appear surprising.  There is (incompletely 
robust) evidence that the ratio of female directors in my sample is negatively 
associated with ROE.  One possible interpretation of the above result is that 
the biomedical and sociological literature (e.g. Sapienza et al, 2008) suggests 
that women have a lower risk tolerance than men.  It may therefore be that 
Boards with a higher proportion of female Directors decide on lower leverage 
ratios (or lower risk in other ways) and this leads to lower ROE (but also 
ceteris paribus less danger of insolvency).   
I attempt to test this hypothesis using a two-equation model (not shown for 
reasons of space) in which the ratio of female directors determines equity 
ratio (alongside a covariate – securities holdings – that is indicative of high-
leverage investment banking activities) while female ratio and equity ratio 
determine ROE (alongside covariates).  However, in this analysis, all 
significant relationships disappear, indicating that the model is mis-specified.  
This suggests that the interpretation that female ratio affects leverage ratio is 
incorrect. 
The estimation results in Table 6.13 suggest an alternative interpretation.  
The relationship detected ceases to be significant when panel estimation is 
used, whereas other relationships remain significant under panel estimation.  
This suggests that banks which have structurally lower performance appoint 
more female directors.  This could be because they wish to be seen to do well 
on other fronts because they are doing poorly financially (making their 
commitment to gender equality insincere).  Or, conversely, it could be that 
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they have social priorities alongside financial ones, reflected in greater gender 
equality, a lower emphasis on earning profits and probably other outcomes. 
Further research could possibly test this conclusion further (see section 9.5 
for discussion).  However, this would be beyond the scope of the hypothesis 
considered here (H6.8), which involves the proposition that irrational gender 
discrimination has adverse effects on bank risk and return.  We must 
conclude, from the evidence available, that such discrimination does not have 
adverse financial effects (although it is clearly undesirable on other grounds).  
Hypothesis H6.8 is rejected. 
 
6.11 Governance and Bank Failure 
As discussed in section 5.6, one would expect effects of ownership and 
governance on bank risk and performance to exist alongside effects of the 
same regressors on bank failure.  Ceteris paribus we would expect any 
characteristic which increases performance to reduce the probability of 
failure, and any characteristic which increases asset risk to increase the 
probability of failure.  If something reduces performance and risk, then it 
would be expected that the larger of these two effects would be dominant in 
terms of effects on the probability of failure. 
The argument that governance is likely to be important in determining the 
probability of bank failure is reinforced by the work of Liang et al (2016).  In 
a study using data mining techniques and a data set from Taiwan, they show 
that corporate governance indicators are useful in bankruptcy prediction. 
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To determine if governance affects the likelihood of bank failure in the ways I 
suggest above, I use the same models 5.13 to 5.15 as in section 5.6.  Please 
refer to section 5.6 for the rationale for the specification of these models.  





Table 6.14 Probit estimation results for governance as a determinant of bank failure.   







    
L.growth_gross_loans   0.00714 
   (0.00550) 
L.growth_total_assets   0.0233*** 
   (0.00853) 
L.loan_impairments   -0.111 
   (0.435) 
L.return_on_assets   0.0560 
   (0.303) 
L.return_on_equity   -0.0221*** 
   (0.00610) 
L.state_majority_owner 1.172*** 2.061*** 8.760*** 
 (0.407) (0.694) (1.827) 
L.mutual_ownership 0.192 -0.736 0.998 
 (0.478) (0.639) (1.349) 
L.foreign_parent 0.913** 1.176** 5.887*** 
 (0.425) (0.592) (1.579) 
L.board_size 0.0178 0.0422 0.0832 
 (0.0498) (0.0694) (0.103) 
L.director_ratio -1.118 -3.317 -9.247*** 
 (1.280) (2.136) (3.522) 
L.rem_co -0.737** -0.985** -2.808*** 
 (0.329) (0.497) (0.743) 
L.exec_rem_disclosed 0.577 0.808 3.731*** 
 (0.397) (0.559) (0.910) 
L.average_pay 0.0313 -3.572 -5.424 
 (0.0694) (2.739) (4.198) 
L.joint_ceo_chairman -0.0881 0.889 0.398 
 (0.417) (0.547) (0.828) 
L.cro_present_onboard 0.460 -0.284 -0.349 
 (0.593) (0.565) (0.874) 
L.comm_dir_board -0.109 -0.505* -0.842** 
 (0.272) (0.300) (0.360) 
L.female_ratio -0.822 -1.148 2.664 
 (1.914) (2.394) (3.035) 
L.no_exp_ratio 0.478 2.211** 5.794*** 
 (0.709) (0.985) (1.609) 
L.irb_permission 0.0678 0.268 -5.956*** 
 (0.425) (0.492) (1.602) 
L.exposure_to_banks  -2.188* -5.784*** 
  (1.217) (1.436) 
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L.securities_holdings  -4.444** -7.575*** 
  (1.982) (2.462) 
L.advisory_activity  -83.80** -73.17 
  (34.92) (52.53) 
L.equity_ratio  2.362 5.221 
  (1.710) (10.08) 
L.current_deposits_over_liabs  -0.818 0.138 
  (0.553) (0.851) 
L.size_over_gdp  0.0362 1.718* 
  (0.683) (0.894) 
Constant -1.063 2.264 0.941 
 (0.803) (1.428) (2.042) 
    
Observations 406 384 294 
Pseudo-R-squared 0.235 0.376 0.591 
VIFs (these regressors) 1.18 – 3.15 1.27 – 6.23 1.28 – 7.3 
Wald Chi2 422.0 463.7 2225.7 
Pr > Chi2 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Pr < Smith-Blundell  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
    
Year dummies included but not shown 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Equation numbers are as in section 5.6.  Dependent variables are stated at the top of columns 
and explanatory variables in rows.  Equations are estimated using maximum likelihood with 
numerical optimisation.  Estimated parameter values are shown along with star symbols for 
statistical significance.  Clustered standard errors are in parentheses and are used to address the 
presumed presence of non-spherical error variance.  Pr>Chi2 is the probability of obtaining a Chi2 at 
least as large as was obtained under the null hypothesis that the regression coefficients are all zero.  
Pr<Smith-Blundell is the probability of obtaining a Smith-Blundell statistic at least as small as was 
obtained under the null that regressors are endogenous. 
 
In Table 6.14, a higher ratio of NEDs and the presence of a remuneration 
committee both lower the probability of failure – suggesting that these 
structures work as intended: ensuring better oversight of risk-taking and 
ensuring that remuneration policy is better aligned with risk-management, 
respectively.  On this basis, I accept hypothesis H6.5 (relating to the director 
ratio) and hypothesis H6.9 (relating to the remuneration committee). 
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It is important to note that, if I had not used a simultaneous equations 
framework for estimating effects on ROA and loan impairments, then the 
results of section 4.6 show that I would have been misled into thinking that 
the presence of a Remuneration Committee has a positive effect on ROA and 
impairments.  This would have completely obscured the proper conclusion 
that it lowers risk only, in a way that lowers the rate of bank failure. 
In addition, the proportion of directors with no previous financial services 
experience has a positive effect on the probability of failure.  This must be 
interpreted alongside my earlier finding that this variable leads to higher 
ROE.  Taken together, the best interpretation of these two findings is that 
having Directors drawn from non-financial-services backgrounds leads to 
more aggressive pursuit of returns, with later consequences for the 
probability of bank failure. (These consequences are clearly mediated by 
some mechanism other than through low ROE eroding equity – a different 
pattern from how a foreign parent increases the probability of failure).   I 
therefore accept hypothesis H6.6, as already stated. 
IRB permission also lowers the probability of bank failure.  This leads to an 
interesting comparison between three variables that all lower both ROA and 
loan impairments – IRB permission, mutuality and having a foreign parent.  
Of these, a foreign parent increases the probability of bank failure while 
mutuality has no effect on the failure rate and IRB lowers it.  The key to 
understanding why this is not contradictory lies in different effects on ROE, 
which has a vital effect on bank solvency.  A foreign parent has a large 
negative effect on ROE, mutuality has a smaller negative effect and IRB has 
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no effect at all.  It is clear that the effect of a foreign parent on ROE is big 
enough to sometimes affect bank solvency, that this is not the case for mutual 
ownership and that the lack of a direct effect of IRB on ROE allows it to have 
beneficial effects on bank survival by other mechanisms.  In conclusion, IRB 
permission lowers the rate of bank failure, thus providing further support for 
my earlier conclusion that hypothesis H6.7 should be accepted. 
The presence of a Commercial Director on the Board appears to be negatively 
associated with the probability of failure.  This is the opposite of my 
expectation.  A possible explanation is that the presence of such a role entails 
greater use of front-line knowledge in Board decisions.  However, it is not 
clear why this effect would not be evident in other outcomes I have analysed.  
In any case, hypothesis H6.4 (that a Commercial Director has a positive effect 
on risk) is rejected. 
Disclosure of executive remuneration appears to be positively associated with 
the probability of failure, which is the opposite of my expectation.  One 
possible interpretation is simply that banks which engage in high levels of 
risk-taking use high levels of transparency as a means to justify their actions.  






This chapter uses novel simultaneous equations frameworks and other 
supporting models to reach a number of interesting conclusions on the roles 
of governance and information-processing capacity in banks. 
Hypotheses H6.1 to 6.3, H6.5 t0 6.7 and H6.9 are all accepted.  Only 
hypotheses H6.4, H6.8 and H6.10 are rejected, on grounds of insufficient or 
contradictory evidence.  All these findings represent important contributions 
to the literature. 
Specifically, the presence of a Joint CEO-Chairman leads to lower loan 
impairments.  This is likely due to greater personal accountability for risk 
perceived by the CEO and clearer decision-making when these two roles are 
combined. 
Similarly, the presence of an independent CRO has the effect of increasing 
loan impairments.  This is consistent with the preceding conclusion and with 
the view that having Board-level individuals responsible for monitoring the 
CEO weakens the accountability perceived by the CEO and impedes clear 
decision-making.  The results for Chairman and CRO are lent credibility by 
being consistent with one another.  This is a radical conclusion in that it 
implies that guidance on corporate governance which supports having an 
independent Chairman and an independent CRO is essentially misguided.  
Although the proportion of NEDs on the Board has no financial effects 
(which is surprising), I find that the proportion of NEDs on the Board and the 
presence of a remuneration committee each lower the probability of bank 
failure.  This suggests that these structures work as intended – lowering the 
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danger of bank instability by ensuring appropriate oversight and incentives, 
respectively.  The finding relating to the remuneration committee is 
particularly striking – it is fully robust and it suggests that setting risk-
aligned incentives can have powerful effects. 
Characteristics related to the ability of banks to process information have 
clear effects.  Larger Board size is found to have positive effects on 
performance and, taking my results in conjunction with the literature, may 
also reduce risk.  This can be attributed to better information processing and, 
consequently, a better risk-return trade-off.  IRB permission – which is a 
direct indicator of ability to process information relating to credit risk – leads 
to lower ROA, lower loan impairments, and a lower rate of bank failure, 
compared to other banks.   This suggests that IRB permission, because it 
leads to better detection of risk, empowers risk-averse agents, leading to less 
risk-taking and consequently less return.  This, in turn, suggests that 
someone in the marketplace has sufficient information to price the relevant 
assets such that they earn lower return.  It is also notable that IRB does not 
affect growth in bank assets, indicating that it does not affect credit provision 
to the wider economy. 
A higher proportion of Directors without previous financial services 
experience leads to higher performance and a higher probability of failure – 
which is consistent with the hypothesis that Directors from non-FS 
backgrounds (such as retail) pursue profits more aggressively, leading 
eventually to a greater probability of failure. 
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The proportion of Directors on the Board who are female was also 
hypothesised to indicate better information processing.  Specifically, if the 
reason for gender imbalance is irrational discrimination then banks will have 
overlooked skilled persons and their ability to make good decisions may be 
impaired.  However, the empirical evidence does not support this hypothesis.  
So, while discrimination is clearly undesirable on other grounds, we cannot 
say that it has adverse financial impacts in this sample. 
Similarly, the expected effects for Commercial Director on the Board and 
Executive Remuneration Disclosed were not evident.  In these cases, the 
parameter sign was the opposite of that anticipated.  The only possible 
interpretations of these results are speculative, so the hypotheses are simply 
rejected. 
A number of more general themes are evident in these findings.  One is that 
characteristics relating to information-processing capability are generally 
important. Board size, IRB permission and the number of Directors with 
previous financial services experience all have effects that can all be 
attributed to differences in the ability of banks to use information relating to 
risk and return. 
A second theme is that governance has fewer significant effects than 
ownership.  It may be that governance structures are not as strong in practice 
as claimed (i.e. informal behaviour partially overcomes formal governance) 
while ownership types are hard facts that cannot easily be ignored by agents 
within banks.  Some aspects of governance either lack the effects that 
regulators clearly assume or have the opposite effects.   
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In particular, an independent Chairman and an independent CRO each 
appear to have impacts opposite to what financial services regulators desire 
in that they increase risk, rather than lowering it.  Having high numbers of 
NEDs, meanwhile, has some of the effects expected (reducing bank failure 
rates) but not all of them (no detectable effects on financial outcomes).  On 
balance, governance appears less effective than ownership in affecting bank 
behaviour. 
A third theme is that, taking my results together with the literature, there are 
indications that some aspects of ownership and governance have effects 
which are context-dependent.  This may be the case for foreign ownership, 
the proportion of NEDs on the Board and the presence of a CRO as a full 
Board member.  It is not surprising to find context-dependence in a social 
science setting where comparable units may have unobserved differences 
between settings that may cause them to act in different ways.  This is 
consistent with the literature on managerial ownership and ownership 
concentrations (see sections 2.5.2 and 2.5.4), where different studies using 
different contexts and methods report opposite effects on risk-taking of 
managerial ownership and block-holdings. 
A fourth and final theme is that different governance structures are not 
complements for one another and only the CRO and Chairman are 
substitutes for one another.  NEDs have different effects that are subject to 




In terms of economic policy and prudential regulation of banks, these results 
have interesting implications (drawn using normative assumptions stated in 
section 9.3).  Larger Boards appear to be desirable, on the basis that they 
increase return and may also reduce risk.  The IRB framework also appears to 
be useful, despite arguments in the literature implying the contrary (Aikman 
et al, 2014 and Haldane, 2013), on the grounds that its effects on risk and 
lack of effects on provision of credit to the economy have clearer social 
significance than its effects on returns (profit can be due to efficiency or rent-
seeking).  There is also reason to believe that the risk-return trade-off in the 
banking system could be improved if IRB banks made better use of their IRB 
models to identify cases where the return is anomalously high given the level 
of risk. 
Having a sufficient number of NEDs on the Board, although it does not have 
as many effects as expected, is beneficial in that it lowers the probability of 
bank failure.  Likewise, a remuneration committee appears to be highly 
effective in setting incentives that reduce the probability of bank failure. 
By contrast, other features of what is considered to be ‘good governance’ (UK 
Corporate Governance Code 2014) do not have the effects expected, or are 
even counter-productive.  Specifically, an independent Chairman and an 
independent CRO each cause higher impairments because they weaken the 
personal accountability of the CEO and complicate decision-making.  This 
may not be true in all settings as Aebi et al (2012) and Dong et al (2014) find 
different results in narrower contexts.  Nevertheless, it is clear that there are 
material circumstances in which independent Chairmen and independent 
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CROs have the exact opposite consequences from those intended by 
policymakers.   
Taking all of this together, it is clear that official guidance relating to 
corporate governance needs to be kept as it is in some respects and 
reconsidered in others.  Regulators should retain guidance requiring large 
numbers of NEDs (and by extension large Boards) and should focus on 
ensuring that the individuals on Boards have financial services experience.  
They should also retain a focus on having a strong Remuneration Committee.  
IRB should be strengthened and embedded deeper into bank decision-
making (a move contrary to the direction of current regulatory thinking, as 
discussed in section 6.9).  By contrast, the requirements for an independent 
Chairman and independent CRO should be abolished and replaced with 
alternative structures that ensure there is scrutiny of CEO’s choices, without 
taking away personal accountability or confusing decision-making.  The latter 
would represent a radical shift in governance standards. 
Given that all of the characteristics relating to information processing proved 
to have important effects, it seems clear that regulators should focus on 
improving information systems within banks.  This is especially so since 
banks’ ways of using information are reported to have important weaknesses 
and to be out-dated in some respects (Eastburn and Boland, 2015). 
On a broader level, it is clear from the limitations that are evident in the 
effects of corporate governance that it cannot be relied upon in isolation as a 
means to reform banking.  The results of Chapter 5 suggest that mutual 
ownership has clear effectiveness as a means of reducing bank risk.  This 
341 
 
suggests that reforms to banking, if they aim to limit risk without affecting 
credit provision to the wider economy, should focus on combining greater 








Chapter 7: Bank Pay and its Consequences 
7.1 Introduction 
In this Chapter, I test hypotheses relating to the determinants of bank pay (at 
all levels in the organisation) and the consequences of such pay for bank risk 
and return.  I use each of average pay, growth in total assets, returns and 
combined failure as dependent variables because these match the specific 
hypotheses I test.  For the latter three I use the methodology described in 
Chapter 3 (because this is my general approach for testing the effect of any 
feature of bank ownership and governance on risk and return).  For 
determinants of average pay I use a different methodology described in 
section 7.4. 
It is important to understand pay at all levels in banks because the pre-
existing literature on bank remuneration has focused narrowly on the 
remuneration of the CEO and other very senior levels.  It has neglected the 
causes and consequences of pay at more junior levels which could, in 
aggregate, be equally important.  
I address this gap by testing a series of novel hypotheses relating to the 
determinants of bank pay and the effects of bank pay on risk and 
performance, focusing on pay at all levels, not just that of the CEO.  In 
analysing the determinants of average pay at all levels within banks, I test the 
novel hypothesis that there is a positive effect on bank pay from the positive 
component of return on assets (that is the component of ROA obtained 
setting any negative ROA values to zero) but no effect from negative 
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components of ROA.  This hypothesis is derived from the literature on 
downwards nominal wage rigidity, as explained in section 7.3.  However, the 
hypothesis is rejected and I find no evidence at all that bank returns affect 
bank pay. 
I also reject the hypothesis that loan impairments have a negative effect on 
average pay in banks.  Taken together with the findings on returns, this 
suggests that financial outcomes at the bank level have surprisingly little 
effect on bank pay, which is a novel and important insight.  It suggests that 
banks are able to set their pay with no dependence on how well they do 
financially. 
I test and accept other novel hypotheses that the presence of a remuneration 
committee and large numbers of non-executive directors lead to higher 
average pay, while the disclosure of executive remuneration leads to lower 
average pay.  These effects occur because structures which regulators intend 
to control pay are used instead to justify high pay, while the effect of pay 
disclosure is to discourage high pay, for reputational reasons. 
These results must be interpreted alongside the finding in the previous 
chapter that the presence of a Remuneration Committee robustly lowers the 
probability of bank failure.  It is clear that a Remuneration Committee is, in 
some way, able to structure incentives so as to reduce the risk of bank failure, 
but these effects are not mediated through the average level of pay, and may 




I also show that mutual banks have lower average pay while investment 
banks have higher average pay.  This is hardly surprising, but it is the first 
time the comparison has been formally demonstrated. 
In examining the consequences of bank pay, I accept the novel hypotheses 
that higher average pay leads to faster growth of bank assets and a lower rate 
of bank failure, both due to efficiency-wage effects.  I also accept the 
hypotheses that excess pay (beyond that which can be explained by variables 
which are important across banks) leads to slower growth of bank assets and 
a higher rate of bank failure, both due to unresolved agency problems (Carter 
et al, 2016). 
These are original contributions that significantly extend the existing 
literature. 
In what follows, sections 7.2 and 7.3 respectively review the existing literature 
and use it to develop hypotheses, section 7.4 tests hypotheses relating to the 
causes of bank pay, sections 7.5 to 7.8 test hypotheses relating to its 
consequences and 7.9 synthesises results and discusses policy implications. 
 
7.2 Key Results in the Literature 
Any consideration of the role of bank governance in risk and performance 
inevitably includes discussion of remuneration.  As discussed in Chapter 2, 
this is because agency theory holds that the incentives of individuals with 
control over firms have implications for outcomes at the corporate level, and 
remuneration must be central amongst those incentives.  It is important to 
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understand whether the determinants of remuneration are as assumed in 
theory and whether remuneration itself has the effects it is assumed to have 
on corporate behaviour. 
Empirical studies relating to the role of remuneration in banks have generally 
focused on the CEO, with a few studies focused on senior executives more 
generally.  The results of these studies are generally clear-cut and aligned 
with the predictions of agency theory.  Higher variable and performance-
based remuneration is found to lead to increased risk-taking.  For instance, 
Bai and Elyasiani (2013) and Hagendorff and Vallascas (2011) each find that 
the performance-sensitivity of CEO pay has a positive effect on risk.  And 
Uhde (2015) and Efing et al (2015) each find that high bonuses amongst 
executives and traders leads to increased risk-taking.  The dissenting results 
are Acrey et al (2011) and Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), who find an 
insignificant or negative association of CEO bonuses with bank risk – but this 
is a minority conclusion that can probably be dismissed on the basis of being 
relevant only in certain contexts. 
In order to develop hypotheses on bank remuneration more generally, not 
just the remuneration of the most senior individuals within banks, it is 
necessary to consider a wider literature beyond banking and relate it back to 
banks.  I first consider the determinants of bank pay.  An important 
phenomenon in this regard is that of downward nominal wage rigidity.  This 
concept is important in New Keynesian macroeconomics (Romer, 2006) and 
serves to explain why wages do not drop rapidly to restore aggregate 
equilibrium after a negative output gap has arisen.  On a micro-economic 
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level, Fehr and Goette (2005) show that downward nominal wage rigidity 
exists regardless of the level of inflation and suggest that it arises because of 
the long-term nature of employment contracts, along with the behavioural 
heuristic of money illusion (Wilkinson, 2008).  Radowski and Bonin (2010) 
provide further empirical evidence that the phenomenon actually exists, in a 
different applied setting. 
In the case of banks, these results imply that we cannot expect a simple 
correlation between bank profitability and average pay.  There is evidence 
that bonuses are a larger component of pay at the most senior levels 
compared to all other levels (Flabbi and Ichino, 2001) so increases in fixed 
base salary may be more important than bonuses in understanding the effects 
of bank performance on average pay across the bank.  Given downward 
nominal wage rigidity, base salary may move up after a year in which the 
bank has performed well (because banks have the financial ability to pay 
more and a desire to set incentives by rewarding desired outcomes) but not 
move down after a year in which it has performed badly.  So, as well as 
including simple measures of bank performance, models of the determinants 
of average pay in banks should also contain measures of the positive 
component of bank returns (setting negative performance to zero).  In 
addition, since performance in the preceding year will determine wage 
increases that persist indefinitely, lagged effects should be taken into 
account. 
There are no studies which consider the effects of bank loan impairments on 
remuneration, at senior levels or any other level.  However, it is reasonable to 
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expect that large impairments would lead ceteris paribus to negative impacts 
on pay (or at least an absence of pay increases).  Indeed, regulation in the 
United Kingdom requires that risk is taken into account in pay settlements 
(Financial Conduct Authority Handbook, Systems and Controls Sourcebook, 
Chapter 19).  So it appears reasonable to include loan impairments as a 
realised risk in models of bank pay. 
Similarly, the UK Corporate Governance Code (2014) requires that 
Remuneration Committees ensure pay is reasonable, aligned with risk and 
not excessive, and encourages banks to disclose executive remuneration as a 
means to discourage excessive pay through public scrutiny and reputational 
risk.  So the presence of Remuneration Committees and Executive 
Remuneration Disclosures should be considered as factors which may affect 
bank remuneration. 
There is evidence that the extent and nature of Board-member oversight 
influences CEO remuneration (Renneboog and Zhao, 2011), suggesting that it 
could also be important for the remuneration of other senior individuals and 
the average level of pay.  Specifically, Renneboog and Zhao (2011) argue that 
inter-personal networks between Directors and CEOs at different firms may 
strongly affect corporate wage-setting.  This suggests that, although 
regulators view Remuneration Committees and oversight by Non-Executive 
Directors as means to restrict pay, it may actually be the case that these 
institutions are used as justification for higher remuneration. 
There is also evidence that Directors’ desire to protect their future reputation 
may affect decisions they make in respect of remuneration.  For instance, 
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there is some evidence from Lin et al (2016) that Director reputation can be 
important in securing future business and, thus, that there is an incentive to 
act in ways that preserve reputation.  This suggests that pay awards will be 
lower in cases where they must be publicly disclosed, because Directors do 
not wish to become known as persons who permit managers to take an 
excessive share of corporate income. 
Finally, although there is no rigorous evidence available, salary surveys 
conducted by recruitment firms (in particular the Robert Walters Salary 
Survey 2016) suggest that salaries are higher in certain parts of the banking 
sector, such as investment banks, and lower in other banks, such as mutuals.  
This seems unsurprising and suggests that indicators of bank business model 
should be included in models of remuneration. 
Moving beyond the determinants of bank pay, it is of interest to consider 
what wider literature, beyond banking, suggests might be the effects of higher 
pay on bank risk and return. 
One could argue that higher pay at all levels in a bank would have the same 
effects as higher performance-related pay at the executive level, as reported 
by Bai and Elyasiani (2013), Hagendorff and Vallascas (2011), Uhde (2015) 
and Efing et al (2015).  However, individuals below the executive level are 
unlikely to have much (or any) control over broad policy decisions regarding 
balance sheet structure, lending criteria, financing choices, risk limits and so 
on.   
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Furthermore, performance-related remuneration contracts within banks tend 
to focus on growth and returns, much more than risk, and bankers below the 
most senior levels do not necessarily take a portfolio-level view, but may 
rather be focused on their own deals.  So it cannot be meaningful to interpret 
effects of pay at all levels in the organisation in terms of a risk-return trade-
off. 
Pay at all levels in the organisation is therefore likely to have different kinds 
of effects from pay at the most senior levels.  Specifically, the comparative 
generosity of pay may have large effects on motivation through impacts 
encapsulated in the theory of efficiency wages, which is of fundamental 
importance in microeconomics.  Akerlof and Yellen (1986) argue that 
efficiency wages arise when managers, being aware that they cannot always 
detect shirking, offer wages higher than the market-clearing wage so that 
employees have an incentive not to take the risk of losing this privileged 
position.  In a distinct argument that supports the same conclusion (that pay 
motivates performance) Kahneman et al (1986) find that perceptions of 
fairness are important in wage-labour exchanges and that perceptions of 
unfairly low wages lead to less effort and lower motivation. 
If this is so, one would expect higher average pay to lead to faster growth, 
higher profitability and lower risk – on the grounds that all are likely results 
of getting more work and better-quality work from employees.   
One would also expect any component of pay which is insensitive to 
characteristics that are relevant across banks in determining pay to have 
different effects from average pay.  In particular, if a component of pay is 
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insensitive to generally-relevant bank characteristics, then it is likely to be 
reflective of unresolved agency issues (Carter, 2016).  This indicates an 
environment in which employees perceive that their rewards are 
unconnected to outcomes for the firm.  One would therefore expect higher 
excess pay to lead to slower growth, lower profitability and higher risk – on 
the grounds that all are the likely results of getting less work and lower-
quality work from employees. 
In summary, the literature suggests a range of financial outcomes and 
institutional factors that should determine average pay within banks.  It 
suggests that higher average pay will increase returns and reduce risk due to 
efficiency wage effects, while excess pay beyond that explained by systemic 






7.3 Literature Gaps and Hypotheses 
There are no studies in the literature which examine any of the following as 
determinants of bank pay: the positive component of returns, loan 
impairments, the presence of a Remuneration Committee and Executive 
Remuneration Disclosures, Director Ratio, a Joint CEO-Chairman, mutual 
ownership and securities holdings (the latter being an indicator for 
investment banking activity).  Given the literature in the preceding section 
pointing to each of these as potentially important factors, this is an important 
set of omissions. 
In addition, there are no studies which consider the effects on risk and return 
of remuneration at all levels in a bank.  This is an important omission since it 
is unlikely that management at the most senior levels could ever have 
complete control over all aspects of a banking organisation, implying that the 
aggregation of actions at all levels could be as important for overall risk and 





Therefore, in this Chapter I seek to test the following hypotheses: 
H7.1: Return on assets has a positive effect on 
bank average pay, immediately and/or at a lag, 
because of incentive schemes in which higher 
performance leads to bonuses or increases in base 
salaries.  
H7.2: The positive component of ROA (treating 
any negative ROA as zero) has a positive effect on 
bank average pay, immediately and/or at a lag, 
because there are upward movements in base 
salaries following strong bank performance but not 
the converse following weak performance. 
H7.3: The loan impairments ratio has a 
negative effect on average pay because such 
measures of realised risk are taken into account in 
pay awards.  
H7.4: The presence of a Remuneration 
Committee has a positive effect on average pay 
because it is used to justify high pay awards.  
H7.5: A high Director Ratio has a positive effect 




H7.6: The presence of Executive Remuneration 
Disclosures leads to lower average pay because 
Directors have a reputational incentive not to be 
seen to give away an excess portion of corporate 
income.  
H7.7: A Joint CEO-Chairman has a positive 
effect on average pay because it gives the CEO 
more freedom to award higher pay to managers.  
H7.8: Mutual banks have lower pay than other 
banks while banks with high securities holdings 
(indicative of investment banking activity) have 
higher pay than other banks.  
H7.9: Higher average pay leads to faster growth 
of bank assets because it leads to more motivated 
work.  
H7.10: Higher average pay leads to higher bank 
returns because it leads to more motivated work.  
H7.11: Higher average pay leads to lower bank 
risk because it leads to more motivated work.  
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H7.12: Higher excess pay (beyond that which 
can be explained by systematic factors6) leads to 
slower growth of bank assets because it reflects 
unresolved agency problems. 
H7.13: Higher excess pay leads to lower bank 
returns because it reflects unresolved agency 
problems. 
H7.14: Higher excess pay leads to higher bank 
risk because it reflects unresolved agency 
problems. 
A minor limitation in testing these hypotheses is that I do not have data on 
remuneration at all levels in banks.  However, I do have data on banks’ total 
numbers of employees and their total remuneration expenditure.  This makes 
it possible to directly calculate average pay (as the latter divided by the 




                                                          
6 In this context “systematic” means factors that are shown to be significant at the level of my 
sample of banks.  Components of pay not determined by such systematic factors clearly must have 
determinants of some kind, but these determinants are not systematically important across banks. 
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7.4 Explaining Average Pay 
Bank pay is expected to depend to some extent on returns, risk and 
institutional factors in the manner described in the preceding sections.  I use 
these factors here to construct a model to test hypotheses H7.1 to H7.8.  In 
addition, the model is used to extract a measure of excess pay for use in 
subsequent sections.  The rationale for this is that pay which is not 
determined by systemic factors is likely to be specific to a particular 
institution in a particular year and can be deemed ‘excess’ pay that is earned 
irrespective of bank financial outcomes or governance structures. 
Models used to test hypotheses are estimated using the following equations 
(Table 7.1) with equation numbers used for cross-reference in regression 




Table 7.1 Dependent and explanatory variables included in models for testing hypotheses 
relating to the determinants of average pay. 
Dependent Variable: average_pay 
All equations 






















Note: variable abbreviations and definitions as per section 3.8.  “L.” signifies a one-year lag. 
 
The regressor choice is based on hypotheses H7.1 to 7.8 above, which 
constitute a systematic set of factors proposed to explain bank pay.  Year 
dummies are included as controls on the basis that pay levels can be expected 
to vary through time as economic conditions change.  Models are estimated 
in linear form because there is no literature suggesting a non-linear 
relationship and linear functions are sufficient to test hypotheses while 




Table 7.2 Estimation results for models explaining average pay in banks. 
 OLS OLS OLS 
 (7.1) (7.2) (7.3) 
VARIABLES average_pay average_pay average_pay 
    
return_on_assets  -18.42 -14.82 
  (18.65) (19.66) 
L.return_on_assets  -17.28 -19.31 
  (12.43) (12.19) 
pos_roa 14.74 54.52 51.46 
 (20.85) (41.25) (41.33) 
L.pos_roa -66.80** -34.10 -32.08 
 (30.15) (27.02) (27.25) 
loan_impairments -7.627 -18.54* -17.09 
 (5.675) (10.85) (11.17) 
rem_co 64.35*** 76.42*** 73.63*** 
 (22.38) (26.38) (26.38) 
exec_rem_disclosed -67.89* -66.13* -66.89* 
 (34.70) (35.80) (35.70) 
director_ratio  225.9* 228.0* 
  (120.3) (119.1) 
joint_ceo_chairman   28.20 
   (26.50) 
mutual_ownership -74.79** -65.34** -59.03* 
 (33.82) (32.67) (33.95) 
securities_holdings 374.1*** 331.3*** 332.3*** 
 (108.1) (113.2) (114.3) 
Constant 90.58*** -107.1 -112.7 
 (26.94) (87.23) (87.07) 
    
Observations 432 413 413 
R-squared 0.431 0.475 0.477 
VIFs 1.21-3.70 1.40-7.14 1.20-7.47 
F statistic 4.7 5.0 9.3 
P(F=0) <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
F (endo reg) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pr > F endo reg <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Pr > Breusch-Pagan <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Year dummies included but not shown 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Equation numbers are as stated in Table 7.1.  Dependent variables are stated at the top of 
columns and explanatory variables in rows.  Equations are estimated using OLS.  Estimated 
parameter values are shown along with star symbols for statistical significance.  Clustered standard 
errors are in parentheses.  Diagnostic testing for heteroskedasticity using the Breusch-Pagan test 
shows it to be present, such that clustered standard errors are used.  VIFs for this set of regressors 
vary from 1.21 to 7.47, but this has not prevented the detection of significant associations or caused 
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sign reversals (shown using smaller sets of regressors).  Pr>F is the probability of obtaining an F at 
least as large as was obtained under the null hypothesis that the regression coefficients are all zero.  
Pr>F endo reg is the probability of obtaining an F statistic at least as large as was obtained in an 
auxiliary regression of residuals on regressors (a test for endogeneity) under the null hypothesis that 
the auxiliary regression coefficients are all zero.  (Bivariate tests also confirmed absence of 
endogeneity; results not shown.)  Pr>Breusch-Pagan is the probability of obtaining a test statistic at 
least as extreme as that obtained under the null hypothesis of spherical error variance.     
 
These results (Table 7.2) lead me to reject the idea that downward nominal 
wage rigidity is important in determining salaries in banking.  A simple 
measure of returns has no effect on average pay, but neither does a measure 
that takes account only of upward movements while setting downward 
movements to zero – referred to as Positive ROA (pos_roa).  This is contrary 
to the reasoning of Fehr and Goette (2005) that downward nominal wage 
rigidity arises because of the long-term nature of employment contracts, 
along with behavioural heuristics in which employees individually and 
collectively resist downward wage movements, while readily accepting 
upward movements.   Their reasoning predicts that effects of positive firm 
performance on wages will be evident while effects of negative firm 
performance will not, but I do not observe this pattern.  Instead, it appears 
that bank pay is rigid in both directions relative to changes in bank 
performance – pay does not respond to any measure of bank performance. 
The fact that bank pay is insensitive to any measure of bank financial 
performance suggests that bonuses are not the main component of 
remuneration for most bank staff.  If they were, the effect of bonuses 
dropping when ROA performance is weak or negative, and rising when the 
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opposite is true, would be expected to manifest as significant positive 
parameter values for both of the first two regressors in Table 7.2 above. 
It is also clear that higher loan impairments do not lead to lower average pay 
in the banks in my sample.  This suggests that, even when impairments are 
high, as they were for certain bank-year observations in my sample, the 
effects on average pay are negligible.  This suggests that the linkage of pay to 
risk expected by regulators (Financial Conduct Authority Handbook, Systems 
and Controls Sourcebook, Chapter 19) is not widespread for employees in 
general in the banks in my sample.  So, although these findings are of no 
significant association, they nevertheless have interesting implications for 
regulation. 
The literature shows that banks cut head-count to reduce costs after periods 
of negative performance (Haltenhof, 2014), but it is clear from my results 
that they do not modify pay to reflect financial wherewithal or incentive-
setting priorities following changes in bank-level outcomes. 
Another very interesting set of findings is that a Remuneration Committee 
and a higher NED ratio both have a positive effect on bank pay, as expected.  
This is in accordance with the view of Renneboog and Zhao (2011) that 
oversight structures can have effects on remuneration very different from 
what is envisaged in guidance such as the UK Corporate Governance Code 
(2014).  Specifically, oversight structures may collude in, or be used as 
justification for, higher pay – and my work verifies this suspicion.  This casts 
doubt on the view that internal controls within firms can be used to ensure 
reasonable and efficient remuneration. 
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A summarised by Morris et al (2009) the dominant view of corporate 
remuneration within the UK and similar economies has been that centralised 
regulation would introduce inefficiencies and that regulators, acting via the 
audit profession, should simply ensure that there are independent oversight 
structures at the firm level, designed to ensure that pay awards are justified.  
However, there have always been critics such as Renneboog and Zhao (2011) 
who point out that the Directors and CEOs of different firms belong to 
connected interpersonal networks and this may introduce inefficiency.  There 
have also been critiques, such as in Stiglitz (2013), which point out that rent-
seeking behaviour at the level of corporate pay is one way in which economic 
inequality has compounded upon itself in recent decades.  The results I 
report here support the critics, rather than the established view. 
However, it is important to reconcile these results with those reported in the 
preceding chapter finding that the presence of a Remuneration Committee 
lowers the rate of bank failure.  It appears that, although a Remuneration 
Committee does not restrain the overall level of pay, it does in some way 
structure pay so as to reduce incentives for excessive risk-taking that may 
lead to bank failure.  Thus, my recommendation is that Remuneration 
Committees are retained as a tool of risk management, but that some other 
policy is used to address excessive corporate pay, if the latter is deemed to be 
a policy objective.   
I also confirm the hypothesis (H7.6) that executive remuneration disclosure 
has a negative effect on average pay.  This is likely to be for reputational 
reasons.  It is entirely consistent with the evidence of Lin et al (2016) that 
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Director’s reputation is something they each seek to preserve for reasons of 
securing future business. 
By contrast, there is no evidence that a Joint CEO-Chairman permits higher 
pay awards.  Taken together with the findings of the previous chapter, this 
suggests that common critiques of combining the roles of CEO and Chairman 
are incorrect: doing so leads neither to excessive risk-taking nor excessive 
pay. 
Finally, I find that remuneration is higher in investment banks and lower in 
mutual banks, compared to other banks.  This is not surprising, but it is the 
first time it has been demonstrated by a rigorous econometric study.  
All of the effects detected are large ceteris paribus.  Because of how variables 
are defined, parameter estimates can be interpreted as the number of 
thousands of pounds sterling (GBP) added to average pay by increasing the 
relevant regressor by one unit.  So having a balance sheet that consists 
entirely of securities holdings (as opposed to one with no securities holdings) 
raises average by around £350,000 (reflecting high salaries in investment 
banks).  Having a remuneration committee raises it by around £70,000 while 
disclosing executive pay lowers it by around £67,000 and mutual ownership 
lowers it by around £67,000.  
In summary, hypotheses H7.1 to 7.3 and H7.7 are rejected.  There is, 
surprisingly, no evidence that financial outcomes at the bank level affect 
average pay within banks, and no evidence that the union or separation of the 
CEO and Chairman roles has any effect on pay.  By contrast, hypotheses H7.4 
363 
 
to 7.6 and H7.8 are accepted.  I find that disclosing executive pay leads to 
lower average pay, while the presence of a Remuneration Committee and 
large numbers of NEDs lead to higher pay.  Mutual banks have comparatively 
low pay while investment banks have high pay.   
These findings have interesting policy implications.  First, they suggest that 
measures to improve dependence of bank pay on risk may be needed if, as 
implied in published regulation, regulators view this as a desirable link.  
Second, they suggest that a Remuneration Committee is more useful for risk 
management than for wage restraint, and they provide further evidence for 
the idea that having a Joint CEO-Chairman may actually be a good thing. 
 
7.5 Excess Pay 
The analysis in section 7.4 shows that it is possible to explain almost half of 
bank pay using a set of variables based on factors that other literature 
suggests should be important.  Other variables that I tried adding to the 
models shown in section 7.4 did not add to explanatory power and could not 
be linked to meaningful behavioural hypotheses, so they were excluded.  This 
suggests that any element of bank pay not explained by the above model (that 
is, half of it) is idiosyncratic to the bank and the year.  I refer to such this 
element as ‘excess pay’ in the sense that it is not based on any systematic 
factor.   
Excess pay is likely to be indicative of unresolved agency issues in which 
executives can pay themselves and managers arbitrary amounts (Carter, 
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2016).  More excess pay implies greater agency problems.  In an environment 
where excess pay is large we would therefore expect staff to perceive that 
their pay is unconnected to corporate outcomes (or to structures designed to 
control corporate outcomes) and thus to expend less effort.  Put differently, 
excess pay cannot be an efficiency wage if it is unconnected to the very 
governance structures and institutional features that would drive the decision 
to set a particular level of efficiency wage.  So, excess pay is expected to lead 
to slower growth, lower returns and higher risk (compared to other banks) 
because these are the likely consequences of an environment where 
employees feel they can do less work and lower-quality work. 
To calculate a measure of excess pay for use as a regressor in subsequent 
analysis, I start from the predicted values from the above model (specifically 
equation 7.3).  These are then subtracted from average pay to obtain the 
component of average pay that does not depend on systematic factors.  The 
result of this computation is referred to as ‘excess pay’ in the sense that it is 
‘excess’ to that which can be explained systematically – although it is possible 
for the ‘excess’ to be positive or negative. 
 
7.6 Effects of Pay on Growth in Bank Assets 
This section shows results that confirm hypotheses H7.9 and H7.12 above.  
Higher average pay is found to lead to faster bank growth while higher excess 
pay leads to slower growth, because of the presence of efficiency wage effects 
in the first case and large agency problems in the second. 
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Models used to test hypotheses are estimated using the following equations 
(Table 7.3) with equation numbers used for cross-reference in regression 




Table 7.3 Dependent and explanatory variables in models for testing hypotheses that bank 
pay affects bank growth. 
Dependent Variable: growth_total_assets 
All equations 













































Note: variable abbreviations and definitions as per section 3.8.  “L.” signifies a one-year lag. 
 
Only small alterations differentiate the equations here from the baseline 
specification in Table 3.1.  Most importantly, excess pay has been added as a 
regressor because it is explicitly the focus of hypotheses to be tested.  In 
addition, the presence of a remuneration committee and executive 
remuneration disclosures have been dropped as these are presumed to act 
mainly through remuneration setting (affecting the level or structure of pay).  
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In some of the equations, governance interaction terms are added as a 
robustness test.  Finally, terms relating to financial performance have been 
included as explanatory variables because it seems obvious that stronger 
financial performance could make it possible to finance faster growth.  
Specifications and estimation methods are varied across the equations as a 
means of testing robustness.  Linear functional forms are used because there 
is no reason to believe that any particular nonlinearity is present and this 
format is sufficient to test hypotheses while treating other causal variables as 





Table 7.4 Estimation results for effects of bank pay on bank growth. 
 OLS OLS OLS Random 
Effects 









     
L.board_size 1.250** 1.048** 0.922* 0.922* 
 (0.583) (0.515) (0.546) (0.546) 
L.director_ratio -18.35 -24.85 2.026 2.026 
 (14.21) (16.85) (13.37) (13.37) 
L.joint_ceo_chairman   1.055 1.055 
   (5.909) (5.909) 
L.cro_present_onboard   4.305 3.250 
   (7.369) (5.214) 
L.comm_dir_board   1.630 1.630 
   (1.753) (1.753) 
L.low_ned   22.89 23.95* 
   (15.28) (12.89) 
L.cumul_gov   -1.055  
   (5.909)  
L.growth_total_assets 0.150 0.142 0.110 0.110 
 (0.139) (0.136) (0.116) (0.116) 
L.loan_interest_income -0.123* -0.108 -0.0706 -0.0706 
 (0.0700) (0.0703) (0.0652) (0.0652) 
L.return_on_assets -1.628 -1.977 -2.112 -2.112 
 (2.118) (2.248) (2.326) (2.326) 
L.return_on_equity 0.126*** 0.123*** 0.121*** 0.121*** 
 (0.0176) (0.0182) (0.0163) (0.0163) 
L.state_majority_owner -0.587 -0.251 -0.627 -0.627 
 (4.648) (4.586) (4.528) (4.528) 
L.mutual_ownership -4.480 -4.869 -5.329 -5.329 
 (4.720) (4.872) (4.785) (4.785) 
L.foreign_parent -13.54 -13.69 -16.10* -16.10* 
 (8.783) (8.813) (8.530) (8.530) 
L.average_pay 153.2*** 148.8*** 126.4*** 126.4*** 
 (51.85) (49.49) (41.32) (41.32) 
L.excess_pay -0.0952* -0.0953* -0.0714* -0.0714* 
 (0.0484) (0.0477) (0.0370) (0.0370) 
L.female_ratio  -9.882 -6.066 -6.066 
  (12.60) (11.63) (11.63) 
L.no_exp_ratio  13.43 17.97 17.97* 
  (9.687) (10.84) (10.84) 
L.irb_permission 2.543 2.266 2.459 2.459 
 (9.118) (8.962) (9.639) (9.639) 
L.exposure_to_banks -27.22** -30.85*** -37.56*** -37.56*** 
 (10.43) (10.62) (12.19) (12.19) 
369 
 
L.securities_holdings -49.44** -45.59** -40.54* -40.54** 
 (22.22) (20.90) (20.55) (20.55) 
L.advisory_activity 11.89 -16.59 -60.98 -60.98 
 (122.2) (117.8) (121.0) (121.0) 
L.equity_ratio -0.243 1.855 -3.607 -3.607 
 (39.40) (40.41) (41.33) (41.33) 
L.curr_dep_over_liab 5.138 3.519 2.241 2.241 
 (3.632) (3.736) (3.850) (3.850) 
L.size_over_gdp -12.48 -12.63* -12.37 -12.37 
 (7.646) (7.559) (7.656) 0.922* 
Constant 15.37 19.55 3.621 -0.260 
 (14.13) (14.77) (15.91) (11.51) 
     
Observations 305 305 305 305 
R-squared 0.270 0.279 0.300 0.299 
VIFs 1.34-7.07 1.34-7.14 1.40-9.07 1.40-9.07 
F statistic 154.5 90.6 97.2  
Pr > F <0.001 <0.001 <0.001  
Wald Chi2    3012.4 
Pr > Chi2    <0.001 
F (endo reg) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pr > F endo reg >0.999 >0.999 >0.999 >0.999 
Pr > Breusch-Pagan <0.001 <0.001 <0.001  
     
Year dummies included but not shown 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Equation numbers are as stated in Table 7.3.  Dependent variables are stated at the top of 
columns and explanatory variables in rows.  Equations 7.4 to 7.6 are estimated using OLS, while 7.7 is 
estimated as a panel model with random effects.  Estimated parameter values are shown along with 
star symbols for statistical significance.  Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.  Diagnostic 
testing for heteroskedasticity using the Breusch-Pagan test shows it to be present, such that 
clustered standard errors are used.  VIFs for this set of regressors vary from 1.34 to 9.07, but this has 
not prevented the detection of significant associations or caused sign reversals (shown using smaller 
sets of regressors).  Auxiliary regression using residuals as dependent variable shows no empirical 
evidence of endogeneity for any independent variable, as was expected for this set of regressors.  
Pr>Chi2 is the probability of obtaining a Chi2 at least as large as was obtained under the null 
hypothesis that the regression coefficients are all zero.  Pr>F is the probability of obtaining an F at 
least as large as was obtained under the null hypothesis that the regression coefficients are all zero.  
Pr>F endo reg is the probability of obtaining an F statistic at least as large as was obtained in an 
auxiliary regression of residuals on regressors (a test for endogeneity) under the null hypothesis that 
the auxiliary regression coefficients are all zero.  (Bivariate tests also confirmed absence of 
endogeneity; results not shown.)  Pr>Breusch-Pagan is the probability of obtaining a test statistic at 





These results (Table 7.4) show clear evidence of a positive effect of average 
pay on growth in bank assets.  The same effect is apparent in section 8.5, in 
models that do not also contain excess pay as a regressor.  This is consistent 
with hypothesis H7.9: that higher pay motivates greater efficiency and thus 
yields better staff performance in general, including in capital deployment.  
In addition, the opposite effect is found for excess pay: it has a negative 
impact on growth in bank assets.  This is consistent with hypothesis H7.12: 
that higher excess pay leads to slower growth, because it entails a perception 
by employees that their pay is not dependent on outcomes for the firm (or on 
structures designed to manage outcomes for the firm). 
In the above, average pay is measured in millions while excess pay is 
measured in thousands.  So it can be seen that increasing average pay by 
£1000 causes the rate of growth of bank assets to increase by 0.13%, while 
increasing excess pay by £1000 causes it to reduce by 0.09%.  Given that the 
assets of the average bank in the data set are 7% of GDP and many banks are 
much larger (in a size distribution that is heavily positively skewed), these are 
not trivial effects.  It seems that ceteris paribus paying the average employee 
of the average bank £1000 more could increase investment in the economy 
by their bank by £137m.  Since the average bank in the data set has 
approximately 10,000 staff, the cost of the change would be £10m. 
These precise numerical estimates should not be taken too literally (they 
could be altered in practice by confounders and market frictions) but it seems 
clear that a) motivating average bank staff by creating a higher-pay 
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environment has macro-economic benefits in the sense of greater investment 
in the economy, but b) these benefits are almost entirely eroded when the 
extra pay has no clear link to bank financial outcomes or governance 
structures. 
It is interesting to consider these findings in light of the principal-agent 
conflicts that lie at the heart of agency theory.  As noted in section 2.4, Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) argued that the separation of ownership and control 
inherent in typical corporate structures may cause managerial decisions to 
deviate from the maximisation of shareholder value.  In the case of bank 
growth, principal-agent conflict or alignment is clearly important: banks 
grow faster when employees earn a greater share of the bank’s earnings (that 
is, when the interests of staff and shareholders are aligned) and they grow 
more slowly when managers earn an income unrelated to systemic factors.  
Efficiency wages are clearly a way for shareholders to overcome the agency 
problem.   
In summary, hypotheses H7.9 and H7.12 are accepted: higher average pay 





7.7 No Effects of Pay on Return on Equity 
My analysis below shows that average pay has no effect on bank return on 
equity, and excess pay has no effect either, leading me to reject hypotheses 
H7.10 and 7.13.  Models used to test hypotheses were estimated using the 
following equations (Table 7.3) with equation numbers used for cross-
reference in regression tables.   
Table 7.5 Dependent and explanatory variables in models for testing hypotheses that bank 
pay affects bank returns. 
Dependent Variable: return_on_equity 
All equations 















































In terms of regressor choice, these models have three important differences 
form the baseline specification stated in Table 3.1.  First, excess pay is added 
as a regressor because, as indicated in section 7.5, I am specifically interested 
in its effects.  Second, I add as regressors financial variables that are 
considered elsewhere in this thesis as outcome variables.  This is because, as 
discussed in section 3.4 different outcome variables in my study could affect 
one another.   Third, the presence of a remuneration committee and of 
executive remuneration disclosures are excluded since there is an assumption 
that their effects operate entirely through remuneration (at least the structure 
of remuneration if not its level). 
Beyond this, all other variables relating to ownership and governance 
structure are retained.  This is because, as explained in sections 5.3 and 6.4, 
there are reasons to expect these to affect risk and performance, such that 
exclusion could lead to mis-specification and bias.  Similarly, balance sheet 
characteristics are retained as regressors since, as discussed in section 3.4, 
there is reason to believe that balance sheet structures are indicative of 
business model and that risk and return are affected by business model. 
As stated previously, models are estimated in linear form because there is no 
literature suggesting a specific nonlinear form to use, and the linear format is 
sufficient to test hypotheses while controlling for co-variates.  There is 
robustness testing across the four equations in terms of both specification 




Table 7.6 Estimation results for models of the effects of bank pay on bank returns.  















     
L.growth_total_assets 0.00496 0.0322 0.0160 0.0194 
 (0.0261) (0.0213) (0.0233) (0.0218) 
L.loan_impairments -1.324 -1.233 -1.165 -0.867 
 (0.867) (0.914) (0.911) (0.879) 
L.loan_interest_income -0.105** -0.0864 -0.0899 -0.0808 
 (0.0495) (0.0538) (0.0572) (0.0515) 
L.state_majority_owner -6.238 -4.174 -1.568 -5.134 
 (4.551) (5.953) (6.155) (4.746) 
L.mutual_ownership -7.105* -7.855** -5.527 -7.215* 
 (3.653) (3.834) (3.741) (3.821) 
L.foreign_parent -12.97*** -10.46** -11.22** -12.41** 
 (4.759) (4.741) (4.766) (5.047) 
L.board_size 0.626  0.925 0.781* 
 (0.403)  (0.569) (0.440) 
L.director_ratio -8.376  -7.339 -6.171 
 (7.965)  (7.438) (8.005) 
L.average_pay 37.74 -0.106 15.69 40.69 
 (32.98) (17.80) (23.33) (37.64) 
L.excess_pay -0.0161 0.0260 0.00894 -0.0155 
 (0.0264) (0.0164) (0.0187) (0.0302) 
L.joint_ceo_chairman -21.79   -23.29 
 (15.39)   (16.61) 
L.cro_present_onboard -1.120   -1.356 
 (2.655)   (2.428) 
L.comm_dir_board -0.0531   0.349 
 (1.617)   (1.682) 
L.female_ratio -15.45***   -7.388 
 (5.700)   (6.346) 
L.no_exp_ratio 8.026**   7.576* 
 (3.735)   (3.952) 
L.irb_permission -4.416 -0.699 -1.343 -5.115 
 (3.509) (2.931) (3.002) (3.494) 
L.exposure_to_banks -2.764 -1.532 -1.468 -5.377 
 (9.456) (9.884) (10.37) (10.68) 
L.securities_holdings -12.57 2.349 -3.234 -15.97 
 (14.96) (8.300) (9.267) (17.04) 
L.advisory_activity 104.3 115.6* 70.33 91.29 
 (70.50) (68.63) (66.84) (69.86) 
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L.equity_ratio 21.59 20.46 24.03 14.18 
 (24.63) (31.03) (32.42) (25.35) 
L.curr_dep_over_liabs 4.780 6.066 7.365* 6.346 
 (3.813) (3.740) (4.374) (4.032) 
L.size_over_gdp 3.938 2.839 0.331 3.558 
 (3.432) (2.894) (3.655) (3.309) 
     
Constant 6.318 6.662 0.181 2.373 
 (8.423) (5.114) (9.629) (8.467) 
     
Observations 304 304 304 304 
R-squared 0.368 0.251 0.263 0.359 
VIFs 1.30-8.12 1.30-8.12 1.30-8.12 1.30-8.12 
F statistic 14.43    
Pr > F <0.001    
Wald Chi2  226.8 266.7 452.0 
Pr > Chi2  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
F (endo reg) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pr > F endo reg >0.999 >0.999 >0.999 >0.999 
Pr > Breusch-Pagan <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
     
Year dummies included but not shown 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Equation numbers are as stated in Table 7.5.  Dependent variables are stated at the top of 
columns and explanatory variables in rows.  Equation 7.8 is estimated using OLS, while equations 7.9 
to 7.11 are estimated as a panel model with random effects.  Estimated parameter values are shown 
along with star symbols for statistical significance.  Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.  
Diagnostic testing for heteroskedasticity using the Breusch-Pagan test shows it to be present, such 
that clustered standard errors are used.  VIFs for this set of regressors vary from 1.30 to 8.12, but 
this has not prevented the detection of significant associations or caused sign reversals (shown using 
smaller sets of regressors).  Auxiliary regression using residuals as dependent variable shows no 
empirical evidence of endogeneity for any independent variable, as was expected for this set of 
regressors.  Pr>Chi2 is the probability of obtaining a Chi2 at least as large as was obtained under the 
null hypothesis that the regression coefficients are all zero.  Pr>F is the probability of obtaining an F 
at least as large as was obtained under the null hypothesis that the regression coefficients are all 
zero.  Pr>F endo reg is the probability of obtaining an F statistic at least as large as was obtained in 
an auxiliary regression of residuals on regressors (a test for endogeneity) under the null hypothesis 
that the auxiliary regression coefficients are all zero.  (Bivariate tests also confirmed absence of 
endogeneity; results not shown.)  Pr>Breusch-Pagan is the probability of obtaining a test statistic at 




This analysis (Table 7.6) shows that the effects which would be expected 
based on the literature on efficiency wages and agency theory are not evident.  
Higher average pay does not lead to higher ROE and higher excess pay does 
not lead to lower ROE, even though we would expect the former to motivate 
staff to do better and the latter to reflect dilution of incentive.   
It is worth noting that signs of a positive effect of average pay on ROE are 
evident in section 5.5, in models of ROE that do not also contain excess pay 
as a regressor.  However, this putative effect is clearly not robust in my 
analysis, and there is no sign of excess pay having any effect at all on ROE. 
One possible interpretation of all this is that raising the level of average pay 
across the organisation increases effort towards expansion of the business (as 
shown in the preceding section) but does not motivate cost control, or 
perhaps cannot motivate cost control because only a limited number of senior 
individuals in the accounting and finance team have control over expenditure 
(Hoitash et al, 2016).  If this is the case, then one would expect no effect on 
ROE because costs might simply rise in line with expansion of income and 
the balance sheet, as any extra effort can imply extra cost (for instance the 
cost of operational infrastructure to support new business ventures).  
Conversely, when employees have less effort to expend effort in an 
environment of high excess pay, costs might drop in line with income and the 
balance sheet, such that no effect on ROE is evident. 
In summary, I reject hypotheses H7.10 and 7.13: average pay and excess pay 




7.8 Effects of Pay on Bank Failure 
In this section, I report results consistent with hypotheses H7.11 and H7.14: 
higher average pay leads to a lower rate of bank failure and higher excess pay 
leads to a higher rate of bank failure.   
Models used to test hypotheses are estimated using the following equations 
(Table 7.5) with equation numbers used for cross-reference in regression 




Table 7.7 Dependent and explanatory variables in models for testing hypotheses that bank 
pay affects the failure rate of banks. 
All equations 















































Note: variable abbreviations and definitions as per section 3.8.  “L.” signifies a one-year lag. 
 
The main difference between these models and the baseline specification 
stated in Table 3.1 is the inclusion of excess pay as a regressor.  This was 
added because, as stated in hypotheses H7.12 to H7.14, I am explicitly 
interested in effects it may have.  A second difference is that explanatory 
variables are included consisting of financial variables that are used 
elsewhere in this thesis as outcome variables.  This is because it appears 
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obvious that these variables can contribute directly to the success or failure of 
a bank so, on this basis, it is prudent to control for them. 
Unlike in sections 7.6 and 7.7, the dummy variables reflecting the presence of 
a remuneration committee and the presence of executive remuneration 
disclosures are retained as regressors in the model.  This is because a) they 
could have effects on bank failure (which is a complex aggregation of many 
influences) other than through control of pay and b) I sought to corroborate 
earlier evidence from Chapter 6 that these dummy variables have 
implications for the rate of bank failure. 
Characteristics relating to ownership and governance are retained in the 
models because, as explained in sections 5.3  and 6.4 we can expect these to 
affect risk, such that their omission could cause mis-specification and bias.  
Balance sheet variables are also included because, as section 3.4 explains, risk 
may vary across different balance sheet structures.   
Probit models are used because they are suitable for testing significance with 
co-variates treated as held constant in settings with binary dependent 
variables.  Logit models were not used, simply because the choice between 
logit and probit is generally considered to be arbitrary.  Linear probability 
models are not used because they can predict probabilities greater than 1 or 
less than zero, which is clearly meaningless.   Results are as follows.  
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Table 7.8 Probit estimation results for models of the effect of bank pay on bank failure. 









     
L.growth_gross_loans 0.00483 0.00614 0.00988*** 0.00611 
 (0.00327) (0.00384) (0.00379) (0.00534) 
L.growth_total_assets 0.00841 0.00767 0.0161** 0.0276*** 
 (0.00613) (0.00669) (0.00751) (0.00885) 
L.loan_impairments -0.340 -0.483** -0.485** -0.685* 
 (0.236) (0.224) (0.244) (0.377) 
L.return_on_assets -0.906 -1.262* -0.386 -0.269 
 (0.702) (0.701) (0.776) (0.258) 
L.return_on_equity 0.0255 0.0379 -0.0105 -0.0243*** 
 (0.0323) (0.0336) (0.0411) (0.00603) 
L.state_majority_owner 2.605*** 3.833*** 5.639*** 9.248*** 
 (0.701) (1.082) (1.453) (1.851) 
L.mutual_ownership 0.240 -0.310 0.946 -0.344 
 (0.697) (0.749) (1.020) (1.269) 
L.foreign_parent 2.653*** 3.040*** 4.488*** 6.242*** 
 (0.766) (0.670) (1.076) (1.445) 
L.board_size -0.0140 -0.0340 0.0267 0.0782 
 (0.0846) (0.0805) (0.0954) (0.105) 
L.director_ratio 0.241 -1.347 -2.765 -5.132 
 (1.819) (1.974) (2.077) (3.741) 
L.rem_co -0.763 -0.134 -0.320 -1.687** 
 (0.560) (0.456) (0.494) (0.837) 
L.exec_rem_disclosed 0.659 0.867 1.184* 2.595*** 
 (0.639) (0.564) (0.710) (0.998) 
L.average_pay -9.892*** -18.42*** -18.63*** -28.20*** 
 (3.532) (3.337) (3.571) (9.038) 
L.excess_pay 0.00809** 0.0131*** 0.0117*** 0.0230*** 
 (0.00406) (0.00306) (0.00418) (0.00835) 
L.joint_ceo_chairman  0.915 0.413 1.224 
  (0.575) (0.631) (0.922) 
L.cro_present_onboard  0.148 0.165 -0.0317 
  (0.655) (0.586) (0.888) 
L.comm_dir_board  -0.352 -0.570* -0.914** 
  (0.385) (0.323) (0.362) 
L.female_ratio  0.00620 1.555 3.213 
  (2.873) (2.959) (2.962) 
L.no_exp_ratio  3.027*** 3.561*** 5.784*** 
  (0.924) (1.152) (1.629) 
L.irb_permission   -4.712*** -6.241*** 
   (1.487) (1.421) 
L.exposure_to_banks    -6.360*** 
    (1.418) 
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L.securities_holdings    -0.402 
    (3.737) 
L.advisory_activity    -81.58 
    (63.09) 
L.equity_ratio -9.822* -8.061 -13.15* 9.580 
 (5.659) (7.387) (6.933) (10.58) 
L.current_dep_over_liabs -0.578 -1.005 -0.655 0.0384 
 (0.607) (0.662) (0.713) (0.852) 
L.size_over_gdp 0.858 0.985** 1.942** 1.780** 
 (0.578) (0.465) (0.852) (0.826) 
Observations 300 300 300 294 
Pseudo-R-squared 0.436 0.488 0.527 0.601 
VIFs (these regressors) 1.32 – 6.8 1.26 – 7.4 1.26 – 7.5 1.29 – 9.3 
Wald Chi2 355.3 873.9 947.6 4716.4 
Pr > Chi2 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Pr < Smith-Blundell (if 
endogenous) 
<0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
     
Year dummies included but not shown 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Equation numbers are as stated in Table 7.7.  Dependent variables are stated at the top of 
columns and explanatory variables in rows.  Equations are estimated using maximum likelihood with 
numerical optimisation.  Estimated parameter values are shown along with star symbols for 
statistical significance.  The presence of non-spherical error variance is assumed, such that clustered 
standard errors are used (shown in parentheses).  Pr>Chi2 is the probability of obtaining a Chi2 at 
least as large as was obtained under the null hypothesis that the regression coefficients are all zero.  
Pr<Smith-Blundell is the probability of obtaining a Smith-Blundell statistic at least as small as was 
obtained under the null that regressors are endogenous. 
 
These results (Table 7.8) show a significant negative effect of higher average 
pay on bank failure.  This is consistent with the hypothesis, derived from the 
theory of efficiency wages, that higher average pay motivates greater effort, 
including higher-quality effort, such that the overall level of risk is reduced.  
It is important to note that there is no obvious idiosyncrasy of my data set, 
compared to other data, which could undermine result.  In particular, the set 
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of failed banks includes both large banking groups and investment banks 
(where salary is high) and also mutuals (where salary is low).   
My results also show a significant positive effect of excess pay on bank 
failure.  This is consistent with the argument that high excess pay represents 
an environment in which agency problems are serious and pay is arbitrarily 
high, such that staff feel limited incentive to expend effort because pay is not 
linked to effort. 
In summary, I accept hypotheses H7.11 and H7.14: higher average pay in 
banks leads to lower bank risk and higher excess pay leads to higher risk. 
 
7.9 Conclusions 
In this chapter, I test a range of novel hypotheses and advance our 
understanding of the causes and consequences of bank pay.  Specifically, I 
find that bank pay has no dependence on returns, with or without taking 
account of downward nominal wage rigidity, and no dependence on loan 
impairments.  Thus, hypotheses H7.1 to 7.3 are rejected: average pay at all 
levels in a bank has no clear dependence on financial outcomes at the bank 
level. 
By contrast, governance and institutional attributes do matter as 
determinants of pay, such that hypotheses H7.4, 7.5, 7.6 and 7.8 are accepted.  
The presence of a Remuneration Committee or of higher numbers of NEDs 
leads to higher average pay, likely because these structures are used to justify 
high pay – even though evidence in the preceding Chapter shows clearly that 
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Remuneration Committees are effective in mitigating risk.  By contrast, the 
disclosure of executive remuneration leads to lower average pay, likely 
because it discourages excessive pay through the prospect of reputational 
costs.  Finally, average pay depends negatively on mutual ownership and 
positively on investment banking activities – neither of which has been 
rigorously demonstrated before, although they are not surprising results.   
Residuals from my simple model of average pay were used to generate a 
measure of ‘excess pay’, consisting of that element of average pay which 
cannot be explained by systematic causes.  This derived variable is then used 
as a regressor to test further hypotheses relating to the consequences of bank 
pay, alongside the simpler measure of average pay. 
My analysis of the consequences of bank pay reveals that higher average pay 
leads to faster bank growth and a lower probability of failure, two of the 
effects that are expected based on the theory of efficiency wages.  It also 
shows that higher excess pay leads to slower growth and a higher probability 
of bank failure, consistent with the argument that high excess pay represents 
an environment in which agency problems are severe (Carter, 2016) and staff 
perceive no link of their pay to corporate outcomes or corporate structures.  
In terms of practical applications, Chapter 6 identified a number of radical 
changes in corporate governance that may be desirable – especially replacing 
independent Chairmen and independent CROs with alternative structures 
that do not confuse decision-making or weaken the personal accountability of 
the CEO.  This chapter has similarly radical implications for policy.  In 
particular, it departs from the standard view as summarised in Morris et al 
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(2009) that controls at the firm level can restrain pay, and implies instead 
that Remuneration Committees are useful as tools of risk management but 
useless as tools of pay restraint.  If pay restraint is to be an objective of policy, 
it will have to be achieved by other means.   
Similarly, my analysis yields evidence that the component of bank pay which 
is outside the influence of systematic factors creates serious risks to bank 
stability and that regulators should do more minimise this component of pay, 
such as by enforcing rules designed to align remuneration with risk (like 
those already in the FCA Handbook).   
Less controversially, it is clear that corporate disclosures of executive pay 
should continue and be extended if there is an objective to restrain pay 
awards not justified by performance. 
On the broadest level, it is clear that some of the main determinants of bank 
pay do not behave in the manner expected by regulatory authorities, that a 
large part of bank pay appears to be arbitrary, being outside the control of 
systematic factors, and that the arbitrary portion of bank pay can cause 






Chapter 8: The Role of Bank Size  
8.1 Introduction 
In this Chapter I test hypotheses relating to the effects of bank relative and 
absolute size, complexity and diversification.  In doing so, I use a simple one-
equation framework to obtain the novel result that bank relative size has a 
positive effect on the rate of growth in bank assets, while absolute size does 
not.  This occurs because larger banks can grow faster due to competitive 
advantages arising from implied subsidies, rather than economies of scale.  It 
suggests that, if size leads to moral hazard and implied subsidy effects, and 
these lead to faster growth and even greater size, then there is problem that 
tends to compound on itself over time.  
In the remainder of this Chapter, sections 8.2 and 8.3 use the existing 
literature to develop hypotheses relating to the effects of size, complexity and 
diversification, section 8.4 demonstrates that there are no robust effects of 
complexity and diversification on risk and return, section 8.5 demonstrates 






8.2 Key Results in the Literature 
Economies and diseconomies of scale are fundamental in economic theory 
(Varian, 2009).  Economies of scale occur when fixed overhead costs are 
spread over more units of output, rendering the unit cost lower.  Similarly, 
economies of scope occur when fixed costs are spread over different business 
lines.  Diseconomies of scale arise when complexity reaches a level that 
impedes coordination and causes inefficiency.   
Bank size may matter in other ways too, as discussed in Chapter 2.  It may 
create moral hazard effects in which larger banks take more risk (Bhagat et 
al, 2015) because they understand that they are systemically important and 
will likely be bailed-out by the State in the event of distress.  Similarly, bigger 
banks may gain from implied subsidies because their investors also expect 
that systemically-important banks will be bailed-out in the event of distress 
and therefore charge banks lower funding costs that do not include as much 
of a risk premium as they would if bailout was not expected. 
Empirical results relating to bank size are clear-cut and in accordance with 
theory. Bhagat et al (2015) and Laeven et al (2015) both find that bank size 
has a positive effect on risk.  Meanwhile, Hughes and Mester (2013), Beccalli 
et al (2015) and Hughes et al (2001) all estimate production functions to 
isolate scale effects from other effects (such as implied subsidies and moral 
hazard) and they all report that bank size has a positive effect on 
performance. 
Potential impacts of complexity on bank performance are related to 
diseconomies of scale.  Banks may have so many different components that 
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coordination failures lead to elevated costs, missed revenue opportunities or 
mistaken decisions, such that financial outcomes deteriorate.  This can occur 
as a result of mergers and acquisitions.  Some banks have grown through 
acquisitions and have become universal banks, combining retail, commercial 
and investment banking activities in one group.  One consequence of this is 
that banks have not been able to integrate internal systems well and have 
been left with systems that have important deficiencies (Eastburn and 
Boland, 2015).  The literature suggests that acquisitions in various sectors 
tend to overestimate potential gains (Malimender and Tate, 2008) which 
may mean that they create entities that are inefficient.   Thus, complexity in 
banking may reach levels that have adverse effects on risk and performance, 
but this has not been tested directly in the empirical literature. 
Asset diversification is also important in finance theory.  In principle, it 
allows a lower risk at a given level of return or a greater return at a given level 
of risk, because risks arising from different assets offset one another provided 
that these assets are not perfectly correlated (Jones 2008).  Since 
diversification and complexity may be related, it is important to examine 
their effects alongside one another.   
Empirical results relating to bank diversification are fairly clear-cut and in 
line with theory: diversification lowers risk and increases return.  Brewer 
(1989), Shiers (2002) and Fang and van Lelyveld (2014) all find that bank 
diversification reduces risk.  Mergaerts and Vennet (2016) and Meslier et al 
(2014) find that diversification increases performance.  Baele (2007) finds 
that diversification leads to higher performance and lower risk.  Kohler 
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(2014) reports that the effect of diversification on risk varies by entity type: in 
retail banks, diversification towards non-interest income reduces risk, while 
in investment banks it increases it.  The dissenting results are Wall (1987), 
who finds no evidence that bank diversification has an effect on bank risk and 
Mercieca et al (2007), who finds no effect on performance, but these are 
minority conclusions. 
In summary, the literature suggests that larger bank size will increase 
performance and risk, but it is silent on the possibility that relative and 
absolute size may have different effects (see section 8.3 below).  It suggests 
that greater complexity will increase risk and/or reduce returns, and that 
diversification will have the exact opposite effects. 
 
8.3 Literature Gaps and Hypotheses 
No empirical studies have sought to differentiate the effects of bank absolute 
and relative size.  If, as argued by Forrsbaeck (2011), it is important that 
banks are subject to implied subsidy effects arising from being systemically 
important and expecting government rescue in the event of distress, then we 
would expect that relative size (linked to being most important for depositors 
and the economy) would have detectable effects.  If, as argued by Hughes and 
Mester (2013), Beccalli et al (2015) and Hughes et al (2001), simple scale is 
important, then we would expect absolute size to have detectable effects.  
Since absolute and relative size will be confounded, it is important to test 
them simultaneously in the same model, but no study has done so. 
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Likewise, no empirical studies have examined the role of complexity in banks 
in determining risk and return.  This is important because the basic theory of 
diseconomies of scale (Varian, 2009) would predict adverse effects. 
 Therefore, in this Chapter I seek to test the following hypotheses: 
H8.1: Bank diversification leads to lower risk 
and/or higher performance because of gains from 
having incompletely correlated assets. 
H8.2: Bank complexity leads to higher risk 
and/or lower performance because of coordination 
difficulties (diseconomies of scale) that arise 
internally within the organisation. 
H8.3 Greater absolute size leads to higher 
performance and/or faster growth because of 
classical economies of scale. 
H8.4 Greater relative size leads to higher 
performance and/or faster growth and/or higher 
risk because of implied subsidy effects and moral 
hazard arising from the expectation of rescue in 
the event of distress. 
 
Hypotheses 8.3 and 8.4 are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  Although the 
two explanatory variables are confounded, including both in models means I 
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have controlled for one while analysing the effects of the other.  So it is 
possible to discover that they have opposite effects, or that one matters while 
the other does not. 
In order to test the effects of complexity, I use the number of employees of a 
bank as a good indicator of complexity.  A greater number of employees 
intrinsically implies a greater amount of activity that must be coordinated 
and is likely to be proportional to the number of business lines that must be 
coordinated. 
To test the effects of diversification alongside complexity, I generated an 
indicator variable for diversification that takes a value of 1 if the proportion of 
current accounts in liabilities exceeds 40% (indicative of extensive retail 
banking activity) and the proportion of securities holdings in assets exceeds 
20% (indicative of extensive investment banking activity).  These cut-offs 
were chosen because they approximately divide the densities of the relevant 
empirical distributions in half.  Where both criteria are not met, the 
diversification indicator takes a value of zero. 
As a second indicator of complexity, I use the multiplicative interaction of 
employee number and the diversification indicator.  This represents the 
number of employees present in a case where they are spread over very 




8.4 No Effects of Complexity or Diversification 
My analysis reveals no effect on risk, performance or growth of any of the 
indicators of complexity or diversification used (results not shown for 
reasons of space but can be provided on request).  The only hint of an 
association is a non-robust positive association of employee number with 
ROE, but the apparent effect disappears when model specification is varied 
and is thus not reliable.   
Setting these results in the context of the literature summarised in the 
previous section, my findings align with the minority conclusions in the 
literature that diversification has no effects on bank risk or performance, as 
reported in Wall (1987) and Mercieca et al (2007).   
Given that Kohler (2014) reports that diversification has opposite effects for 
retail compared to investment banks, one possible interpretation is that, 
because my data set contains both types of entity, these effects have cancelled 
each other out so that no average effects are evident.  However, I have ruled 
this out by constructing interaction terms in which my diversification 
indicator is interacted with indicators of retail and investment bank status.  
This again suggested no effect of diversification on either risk or 
performance.  In any case, the conclusion of Kohler (2014) is difficult to 
reconcile with finance theory: it is possible that diversification improves the 
risk-return trade-off in the way theory predicts, or that it is ineffective in 
doing so, perhaps because cross-asset correlations become strongly positive 
because of dependence on the macro-economy, but it is unclear why 
diversification would ever increase risk. 
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A more plausible conclusion is simply that diversification has different effects 
in different geographical and temporal contexts, perhaps because of different 
levels of cross-asset correlations.  In my sample, it has no measurable effects.  
This is important in interpreting the effects of having a foreign parent, as 
discussed in Chapter 5.  Theoretically plausible effects of having a foreign 
parent are an improved risk-return trade-off because of international 
diversification, or more adverse outcomes because of cross-border 
information asymmetries.  The fact that I find no effects of diversification in 
my sample strengthens the argument that the effects of a foreign parent are 
due to information asymmetries. 
The fact that I find no effect of complexity is also of some importance.  It 
suggests that banks do not struggle to manage their internal complexities to 
the extent I have hypothesised.  This is important in a policy sense because, if 
the opposite were found, it would provide an additional argument in favour 
of smaller banks. 
In summary, Hypotheses H8.1 and H8.2 are rejected.   
  
8.5 Positive Effects of Relative Size on Growth 
To test my hypotheses relating to bank size, I use world rank by assets as an 
indicator of relative size and size over GDP as an indicator of absolute size.  
Results obtained are as follows. 
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Models used to test hypotheses are estimated using the following equations 
(Table 8.1) with equation numbers used for cross-reference in regression 
tables.   
Table 8.1 Dependent and explanatory variables included in models for testing hypotheses 
that bank size influences bank growth. 
Dependent Variable: growth_total_assets 
All equations 
(8.1 to 8.4) 
















































Note: variable abbreviations and definitions as per section 3.8.  “L.” signifies a one-year lag. 
This set of equations differs from the baseline specification stated in Table 3.1 
in that it includes an additional variable intended to test hypotheses relating 
to relative size: world rank by assets.  Even though the intention is to test 
hypotheses relating to size, explanatory variables relating to governance, 
ownership and balance sheet characteristics are retained.  This is because, as 
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explained earlier, there are reasons to expect these to affect risk and 
performance, such that their exclusion would lead to mis-specification and 
bias.  Linear models are used for estimation because there is no reason to 
believe any specific non-linearity is present, and both OLS and random 
effects estimation is used to avoid results that are biased by the 





Table 8.2 Estimation results for effects of bank size on growth in bank assets.  
 OLS OLS OLS Random 
Effects 













     
L.world_rank_by_assets -0.00249*** -0.00255** -0.00325** -0.00348** 
 (0.000744) (0.000955) (0.00136) (0.00152) 
L.size_over_gdp 27.99 5.753 -45.16 -51.47 
 (20.46) (40.78) (44.25) (47.15) 
L.loan_impairments -3.231* -4.427 -3.524 -3.519 
 (1.893) (2.721) (2.542) (2.525) 
L.return_on_assets 1.920 -0.513 -0.0720 -0.0307 
 (1.806) (3.622) (3.984) (3.855) 
L.return_on_equity 0.0997*** 0.0896** 0.0214 0.0189 
 (0.0368) (0.0364) (0.0283) (0.0286) 
L.state_majority_owner   -2.266 -2.953 
   (6.052) (6.049) 
L.mutual_ownership   -7.596 -6.690 
   (13.16) (14.11) 
L.foreign_parent   -10.15 -9.539 
   (11.90) (12.71) 
L.board_size   0.188 0.0843 
   (0.570) (0.586) 
L.director_ratio   -19.35 -20.63 
   (15.26) (15.94) 
L.rem_co   -9.618 -10.90* 
   (6.171) (6.404) 
L.exec_rem_disclosed   6.395 7.292* 
   (3.829) (4.125) 
L.average_pay   95.33*** 96.52*** 
   (29.88) (30.79) 
L.joint_ceo_chairman  6.972 -0.299 -0.573 
  (6.291) (7.762) (7.665) 
L.cro_present_onboard  6.739 5.375 5.887 
  (7.294) (7.883) (8.149) 
L.comm_dir_board  1.610 0.476 0.621 
  (2.316) (2.388) (2.446) 
L.female_ratio  -7.725 3.531 4.261 
  (12.95) (14.35) (14.75) 
L.no_exp_ratio  20.17** 22.90** 24.58** 
  (7.947) (10.09) (10.37) 
L.irb_permission  2.456 6.373 6.202 
  (18.94) (19.26) (20.45) 
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L.exposure_to_banks 3.490 -14.91 -25.71 -26.34 
 (9.325) (9.788) (17.21) (18.79) 
L.securities_holdings 3.412 16.68 -25.85 -22.66 
 (7.930) (15.58) (24.68) (26.81) 
L.advisory_activity -232.3*** -78.76 -126.7 -121.1 
 (80.01) (173.2) (150.2) (155.6) 
L.equity_ratio 143.9** 173.1** 162.7* 174.4** 
 (59.01) (70.67) (82.97) (87.00) 
L.curr_dep_over_liab 4.777 5.896 10.60 10.76 
 (5.406) (7.136) (6.726) (7.460) 
Constant 2.130 -6.608 17.33 17.67 
 (6.259) (10.35) (26.69) (28.10) 
     
Observations 375 308 298 298 
R-squared 0.220 0.258 0.302 0.295 
VIFs 1.30-3.77 1.08-5.70 1.37-9.83 1.37-9.83 
F statistic 25.3 91.2 310.1  
Pr > F <0.001 <0.001 <0.001  
Wald Chi2    17559.1 
Pr > Chi2    <0.001 
F (endo reg) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pr > F endo reg >0.999 >0.999 >0.999 >0.999 
Pr > Breusch-Pagan <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
     
Year dummies included but not shown 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Equation numbers are as stated in the main text above.  Dependent variables are stated at the 
top of columns and explanatory variables in rows.  Equations 8.1 to 8.3 are estimated using OLS, 
while 8.4 is estimated using a panel model with random effects, for comparison purposes.  Estimated 
parameter values are shown along with star symbols for statistical significance.  Clustered standard 
errors are in parentheses, used to deal with the presumed presence of non-spherical error variance.  
VIFs for this set of regressors vary from 1.30 to 9.83, but this has not prevented the detection of 
significant associations or caused sign reversals (shown using shorter equations).  Auxiliary 
regression using residuals as dependent variable shows no empirical evidence of endogeneity for any 
dependent variable.  Pr>Chi2 is the probability of obtaining a Chi2 at least as large as was obtained 
under the null hypothesis that the regression coefficients are all zero.  Pr>F is the probability of 
obtaining an F at least as large as was obtained under the null hypothesis that the regression 
coefficients are all zero.  Pr>F endo reg is the probability of obtaining an F statistic at least as large as 
was obtained in an auxiliary regression of residuals on regressors (a test for endogeneity) under the 
null hypothesis that the auxiliary regression coefficients are all zero.  (Bivariate tests also confirmed 
absence of endogeneity; results not shown.)  Pr>Breusch-Pagan is the probability of obtaining a test 




These results (Table 8.2) indicate that world rank by assets has a negative 
effect on growth in total assets.  Since a lower number for rank corresponds 
to larger size, this is consistent with the hypothesis that larger banks, because 
of implied subsidies, can grow more rapidly.  This has not previously been 
shown empirically. 
It is notable that size over GDP does not have the same effect (even when 
world rank by assets is omitted – results not shown).  This suggests that it is 
relative size, not absolute size, which is important.  This, in turn, is very 
important in terms of the literature discussed in section 8.2.  Specifically, it is 
consistent with the argument of Forrsbaeck (2011) and others that moral 
hazard and implied subsidy are important in banking.  It is inconsistent with 
the arguments of Hughes and Mester (2013), Beccalli et al (2015) and 
Hughes et al (2001) that simple scale is important.  So relative size acting 
through moral hazard matters while absolute size acting through economies 
of scale does not (in this sample). 
Statistically, it is important that the relationship of size over GDP and world 
rank by assets to one another is monotonic but not linear.  This makes it 
possible to separately estimate effects of each, as indicated by the fact that 
VIFs are not extreme. 
It is important not to over-state the importance of the findings I report here.  
They do not refute the fundamental theory of economies of scale.  Rather they 
suggest that most UK banks are operating on a region of the scale curve 
where neither economies of scale nor diseconomies of scale are important.  
These banks are all (or nearly all) large enough that they all realise similar 
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gains from scale but, as noted in the preceding section, no significant number 
of them is so large as to begin experiencing diseconomies of scale.   
In summary, hypothesis H8.3 is rejected while H8.4 is accepted.  This has 




The results I have shown here differ from the existing literature in a number 
of ways.  Firstly, the expected effects of complexity and diversification are 
absent and hypotheses H8.1 and 8.2 are rejected.  Secondly, because 
hypothesis H8.3 is rejected while H8.4 is accepted, I can say that a new effect 
– not previously published – has been found, in which the relative size of 
banks has a positive effect on bank growth whereas absolute size does not.  It 
appears that the largest banks gain competitive advantages through implied 
subsidy effects and then use the proceeds to grow faster.  Neither economies 
nor diseconomies of scale are important in this sample. 
In terms of implications for economic policy, this result is important.  
Specifically, if larger banks grow faster because of effects related to moral 
hazard, and if large banks cause moral hazard and systemic risk, then there 
are problems that can compound themselves over time in a pernicious 
feedback loop. 
This, in turn, suggests a need for policy interventions to counteract the undue 
competitive advantage of larger banks.  Measures that could achieve this goal 
399 
 
include taxes related to size, competition regulations designed to break-up 
large banking groups and Recovery and Resolution Plans (RRPs) designed to 
ensure bank investors bear the cost of bank failure (through pre-emptive 
investment in separate infrastructure for different divisions of the bank, or 
subordinated bonds that convert to equity under distress).  All of these tools 
have been employed by the authorities since the global financial crisis of 
2007-2009. 
By contrast, there is limited evidence that bank diversification or complexity 
should be explicit targets of policy.  Obviously regulators should deal with 
extreme cases (such as if banks have concentrations in one large asset or very 
fragmented internal systems) but these do not generalise to my whole 
sample.  Relative size is the more relevant policy target. 
Taken together with the results of my earlier chapters, I must recommend a 
system in which there are many mutual banks of limited size, limited foreign 
and state ownership, enhanced structures for using information, strong 
remuneration committees and alternative structures in place of certain 







Chapter 9: Conclusions and Policy Implications 
9.1 Introduction 
It is has long been clear that ownership and governance have implications for 
corporate risk and performance, including in banks (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997).  So we can infer that changing standards of governance across the 
banking system might change the level of risk in the economy. 
This is a key motivation for seeking to determine if different kinds of 
ownership and governance structures can improve outcomes for banks.  I 
have found a range of causal effects of bank ownership, governance and size 
on bank-specific risk and performance.  In this final chapter I summarise and 
discuss my results (section 9.2), present policy implications given certain 
normative assumptions (section 9.3), consider limitations of the work 
(section 9.4), and discuss avenues for future research (section 9.5). 
 
9.2 Key Conclusions 
Overall, my work shows that the effects of a particular ownership or 
governance structure can be attributed to the ways in which categories of 
decision-maker are empowered by that structure, and that factors relating to 
information processing capability generally have important effects.  Banks 
have lower return and lower risk when key agents have limited incentives to 
take risk or strong personal accountability to control it, or there are 




The basis of these generalisations can be seen by considering lessons learned 
from my analysis of specific features of ownership and governance.  The 
following sub-sections summarise the key lessons that can be extracted from 
Chapters 4 through 8, in the context of wider debates in the literature. 
 
9.2.1 Bank Risk and Return are Simultaneous 
In Chapter 4, I demonstrate that risk and return measured in the profit and 
loss account of banks are indeed simultaneous on both a same-year basis and 
lagged basis, when measured by loan impairments and return on assets 
respectively.  This is the first time risk-return simultaneity has been 
confirmed and used in a study of bank ownership and governance.  It is 
consistent with the argument of basic finance theory that risk and return are 
generally correlated, and it confirms that this correlation holds despite the 
complexity and opacity of banking.   
I also demonstrated that, if the simultaneity between ROA and loan 
impairments is not taken into account in models where these are the 
dependent variables, biased estimates are obtained for the effects of several 
key features of banks, specifically: state majority ownership, mutual 
ownership, Board size, Joint CEO-Chairman and the presence of a 
Remuneration Committee.  So identifying simultaneity (lagged and unlagged) 
is of interest in its own right and also important for obtaining unbiased 
answers to some of the most important questions in the field of bank 




9.2.2 State Ownership Has Limited Impact 
One recurring question in the literature on corporate ownership and 
governance has been the importance, or otherwise, of ownership by the state, 
a foreign parent or mutual owners (staff or depositors).  Such questions are 
important because they relate to different visions of how to run an economy: 
statist or privatised, globalised or inward-looking, capitalistic or worker-
oriented. 
In Chapter 5, I report robust evidence that state ownership reduces financial 
performance.  Specifically, it lowers loan interest income.  This is consistent 
with the argument that state ownership leads to weaker financial 
performance because social and political goals are prioritised (such as by 
offering soft loans) and managers do not have material direct cash flow 
rights.   
However, my results have important differences from earlier studies.  
Specifically, I find that state majority ownership has far fewer effects than 
expected, in that it does not affect other measures of returns or loan 
impairments.  The difference arises because, unlike earlier studies, I take 
account of the simultaneity of risk and return.  Had I not done so, I would 
have concluded that state majority ownership also increases loan 
impairments, in line with earlier studies. 
So, while state ownership of banks is not financially efficient, it is not as 
inefficient as its critics claim.  It may therefore have some uses in the realm of 
industrial policy where development objectives matter more than bank 




9.2.3 Mutuality Lowers Risk and Return 
In Chapter 5, I also find that mutuality lowers bank risk and performance.  
This is important because it reinforces a thin literature that reached the same 
conclusions. 
My findings represent a more direct test of the effects of mutuality than any 
earlier work.  This is because the UK Building Societies Act, 1986 left limited 
differences between building societies and other banks in terms of business 
activities.  Under this legislation, introduced for reasons of deregulation and 
boosting competition, building societies gained rights to offer unsecured 
loans and cheque accounts, and even to engage in foreign exchange activities, 
provide stock-broking services, manage retail investment funds and arrange 
and advise in respect of insurance.   
Thus, a UK building society differs from other banks only in its mode of 
ownership: it is mutually owned by depositors, rather than being owned by 
shareholders.  So, since virtually all of the mutual banks in the UK are 
building societies, testing the effects of mutuality in this context is freer from 
confounding factors than any of the earlier studies.  It should also be noted 
that, had I not used a simultaneous equations framework, section 4.6 shows 
that I would have concluded that mutual ownership has no robust effects at 




9.2.4 A Foreign Parent Lowers Return with Mixed Effects on Risk 
I also find that a foreign parent lowers banks’ risk and return, but that the 
effect on return leads to a greater probability of failure in crisis periods (such 
that the overall effect on risk is mixed).  This is important because it adds 
some clarity to a literature where there have been contradictory reports on 
the effects of banks being owned by a foreign parent.  
My findings are the first time a particular combination of effects of foreign 
ownership has been found – lowering returns at the same time as lowering 
impairments and increasing the probability of failure.  The first two effects 
are identical to the impact of mutual ownership.  So, because the pattern is 
similar to mutuals where managers have little incentive to take risk in order 
to pursue profit, it suggests that managers in foreign-owned banks have a 
similarly protected position.  This, in turn, suggests that information 
asymmetries between managers and foreign owners dominate over any 
beneficial effects of foreign ownership, such as diversification.  The reason a 
foreign parent has an effect on failure rates while mutual ownership does not 
is that it has a larger negative effect on ROE, which then increases the 
chances of failure during stress periods. 
 
9.2.5 Empowered Accountable CEOs Lower Risk 
One area in which my results depart substantially from established corporate 
governance guidelines, such as the UK Corporate Governance Code 2014, is 
in respect of the roles of an independent CRO and an independent Chairman.  
Specifically, I found in Chapter 6 that an independent CRO and Chairman 
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each cause higher impairments, likely because they lead to confused decision-
making and CEOs perceiving less personal accountability for risk 
management.  This contrasts with governance guidelines which recommend 
having an independent Chairman and CRO. 
 
9.2.6 NEDs and Remuneration Committees Reduce Bank Failure Rates 
I find in Chapter 6 that the presence of a high proportion of NEDs on the 
Board reduces the rate of bank failure.  This is the first time non-executive 
Directors have been reported to affect what is arguably the most socially-
important consequence of bank risk: bank failure.  However, I find no 
evidence that the proportion of non-executive Directors affects any other 
aspect of bank performance or risk. 
In a similar manner, I confirm that the presence of a remuneration 
committee lowers the probability of bank failure.  This suggests that such 
committees are able to structure pay in a way that lowers the most serious 
risks banks face. 
 
9.2.7 Information Processing Capability is Important 
In Chapter 6, I argued that features of banks which represent greater ability 
to process information on risk and return should generally have 
consequences for risk and return.  Such features include the size of the Board, 
the proportion of Directors with relevant financial services experience and 
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having permission to use the IRB framework for credit risk measurement and 
management. 
In the case of Board size, I found that larger Boards lead to stronger 
performance, as measured by Return on Equity, because they entail a greater 
base of skills and experience on which to draw.  In addition, my empirical 
work rules out any nonlinear effect in which very large boards become 
ineffective because accountability is diluted or communication within the 
Board becomes more difficult.   
In the case of Directors’ experience, I found that having a higher proportion 
of Directors with no previous financial services experience leads to higher 
performance but also a higher probability of bank failure, because the 
eventual consequences of pursuit of profit are not adequately understood. 
Finally, I found that IRB permission leads to lower risk and lower return 
because it empowers risk-averse individuals within banks.  This is important 
in that it confirms that the IRB framework can have risk-reducing effects, 
even though some authors have argued that it is ineffective (Haldane, 2013 
and Aikman, 2014).    
It is notable that, although a foreign parent, mutuality and IRB permission 
each reduce both returns and loan impairments, only a foreign parent 
increases the probability of bank failure.  This is because these regressors 
have different effects on ROE, which is crucial for bank solvency: a foreign 
parent has a large negative effect on ROE, mutuality has a small negative 
effect and IRB permission has no effect. 
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My over-arching conclusion here is that structures relating to information 
processing are the one area of corporate governance where I always find 
significant effects and where these effects are not materially inconsistent with 
what regulators expect.  Banks need sufficient Board sizes, Directors with 
suitable experience and rigorous modelling frameworks for assessing risk. 
 
9.2.8 Bank Pay is Determined by Governance not Performance 
In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2009, bank pay was a 
major topic of public debate, to the point where some authors such as Admati 
and Hellwig (2014) argued that it detracted from discussion of more 
fundamental, structural problems in banking.  I therefore sought to identify 
the determinants of bank pay and to evaluate the importance of bank pay 
alongside, and in comparison with, other aspects of bank ownership and 
governance. 
I find that neither return on assets nor a measure containing only the positive 
component of return on assets has any effect on average pay.  This is 
inconsistent with the idea that banks set performance-related pay, and with 
the existence of downward nominal wage rigidity, arising due to the long 
term nature of most wage contracts and behavioural heuristics.  In the case of 
banking, it appears that average pay is rigid in both directions relative to the 
profitability of the organisation overall. 
Similarly, for loan impairments I find no sign of the expected negative impact 
on average pay.  This suggests that the regulatory requirements that risk be 
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taken into account in pay settlements, which has existed since before the 
financial crisis that began in 2007 (Financial Conduct Authority Handbook, 
Systems and Controls Sourcebook, Chapter 19) have not been implemented 
in any widespread way in banking. 
With potentially controversial implications for policy, I find that a 
Remuneration Committee and a high ratio of NEDs on the Board each lead to 
higher pay.  These results accord with the argument that Board-level 
oversight of corporate pay may, because of network effects amongst Directors 
and executives at different firms, not be effective in restraining pay.  It is 
clear that a Remuneration Committee is effective as a tool of risk 
management, but not as a tool of pay restraint. 
Less controversially, I find that disclosure of executive remuneration lowers 
average pay.  This is consistent with the argument that Directors seek to 
preserve reputation because it may have future value for their business 
relationships, such that they grant lower pay awards when these awards will 
be visible, because they do not want to be known for potentially over-
generous payments.  
In the same analysis, I confirm that mutuals have lower average pay than 
other banks while investment banks (as indicated by securities activities) 
have higher pay.  This is not surprising but it is the first time this has been 
shown rigorously. 
Finally, I found that around half of bank pay appears to be outside the control 




9.2.9 Average and Excess Pay have Opposite Effects 
Similarly to the issues discussed in the preceding sub-section, it has been of 
particular interest since the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 to 
determine if bank pay structures have implications for risk and return, and 
whether these issues are important when compared to other structural issues 
in the sector. 
I find that higher average pay leads to faster growth and lower risk, likely 
because of efficiency wage effects.  Bank employees are more effective in 
pursuing growth and minimising risk when they are motivated by a higher 
fixed salary, either because they fear losing this salary or because the 
perception of fairness is intrinsically motivating. 
In addition, I find that higher excess pay in banks (defined as pay beyond that 
which can be explained by factors which are important across banks) leads to 
slower growth and a higher probability of bank failure.  It is likely that this 
occurs because excess pay represents unresolved agency problems and a 
perception by employees that their rewards are unrelated to bank-level 
financial outcomes or structures. 
 
9.2.10 Relative Size is More Important than Absolute Size 
Alongside bank pay, another issue that has received much attention in public 
debate is the size of banks and the issue of “Too Big To Fail” (TBTF) – banks 
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that have grown so large and interconnected that the failure of a single one 
could have severe repercussions for the economy.   
In Chapter 8, I find that greater relative size in banking boosts the growth 
rate of the balance sheet, while greater absolute size does not.  This is 
consistent with the argument that greater relative size entails systemic 
importance and thus a greater expectation of being rescued by government in 
a crisis, such that funding costs are lower and the bank receives an implied 
subsidy. 
It runs contrary to the arguments that absolute size is important in that it 
leads to economies of scale in banking.  It seems clear that economies of scale 
are not important in my sample.  Neither are diseconomies of scale, in that I 
find no adverse impact of the indicators of complexity considered in section 
8.4.  The banks in my data may simply be of a size where most are large 
enough to have achieved fully efficient scale, but few are so large that scale 
leads to inefficiency. 
 
9.2.11 Some Aspects of Governance and Activities Have No Impact 
In any empirical study, information on variables which do not matter can be 
as important as identifying those which do matter; it can refute hypotheses 
previously considered believable.  So I briefly note here some factors that do 
not appear to have any significant impact on bank risk and performance. 
The presence of a Commercial Director as a full Board member has no robust 
impacts.  It is unclear why this might be so, given the distinct incentives 
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associated with the role, but it is an empirical reality.  It is possible that the 
role might carry less influence in practice than bank annual reports suggest. 
Likewise, a greater proportion of female Directors on the Board has no robust 
effects on risk or return.  Rather, there are indications that banks with 
structurally weaker performance may appoint more female Directors.  This 
may be because they wish to distract from weak financial performance by 
doing well in other matters, or because they have assigned greater priority to 
non-financial goals compared other banks (which would manifest as different 
outcomes for finances, diversity and likely other metrics). 
Finally, neither diversification nor bank complexity had any important effects 
in my sample.  It is possible that asset correlations were high enough for 
diversification to have little impact, while, as noted above, most banks in the 
sample may be of a size where neither economies nor diseconomies of scale 
are important.  What is clear is that the finding that diversification is not 
important is consistent with the conclusion in section 5.5 that cross-border 
information asymmetries dominate over putative benefits of international 
diversification in foreign-owned banks. 
 
9.2.12 Context can be Important 
A final lesson I can extract from my results is that particular governance 
structures may have different effects in different contexts.  There is reason to 
believe that this could be so where my results add to a diversity of findings in 
the literature. Specifically, I find that Board size increases returns in my 
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sample, likely because of better use of information, but there are studies 
which show a negative effect in other settings, possibly because these settings 
have features that make it easier for dilution of accountability to occur.  There 
is a complex mix of findings in the literature as to whether a foreign parent 
increases or reduces each of risk and return, suggesting that context-
specificity may matter, even though I identify strong reasons why cross-
border information asymmetries should be the dominant consequence.  
Similarly, I conclude that an independent CRO (like an independent 
Chairman) mainly detracts from clear decision-making and the personal 
accountability of the CEO, but studies with different results may imply that 
there are settings where the independence of the CRO in limiting bad 
decisions dominates over this fact, possibly because other aspects of 
governance are weak in those settings.   
In short, no recommendation relating to any aspect of governance can ignore 
context.  The policy recommendations that follow are therefore firm in the 
case of the UK banking system (which was the sample for my study) and for 
systems similar to the UK (such as other Western economies) but more 
tentative for settings that are very different from the UK. 
 
9.3 Policy Implications 
A major reason that investigators seek to identify relationships between 
economic variables is to inform policy or management decisions.  Lucas 
(1976) pointed out that we should not make policy recommendations solely 
from statistical correlations because these correlations may not represent 
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invariant behavioural patterns and may break down under the pressure of the 
policy itself (the “Lucas critique”).  Instead, we should seek deeper patterns 
verified through correlations (“deep parameters”) and base policy 
recommendations on these.  My work has formulated behavioural hypotheses 
grounded in micro-level studies in the literature and has validated these 
econometrically.  It can therefore be used as the basis of policy 
recommendations. 
I consider banking policy in a context where bank regulation has already 
changed substantially in response to the crisis of 2007-2009.  In the UK, the 
supervisory bodies responsible for regulation have changed, standards 
relating to liquid asset resources and capital requirements have become 
stronger in several respects, new arrangements for dealing with bank failures 
have been introduced, and some adjustments have been made to bank 
governance.  However, changes to bank governance have been incremental 
adjustments within a pre-existing framework and have not extended to re-
consideration of ownership types.  (See Section 2.3 for details.) 
In this section, I draw policy recommendations from my empirical results by 
interpreting them in the context of the relevant financial-policy literature and 
making assumptions relating to which outcomes are desirable and which are 
undesirable.  Specifically, I follow widely-accepted assumptions in the 
literature that loan impairments and bank failure are clearly undesirable 
(with bank failure being worse because of the potential for severe systemic 
effects – e.g. Bernanke, 1983), that provision of investment to the economy is 
clearly desirable (Romer, 2006) and that the desirability of bank profit is 
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ambiguous as we do not know if it is based on efficiency or rent-seeking 
(Stiglitz, 2013).  I treat an increase in profitability as desirable only if there 
are no accompanying adverse impacts and there is reason to believe it occurs 
due to better information processing.  I treat a decline in profitability as less 
important than any other improvement that may accompany it (unless there 
is reason to believe the decline is large enough to affect a bank’s ability to 
survive crisis periods). 
The first policy implication that arises from my work is that, because bank 
risk and return are simultaneous in the same period and at a lag, regulators 
must accept that any policy which seeks to lower bank risk will also have an 
impact on bank ROA.  However, under the assumptions stated in the 
preceding paragraph, it is still reasonable for regulators to have a bias 
towards minimising risk. 
A second policy implication arises from the presence of a simultaneous 
relationship between bank risk and return and the absence of any impact of 
indicators of bank complexity.  Taken together, these suggest that, while 
banking is clearly complex and opaque, it is not so opaque that classical 
market mechanisms cannot operate at all.  So, while studies such as Lo (2011) 
suggesting that controlling complexity in banking should be a priority cannot 
be dismissed entirely, I do not ascribe the same importance to the issue.  
Robustness against shocks, rather than simplicity per se should be the goal of 
bank prudential regulation. 
A third policy recommendation is that, while state majority ownership of 
banks should not be the norm, it is not so inefficient that it should never be 
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considered.  I make this recommendation because my simultaneous-
equations framework shows that the full range of adverse effects identified by 
earlier studies such as Schliefer and Vishny (1997) and Iannotta et al (2007 
and 2012) are not present – and the one impact that is robustly present 
(reduced loan interest income) is of less societal interest than development 
goals.  So, where the criteria for efficient industrial policy identified in works 
such as Esteban et al (2013) and Rodrik (2007) are satisfied, state-owned 
banks should be considered as a tool of such policy, at least until such time as 
the target market failure has been successfully addressed7. 
To improve bank stability, mutual ownership of banks should be more 
widespread.  I find that mutuality lowers the rate of loan impairments (which 
could be important for bank stability and market function) while its only 
negative impact is on bank profitability – which I have argued should be a 
lower policy priority.  In addition, Gupta (2014) argues that mutuals are 
beneficial because they enhance economic democracy and increase the 
alignment between decision-makers and those affected by commercial 
decisions.  Mutuals could be made more widespread through tax incentives 
or some form of public support for their establishment.  
I am forced to argue against widespread foreign ownership of banks on the 
basis that it increases the rate of bank failure, probably through large 
negative effects on return on equity or linkage to other, unstable, economies.  
I make this recommendation because, even though the effects of foreign 
                                                          
7 To avoid any appearance of a conflict of interest in stating this recommendation I should note that, 
at the time of writing, I work for a state-owned bank created to address a market failure – the UK 
Green Investment Bank plc. 
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ownership are otherwise similar to the effects of mutuality in the sense of 
reducing ROA and loan impairments, bank failure entails large social costs.  
If international trade agreements make it impossible to block foreign take-
overs of banks, an alternative could simply be to ensure that stress testing 
takes account of the specific ways in which foreign ownership increases risk, 
such that acquirers who do not wish to bear the cost of mitigating this risk are 
deterred and pre-existing foreign-owned banks are adequately stabilised.  
In terms of governance, regulators should focus on structures to improve 
information processing within banks.  Firms should have large Boards 
populated with a high proportion of NEDs with suitable financial services 
experience.  Regulators already have the power to bring about this outcome 
through the ‘approved persons’ regime.  Meanwhile, IRB or frameworks 
similar to it should be strengthened and extended to more banks.  In order to 
improve the risk-return trade-off systemically, firms should be encouraged to 
use IRB to identify cases where the risk-return pairing of loans is 
anomalously good. 
Other aspects of corporate governance standards require a fundamental re-
think.  Currently, firms are encouraged to have an independent CRO and an 
independent Chairman.  The former is suggested in the FCA Handbook for all 
financial services firms exceeding certain thresholds while the latter is 
required by the UK Corporate Governance Code.  However, I find convincing 
evidence that the real effect of these roles is to increase risk by confusing 
decision-making and diluting the personal accountability of the CEO. 
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This suggests that these roles should be replaced with structures that have 
the same objectives of ensuring transparency and oversight, but which avoid 
confusing decision-making or diluting CEO accountability.  One option could 
be to give the NEDs a dedicated, independent staff with the ability to directly 
monitor all communication, documentation and meetings within the firm.  
An alternative could be to give similar powers to some external monitor, such 
as an audit firm. 
Similarly, while I find there is evidence that a Remuneration Committee is 
effective as a tool of risk management, there is no evidence that it is effective 
as a tool of pay restraint.  If restraining executive pay is a policy objective, 
then other means should be sought to achieve it.  I find evidence that more 
widespread use of executive pay disclosures could help in this regard, 
although it seems unlikely that they could be a full solution.   
In other areas of governance, my recommendations are less controversial: 
high NED ratios and remuneration committees should each be retained as 
effective means of limiting the rate of bank failures.   
Finally, the finding that bank relative size is more important than absolute 
size has interesting policy implications.  I cannot argue that the relative size 
of banks should be reduced – if they were all made smaller some bank would 
still be the biggest.  However, what this finding really points to is that bank 
managers’ and investors’ perception that an institution is systemically 
important can lead to implied subsidy effects.  Specifically, perception of 
systemic importance leads to expectations of bailout in the event of distress, 
leading in turn to lower risk premia in funding costs, cheaper funding and 
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faster growth.  This causes the most important banks to grow larger still – 
increasing the vulnerability of the economy in the event that they fail.  There 
is evidence that systems composed mainly of many small banks can still 
produce contagion and severe crises, such as in the US in the early 1930s 
(Bernanke, 1983), but it nevertheless is advisable to interrupt a feedback loop 
that increases the vulnerability of the economy to the status of specific firms. 
Therefore, measures to reduce the size of the largest banks are justified.  One 
mechanism to achieve this would be competition law: breaking up large 
banks on the grounds that implied subsidies are effectively a gain from anti-
competitive conditions.  Another option would be to tax banks based on 
balance-sheet size or leverage (which is risky in its own right and magnifies 
size).  Another would be to remove tax breaks for debt, which magnify 
borrowing and bank size.  Yet another would be to impose costs through 
comparatively more rigorous Recovery and Resolution Plans for larger and 
more complex firms. 
Taken together, these recommendations amount to proposing a system in 
which mutual banks are numerous, governance focuses on use of 
information, NED oversight and CEO accountability, and there are few state-
owned banks, large banks or foreign banks.  We might call this ‘data-driven 
community banking’.  Based on other literature, state-owned banks should be 
limited to specific industrial-policy roles where private-sector action is 
insufficient to meet societal goals.   
On a macroeconomic level, these recommendations should not be stated with 
too much certainty.  It is possible that general equilibrium effects arise in 
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which effects identified at the bank-specific level are less powerful at the 
macroeconomic level.  For instance, it is conceivable that more widespread 
mutuality could lead to a less dynamic commercial culture (although no real 
evidence has been presented for this argument, only arguments from 
practitioners that may be self-interested).  General equilibrium effects could 
also push in the opposite direction: design of better systems for using 
information within banks could have positive externalities for the economy as 
a whole.  In any case, it is clear that there is an argument for the banking 
system to move some way in the directions I recommend, with monitoring of 
general equilibrium effects along the way. 
How do my recommendations compare, in terms of promise for improving 
banking, to more radical proposals that would involve abolishing the 
fractional reserve system and moving to narrow banking, such as discussed in 
Kobayakawa and Nakamura (2000)?  In the absence of an actually-existing 
narrow banking system from which to draw empirical data, it is impossible to 
compare rigorously.  However, three things are clear.  Firstly, no set of 
reforms focused on governance and ownership can ever completely eliminate 
the possibility of bank runs in a fractional reserve system, although it can 
sharply reduce their probability.  Secondly, the set of potential reforms I 
identify here is broad enough that it has clear potential to yield a system 
much more stable than has existed to date.  Thirdly, a series of incremental 
reforms is easier to implement than a re-design of system fundamentals, but 
at the same time more vulnerable to reversal by vested interests within the 
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system.  So, while I have identified one viable reform package that contains 
some radical elements, more radical possibilities remain a reasonable option. 
 
9.4 Limitations 
One significant limitation of this study is that it has not been possible to 
evaluate the importance of structures relating to internal and external audit 
of banks’ governance and controls.  Corporate governance standards (UK 
Corporate Governance Code 2014) require larger banks to operate an 
independent Audit and/or Risk Committee (ARC) and an independent 
Internal Audit (IA) function.  In addition, recent regulation has instructed 
that external auditors be changed periodically as a means to ensure 
independence (European Parliament and Council, 2014).  However, 
essentially all banks in my data set had an ARC and an IA function and the 
rate of change of external auditors was essentially zero, meaning that there is 
insufficient variation in these factors for econometric evaluation of their 
effects on risk and return.  It should be noted that, because these factors do 
not vary, they cannot cause omitted variables bias.  Instead, any effects they 
may have are absorbed into intercept terms in my models.  
It would be of interest to consider impacts of bank ownership and governance 
on financial crime and wider social, macroeconomic and environmental 
outcomes.  But, compared to measures of bank-specific risk and 
performance, it is more challenging to obtain data on these other dependent 
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variables in a form that can be related to the governance of particular banks, 
so they must be left to future studies. 
It would also be of interest to determine if the parameter estimates I obtain 
for UK data would be similar if the same models were applied to non-UK 
banks.  Given different legal and structural conditions, it is likely that some 
variation in parameter estimates would occur.  However, since the regressors 
used should represent the same incentive structures in any setting (e.g. 
control functions have lower risk-taking incentives than profit centres 
regardless of country) there is no reason to expect fundamentally different 
results.  The study was restricted to the UK in order to avoid combining data 





9.5 Future Research 
The literature considered and the results I present in this thesis suggest a 
number of interesting avenues for future research, not followed as yet.  These 
are briefly discussed below. 
 
9.5.1 Governance 
A number of explanatory variables relating to governance have surprisingly 
non-robust effects in my study.  For instance, my results show only non-
robust evidence that there are effects on risk and return arising from the 
presence of a Commercial Director as a full Board member.  This is very 
surprising given that a role which is explicitly constructed to have highly 
commercial incentives would be expected to sway bank decision-making 
towards greater risk in the pursuit of greater return.  Further investigation of 
why this impact is not present would be desirable. 
This is not likely to be achieved using the current data set.  Except where 
there is reason to believe that the techniques chosen are biased, using more 
advanced econometric methods to find a correlation where none was evident 
previously may well constitute data mining bias.   
Instead, it would be of interest to expand the data set by collecting similar 
data for other time periods or high-income countries to determine if robust 




9.5.2 Gender Balance 
The findings I report in respect of gender suggest further interesting 
questions that I have not pursued because they would take me beyond the 
scope of this thesis.  Specifically, I find that the apparent negative effect on 
ROE of a higher ratio of female Directors disappears when a panel model is 
used, suggesting that some stable, unmeasured feature of banks is associated 
with high female ratios on the Board and also low ROE.  As discussed in 
Chapter 6, it could be that banks with structural financial weakness attempt 
to do well on other metrics, for the sake of their reputation.  Or it could be 
that banks which give greater priority to social goals alongside financial ones 
are both less likely to aggressively pursue profit and more likely to avoid 
gender bias. 
Which of these hypotheses are correct could be resolved using some indicator 
of the extent to which banks prioritise Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR).  
The presence of a dedicated CSR team, or the extent of CSR activities or 
reporting, could serve as such indicators.  If the CSR indicator could explain 
both lower returns and a higher female Director ratio, and if its inclusion in 
models removed the apparent negative effect of the female ratio on ROE, 
then we would have an explanation that non-financial objectives lead to both 
lower profit and greater equality of opportunity.  Alternatively, if we compute 
some indicator of structurally-weak performance (perhaps based on returns 
in the past five years compared to market average) and show that this 
explains both low current profitability and a high female ratio, and that its 
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inclusion removes the apparent effect of the female ratio, then we would 
know that structurally weak banks attempt to look good in other regards. 
 
9.5.3  Credit Growth 
In theory, rapid credit growth may represent bubble conditions or 
uncontrolled lending.  It may thus lead to higher impairments with a lag.  
Most studies examining the lagged effects of credit growth have done so at 
the macroeconomic level.  Only one study (Foos et al, 2010) has done so at 
the bank level.  
To test the hypothesis that credit growth has lagged effects on impairments 
and other outcomes in my sample and modelling framework, I could simply 
use rates of growth of loans (and other forms of credit, perhaps differentiated 
by borrower type) as regressors for bank risk and performance.  This would 
serve to determine if the association reported in earlier theoretical and 
empirical work is robust, which would be of interest for policy-makers 
seeking to manage credit cycles. 
   
9.5.4  Short-Termism 
Some literature suggests that decision-making within firms and banks unduly 
prioritises returns in the short term, particularly when remuneration is based 
on current-period returns and/or stock market valuation is an outcome of 
interest to management (e.g. Chen et al 2015).  However, if decisions 
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excessively prioritise the next financial period, long-term projects may be 
foregone and long-run results may be suboptimal. 
Bankscope data includes variables (senior debt >1 year maturity and total 
long-term funding) that could serve as proxies for a long-termist outlook.  
Banks with long-term funding secured may be able to focus more easily on 
long-term priorities, because they have less need to respond to the priorities 
of short-term investors.  I could employ the regressors mentioned above to 
determine if they lead to better financial outcomes with a lag.  In the 
literature I find no studies which consider the effects of short-termism versus 
long-termism in this way. 
 
9.5.5 Changes in the Effects of Variables 
The literature has not considered changes in the effects of ownership or 
governance structures over time.  One might expect such changes given 
lessons collectively learned (or forgotten) and changing enforcement of 
governance codes in light of market experience.  I could test this possibility 
by considering if the effects of regressors differ in 2003-2007 compared to 
2008-2012 (that is, the periods before and after onset of the Global Financial 
Crisis, which is likely to have changed attitudes of both bank managers and 
regulators).  Changes in sign or significance would not be expected, given that 
the fundamental incentives associated with a given structure do not change, 
but magnitudes of effect could well change. 
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Alongside changes of effects, effects of changes might also be interesting.  
This is because changing a governance structure might send signals to 
employees about which behaviours are preferred – signals that might 
dissipate over time.  This could be examined using lagged first differences of 
governance variables as regressors. 
 
9.6 Closing Remarks  
From my results, it seems that a well-functioning banking system would have 
many mutuals with strong NED oversight, empowered and accountable 
CEOs, and structures designed to maximise the use of information.  It would 
have few large banks or foreign banks, and state-owned banks would exist 
only for well-defined industrial-policy goals.  We might call this system ‘data-
driven community banking’.  I cannot comment, on the basis of available 
empirical evidence, on the likely effectiveness of proposed fundamental 
changes in the nature of money and banking, such as full-reserve banks.  But 
it does seem clear that there is a package of reforms which, within the 
confines of the fractional-reserve system, could materially improve outcomes 








Appendix A: Data Processing Audit 
As discussed in Chapter 3, data processing in this thesis involved merging 
multiple extracts of financial data from Bankscope with one another and 
merging these with governance and ownership data collected by hand, all 
using bank-year as a merge key.  Data processing steps were carried out with 
a very high level of caution to avoid introducing error.  In order to provide 
further assurance that data processing did not introduce error, I carried out a 
sample-based audit of the final processed data set.  This involved selecting an 
arbitrary sample of 50 cells in the data set, consisting of the value of a specific 
variable for a specific bank and year, and re-confirming the values against 
original raw data (either Bankscope or annual reports).  Results obtained are 
as follows. 
Table A.1 Results of Data Processing Audit.   










1 ABN AMRO (Guernsey) 
Limited 
2011 State Majority 
Owner 
1 1 1 




0 0 0 
3 Banc of America 
Securities Limited 
2010 Foreign Parent 1 1 1 
4 Bank Leumi (UK) Plc 2009 Number of 
Executive 
Directors 














5 Bath Investment & 
Building Society BIBS 
2008 Joint CEO 
Chairman 
0 0 0 
6 BMCE Bank International 
Plc 
2008 State Majority 
Owner 
0 0 0 
7 Bradford & Bingley Plc 2006 Cash and 
amounts due 
from banks 
202.6 202.6 203 
8 Britannia Building Society 2005 Residential 
mortgage loans 
19002.5 19002.5 19003 
9 British Arab Commercial 
Bank Plc 
2009 Loans and 
advances to 
banks 
1526 1526 1526 
10 Brown, Shipley & Co 
Limited 
2004 Total assets 725.4 725.4 725 
11 Butterfield Bank 
(Guernsey) Limited 
2011 Total equity 77.0 77.0 77.0 
12 C. Hoare & Co 2011 Cash and 
amounts due 
from banks 
636.5 636.5 637 
13 Cambridge Building 
Society 
2010 Net income 1.00 1.00 1.00 
14 Coventry Building Society 2009 Loan 
impairments 
17.00 17.00 17.00 





971.00 971.00 600 
16 Cumberland Building 
Society 
2007 State Majority 
Owner 


















1 1 1 
18 Derbyshire Building 
Society 
2005 Foreign Parent 0 0 0 
19 Fairbairn Private Bank Ltd 2004 Number of 
Executive 
Directors 
Missing Missing  Missing  
20 FBN Bank (UK) Limited 2011 Joint CEO 
Chairman 
0 0 0 
21 Hanley Economic 
Building Society (The) 
2012 CRO Present on 
Board 
 
0 0 0 
22 HBOS Plc 2006 Corporate and 
commercial 
loans 
140060 140060 140060 
23 Lambeth Building Society 2009 Net Income 2.1 2.1 2 
24 Lazard & Co Holdings 
Limited 




73.3 73.3 73 
25 Lloyds TSB Bank Plc 2005 Loans and 
advances to 
banks 
31655 31655 31655 
26 London Scottish Bank Plc 2006 Total assets 386.5 386.5 387 
27 Market Harborough 
Building Society 














28 Melton Mowbray 
Building Society 
2006 Cash and 
amounts due 
from banks 
0.2 0.2 0.2 
29 Mitsubishi UFJ Securities 
International plc 
2005 Loans and 
advances to 
banks 
446.2 446.2 446 





329.4 329.4 329 
31 Morgan Stanley & Co. 
International Plc 
2012 State Majority 
Owner 
0 0 0 




0 0 0 
33 Newbury Building Society 2010 Number of 
Executive 
Directors 
3 3 3 
34 Newcastle Building 
Society 
2009 Number of 
Executive 
Directors 
5 5 5 
35 Nomura Bank 
International Plc 
2010 Joint CEO 
Chairman 
Missing Missing Missing 
36 Northern Bank Limited 2007 CRO Present on 
Board 
 
Missing Missing Missing 





47.8 47.8 48 
38 Portman Building Society 2005 Residential 
mortgage loans 
13523.2 13523.2 13523.2 
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39 Principality Building 
Society 
2005 Loans and 
advances to 
banks 
49.9 49.9 50 
40 R Raphael & Sons Plc 2009 Total assets 156.3 156.3 156 
41 Rathbone Brothers Plc 2012 Total equity 229.5 229.5 230 
42 Scottish Building Society 2011 Cash and 
amounts due 
from banks 
0.1 0.1 0.1 
43 Swansea Building Society 2010 Net income 1.3 1.3 1.3 




176.6 176.6 177 





317.7 317.7 318 
46 UFJ International Limited 2004 State Majority 
Owner 
0 0 0 
47 Unity Trust Bank Plc 2006 Mutual 
Ownership 
0 0 0 
48 Vernon Building Society 2010 Number of 
Executive 
Directors 














49 Virgin Money Plc 2010 Number of 
Executive 
Directors 
3 3 3 
50 Yorkshire Building 
Society 
2005 Joint CEO 
Chairman 
0 0 0 
Note: I compare values in the final data set used for analysis against both the original extract 
produced at the outset of my thesis research and against values obtained by re-running the same 
searches in Bankscope or annual reports.  Monetary amounts are in £m GBP.  One case where a new 
search of Bankscope yielded a different result from what Bankscope reported initially is highlighted 
in red.  This case is discussed and justified in the text immediately after the table.  No other 
discrepancies were found. 
 
The audit reveals no discrepancies between data used in analysis and the data 
originally extracted at the outset of my research.  This provides robust 
confirmation that no errors were introduced during data processing (which 
was expected since processing was carried out with extreme caution).   
However, the audit does reveal that, in a small minority of cases, extracts for 
the same variable for the same observation can differ in Bankscope extracts 
made at different times.  This is due to accounting re-statements by banks or 
corrections in data-entry errors by the curators of the Bankscope database.  
Such re-statements or corrections are not likely to affect my econometric 
results in a systematic way since a) they occur in a small minority of cases 
and b) re-statements are unlikely to introduce systematic bias.  In addition, 
older results are less likely to be subject to re-statement since errors will 
either have been rectified or forgotten.   
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In addition, since lagging of variables by one year forms an important part of 
my analysis, I confirmed that this operation was performed correctly.  To 
perform the operation I used the time series lag operator in STATA, which 
respects both the calendar and the panel structure of the data.  (For similar 
reasons I used the time series lead operator in missing-value replacement.)  
To verify the correct functioning of the lag operator, I extracted a data set in 
which lagged values had been generated and I confirmed by visual inspection 
that this operation had functioned as intended.  The following table provides 
an example of this audit for two variables for two banks, although the actual 




Table A.2 Confirmation of the correct functioning of the STATA lag operator used in 
generating lagged variables.   










Royal Bank of 
Scotland Group 
Plc 
2004 4.666666508   22.48829651   
Royal Bank of 
Scotland Group 
Plc 
2005 5 4.666666508 20.6911087 22.48829651 
Royal Bank of 
Scotland Group 
Plc 
2006 2.400000095 5 21.75479889 20.6911087 
Royal Bank of 
Scotland Group 
Plc 
2007 2 2.400000095 23.90649986 21.75479889 
Royal Bank of 
Scotland Group 
Plc 
2008 5 2 37.67001724 23.90649986 
Royal Bank of 
Scotland Group 
Plc 
2009 5.5 5 19.69703674 37.67001724 
Royal Bank of 
Scotland Group 
Plc 
2010 5.5 5.5 20.31297302 19.69703674 
Royal Bank of 
Scotland Group 
Plc 
2011 5.5 5.5 21.2951622 20.31297302 
Royal Bank of 
Scotland Group 
Plc 
2012 5 5.5 20.14081573 21.2951622 
Manchester 
Building Society 
2005 2.333333254   15.23719692   
Manchester 
Building Society 
2006 1.399999976 2.333333254 16.61425018 15.23719692 
Manchester 
Building Society 
2007 1.399999976 1.399999976 17.60666656 16.61425018 
Manchester 
Building Society 
2008 1.399999976 1.399999976 20.25213623 17.60666656 
Manchester 
Building Society 
2009 2 1.399999976 20.1137352 20.25213623 
Manchester 
Building Society 
2010 2.333333254 2 19.0575676 20.1137352 
Manchester 
Building Society 
2011 1.5 2.333333254 34.681633 19.0575676 
Note:  values are not rounded because they come from an intermediate analytical step.  In all 




Appendix B: First Stage Regressions 
The following tables show estimation results for first-stage regressions 
employed in 2SLS estimators (see Sections 3.5 and 4.4 for details of this 
estimator and its use).  First-stage equations are estimated by OLS.  There are 
no first-stage equations to show for my multi-equation models using GMM 
because the estimation in this case does not use a multi-stage procedure.  
Model numbers are as per the main text. 
It should be noted that the first-stage equation serves purely to predict a 
value for endogenous terms that is independent of causal effects from other 
endogenous terms, thus permitting estimation of the second stage.  
Therefore, it is not appropriate to interpret parameter sign or significance in 
the first stage.  The only things that matter are that the first stage has 
predictive power and is free from endogeneity.  I therefore present only the 
following diagnostic statistics: R-squared, the F statistic and the F statistic 
from a test for endogeneity that entails an auxiliary regression.  
These tests show that all the equations have predictive power and are free 
from endogeneity.  The latter is expected given the arguments in Section 3.10 
that my explanatory variables should generally be exogenous because of their 




Table B.1 First Stage Regression for Table 4.2 









     
L.growth_total_assets   -0.00482 0.00143 
   (0.00316) (0.00210) 
L.loan_interest_income   -0.0416*** -0.000836 
   (0.00599) (0.00342) 
L.state_majority_owner -0.475 0.151 -1.294*** 0.105 
 (0.449) (0.235) (0.402) (0.265) 
L.mutual_ownership -0.917** -0.336 -0.502 -0.380 
 (0.401) (0.208) (0.371) (0.245) 
L.foreign_parent -0.412 -0.333 -0.578 -0.417* 
 (0.403) (0.213) (0.376) (0.249) 
L.board_size 0.0305 0.00869 0.0792** 0.0108 
 (0.0367) (0.0189) (0.0318) (0.0211) 
L.director_ratio 1.045 -0.538 0.851 -0.570 
 (0.944) (0.501) (0.811) (0.532) 
L.rem_co 0.979*** -0.295 0.948*** -0.222 
 (0.355) (0.190) (0.309) (0.205) 
L.exec_rem_disclosed -0.297 0.115 -0.0941 -0.0140 
 (0.268) (0.141) (0.223) (0.146) 
L.average_pay -2.967** 1.808*** -1.990* 1.247* 
 (1.286) (0.682) (1.090) (0.721) 
L.joint_ceo_chairman -0.241 -0.886*** 0.327 -1.073*** 
 (0.384) (0.194) (0.456) (0.303) 
L.cro_present_onboard -0.307 -0.0996 -0.265 -0.0536 
 (0.442) (0.239) (0.388) (0.257) 
L.comm_dir_board -0.139 0.0244 0.170 -0.0649 
 (0.193) (0.104) (0.160) (0.105) 
L.female_ratio 0.464 -0.175 1.295 -1.013 
 (1.178) (0.629) (0.984) (0.645) 
L.no_exp_ratio 0.159 0.336 0.450 0.379 
 (0.544) (0.284) (0.474) (0.311) 
L.irb_permission -0.452 -0.0871 -0.0551 -0.262 
 (0.376) (0.203) (0.306) (0.202) 
L.exposure_to_banks 1.912** -0.635 4.026*** -1.057** 
 (0.862) (0.405) (0.759) (0.496) 
L.securities_holdings 0.989 -0.931** 2.183*** -0.796 
 (0.883) (0.456) (0.829) (0.545) 
L.advisory_activity -7.530 24.41*** -36.85*** 30.66*** 
 (5.636) (2.902) (7.749) (5.061) 
L.equity_ratio 8.698*** -4.735*** 36.92*** -8.681*** 
 (1.620) (0.646) (2.073) (0.944) 
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L.curr_deposits_over_liab -0.760** 0.537*** -1.613*** 0.735*** 
 (0.367) (0.196) (0.307) (0.202) 
L.size_over_gdp -0.0589 0.152 -0.130 0.232 
 (0.439) (0.230) (0.370) (0.245) 
Constant -1.084 1.008** -3.306*** 1.290** 
 (0.935) (0.490) (0.837) (0.541) 
     
Observations 403 431 303 311 
R-squared 0.352 0.466 0.737 0.522 
F statistic 7.3 12.6 26.4 10.6 
Pr > F <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Pr > F endo reg >0.999 >0.999 >0.999 >0.999 
Year dummies included but not shown 
Clustered errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Pr>F is the probability of obtaining an F at least as large as was obtained under the null 
hypothesis that the regression coefficients are all zero.  Pr>F endo reg is the probability of obtaining 
an F statistic at least as large as was obtained in an auxiliary regression of residuals on regressors (a 





Table B.2 First Stage Regression for Table 5.6 









     
L.state_majority_owner -1.421*** 0.0217 -1.294*** 0.105 
 (0.374) (0.236) (0.402) (0.265) 
L.mutual_ownership -0.281 -0.451** -0.502 -0.380 
 (0.367) (0.229) (0.371) (0.245) 
L.foreign_parent -0.326 -0.366* -0.578 -0.417* 
 (0.321) (0.201) (0.376) (0.249) 
L.growth_total_assets -0.00453 0.00194 -0.00482 0.00143 
 (0.00321) (0.00205) (0.00316) (0.00210) 
L.loan_interest_income -0.0401*** -0.000858 -0.0416*** -0.000836 
 (0.00614) (0.00338) (0.00599) (0.00342) 
L.board_size   0.0792** 0.0108 
   (0.0318) (0.0211) 
L.director_ratio   0.851 -0.570 
   (0.811) (0.532) 
L.rem_co   0.948*** -0.222 
   (0.309) (0.205) 
L.exec_rem_disclosed   -0.0941 -0.0140 
   (0.223) (0.146) 
L.average_pay   -1.990* 1.247* 
   (1.090) (0.721) 
L.joint_ceo_chairman 0.304 -1.060*** 0.327 -1.073*** 
 (0.459) (0.294) (0.456) (0.303) 
L.cro_present_onboard -0.479 0.0592 -0.265 -0.0536 
 (0.353) (0.226) (0.388) (0.257) 
L.comm_dir_board 0.235 -0.0330 0.170 -0.0649 
 (0.156) (0.0987) (0.160) (0.105) 
L.female_ratio 1.732* -1.292** 1.295 -1.013 
 (0.983) (0.617) (0.984) (0.645) 
L.no_exp_ratio 0.683 0.423 0.450 0.379 
 (0.441) (0.280) (0.474) (0.311) 
L.irb_permission 0.0321 -0.240 -0.0551 -0.262 
 (0.309) (0.196) (0.306) (0.202) 
L.exposure_to_banks 3.342*** -0.912** 4.026*** -1.057** 
 (0.733) (0.458) (0.759) (0.496) 
L.securities_holdings 1.366** -0.206 2.183*** -0.796 
 (0.628) (0.396) (0.829) (0.545) 
L.advisory_activity -30.00*** 30.32*** -36.85*** 30.66*** 
 (7.653) (4.801) (7.749) (5.061) 
L.equity_ratio 37.72*** -8.866*** 36.92*** -8.681*** 
 (2.034) (0.862) (2.073) (0.944) 
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L.curr_deposits_over_liab -1.831*** 0.758*** -1.613*** 0.735*** 
 (0.295) (0.186) (0.307) (0.202) 
L.size_over_gdp 0.536 0.0990 -0.130 0.232 
 (0.352) (0.223) (0.370) (0.245) 
Constant -1.391** 0.769** -3.306*** 1.290** 
 (0.594) (0.365) (0.837) (0.541) 
     
Observations 305 314 303 311 
R-squared 0.712 0.514 0.737 0.522 
F statistic 28.9 12.7 26.4 10.6 
Pr > F <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Pr > F endo reg >0.999 >0.999 >0.999 >0.999 
Year dummies included but not shown 
Clustered errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Pr>F is the probability of obtaining an F at least as large as was obtained under the null 
hypothesis that the regression coefficients are all zero.  Pr>F endo reg is the probability of obtaining 
an F statistic at least as large as was obtained in an auxiliary regression of residuals on regressors (a 





Table B.3 First Stage Regression for Table 6.2 









     
L.board_size 0.0892*** 0.00779 0.0951*** -0.00479 
 (0.0295) (0.0211) (0.0299) (0.0213) 
L.director_ratio -1.122 0.0127 -114.4** 51.35 
 (0.896) (0.634) (46.09) (32.60) 
L.joint_ceo_chairman 0.428 -1.102*** 0.531 -1.249*** 
 (0.423) (0.302) (0.422) (0.301) 
L.cro_present_onboard -0.200 -0.0737 -0.144 -0.164 
 (0.359) (0.257) (0.358) (0.254) 
L.comm_dir_board -0.0279 -0.00483 0.0764 -0.0714 
 (0.156) (0.111) (0.158) (0.112) 
L.female_ratio 0.813 -0.865 0.815 -1.062 
 (0.918) (0.649) (0.915) (0.645) 
L.no_exp_ratio -0.0374 0.527 -0.0232 0.540* 
 (0.455) (0.322) (0.449) (0.317) 
L.low_ned -2.085*** 0.621* -2.965*** 0.728 
 (0.518) (0.370) (0.723) (0.513) 
L.growth_total_assets -0.00198 0.000586 -0.00153 0.000235 
 (0.00301) (0.00215) (0.00297) (0.00212) 
L.loan_interest_income -0.0440*** -0.000261 -0.0456*** 0.000980 
 (0.00557) (0.00342) (0.00552) (0.00338) 
L.state_majority_owner -1.173*** 0.0687 -0.836** -0.334 
 (0.373) (0.265) (0.404) (0.287) 
L.mutual_ownership -0.469 -0.388 -0.362 -0.444* 
 (0.344) (0.244) (0.342) (0.241) 
L.foreign_parent -0.211 -0.524** -0.186 -0.563** 
 (0.360) (0.257) (0.355) (0.252) 
L.rem_co 0.873*** -0.200 0.945*** -0.286 
 (0.286) (0.205) (0.285) (0.203) 
L.exec_rem_disclosed -0.0921 -0.0140 -0.151 0.0538 
 (0.206) (0.146) (0.205) (0.145) 
L.average_pay -1.925* 1.227* -1.164 0.424 
 (1.009) (0.718) (1.050) (0.744) 
L.irb_permission -0.0445 -0.264 -0.0531 -0.248 
 (0.283) (0.201) (0.279) (0.198) 
L.exposure_to_banks 4.438*** -1.175** 4.651*** -1.455*** 
 (0.709) (0.499) (0.711) (0.499) 
L.securities_holdings 2.376*** -0.849 2.283*** -0.822 
 (0.769) (0.544) (0.759) (0.535) 
L.advisory_activity -32.30*** 29.24*** -30.10*** 27.28*** 
 (7.256) (5.116) (7.210) (5.060) 
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L.equity_ratio 37.49*** -8.780*** 37.71*** -8.952*** 
 (1.923) (0.943) (1.899) (0.928) 
L.curr_deposits_over_liab -1.440*** 0.682*** -1.546*** 0.732*** 
 (0.287) (0.204) (0.287) (0.202) 
L.size_over_gdp -0.118 0.229 -0.179 0.334 
 (0.342) (0.245) (0.342) (0.243) 
L.director_ratio_sq   166.2** -83.64* 
   (64.56) (45.65) 
L.director_ratio_cu   -79.61*** 43.83** 
   (29.79) (21.07) 
Constant -1.937** 0.868 23.07** -8.864 
 (0.846) (0.595) (10.86) (7.682) 
     
Observations 303 311 303 311 
R-squared 0.750 0.527 0.757 0.547 
F statistic 27.4 10.4 26.3 10.5 
Pr > F <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Pr > F endo reg >0.999 >0.999 >0.999 >0.999 
Year dummies included but not shown 
Clustered errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Pr>F is the probability of obtaining an F at least as large as was obtained under the null 
hypothesis that the regression coefficients are all zero.  Pr>F endo reg is the probability of obtaining 
an F statistic at least as large as was obtained in an auxiliary regression of residuals on regressors (a 





Table B.4 First Stage Regression for Table 6.5 









     
L.board_size 0.0975*** -0.00705 0.0883*** 0.00762 
 (0.0312) (0.0209) (0.0306) (0.0207) 
L.director_ratio -109.7** 47.03 -1.062 0.0234 
 (47.61) (31.85) (0.876) (0.584) 
L.director_ratio_sq 159.1** -77.20*   
 (66.49) (44.47)   
L.director_ratio_cu -76.27** 40.79**   
 (30.65) (20.50)   
L.low_ned -3.167*** 0.623 -2.246*** 0.555 
 (0.847) (0.567) (0.609) (0.411) 
L.cumul_gov -0.170 -0.140 -0.191 -0.0720 
 (0.374) (0.251) (0.374) (0.253) 
L.cro_or_chair -0.359 1.386*** -0.237 1.174*** 
 (0.591) (0.398) (0.586) (0.397) 
L.female_ratio 0.849 -1.092* 0.801 -0.868 
 (0.965) (0.642) (0.965) (0.646) 
L.no_exp_ratio -0.0640 0.580* -0.0221 0.530* 
 (0.467) (0.311) (0.470) (0.315) 
L.growth_total_assets -0.00142 0.000133 -0.00203 0.000578 
 (0.00313) (0.00211) (0.00315) (0.00214) 
L.loan_interest_income -0.0454*** 0.000975 -0.0440*** -0.000258 
 (0.00583) (0.00338) (0.00586) (0.00342) 
L.state_majority_owner -0.815* -0.352 -1.185*** 0.0667 
 (0.425) (0.285) (0.386) (0.261) 
L.mutual_ownership -0.378 -0.431* -0.464 -0.387 
 (0.360) (0.240) (0.361) (0.243) 
L.foreign_parent -0.182 -0.567** -0.213 -0.525** 
 (0.376) (0.252) (0.379) (0.256) 
L.rem_co 0.939*** -0.281 0.874*** -0.200 
 (0.301) (0.202) (0.302) (0.204) 
L.exec_rem_disclosed -0.143 0.0466 -0.0943 -0.0143 
 (0.217) (0.144) (0.217) (0.145) 
L.average_pay -1.158 0.415 -1.937* 1.225* 
 (1.111) (0.743) (1.060) (0.715) 
L.irb_permission -0.0523 -0.250 -0.0447 -0.264 
 (0.295) (0.198) (0.298) (0.201) 
L.exposure_to_banks 4.617*** -1.427*** 4.449*** -1.174** 
 (0.748) (0.496) (0.745) (0.497) 
L.securities_holdings 2.234*** -0.773 2.397*** -0.845 
 (0.796) (0.529) (0.801) (0.537) 
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L.advisory_activity -29.70*** 26.94*** -32.48*** 29.21*** 
 (7.578) (5.026) (7.569) (5.060) 
L.equity_ratio 37.64*** -8.927*** 37.52*** -8.779*** 
 (2.002) (0.926) (2.021) (0.941) 
L.current_dep_over_liabs -1.546*** 0.734*** -1.438*** 0.682*** 
 (0.303) (0.202) (0.303) (0.203) 
L.size_over_gdp -0.191 0.344 -0.113 0.230 
 (0.361) (0.242) (0.359) (0.243) 
Constant 22.81** -9.106 -1.377 -0.172 
 (11.33) (7.582) (1.093) (0.730) 
     
Observations 303 311 303 311 
R-squared 0.757 0.546 0.750 0.527 
F statistic 27.1 10.8 28.3 10.8 
Pr > F <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Pr > F endo reg >0.999 >0.999 >0.999 >0.999 
Year dummies included but not shown 
Clustered errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Pr>F is the probability of obtaining an F at least as large as was obtained under the null 
hypothesis that the regression coefficients are all zero.  Pr>F endo reg is the probability of obtaining 
an F statistic at least as large as was obtained in an auxiliary regression of residuals on regressors (a 




Table B.5 First Stage Regression for Table 6.10 





   
L.growth_total_assets -0.0160*** 0.00468** 
 (0.00425) (0.00216) 
L.loan_interest_income -0.0377*** 0.00529 
 (0.00813) (0.00331) 
L.state_majority_owner -1.225** 0.0891 
 (0.541) (0.272) 
L.mutual_ownership -1.396*** -0.203 
 (0.497) (0.252) 
L.foreign_parent -1.169** -0.290 
 (0.508) (0.259) 
L.board_size 0.0882** 0.0122 
 (0.0441) (0.0226) 
L.director_ratio 1.331 -0.591 
 (1.086) (0.550) 
L.rem_co 0.896** -0.153 
 (0.416) (0.212) 
L.exec_rem_disclosed -0.219 -0.0568 
 (0.299) (0.151) 
L.average_pay -0.493 0.383 
 (1.124) (0.572) 
L.joint_ceo_chairman 0.0680 -0.946*** 
 (0.603) (0.309) 
L.cro_present_onboard 0.0402 -0.133 
 (0.498) (0.255) 
L.comm_dir_board 0.0154 -0.0543 
 (0.215) (0.110) 
L.female_ratio -0.0789 -0.718 
 (1.315) (0.666) 
L.no_exp_ratio -0.0424 0.430 
 (0.635) (0.321) 
L.irb_permission 0.254 -0.561* 
 (0.663) (0.339) 
L.big_and_irb -0.689 0.446 
 (0.834) (0.427) 
L.exposure_to_banks 2.417** -0.741 
 (0.998) (0.497) 
L.advisory_activity -24.37** 30.30*** 
 (10.41) (5.252) 
L.equity_ratio 20.69*** -7.656*** 
 (2.420) (0.810) 
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L.current_deposits_over_liabs -1.323*** 0.775*** 
 (0.418) (0.212) 
L.size_over_gdp -0.236 0.0946 
 (0.509) (0.260) 
   
Constant -1.272 0.749 
 (1.120) (0.580) 
   
Observations 306 316 
R-squared 0.508 0.540 
F statistic 9.8 11.6 
Pr > F <0.001 <0.001 
Pr > F endo reg >0.999 >0.999 
Year dummies included but not shown 
Clustered errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Pr>F is the probability of obtaining an F at least as large as was obtained under the null 
hypothesis that the regression coefficients are all zero.  Pr>F endo reg is the probability of obtaining 
an F statistic at least as large as was obtained in an auxiliary regression of residuals on regressors (a 
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